VZCZCXRO6203
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHLI #1856/01 1991616
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181616Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY LISBON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6061
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1473

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LISBON 001856 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR EUR/WE, EUR/ERA, EUR/SCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2017 
TAGS: PREL EUN PO UN ZL
SUBJECT: PORTUGAL - MOVING TOWARDS EU CONSENSUS ON KOSOVO 
 
 
Classified By: DEP POL/ECON COUNSELOR CARI ENAV FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND 
 (D) 
 
Summary 
----------- 
 
¶1. (C) FM Luis Amado told A/S Daniel Fried on July 13 that 
the issue of Kosovo's independence was the most pressing 
near-term issue of Portugal's EU Presidency, aside from EU 
treaty reform.  The two compared notes from their recent 
trips to the Balkans, confirming the challenges and next 
steps the United States and the EU will face in the event of 
Russian blockage of a Kosovo UNSCR.  Amado acknowledged the 
need for the United States and the EU to work together on a 
"Plan C" (Kosovo independence without a UNSCR) and noted that 
his Political Director Bramao Ramos was working diligently to 
bring all 27 member states to consensus to support Kosovo 
independence.  To be able to apply maximum pressure on the 
few dissenting member states, Amado said he needed to exhaust 
every avenue with Russia.  He suggested that Contact Group 
Foreign Ministers hold a meeting in Moscow within the next 
120 days should negotiations with Russia prove unproductive 
and asked Fried to relay this request to Secretary Rice. 
 
Context/Participants 
------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) A/S Daniel Fried called on FM Amado in Lisbon on 
July 13 following a full day of meetings with the EU-27 
political directors and the EU Troika political directors, 
plus discussions with Portugal's Secretary of State for 
Defense (reported septel) and the Prime Minister,s Senior 
Diplomatic Advisor.  Kosovo was at the center of every 
discussion.  FM Amado was accompanied by PolDir Vasco Bramao 
Ramos, Chief of Staff Francisco Ribeiro Menezes, and 
Diplomatic Advisor Paulo Lourenco.  Fried was accompanied by 
Charge Adrienne O,Neal and Dep P/E Counselor Cari Enav. 
 
Dealing with Russia and Beyond 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Both A/S Fried and FM Amado had just returned from 
separate trips to the Balkans. Leaders in Belgrade and 
Pristina reiterated their well known positions (septel), with 
Belgrade refusing to accept Kosovo independence and Pristina 
growing ever anxious at the delay in implementing the 
Ahtisaari plan. Amado acknowledged the West would not be able 
to ask the Kosovars to wait much longer after the agreed upon 
120 days, so it was critical that the West engage Russia at 
every possible level during this timeframe.  Fried assured 
Amado that the United States would explore every opportunity 
to bring the Russians on board.  However, in the likely event 
that Russia would not agree to the current UNSC draft, the 
United States and the EU would have to decide whether to pull 
the text or force a veto.  In any event, Fried stressed, we 
would have to move forward together toward Kosovo's 
supervised independence. 
 
Developing a Plan C 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Amado underscored the need for a coordinated U.S.-EU 
approach to address Kosovo independence in response to a 
Russian veto (Plan C) -- the same point Fried had been urging 
throughout the day in his meetings with EU interlocutors. 
Amado commented that "if Russia is on board, that's not bad. 
If the EU and the U.S. are united but without Russia, that's 
also not bad, but if we (the U.S. and Europe) are divided, 
that's very bad."  Fried noted that on this basis the U.S. 
would work with Europe on Kosovo independence. (Note: In a 
separate meeting, the PM's Senior Diplomatic Advisor Jorge 
Roza de Oliveira agreed that moving forward was the only 
realistic way to avoid chaos and bloodshed in Kosovo.  He was 
relieved to know the U.S. would continue to coordinate with 
the EU post-UNSCR.) 
 
¶5. (C) Amado noted that PolDir Bramao Ramos was working 
diligently with other member states to develop consensus 
within the EU on moving forward without Russian concurrence. 
Bramao Ramos was taking a two-pronged approach.  On the one 
hand, he was trying to establish a legal basis for the ESDP 
Mission.  On the other hand, he was endorsing the concept 
that EU unity would not require all member states to 
recognize Kosovo's independence at the same time.  Timing 
would be a foreign policy decision for each member state to 
determine. 
 
Looking for "Legitimacy" 
 
LISBON 00001856  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Amado reiterated his concern that there was not much 
time left to secure a satisfactory outcome in Kosovo.  The EU 
understands the need for unity, but there are still a few 
problematic member states (Greece and Spain in particular) 
that would only move forward under the framework of a UNSCR. 
To establish "legitimacy" to confront these partners and 
force consensus, Amado insisted he needed to exhaust every 
avenue with the Russians.  He suggested that the Contact 
Group hold a meeting in Moscow at the FM level within the 
next 120 days should negotiations with Russia prove 
unproductive.  He asked Fried to relay this request to 
Secretary Rice and noted that he would not mention this 
 
SIPDIS 
proposal to any other member state until he had spoken with 
the Secretary about it. 
 
Comment 
------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Amado expressed commitment to Kosovo's independence, 
and we were encouraged to hear him say that he is working to 
achieve that outcome in the event of a Russian blockage at 
the UNSC.  As the EU pulls itself together towards consensus 
in the face of Russian intransigence, Amado is looking for 
"legitimacy" to pressure the few member-states yet to 
acknowledge the inevitability of Kosovo's independence.  By 
seeking a Contact Group meeting in Moscow, he is also looking 
for cover to fend off criticism by Russia and others that the 
international community did not do everything possible to 
address Russian concerns.  PM Kostunica arrives in Lisbon on 
July 16 to discuss developments further. 
Hoffman