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DE RUEHFR #2827/01 1830741
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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8635
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1284

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002827 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (CHANGED SUBJECT) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/13/2017 
TAGS: PGOV FR LE UNSC PREL
SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' JULY 13 MEETING WITH SARKOZY DIPLOMATIC 
ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LEVITTE 
 
PARIS 00002827  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) June 13, 2007, 3:00 P.M. 
 
¶2. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
Under Secretary Burns 
Ambassador Stapleton 
Political Minister-Counselor Rosenblatt 
P Staff Bame 
Poloff Waller (notetaker) 
 
France 
Amb. Jean-David Levitte, Diplomatic Advisor to the President 
Francois Richier, Counselor for Strategic Affairs 
Damien Loras, Counselor for the Americas 
 
¶3. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting that centered on Kosovo, Lebanon 
and Iran, U/S Burns: locked in a French commitment to join 
the U.S. in recognizing Kosovo's independence if an 
additional four to six months of dialogue fails to produce a 
breakthrough; expressed disappointment with France's failure 
to consult Washington before launching FM Kouchner's Lebanon 
dialogue initiative; urged the French to carefully select the 
dialogue's participants; noted the need to address the 
divergence in U.S. and French views on Hizballah; and urged 
Levitte not to reward Syria until Damascus took positive 
actions in the region.  He welcomed France's decision not to 
reduce its military commitment in Afghanistan and encouraged 
the French to establish a PRT.  He delivered a particularly 
strong message on the need to get serious about sanctions 
against Iran.  In response, Levitte said President Sarkozy 
was maintaining "exactly the same line" on Lebanon as Chirac, 
albeit with the "nuance" of no longer being allied with "one 
family" (i.e., the Hariris).  Levitte said Sarkozy had not 
decided whether to proceed on a dialogue with Syria; Levitte 
promised to call Burns as soon as a decision is made.  He 
emphasized that France wants to see a change of Syrian 
behavior, but not of the regime.  On Afghanistan, France will 
likely not establish a PRT, although a final decision hasn't 
been taken; Sarkozy is looking for other ways to make quick, 
visible contributions to reconstruction.  On Iran, Levitte 
agreed on the need for unofficial sanctions, but said that 
"it would be disastrous" for Congress to sanction European 
companies doing business with Iran.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶4. (C) Burns noted that the Secretary was prepared to move 
forward on the basis of President Sarkozy's proposal for 
renewed dialogue, provided that the EU would join with 
Washington in supporting Kosovo's independence at the end of 
that dialogue if the parties remained polarized.  Burns then 
reviewed next steps, including what to do if Russia continued 
to refuse to engage at the UN. 
 
¶5. (C) In turn, Levitte sketched four possible scenarios. 
The best case, he said, would be for the new UNSCR to pass 
with Russia's support, but this clearly would not happen. 
The next best outcome would be to pass an alternative 
resolution that paved the way for renewed negotiations 
between the parties (while leaving the ultimate outcome 
vague), with a Russian abstention.  The third best scenario 
would be to abandon the effort to pass a new resolution at 
this time, and instead move directly to renewed negotiations. 
 
 
¶6. (C) Finally, Levitte said it was imperative, from a 
European perspective, not to push the Russians into a veto 
that would destroy the international legal basis for Kosovo's 
independence and for the French and other foreign military 
presence there.  "Our worst-case scenario would be to act 
illegally after a veto," said Levitte, insisting it would be 
better to proceed without a new resolution at all then to 
proceed over Moscow's veto.  He added that France's legal 
advisors were creative enough to cobble together a 
justification for recognizing Kosovo's independence on the 
basis of existing UNSCRs. 
 
¶7. (C) Burns pointed out that the U.S. did not necessarily 
agree that a Russian veto would be a "worst case scenario," 
but reaffirmed Washington's willingness to move forward on 
the basis of the Sarkozy proposal in order to remain united. 
Burns said he wanted to make sure he understood Levitte's 
position clearly: If the additional negotiations failed to 
produce an agreement, would France find a way to recognize 
Kosovo's independence?  "Yes, absolutely," said Levitte, who 
 
PARIS 00002827  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
indicated that he would prepare a note for President Sarkozy 
in order to get his approval in writing.  He characterized 
Sarkozy's position as "everything is negotiable so long as 
Kosovo achieves independence in the end."  Levitte predicted 
that, of the other EU states, Germany and Spain would be the 
most difficult to bring along. 
 
Lebanon 
------- 
 
¶8. (C) Turning to Lebanon, Burns said it would have been nice 
to have known of Kouchner's plans for a national dialogue in 
advance.  Levitte dodged by saying he believed Ambassador 
Emie had taken care of that.  Levitte added that "Sarkozy is 
maintaining exactly the same line (as Chirac) with one slight 
nuance: France will no longer be linked exclusively to one 
family or clan." 
 
¶9. (C) Warming to this theme, Levitte said that France "was 
traditionally the friend of all of Lebanon's citizens," not 
of any given community.  Consequently, the French would not 
try to divide Lebanon's complex society into "good Lebanese" 
and "bad Lebanese." 
 
¶10. (C) The passage of UNSCR 1757 has put Damascus in a 
corner, Levitte continued.  Syria sees a last chance to 
escape by creating chaos in Lebanon, both to prevent the 
election of a new Lebanese president and to bring the 
Brammertz investigation to a standstill "because Lebanon will 
be such a mess."  Syria has given huge quantities of arms to 
Sunni extremists as well as to Hizballah, turning Lebanon 
into a powder keg waiting to explode.  Our joint goal, 
Levitte purred, is to do whatever we can to stop the chaos. 
France does not imagine that FM Kouchner's proposed dialogue 
will solve Lebanon's problems, but hopes that it will restore 
dialogue.  Paris will invite participants to think about "the 
future of the Lebanese state -- how can we make it work?" 
Levitte confirmed that Hizballah would be represented, albeit 
at a low level. 
 
¶11. (C) Inasmuch as France appeared determined to proceed 
with FM Kouchner's dialogue initiative despite U.S. 
reservations, Burns noted that some of the names floated as 
prospective participants would be inappropriate.  He urged 
Levitte to ensure that the right Lebanese were invited to 
participate in the dialogue.  He also underscored that the 
U.S. and France have differing views of Hizballah, and 
suggested that Levitte be briefed by Israeli Deputy Prime 
Minister Shaul Mofaz on the capabilities of Hizballah's 
Iranian-supplied missiles.  Levitte said he would meet Mofaz 
soon.  Burns noted the need to refrain from taking actions 
that might strengthen Hizballah, as well as the need to 
cooperate on the renewal of UNIFIL's mandate and to tighten 
control of the Syrian-Lebanese border. 
 
Syria 
----- 
 
¶12. (C) On Syria, Levitte said France seeks a change of 
behavior -- on Lebanon, terrorism and Iraq -- but not regime 
change.  The French message to Damascus is simple: Syria can 
have five more years of Chirac (i.e., no dialogue) or, change 
its policy and enjoy five years of Sarkozy (i.e., dialogue). 
 
¶13. (C) Burns urged that France not reward Damascus until the 
Syrians take positive action.  Levitte agreed, and stressed 
that Sarkozy has not yet decided whether to proceed.  "We'll 
have a dialogue with Syria only if we think it will help to 
calm down the situation in Lebanon and avoid an explosion," 
said Levitte.  In any event, he assured Burns that the French 
would be transparent with Washington.  "I'll call you as soon 
as a decision is taken," Levitte promised.  (NB: This 
exchange took place before news of the assassination of 
Lebanese MP Walid Eido reached either party.) 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶14. (C) Burns informed Levitte that there appeared to be 
little hope that Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani 
would accept suspension.  U/S Burns and French MFA PolDir 
Gerard Araud would therefore exchange proposed elements for a 
third UNSCR.  U/S Burns noted that while a third and perhaps 
even a fourth UNSCR would be good for the sake of unity, they 
would likely prove insufficient to bring the Iranians to the 
negotiating table.  It was therefore critical that the EU and 
Japan consider more meaningful sanctions outside of a UN 
context.  Much more could be done to restrict commerce and 
export credits.  U/S Burns emphasized that if the world 
 
PARIS 00002827  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
wanted tough diplomacy to succeed (in lieu of a military 
option), then it was time to get serious on sanctions. 
 
¶15. (C) Levitte said it was important to have a third 
sanctions resolution as soon as possible.  "We should not 
assume that Russia and China will water it down; let's be 
ambitious and they may surprise us," he said.  He voiced his 
complete agreement on the importance of voluntary economic 
sanctions, and noted that French banks had reduced their ties 
to Iran by over 50 percent in the past twelve months.  He 
predicted that number would continue to shrink in the months 
ahead.  He also noted that the French energy giant Total has 
decided against pursuing any major investments in Iran at 
this time.  He said France was prepared to consider further 
options, but said it was important not to publicly discuss 
such possibilities so as not to undermine the case for 
additional UNSC sanctions.  "Let's be efficient but 
discreet," said Levitte. 
 
¶16. (C) Levitte said it would be "a disaster" if Congress 
were to impose sanctions on European companies doing business 
with Iran.  Burns assured him that the Administration's 
position was that sanctions should be targeted against Iran 
and not against Europe, but he acknowledged that the 
political pressure on the Hill for tougher measures was real. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶17. (C) Levitte emphasized that, as Sarkozy had already 
informed President Bush, the new French government would not 
reduce its military presence in Afghanistan and would instead 
increase its training efforts by deploying an additional 150 
embedded trainers to assist the Afghan army.  "We'll stay (in 
Afghanistan), we'll remain engaged, and we'll show solidarity 
with our allies," said Levitte.  He added that President 
Sarkozy has tasked his advisors with developing a menu of 
options for making a concrete contribution to Afghanistan's 
reconstruction.  Burns seized the opportunity to encourage 
France to lead a PRT, noting that France was the only NATO 
member not participating in a PRT.  Levitte did not 
completely rule out the possibility, but emphasized that 
Sarkozy preferred to take a sector-based approach to 
reconstruction rather than a geographic approach.  The new 
French President wants options for doing something "quick and 
visible" in a field where the French could make a difference 
and demonstrate their value-added (e.g., using a French NGO 
to build a modern hospital). 
 
Sarkozy Visit to Washington 
--------------------------- 
 
¶18. (C) Levitte said that Sarkozy hoped to visit Washington 
on September 26, and that he would welcome an opportunity to 
address the Congress. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON