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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6518
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001334 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR KOCI NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS A WORK IN 
PROGRESS 
 
REF: A. KATHMANDU 1204 
 
     ¶B. KATHMANDU 1314 
     ¶C. KATHMANDU 1298 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Robert L. Hugins.  Reasons 1.4 (b/d). 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Representatives from several child-focused 
international NGOs reported to Emboffs in late June that they 
and other similar NGOs under the leadership of the UN 
Children's Fund were poised to assist with reintegration of 
former Maoist child combatants.  They had devised a standard 
reintegration package and had divided up responsibility for 
different parts of the country among themselves.  Debate 
continued, however, over how a separate Government of Nepal 
assistance package would be administered.  The NGO 
representatives indicated that planning and preparation for 
reintegration of other types of Maoist "combatants," 
including new recruits who were found to be ineligible to 
remain in the camps, was lagging.  The participants also 
highlighted that roughly 40 percent of the Maoist People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) were women.  Addressing reintegration 
of the children and new recruits expelled from the camps 
during the verification process represents only the first 
phase of future reintegration efforts and even more difficult 
issues with former PLA militia remain to be tackled. 
 
NGOs Planning for Reintegration of Children 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  In a meeting in late June, representatives from 
Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), 
and World Education explained to Emboffs that, under the UN 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) chairmanship, a Children Associated 
with Armed Groups and Armed Forces Working Group (CAAFAG) had 
been meeting regularly over the past nine months to plan for 
reintegration of former Maoist child combatants.  CAAFAG had 
devised a standard reintegration package for children that 
included formal education and/or income generation activities 
and material support (not cash) for the children to 
re-establish themselves in their communities.  Responsibility 
for different geographic zones of the country had been 
divided up among the CAAFAG member NGOs.  However, the World 
Education representative reported that his organization would 
not be responsible for a zone, but would instead provide 
technical assistance to UNICEF on education modules for the 
children.  The NGO representatives highlighted that their 
reintegration efforts focused both on children (under 18) who 
would be released from the camps through the verification 
process, as well as the hundreds of children who had already 
left the cantonments or who were never cantoned. 
 
GON Has Its Own Reintegration Package for Children 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The NGO representatives highlighted that the 
standard CAAFAG donor package for released child combatants 
was different from a planned Government of Nepal (GON) 
package.  Debate within the GON continued over how the GON 
assistance package of NR 80,000 (approximately USD 1,230) 
would be distributed to each child.  CAAFAG had made 
recommendations to the GON and to the UN Mission in Nepal, 
including steps to ensure transparency and avoid direct 
payment to the children, but the NGO representatives 
expressed concern that the GON had not sufficiently thought 
through the possible implications of the distribution process. 
 
Minimal Access to Camps But Camp Mobility High 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The NGO representatives told Emboff that, of the 
various child protection agencies, UNICEF was the sole 
organization with access to the camps, although even UNICEF 
fell under UNMIN's umbrella.  For example, all UNICEF staff 
visiting the camps were required to wear UNMIN T-shirts 
(although they were permitted to wear UNICEF caps).  The NGO 
representatives conceded that, out of necessity, they had 
 
KATHMANDU 00001334  002 OF 003 
 
 
relied on information from UNICEF and the UNMIN team in 
designing their programs.  The Save the Children 
representative emphasized that mobility in and out of the 
camps was high; those cantoned came and went as they pleased. 
 Without a fence or barrier, it was difficult to keep track 
of combatant movement to and from local communities. 
 
Ensuring Children Are Not Re-Recruited 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Emboff asked how the NGOs were protecting against 
the re-recruitment of children into the Maoist Young 
Communist League (YCL) or other armed groups.  The Save the 
Children representative responded that they were monitoring 
recruitment within communities and working with child 
protection committees at the Village Development Committee 
(VDC) level.  Community sensitization, IRC said, would be 
essential to ensure sustainable reintegration of former child 
combatants.  IRC described a program underway to use "foster 
families" as a "half-way home" for child combatants until 
they were able to re-establish themselves in their 
communities. 
 
What About New Recruits? And Women? 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  When asked what plans were in place for 
reintegration of other, non-child "combatants" expelled from 
the camps during verification, the NGO representatives 
replied that no coordination mechanism similar to CAAFAG 
existed for new recruits or others who did not qualify to 
remain in the camps.  However, the UN Development Program 
(UNDP) would likely take the lead.  The NGOs also reported 
that the debate within the GON on how to handle reintegration 
packages for non-child combatants continued.  All of the NGOs 
present expressed a willingness to look at reintegration 
programming for a wider cross-section of those deemed 
ineligible to remain in the camps, but as U.S. organizations, 
they needed further guidance on how to stay within the 
parameters of the U.S. law banning material support to the 
Maoists as a designated terrorist group.  The participants 
also highlighted that roughly 40 percent of the Maoist 
People's Liberation Army (PLA) were women and there had been 
recent reporting of numerous pregnancies in the camps.   To 
date, there was no clear strategy on how to handle the 
reintegration of women. 
 
And then Reintegration of Ex-PLA? Militia? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (C)  A recent USAID funded report by the Academy for 
Educational Development (AED) addresses an even more 
challenging integration question, namely integration of 
Maoist PLA into the Nepal Army (NA).  The report noted that 
integration of the PLA into a "New Nepal Army" figured 
prominently in the peace negotiations in late 2006.  The 
November peace agreements, however, were vague on the topic. 
The agreements only mentioned that persons discharged from 
the camps would be ineligible for later integration and 
called for a special committee on integration and 
rehabilitation of Maoist combatants (Ref B).  The report went 
on to point out that, with 95,000 plus soldiers, many 
observers believe that the NA was already bloated.  However, 
according to AED, the PLA is of the view that a new national 
army should include roughly half of their combatants, ranging 
upward from 30,000, including representation at leadership 
levels.  Meanwhile, the NA has repeatedly argued that the 
Maoists should be allowed to join the NA only if they meet 
basic recruitment standards.  The Chief of the Army Staff, 
taking a hard position, argues that integration of Maoists 
into the NA should not occur for at least five years.  AED 
also reported that the NA believes that the PLA is pushing 
for military integration to undermine the capacity of the 
Army. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  The UN Mission in Nepal's work to verify the 30,000 
 
KATHMANDU 00001334  003 OF 003 
 
 
Maoist "combatants" is currently on hold.  On June 30, Maoist 
Chief Pushpa Dahal ("Prachanda") demanded that the process be 
suspended after UNMIN provided the details of its examination 
of the members of the Maoist First Division in Eastern Nepal. 
 According to sources at UNMIN, the Maoists balked because 
UMNIM had disqualified larger numbers of the alleged 
combatants than the Maoist anticipated on the grounds that 
they were new recruits or children.  If the process resumes, 
thousands of children and new recruits who are deemed 
ineligible to remain in the cantonments will require 
reintegration options.  The progress made by CAAFAG is 
heartening.  However, if the needs of new recruits remain 
unaddressed, they could pose one of the largest threats to 
security in the lead-up to the Constituent Assembly election. 
 These unemployed and recently trained, largely young, men 
and women represent ideal recruits for the Young Communist 
League and other armed groups.  Addressing the initial wave 
of those expelled through verification marks only the 
beginning of the challenges for Nepal. 
 
¶9. (C) An immense hurdle looms ahead, as those combatants 
remaining in the cantonment camps, Maoist militia and other 
former fighters, seek options for a return to civilian life 
or integration into GON security forces.  Demobilization, 
disarmament, and reintegration experience worldwide points to 
the need to tailor reintegration packages to fit local 
economies and the needs of ex-combatants to protect against 
re-recruitment and further conflict.  These packages must 
include plans for women combatants and the Maoist militia.  A 
first step would be to encourage UNDP to undertake a 
multi-donor assessment on reintegration options (Ref C). 
Post will urge the new special committee on integration to 
operate in a transparent manner, focusing on democratization 
of the security forces, but avoiding any co-option of the 
Army for Maoist political aims.  Unless and until Maoist 
change their behavior and renounce violence, we can see only 
token integration of combatants into the NA.  Post will also 
push for greater international pressure and support on 
devising viable options to transition former combatants. 
MORIARTY