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DE RUEHMK #0669/01 2000658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 190658Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7032
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1339
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0950
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1002
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 MANAMA 000669 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2032 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR ETRD ECON BA POL OFFICIALS
SUBJECT: FUTURE OF BAHRAIN: AMBASSADOR'S PARTING THOUGHTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe.  Reason: 1.4 (B)(D) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) Bahrain faces numerous challenges as it attempts to 
deal with transitional issues of economic development and 
political reform.  Because the country's Sunni-Shia sectarian 
divide so dominates the local landscape, the path forward is 
potentially more treacherous for Bahrain's leadership than 
for the rulers of other GCC countries.  The sectarian issue 
affects much of what the USG is trying to do in Bahrain, most 
notably our freedom agenda, as seen in the NDI saga, and our 
counterterrorism cooperation. It is also a factor in the 
country's shift to a more socially and religiously 
conservative society; although King Hamad and the Al-Khalifas 
are generally moderate and secular in outlook, the King has 
made a political calculation to ally with Sunni Islamists in 
Parliament in the face of Shia opposition. A key factor for 
Bahrain as it deals with the many challenges it confronts in 
a complex regional environment will be the quality of its 
leadership.  Like Bahrain itself, the royal family is going 
through a period of transition, from the traditional tribal 
leadership of the Prime Minister to the modern, technocratic 
approach of the Crown Prince, who while waiting in the wings 
is managing economic reform.  The King himself is the 
transition from the old to the new.  With sectarian tensions 
in the region rising and disaffected Shia youth willing and 
ready to challenge the regime, there is a harder edge to the 
sectarian divide that may cause increasing problems for the 
ruling family.  The betting here, however, is that Bahrain's 
"shock absorbers" are sufficiently strong to give the 
government the space it needs to implement economic reforms 
and improve the well-being of its people. In this context, 
the U.S.-Bahrain relationship remains strong: trade ties have 
been bolstered significantly with the FTA; the U.S. Navy 
presence remains welcomed and has been strengthened by 
Bahrain's decision to join the coalition; Bahrain's new 
Parliament offers promising prospects for more engagement; 
and CT cooperation has improved since the government's 
mishandling of six Sunni terror suspects in 2004 precipitated 
the departure of Navy dependents. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
BILATERAL RELATIONS -- STRONG AND BROADENING 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  As I get set to depart after three years as 
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain, the U.S. relationship 
with this small island country is strong, healthy, and 
broadening. Despite continuing negative local press coverage 
and editorializing about U.S. policies in the region, support 
for the U.S. Navy presence and base in Bahrain remains 
generally strong and has weathered the departure of all Navy 
dependents in 2004.  In fact, the Navy's relationship with 
Bahrain has been strengthened by Bahrain's decision to join 
the coalition and participate actively in CTF-150 and 
CTF-152.  The trade relationship has been bolstered 
significantly by the implementation of the free trade 
agreement.  Trade is expanding rapidly, the newly-formed 
American Chamber (Amcham) in Bahrain is growing and making 
itself known as an active presence in Bahrain, and the 
U.S.-Bahrain Business Council made a big local splash with 
its initial trade mission to Bahrain in May. 
 
¶3. (S)  Our freedom agenda took a hit with the closure of 
NDI's office in June 2006, but NDI is starting to resume 
programming and, following the broader participation of Shia 
oppositionists in the November parliamentary elections, 
prospects look promising for more robust engagement with 
politicians and civil society.  The government's current 
focus on education is a natural for us, offering 
opportunities for enhanced programming.  The government's 
handling of the six Sunni terrorist suspects, whose abrupt 
release precipitated the 2004 departure of the Navy 
dependents, remains a reminder of the difficulty of actually 
prosecuting Sunni extremists in Bahrain, but CT cooperation 
has since improved and, by Gulf standards, is good and 
collaborative.  To date, the government has largely succeeded 
in neutralizing the small number of Sunni extremists of 
concern to us.  On the regional diplomatic front, new Foreign 
Minister Shaikh Khalid has proven to be a supportive voice, 
especially on the Israeli-Palestinian question, and the 
government is essentially like-minded on Iraq, Iran, and 
Lebanon.  But Bahrain, small as it is and with a constant eye 
 
MANAMA 00000669  002 OF 007 
 
 
on neighboring Saudi Arabia, will never be a leading player 
in the region on key foreign policy issues. 
 
------------------------ 
PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (C) Bahrain, like many countries in the region, is at a 
bit of a crossroads as it struggles to deal with critical 
issues of economic development and democratic reform. 
Because it does not have the oil wealth of its Gulf neighbors 
and because its Sunni-Shia sectarian divide so dominates the 
economic and political reform debate, the path forward is 
potentially more treacherous for Bahrain's leadership than 
for the rulers of other GCC countries.  There is no 
indication that the Al-Khalifas will not be able to chart the 
course ahead in a positive, stable way or that U.S. interests 
will be threatened.  But the challenges ahead will require 
good leadership.  And regional developments, especially in 
Iran and Iraq, will have an impact.  If developments in Iraq 
and Iran move in a way that further exacerbates sectarian 
tensions, the path forward in Bahrain will be all that more 
daunting. 
 
¶5. (C) Bahrain is facing the same challenges that many 
countries in the region are facing, including pressures for 
democratic reform, the need to develop and reform the 
economy, rising Islamic extremism, sectarian tensions, and 
security threats.  How the royal family and government deal 
with these challenges will say much about Bahrain and its 
future. 
 
----------------- 
DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) King Hamad has taken important first steps in 
launching Bahrain on the road of democratic reform.  His 
approach of gradual steps with safeguards to protect the 
minority Sunnis (and ruling Sunni royal family) has critics, 
both from Sunni conservatives who think he has moved too fast 
and Shia activists who have little trust in the ruling family 
or its intentions.  On the positive side, the King succeeded 
in drawing the largest Shia opposition group -- Al-Wifaq 
--into the parliament, and political discourse and press 
reporting is as lively and open as it has ever been. 
Parliament, while still finding its way, is playing an 
increasingly important oversight role.  The press, especially 
Shia-oriented Al-Wasat, has successfully raised sensitive 
issues of concern ranging from environmental damage to royal 
family behavior. 
 
¶7. (C) At the same time, however, the current system is 
flawed, most notably through a gerrymandered electoral map 
designed, at least for now, to keep the Shia majority 
population from gaining control of the elected parliament. 
The King says that his ultimate goal is to create a 
constitutional monarchy where the royal family plays a 
paternal role as protector of all Bahrainis, Shia and Sunni 
alike.  Whether he succeeds hinges on two questions.  First, 
in the short run, will the King and the Sunni-controlled 
government allow Al-Wifaq enough parliamentary successes so 
that it can justify its decision to join the Parliament and 
win the battle for the hearts and minds of the broader Shia 
population?  Al-Wifaq already faces stiff opposition from the 
rejectionist Haq group.  Second, in the longer run, is the 
Sunni royal family truly willing to see democratic reform 
proceed to its logical conclusion where Shia MPs control the 
parliament?  Al-Wifaq leader Ali Salman talks of the day -- 
admittedly far in the future -- when Bahrain would have a 
Shia Prime Minister, a concept even liberal royal family 
members (much less Bahrain's Saudi neighbor) have trouble 
imagining. 
 
¶8. (C) For U.S. interests, Bahrain's sectarian divide will 
continue to hamper our efforts to support democratic reform. 
For many Sunni, support for democracy translates into support 
for the Shia majority.  The recent flare-up in controversy 
over a possible NDI return illustrates the sensitivity of our 
democratic programming.  Still, the new parliament, which is 
extremely short on expertise and experience, offers promising 
opportunities for cooperation, which NDI is adroitly trying 
to exploit. 
 
-------------------- 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
MANAMA 00000669  003 OF 007 
 
 
-------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) With Bahrain's limited petroleum resources, economic 
development and transformation of the economy to compete 
successfully in the globalized economy will be key 
challenges.  The government has taken some important steps in 
the right direction.  It has moved solid technocrats with 
clean reputations into key positions (e.g., Shaikh Ahmed at 
Finance, Hassan Fakhro at Industry and Commerce, and Abdul 
Hussein Ali Mirza at Oil and the Tender Board).  It has 
started to corporatize state corporations, putting many of 
them under a Singapore-style holding company, Mumtalakat.  It 
has established and beefed up another Singapore-style 
organization, the Economic Development Board, to lead the 
economic development effort. The King has charged his 
American-educated son, Crown Prince Shaikh Khalifa, with 
responsibility to oversee the economic reform effort.  The 
Crown Prince has spearheaded an effort to reform the labor 
market, aimed at lessening dependence on cheap imported labor 
and providing incentives to increase productivity.  And 
Bahrain has signed an FTA with the U.S., symbolically 
signaling its intention to actively participate in the global 
economy and more practically giving an important boost to the 
country's trade and investment climate. 
 
¶10. (S) That said, the country faces significant economic 
challenges.  Despite concerted efforts by Shia Minister of 
Labor Majid Al-Alawi to deal with the unemployment problem, 
unemployment remains a sensitive and potentially explosive 
issue among the country's Shia.  Poverty does exist in 
Bahrain, and many poorer Bahrainis have trouble making ends 
meet.  People are genuinely concerned about rising prices and 
lack of affordable housing. The government, in addition to 
training and finding jobs for less skilled workers who 
compete with foreign labor and are heavily Shia, must help 
create employment opportunities for the increasing number of 
university graduates. Finally, despite important efforts to 
improve transparency and institutionalize commercial law, the 
royal family still casts a large shadow over the economy, 
with its inevitable stake in major development projects, its 
extensive control over real estate, and its ability to make 
or break business deals.  The economy is growing at a healthy 
6 percent rate, the real estate sector is booming, economic 
reforms are being introduced, the telecommunications sector 
is opening up, and a new port will soon be inaugurated, so 
there is much positive to report. But many poorer Bahrainis 
do not yet feel the benefits.  That will be a key challenge 
for the government. 
 
----------------- 
ISLAMIC EXTREMISM 
----------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Like much of the Islamic world, Bahraini society has 
turned more socially and religiously conservative in recent 
years, a striking development in a country long known as a 
center of openness and moderation in the Gulf. This trend is 
likely to continue as Islamists, who now dominate parliament, 
try to flex their muscles.  The trend can be seen at Bahrain 
University, where almost all female students are now covered 
(a sharp contrast from a generation earlier).  It was seen in 
the sharp parliamentary attacks against a mildly provocative 
dance show presented during this year's Spring of Culture 
festival, and in recent tourism office circulars aimed at 
restricting locations where alcohol can be served.  Bahrain's 
wooing of Islamic Banks is also having an impact. Islamic 
banks are financing several new projects which include 
upscale hotels, like the just opened Banyan Tree and 
Arcapita's planned Four Seasons.  Bahrainis and expats alike 
are just now discovering that these hotels will not serve 
alcohol. Islamist parliamentarians periodically bring up 
their desire to ban alcohol more broadly, criticize 
permissive entertainment, and talk of the need to segregate 
Bahrain University by sex. 
 
¶12. (S)  Ironically, although King Hamad and the Al-Khalifas 
more generally are for the most part moderate and secular in 
outlook, the King has made a political calculation to ally 
with the Sunni Islamists in Parliament, an approach that 
serves to increase the Islamists' clout.  He feels he needs 
the support of the Sunni Islamists as a counterweight to the 
large Shia bloc in the parliament, which is considered the 
opposition.  Although the more liberal, moderate Sunni or 
non-sectarian political societies might seem to be the King's 
natural ally, on many issues including democratic reform and 
government/royal family oversight they often in fact align 
 
MANAMA 00000669  004 OF 007 
 
 
themselves with the Shia oppositionists.  With the King 
supporting the Sunni Islamist parties, the result is an 
elected Parliament dominated by three religious-based 
parties, two Sunni and one Shia, who hold 32 of the 40 seats. 
 
 
¶13. (C) This is not to say that the moderates have given up. 
In fact, there are some hopeful signs.  The Islamist attack 
on the Spring of Culture generated the first significant 
popular counter-reaction we have seen, although it is unclear 
if that will be sustained.  After years of essentially ceding 
Bahrain University to Islamist influences, the government has 
appointed a moderate new President (a good contact of the 
Embassy), over the opposition of Islamist elements at the 
university.  Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs 
Undersecretary Fareed Al-Muftah has launched a determined 
effort to promote moderation in the mosques, and has welcomed 
USG help in this endeavor. There is a recognition that 
Bahrain's campaign to strengthen its tourist industry will 
suffer if alcohol laws are too restrictive; the CEO of the 
Islamic Bank behind the Banyan Tree told us he is looking for 
a solution to the alcohol problem, perhaps by creating a new, 
non-Islamic company to buy out the hotel.  Clearly, a major 
challenge for the government in the coming years will be to 
balance its goal of creating an open, investor-friendly, 
globalized economy with its perceived need to maintain the 
support of the country's strong Sunni Islamic movement. 
 
------------ 
SECTARIANISM 
------------ 
 
¶14. (C) Bahrain's demographic make-up, with a Sunni-minority 
royal family ruling over a Shia majority population ensures 
that sectarianism permeates all issues in the country. 
Several factors have made the issue more sensitive in recent 
years: the sectarian tensions aroused by the war in Iraq, the 
sense that Iran and/or Shia power is rising, and the push for 
democratic reforms which, for Sunnis in Bahrain, raises the 
specter of Shia electoral dominance.  Human rights in Bahrain 
is framed in sectarian terms -- it is the Shia who have been 
disadvantaged politically and economically, and don't have 
access to certain jobs (especially in the military). 
Although there are poor Sunni in Bahrain, poverty and 
unemployment are likewise framed in sectarian terms. 
Bahrain's press is admirably more open and free-wheeling, but 
it is increasingly sectarian as well.  Al-Wasat, run by 
former Shia exile Mansour Al-Jamri, focuses heavily on 
Shia-related issues, often giving front-page coverage to 
controversial issues that are not even reported in two 
Sunni-associated dailies (Akhbar Al-Khaleej, whose editor is 
close to the Prime Minister, and Al-Watan, which has ties to 
the King's palace).  Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Watan, in turn, 
have a decidedly Sunni slant, both in news reporting and 
editorial commentary.  Al-Wifaq leader Shaikh Ali Salman 
recently told us that the sectarian divide is not only 
sharper than it was in the past, but is sinking deeper into 
the roots Bahraini society. 
 
¶15. (C) Currently, there are splits within both the Shia 
community and the Bahrain Sunni leadership on how best to 
deal with Bahrain's sectarian divide.  Leading Shia political 
society Al-Wifaq, after boycotting the 2002 parliamentary 
elections, made a calculated decision to try to work within 
the system.  Al-Wifaq participated in the 2006 parliamentary 
elections, and Al-Wifaq leader Shaikh Ali Salman has held 
high-profile meetings with the King and PM, helping secure 
the release of Shia arrested in connection with local 
demonstrations and gaining a commitment on wages.  Still, 
Shia rejectionists - led by Haq movement - seem to be gaining 
some ground in the poorer villages as Shia youth react to 
heavy-handed police tactics, economic frustrations, the 
perceived inability of Al-Wifaq to pass meaningful 
legislation, and long-term dissatisfaction with the 
Al-Khalifas. A part of the Haq strategy is to provoke the 
police to overreact to demonstrations, increasing Shia 
distrust of and alienation from the government. 
 
¶16. (S) There are elements in the royal family that are only 
too happy to oblige the Shia activists and crack down hard on 
the demonstrators.  The royal family is, in fact, divided on 
how to deal with the Shia.  More moderate Al-Khalifas, 
exemplified by the Crown Prince, are focused technocratically 
on creating the economic, education, and labor reforms that 
will provide the necessary job creation for all Bahrainis and 
essentially coax disgruntled Shia into the system. They are 
 
MANAMA 00000669  005 OF 007 
 
 
less focused on democratic reform, but seem to accept it as 
an inevitable component of overall reform.  In contrast, 
royal family hard-liners, exemplified by the Prime Minister, 
are wary of reform for many reasons: the demographic threat 
posed by the majority Shia, whose loyalty to Bahrain (i.e., 
connections with Iran) has long been questioned; concern that 
democracy, and by extension noisy street demonstrations, will 
scare investors away; and -- most importantly -- the 
potential threat to the Al-Khalifa regime that reform may 
ultimately pose.  Although one of the key hard-liners is 
Royal Court Minister and close King confidant Shaikh Khalid 
bin Ahmed, the views of the King are less clear.  It was the 
King, after all, who launched the reform movement, talks of a 
day when the King will serve as a constitutional monarch 
paternalistically protecting the interests of all Bahrainis, 
and infuriates hard-liners by regularly ordering the release 
or pardon of Shia extremists and demonstrators.  And yet, he 
does little to reign in Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed and his 
hard-line allies. 
 
---------------- 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
---------------- 
 
¶17. (S) The sectarian issue continues to color Bahrain's 
approach to counterterrorism. For the government and ruling 
family, the existential threat is Iran and its historical 
claims to Bahrain.  Iran's increased aggressiveness under 
President Ahmadinejad, coupled with perceived Iranian inroads 
in Iraq, have only heightened Bahraini concerns. The 
government is only too happy to have us focus on potential 
threats from Iran and their alleged Shia allies in Bahrain. 
In contrast, Sunnis, even Sunni extremists, form the base of 
support against a potential Shia/Iranian threat.  The 
government fully understands that any kind of terror attack 
by Sunni extremists in Bahrain -- against U.S. or Bahraini 
interests -- would be a disaster for the country and its 
economy, and it is ready to cooperate with us fully to make 
sure that doesn't happen.  But our future cooperation will 
continue to be affected by two factors: Bahraini confidence 
that, in this small island country, the authorities can stay 
one step ahead of and deal with any extremists planning a 
local operation; and Bahraini reluctance to move against or 
alienate the Sunni Islamist community at a time of heightened 
concern about Iran and rising Shia influence in the region. 
 
---------------- 
THE ROYAL FAMILY 
---------------- 
 
¶18. (S) The key factor for Bahrain as it deals with the many 
economic, political, and security challenges in this complex 
regional environment will be the quality of its leadership, 
most notably the senior members of the royal family.  Like 
Bahrain itself, the royal family is going through a period of 
transition, from the traditional tribal leadership of former 
Amir Shaikh Issa and his brother Prime Minister Shaikh 
Khalifa, who has been in power since independence in 1970, to 
the more modern approach of Crown Prince Shaikh Salman, who 
while waiting in the wings has been charged with managing 
economic reform.  In between is King Hamad who, in the words 
of Deputy Prime Minister Jawad Al-Arrayid, is straddling the 
transition from tribal to modern leadership. 
 
¶19. (S) The Prime Minister is definitely old school. He is a 
traditional Arab leader who enjoys greeting people at his 
majlis, attending weddings and condolence calls, and making 
gestures to people in need.  He has no interest in economic 
or political reform.  He is disliked by many Shia as the 
symbol of Sunni domination and repression, and for the wealth 
he has amassed through his tight control over the economy. 
For the King, he serves a useful purpose, both as a 
lightening rod drawing away criticism from the younger 
generation and for the attention he pays to the Sunni base. 
Although it would be a mistake to underestimate the power of 
the PM, in fact his powers are eroding.  Through several 
Cabinet changes, the King has moved out key Prime Minister 
supporters from economic-related ministries.  Al-Wasat editor 
(and former Shia exile) Al-Jamri says that Minister of the 
Royal Court Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed is now the de facto PM, 
and that Shaikh Khalifa is currently more focused on 
protecting his business interests and his family's future. 
The PM initially reacted sharply against the Crown Prince's 
economic reforms, but lately seems to have acquiesced. Many 
of his old cronies who held key Cabinet positions now serve 
as advisors to the PM; the PM, it is said, is determined to 
 
MANAMA 00000669  006 OF 007 
 
 
demonstrate that the Al-Khalifas remain loyal to those who 
faithfully serve the Al-Khalifas.  He reportedly recognizes 
the limited capabilities of his two sons, DPM Shaikh Ali and 
especially Shaikh Salman. 
 
¶20. (S) King Hamad is truly caught in the middle. He is the 
transition from the traditional tribal leadership style of 
his father and uncle to the modern technocratic style of his 
son.  He is caught between the liberal Al-Khalifas who 
support his reform efforts and those who fear change and 
democracy.  He is caught between those Sunnis who completely 
distrust the Shia and want to crack down hard on 
demonstrators and those who want to reach out and bring Shia 
into the system.  He is caught between his desire to be a 
regional leader on reform and those neighbors -- especially 
Saudi Arabia -- who worry about the influence his reforms 
might have elsewhere in the region. 
 
¶21. (S) The King is also a bit of an enigma. He favors 
reform, but lost much Shia support and trust when he appeared 
to pull back from his initial reform proposals.  He wants to 
reach out and support the people of Bahrain, but lacks his 
father's or uncle's touch with the people, is uncomfortable 
in majlis-like settings, and increasingly seems to isolate 
himself in his palace where he invites trusted friends and 
advisors to nightly dinners and discussions rather than 
mixing more broadly with the people.  He is a true friend of 
the United States and its policies in the region (and the 
U.S. military), yet courts harshly anti-American Sunnis and 
allowed his Royal Court Minister to call the shots in closing 
down NDI's Bahrain operations.  He counsels patience and 
understanding with the Shia, but permits hard-line royal 
family members to crack down hard against Shia interests. 
 
¶22. (S) Long-time King confidant Hassan Fakhro captured a key 
element in the King's personality when he said that his 
biggest strength is that he is not vindictive.  He is a 
forgiving man.  This frustrates those in the Royal Family who 
feel he is too soft on the demonstrating Shia activists (who 
will never forgive the Al-Khalifas). But it may prove to be 
just the right approach to move Bahrain through the 
transition. 
 
¶23. (S) The Crown Prince represents the future of Bahrain. 
On many levels that is a very good thing, for Bahrain and for 
the U.S.  U.S.-educated (DOD's Bahrain School and American 
University), Shaikh Salman talks and thinks like an American, 
and is an impressive and articulate interlocutor in venues 
ranging from bilaterals with U.S. leaders to discussions at 
Davos.  He evinces an air of technocratic confidence and is 
intently focused on creating a modern, competitive, 
globally-connected economy in Bahrain.  In areas under his 
purview, he can act decisively.  He has stayed away from 
political issues (democratic reform), leaving that for his 
father.  But there is no doubt that he sides with the 
moderate wing of the family. 
 
¶24. (S) Universally respected abroad, Shaikh Salman does have 
his detractors at home.  Some members of leading business 
families, particularly those that have tied their commercial 
fortunes to the Prime Minister, have resented the young Crown 
Prince's efforts to shake up the economy (and perhaps 
jeopardize their privileged positions). Like his father, the 
Crown Prince is not comfortable cultivating people in 
traditional Arab settings such as majlises, and leaves an 
impression that he has somewhat isolated himself with a 
selected group of like-minded, similarly-aged friends and 
colleagues. Known for his fondness of cars, he is accused of 
drawing from the country's treasury to create his own pet 
project, the Formula 1 racetrack (in fact, there are signs 
the Formula 1 project may turn out to be a shrewd, 
investment-attracting endeavor for Bahrain).  Perhaps most 
critically, there are increasing grumblings that the Crown 
Prince is showing a familiar Al-Khalifa trait of exploiting 
Bahrain's land (and more recently, water to be exploited 
through re-claimed land projects) for his own personal 
wealth.  The extensive Al-Khalifa land holdings, in fact, 
could become a potentially destructive grievance if the whole 
economic and political reform process is not handled 
correctly and in a way that benefits all Bahrainis. 
 
----------------------------------- 
CONCLUSION: STRONG SHOCK ABSORBERS? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶25. (S) With sectarian tensions in the region rising, and 
 
MANAMA 00000669  007 OF 007 
 
 
disaffected Shia youth willing and ready to challenge the 
Al-Khalifa regime in the villages and on the streets, there 
is a sense of a harder edge to the sectarian divide that may 
cause increasing problems for the ruling family.  And there 
is definitely a greater sense of despair and frustration, 
especially among poorer Shia, than there was when I arrived 
here three years ago.  I recently asked Deputy Prime Minister 
Jawad Al-Arrayid, a long-serving Shia Minister who has 
managed to maintain excellent ties with the King, PM, and CP, 
whether he was worried about increasing Shia anger in the 
streets and the threat it may pose to the Al-Khalifa 
leadership.  Al-Arrayid said that Bahrain is like a car with 
extremely strong shock absorbers.  These strong shock 
absorbers allow Bahraini society to pass through very bumpy 
roads.  They will give the Bahraini government the space it 
needs to implement its economic reforms and improve the 
economic well-being of its people.  After observing Bahrain 
for the last three years, I believe he is right. 
 
********************************************* ******** 
Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
********************************************* ******** 
MONROE