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Viewing cable 07KHARTOUM1043, DARFUR: MAINTAINING FOCUS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07KHARTOUM1043 2007-07-02 07:17 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO0665
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1043/01 1830717
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020717Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7769
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0194
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001043 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2012 
TAGS: PREL PGOV AU UN SU ER LY
SUBJECT: DARFUR: MAINTAINING FOCUS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 01006 
 
KHARTOUM 00001043  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------ 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) A recent African Union-sponsored conference on the 
Abuja talks and the current Darfur peace process provided 
insights into the direction of the UN/AU strategy.  In the 
lead up to a July meeting of special envoys in Tripoli, 
Libya, the U.S. can exert leverage with the UN, AU, and key 
governments to incorporate the lessons of the Abuja talks and 
maintain focus in the peace process.  The upcoming summit 
will provide an opportunity to lay the foundation for an 
inclusive and viable peace agreement by garnering 
international support for: 1) The UN/AU as the lead mediators 
in the Darfur negotiating process, 2) A two-stage UN/AU 
process to prepare Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) 
non-signatories for negotiations, composed of a meeting to 
re-connect the political and military elements of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLM) and a conference in Southern Sudan 
sponsored by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) to 
focus the political goals of the rebel movements and enhance 
their internal capacity; 3) A clear statement that the 
international community expects suppoJQQBC4dtion of separate agreements between the 
Sudanese Government and individual rebel groups outside the 
UN/AU process, and a review of DPA implementation concurrent 
with the negotiations; and 5) A UN/AU negotiating structure 
built on the concept of "shuttle diplomacy" versus formal and 
protracted peace talks in a single venue.  End summary. 
 
------------------------ 
AU Conference on the DPA 
------------------------ 
 
2. (C) A June 25-28 conference hosted by the African Union, 
"The Darfur Peace Agreement and the Peace Process: The Way 
Forward," provided a venue for discussion of the status of 
the DPA and methods for strengthening the current effort to 
bring the non-signatories to the agreement.  Representatives 
of the UN, AU, the National Congress Party (NCP), the SPLM, 
the SLM/Minawi, the U.S., UK, Canada, and the Netherlands 
attended.  The goal was not to present government-approved 
positions but to brainstorm ideas for a renewed political 
process.  Participants also engaged in substantive dialogue 
on strengthening the security provisions of the DPA in 
preparation for the arrival of Force Commander Martin Luther 
Agwai, which will be reported septel.  During the conference 
and in discussions with the AU and UN chairmen of the Joint 
Mediation Support Team (JMST), the outlines of a more 
concrete UN/AU strategy for the political process emerged. 
 
-------------------------- 
UN/AU to Lead Negotiations 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Reflecting on the experience of the Abuja talks, 
participants acknowledged the importance of a clearly-defined 
mediator for negotiations.  While the Tripoli Consensus of 
April had stipulated that all initiatives converge under 
UN/AU leadership, Eritrea, the SPLM, and the Sudanese 
Government had indicated that Asmara, not the UN/AU, would 
mediate the peace process and lead the negotiation phase. 
The NCP and SPLM representatives at the conference, however, 
gave a clear endorsement of the UN/AU, and the remainder of 
the participants urged Sudan to make this endorsement public 
to weaken Asmara's claim to the mediation under its "regional 
initiative" with Chad and Libya.  The upcoming meeting in 
Tripoli seems a natural venue to consolidate this endorsement. 
 
4. (C) Many delegates urged the appointment of a single UN/AU 
mediator to negotiate between the parties.  Such a mediator 
would need to maintain his neutrality while channeling 
pressure on the Sudanese Government and the Darfur faction 
leaders.  Participants concluded that the mediator should 
calibrate the role of the international community to ensure 
that pressure at key points leads the parties to compromise 
but that international involvement does not artificially 
accelerate the process.  The mediator should be adept at 
setting deadlines to maintain momentum based on the situation 
in Darfur rather than on external deadlines set by the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001043  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
international community.  The mediator should also have 
experience negotiating between governments and insurgent 
movements, not just between two states. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Reconnecting Political and Military Elements 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Noting the splintering of the Darfur rebel movements 
in the wake of the DPA, the UN and AU emphasized the need to 
repair the rift between the political and military leaders of 
the Darfur rebel factions as the first step to preparing for 
negotiations.  The meeting proposed by the Centre for 
Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD) in Kenya was discussed at length. 
 The NCP representatives did not voice any objections to the 
meeting and welcomed a consolidation of the rebel factions. 
Participants agreed that the CHD meeting was the most 
concrete step in the political process thus far and should 
proceed in the near future.  The goal should be that the 
political leadership would represent the military wings of 
the factions during the negotiating process to obviate the 
need for direct participation by the field commanders.  The 
UN/AU reported that the commanders had expressed support for 
this approach but cautioned the international community 
against emboldening individual commanders, who might then 
decide they too needed a seat at the table. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Capacity Building for Negotiations 
---------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Many conference participants who had been involved in 
the Abuja talks recalled the lack of capacity and 
organization within the rebel movements, which had weakened 
rebels' ability to advocate effective positions.  The NCP 
representatives said repeatedly that the non-signatories 
should compose written position papers before new 
negotiations begin.  Despite the delay in the SPLM-sponsored 
conference in Southern Sudan, many believed the SPLM, perhaps 
with the assistance of experts from the UN/AU and INGOs, 
would be the best-placed to prepare the non-signatories for 
negotiations.  The SPLM could bring to bear its own 
experience negotiating with the NCP, help the non-signatories 
to distill their agenda, and facilitate a greater 
understanding of the intersection between the Darfur 
movements' goals and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
 The SPLM could also underscore "the interim nature" of the 
national political structure, which left open the possibility 
of greater political change through the 2009 elections. 
 
7. (C) Conference delegates anticipated that the rebel 
movements would concentrate on the following issues: 
compensation, obtaining a majority for the movements' 
political parties in the three Darfur state legislatures, a 
national vice president for Darfur, and a greater number of 
seats in the National Assembly for Darfur representatives. 
Though many movements' viewed the SPLM as having obstructed 
their claims to compensation and a vice president during the 
Abuja talks, the SPLM representative at the conference, State 
Minister of Industry Timothy Tot, indicated greater 
flexibility on these issues at present.  (Note: While Tot is 
a member of the SPLM, he appeared supportive of NCP policies, 
and his flexibility on key rebel demands may indicate the 
NCP's willingness to discuss these points.  End note.)  Other 
conference participants suggested that the responsibilities 
of the Senior Assistant to the President as established under 
the DPA could be enhanced. 
 
---------------------- 
International Leverage 
---------------------- 
 
8. (C) Conference participants were united in their support 
for targeted international pressure on those who obstructed 
the UN/AU process.  NCP representatives--backed by AU 
participants from the Abuja talks--said that one-sided 
pressure on Sudan had emboldened the rebel movements during 
the discussions on the DPA and had encouraged intransigence. 
For the second time in one week, UN and AU representatives 
appealed for support from the international community to 
press SLM leader Abdulwahid al-Nur to communicate with his 
commanders and participate in the CHD meeting and the SPLM 
conference.  The UN/AU said if al-Nur and others refused to 
attend these two meetings, they should face clear 
international condemnation.  They also requested frank 
dialogue with France and Eritrea to pressure recalcitrant 
actors.  "If political leaders do not participate in the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001043  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
political process, it is a failure of the international 
community," said one UN representative.  A communications 
expert at the conference urged the UN/AU to develop more 
regular and transparent mechanisms, such as weekly status 
reports, for information sharing on the progress of the 
Darfur political process in order to mobilize the 
international community. 
 
-------------------------- 
Framework for Negotiations 
-------------------------- 
 
9. (C) There was broad support among conference participants, 
including among the NCP delegates, for a framework of 
principles that the parties would agree to prior to 
negotiations.  These principles would include respect for 
previous cease-fire arrangements from N'djamena and Abuja and 
an end to separate agreements outside the UN/AU process.  In 
addition, several participants noted that the credibility of 
the DPA had been undermined in the absence of an effective 
oversight mechanism and recommended that further appointments 
to the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA) be 
postponed until DPA implementation could be reviewed.  The 
UN/AU could conduct such a review concurrent with the 
political process.  Through public "naming and shaming," UN 
Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim, backed by 
the international community, would guarantee adherence to the 
framework during negotiations. 
 
----------------- 
Shuttle Diplomacy 
----------------- 
 
10. (C) The conference attendees agreed that a negotiating 
structure must be finalized soon.  The UN and AU reiterated 
their preference for a negotiating process along the lines of 
the U.S.-proposed "shuttle diplomacy" approach.  The UN/AU 
said that a negotiating process beginning in August would 
involve UN/AU mediation between the parties, which would 
culminate in a brief, intensive negotiating session to 
finalize the agreement.  With an adept negotiating method, 
the UN and AU must balance two, competing agendas: the NCP 
and the international community's continued support for the 
DPA and the rebel movements' demand for a new agreement.  The 
NCP participants resisted "changes" to the DPA, while a UN 
representative explained that "there was no point to 
negotiations if the Government is not willing to change the 
agreement."  Other participants noted that it would be 
important for the international community--and the U.S. in 
particular--to serve as a guarantor for the DPA to re-assure 
the NCP that the agreement was being enhanced, not thrown 
away. 
 
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Comment 
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11. (C) Based on the comments of the stakeholders present at 
the June 25-28 conference, reaching agreement in Tripoli on 
the five elements noted in this cable is possible.  It is 
essential, however, that we continue to emphasize a 
realistic, sequenced approach to the peace process.  At the 
highest levels, we should encourage the UN and AU to remain 
steadily on course with the points above, while allowing for 
some flexibility in deadlines that may not be feasible.  End 
comment. 
 
12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. 
FERNANDEZ