VZCZCXRO3359
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0888/01 2071554
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261554Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6605
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000888 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV KPKO CG ZA BE NL FR
SUBJECT: SSR CONTACT GROUP:  SUBSTANCE REFERRED TO EXPERTS 
 
 
 ¶1. (SBU) Summary.  The Contact Group on Security Sector 
Reform (SSR) formally recognized the GDRC's ownership of 
efforts to reform the Congolese military at the group's July 
12-13 meeting in Kinshasa.  Minister of Defense Chikez Diemu 
outlined a vision for SSR aimed at creating a core group of 
fighters, with a large number of other soldiers engaged in 
community development.  Donors agreed to appoint a Group of 
Experts to propose details for implementing these ideas at a 
follow-up roundtable in October.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Contact Group on Security Sector Reform in the 
DRC established a Group of Experts to flesh out a general 
plan outlined by Congolese Defense Minister Chikez Diemu 
during its July 12-13 meeting in Kinshasa.  The meeting was 
co-chaired by Diemu and South Africa's Special Envoy to the 
Great Lakes, Ambassador Kingsley Mamabolo.  Traditional 
donors, including the U.S., UN, EU, Angola, Belgium, South 
Africa, France, the UK, the Netherlands, Canada and the World 
Bank, as well as a fair percentage of senior FARDC officers, 
formed the bulk of participants.  Also invited and 
participating were China, Egypt, Morocco, Greece and Sweden; 
India was invited but did not attend. 
 
------------------ 
Congolese proposal 
------------------ 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GDRC's claim to ownership of the SSR process was 
conceded by all delegations.  Diemu presented a vision for 
SSR that was long on intentions but deliberately short on 
specifics.  Diemu presented four basic goals in his Global 
Plan for military reform:  1.  creating an army with 
deterrent capacity ("une armee' de dissuasion"); 2. 
realizing a level of excellence; 3. reaching reconciliation 
between the army and the Congolese people; and 4. using the 
army to reach nutritional self-sufficiency ("la production du 
pain," or the production of bread) for soldiers and for the 
Congolese people in general.  Following discussions, Diemu 
and the assembled donors endorsed a proposal that a Group of 
Experts work out the necessary details for articulating this 
vision during the lead-up to a roundtable in October, and 
called for a completed roadmap by January 2008. 
 
¶5. (SBU) He also outlined an aspirational timeline for 
meeting the GDRC's goals:  in the immediate term (2007-08), 
complete disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion (DDR) to 
be completed by December 2007, and remaining army integration 
(brassage); in the short term (2007-09), creation of a 
division-equivalent Rapid Intervention Force (FIR); in the 
medium term (2008), reconstruction of remaining armed forces 
and production of community projects; and, in the long term 
(2011), finalization of FARDC's principal defense force, to 
include ground, air and naval forces. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Diemu envisioned that the FIR would consist of 
approximately 17,000 troops and serve as the core of FARDC 
deterrent forces.  It should be well-equipped, 
properly-trained, with good leadership and a rigorous 
selection criteria.  He said details of creating, equipping, 
and training should be left to the experts to propose.  His 
vision also included a large activist army which would focus 
raise food and build roads, houses, schools and hospitals. 
 
---------- 
Discussion 
---------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Several donors spoke in favor of realistic 
timetables, concrete goals, coordination of efforts and 
guidance by experts.  Many expressed concern about the need 
to complete DDR as soon as possible.  Diemu initially called 
for completion by the end of 2007, although following 
discussion, he conceded community re-integration may take 
longer. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) South Africa's Mamabolo emphasized that the DRC 
must take charge of its own security.  The Belgian ambassador 
called attention to his government's SSR master plan, citing 
the work of EUSEC in developing it, as well as Belgium's 
commitment to training and evaluation.  The Dutch ambassador 
suggested utilizing existing structures such as the Joint 
Commission on Security Sector Reform and focus future efforts 
on the Belgian master plan.  MONUC Force Commander Gen. 
Babacar Gaye called for a "reasonable" Congolese force to be 
trained, equipped and positioned by 2009 to take over from 
his forces.  (Comment:  In fact, the SSR Joint Commission no 
 
KINSHASA 00000888  002 OF 002 
 
 
longer exists, as it was a part of the DRC Transition 
structure, chaired by then-Vice President Ruberwa.  End 
comment.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Discussion also focused on the need for urgent 
improvement in the well-being and conditions of military 
personnel, as well as putting in place a legal framework for 
reform.  Delegations discussed the willingness of donors to 
"accompany and support" the government, and under its 
authority, execute a global work program under modalities 
defined by the experts. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The EU Special Envoy to the Great Lakes proposed 
that the prospective October roundtable encompass a global 
agenda to deal fully with the military, police and justice 
sectors and reform programs.  This idea was supported by his 
South African counterpart, Ambassador Mamabolo.  The 
Ambassador and the French ambassador both noted that dangers 
of expanding the scope to a point where it became too 
complicated.  The group agreed to have the roundtable 
potentially consider a separate report on this issue. 
Defense Minister Diemu noted that he is not in a position to 
commit his Interior Minister and Justice Minister colleagues 
to specific future plans or timetables, but agreed to 
consider the proposal.  Subsequently, he privately expressed 
opposition to the idea.  The extensive military integration, 
reform, DDR, and capacity-increase agenda will already pose a 
substantial challenge to planners without adding the 
substantial additional police and judicial reform programs. 
(Comment:  Planning for justice sector reform has barely 
begun in terms of substance or donor backing.  End comment.) 
 
----------- 
Conclusions 
----------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) The group reached several conclusions:  SSR will be 
implemented under the leadership of the Congolese Defense 
Minister; the yet-to-be-defined Group of Experts will develop 
a global plan to implement his ideas; the follow-up 
roundtable is projected for Kinshasa in October; a report 
regarding work in the police and justice sectors will be 
presented at the roundtable, pending agreement by the 
ministers concerned.  Delegates called for the experts to 
meet during August-September.  Diemu requested that it 
present a roadmap including specific commitments from 
bilateral and multilateral donors. 
 
¶12. (U)  The group adopted a revised version of Diemu's 
original Global Plan, which envisioned:  a) military 
"dissuasive capacity" to defend territorial integrity; b) 
reconciliation between the army and the Congolese people; c) 
food self-sufficiency for the military; and d) the 
realization of principles of excellence, and social 
well-being of the military, including honorable retirement. 
(Note:  The original draft text of the final report 
inadvertently omitted any mention of military capability, 
which was subsequently inserted as the first point.  End 
note.)  A copy of the conference final report (in French) is 
being sent to AF/C. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU)  The assembled group was large and unwieldy as a 
working group, and discussion was dominated by a few 
interventions, invariably followed by a specific response 
from the Defense Minister.  CHOD General Kayembe and most 
FARDC officers did not contribute to the discussions.  The 
lack of specificity of the discussion was reflected in the 
final report, essentially referring substantive work to the 
undefined group of experts.  On a more positive note, General 
Kayembe convened a meeting with representatives from 
interested Embassies on July 23 to get work underway to 
prepare for  the requested October roundtable.  We gather 
that Kayembe has been handed the task of implementing this 
project, which we take as a good sign.  Diemu, fresh from an 
extended visit to China, appeared interested in asserting 
Congolese ownership of SSR as a principal objective. 
Strongly supported by the South African delegate, Diemu 
obtained agreement from all present to this principle.  End 
comment. 
MEECE