VZCZCXRO1579
RR RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKM #1159/01 1940809
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130809Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9073
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/07 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BY CG RW UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS TEMPLATE 
 
REF: STATE 88842 
 
Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary: Ugandan military and civilian officials 
view the U.S.-facilitated Tripartite Plus process as 
important for confidence-building between the parties and for 
keeping pressure up on neighbors to rein in negative forces. 
Ugandans argue that the process has resulted in 
behind-the-scenes progress on the negative forces, even if 
not apparent to the U.S.  We do not believe it is time to 
bring the Tripartite Plus process to a close.  However, it 
could be time to consider how the Tripartite Plus process 
could be continued without U.S. facilitation under the rubric 
of the Great Lakes Security Pact.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence Leopold 
Kyanda, Commander of Uganda's Land Forces Lt. General Katumba 
Wamala, the Deputy Director of the External Security 
Organization (ESO) Robert Masolo, and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affair's Director for East African and the Ring States Julius 
Kagamba Singomba all told emboffs that the Tripartite Plus 
process continues to build confidence among the parties. 
They believe that regular meetings are a useful, neutral 
forum for airing political differences, even if they are not 
resolved publicly at the meetings.  Military officers report 
that the Chief of Defense Forces' meetings and smaller 
bilateral meetings on border security are building a 
foundation and expectation of cooperation that had been 
lacking in the past. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Tripartite Plus keeps up the pressure on the parties 
to take action on issues, even if it is behind-the-scenes, 
according to Kagamba.  He told P/E Chief that even though it 
appears that there is a disagreement or stalemate at the 
table over the issue of the Peoples' Redemption Army (PRA), 
the Rwandan Government has been making moves against many of 
the people on the Ugandan list.  The Ugandan Government is 
pleased with some of the actions, but does not want to make 
those actions public at the table because of the sources of 
the information.  Kagamba said that Uganda believes that 
Rwanda is trying to disengage itself from the PRA.  Moreover, 
one result of the Tripartite Plus process is that Congo must 
pay constant attention to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) 
even if it lacks the capacity to take action against them. 
While the lack of action might be misinterpreted, the 
presence of the LRA on the regional agenda limits any type of 
support the Congolese might consider giving them.  Congo is 
more uncomfortable with the LRA than it was before, according 
to Kagamba. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Uganda continues to push for a regularization of its 
relationship with Congo bilaterally as well as through the 
Tripartite Plus forum.  Foreign Minister Kutesa raised the 
issue of agrement for the Ugandan Ambassador in Kinshasa with 
his Congolese counterpart at the African Union Summit in 
Accra.  The Congolese Foreign Minister told Kutesa that 
Uganda needs to address the issue of the 10 Billion dollar 
judgment against it by the International Court of Justice 
first.  Nonetheless, Ugandan ministers travel to Kinshasa to 
address important issues as needed.  The Ugandans are 
pressing for a reinstatement the Joint Permanent Commission 
to handle border issues, refugees, joint exploitation of 
natural resources, trade, tourism, and illegal arms flows. 
Regular meetings between Ugandan and Congolese military 
officials also occur. 
 
¶5.  (C)  On the Fusion Cell, our military and intelligence 
interlocutors argued that a virtual cell might work better 
than the center in Kisangani.  Kyanda and Kagamba expressed 
concern over the cost of maintaining a person at Kisangani. 
Quarterly meetings of the focal points might accomplish the 
objectives of the Fusion Cell with less costs.  The Ugandans 
also expressed appreciation for the visits of Colonel Orth 
and Africa Bureau Deputy Assistant James Swan in between 
Tripartite Plus meetings to informally keep things moving 
between formal gatherings. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Kagamba stated that the criminalization of harboring 
negative forces in each of the Great Lakes Security Pact 
countries is one way to resolve the issue of illegal arms 
flows.  He argued that prosicution of arms suppliers by host 
countries could contribute to deterring illegal arms 
deliveries.  He also asked if the U.S. can donate old radar 
systems to monitor the 17 airstrips in Congo that MONUC has 
identified as possible transit points for illegal weapons. 
This type of verification could deter arms traffickers. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Uganda will raise (at the next meeting) the issue of 
adding Kenya and Tanzania as Tripartite Plus observers.  They 
are already part of the Great Lakes Security Pact troika. 
 
KAMPALA 00001159  002 OF 002 
 
 
Kagamba also requested an invitation for the Great Lakes 
Executive Secretary Ambassador Liberata Mulamula, based at 
the Secretariat Headquarters in Bujumbura. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
COMMENT: LOOKING AHEAD 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
¶8.  (C)  From our perspective, it is not yet time to bring 
the Tripartite Plus process to a close.  The Ugandans have 
pointed out a number of positive behind-the-scenes 
developments that indicate that some of the difficult issues 
are being addressed, even if these do not manifest themselves 
in the deliverable form that we prefer.  Nevertheless, 
considering how to transition the Tripartite Plus into the 
Great Lakes Security Pact process could begin by bringing in 
key players as observers to begin preparing the groundwork 
for an eventual and clean hand-off. At the next Tripartite 
Plus meeting, discussion of a hand-over could begin and the 
parties asked to decide on what they want to achieve prior to 
a hand-over.  We also suggest not adding new issues that can 
be handled bilaterally and sticking to the three existing 
areas of restoring diplomatic relations, addressing negative 
forces, and negotiating extradition treaties.  These 
deliverables create the framework for dealing with other 
issues.  Illegal arms, for example, are a symptom, not a root 
cause or mechanism for resolving poor relations between the 
parties.  We also recommend that the relevant Political 
Officers and Defense Attache personnel from the U.S. Missions 
in the Tripartite Plus countries be invited to each 
Tripartite Plus meeting.  This will help posts better 
understand the issues and relationships, improve follow up, 
interpret events and analyze progress on the ground, and 
provide U.S. support when the U.S.-facilitation phase of the 
process does come to a close. 
 
 
 
BROWNING