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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHDIR #0047/01 1921316
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111316Z JUL 07
FM IRAN RPO DUBAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0152
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHDIR/IRAN RPO DUBAI PRIORITY 0145
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 0136
RUEHAD/USDAO ABU DHABI TC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0102
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 IRAN RPO DUBAI 000047 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/11/2017 
TAGS: ECON PGOV KPLS IR
SUBJECT: RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL TRACKS WITH IRPO'S ANECDOTAL 
REPORTING 
 
REF: RPO DUBAI 0045 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000047  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jillian Burns, Director, Iran Regional Presence 
Office - Dubai, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
 
1.(C) Summary.  The results of the Terror Free Tomorrow June 
2007 survey of 1000 Iranians overall tracks with what IRPO hears 
anecdotally from Iranians.  Both the survey and IRPO's findings 
indicate a large amount of support for Iran's nuclear energy 
program among Iranians, but mixed views regarding a nuclear 
weapon.  While support for the nuclear program runs deep in 
Iranian society, the people see Iran's economy as the top issue 
of concern.  The challenge there in is that while the Iranian 
government closely monitors public opinion, its policy making is 
not often responsive to public wishes.  End Summary. 
 
2.(C) The telephonic survey has the advantage of a much more 
methodical assessment of views and much broader access to the 
Iranian population than IRPO has in Dubai.  The reliability of 
polling in Iran is questionable, however, given that Iranians 
tell us that the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) also 
does polling (and never publishes the results.  reftel).  If 
widely known, this would color how freely Iranians are likely to 
speak to an unknown pollster.  Furthermore, many Iranians are 
nervous that their email and telephone lines are monitored. 
There always seems to be a cultural tendency to tell people what 
they want to hear. 
 
It's the economy, stupid 
----------------------------- 
 
3.(C) A main finding of the study is that 29% of respondents 
view developing nuclear weapons as a very important priority for 
the Iranian government, while 88% of respondents considered 
improving the economy a very important priority.  At the same 
time, 52% favor the development of nuclear weapons and believe 
Iranians would live in a safer world if Iran had nuclear 
weapons.  Not an insignificant number - 31% - thought that if 
the government had nuclear weapons, Iranian people would live in 
a more dangerous world.  This generally tracks with what Iranian 
interlocutors tell us.  By far, the economy is their greatest 
concern, a sentiment then candidate Ahmadi-Nejad skillfully 
tapped into, after the previous government was criticized for 
prioritizing social reform over the economy.  We are not 
surprised by the fact that 92% ranked creation of new jobs and 
90% curbing inflation as very important tasks for the 
government, particularly given that 64% of respondents said they 
did not work. 
 
4.(C) It was noteworthy that the percentage who said 
Ahmadi-Nejad has failed to keep his campaign promise to "put oil 
money on the table of the people themselves" was not higher than 
56%.  Most Iranians we see in Dubai have only criticism for the 
president, but again we are unlikely to meet those people 
getting direct handouts on the president's provincial tours.  It 
would indicate that Ahmadi-Nejad's popularity may not be as low 
as it appears from the outside, but that many are still 
withholding judgment on his economic program.  This might 
explain the fact that less than half the respondents (42%) said 
they thought the Iranian economy was headed in the wrong 
direction, and barely more than half (52%) said the president's 
policies have not succeeded in reducing unemployment and 
inflation.  It seemed surprising that only 31.4% said their own 
economic situation was worse than when Ahmadi-Nejad took office 
in August 2005.  Nonetheless, only 18% of Iranians said the 
overall economic situation was excellent or good, despite the 
fact that reportedly journalists in Iran have been discouraged 
from writing negative stories about Iran's economy.   It is also 
important to note that some have benefited from rising property 
prices or from government largess. 
 
5.(C) On the other hand, it seems significant in a country 
riddled with corruption that a larger percent (36%) thought 
overall corruption had decreased since Ahmadi-Nejad came into 
office - promising to go after the "oil mafia" and others - than 
those who thought corruption had increased (28%).  Again, this 
sentiment is contrary to several IRPO Dubai interlocutors who 
believe that those charged with cleaning up the smuggling are 
the real smugglers themselves. 
 
Mixed views on nuclear issues 
------------------------------------- 
 
6.(C) Numerous Iranians have told us they hope Iran develops a 
nuclear weapon, but it is clear most would like their government 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000047  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
to prioritize improving the economy.  The reasons why those 
Iranians support acquisition of a nuclear weapon seem to focus 
on security and national pride.  Post-Iran-Iraq war trauma seems 
to infuse Iranian society, and Iranians seem to fear that one 
day in the future they could again be the victim of an aerial 
attack or invasion - either by the US, Israel, or a future 
aggressive neighbor.  While a few Iranians tell us they are 
hoping for a US attack to overthrow their government, most say 
Iranians do not want any more violent upheaval.  Some Iranians 
also cite national pride as a reason why they want a nuclear 
weapon, usually indicating that if Pakistan has a bomb, so 
should they.  They feel that Iran will be taken more seriously 
if armed with a weapon.  Even some Iranians who are extremely 
critical of their government still support acquiring a nuclear 
weapon.  They do not view this as entrenching the current 
government in power but as protecting the Iranian nation.  A few 
Iranians, however, tell us they do not believe their government 
is seeking a nuclear weapon. 
 
7.(C) The high numbers (79-80%) who responded they would favor 
Iran providing full inspections and a guarantee not to develop 
or possess nuclear weapons in exchange for various incentives is 
noteworthy, particularly as few Iranians we meet seem to know 
much about the contents of the P5+1 package on the table.  These 
results would suggest that they would support the package if 
information with more specifics could reach them.  It further 
reinforces the notion that the economy is much more important - 
at least to the Iranian people - than a nuclear program.  The 
finding that support for nuclear weapons drops to below 17% if 
Iran were to receive outside assistance in return for full 
inspections and a guarantee not to have nuclear weapons likely 
means that the respondents assumed such an agreement would 
improve the economy and at the same time, reduce the likelihood 
of military confrontation in the future. 
 
8.(C) It is not surprising that 78% of Iranians favor the 
development of nuclear energy, given all the government's 
rhetoric equating nuclear energy with progress and international 
stature.  Also, at the time the poll was taken, the price of 
gasoline had just been increased 25% and rationing was being 
discussed.  In addition, Iranians have long suffered from 
electrical outages and high levels of pollution in large cities. 
 This statistic tracks with what we hear from Iranians. 
 
US rapprochement 
----------------------- 
 
9.(C) The figure of 68% of Iranians strongly or somewhat 
favoring normal relations and trade with US tracks with Iranian 
pollster Abbas Abdi's infamous 2003 survey that landed him in 
prison.  It seems low compared to what we hear (mostly from 
Iranians in Dubai for US visas, which tends to color what they 
say to us).  However, we are cognizant of the fact that we meet 
few Iranians from the estimated 10-20% of society who are 
considered hard-core supporters of the Islamic Republic. 
 
10.(C) While it was not surprising that the European Union and 
specifically France rated higher than the US for desired trade 
relations, given their longstanding presence in Iran, we were 
surprised China and Russia outranked the US (64% strongly 
favored normal trade relations with China and 48% with Russia, 
versus 33% with the US).  Iranian markets are reportedly flooded 
with cheap Chinese goods.  While many say they would prefer 
higher quality US goods, perhaps many realize they would not be 
able to afford them even if they were available.  Although they 
may be perceived as reliable trade partners, as far as political 
partners, most Iranians tell us that the Chinese and the 
Russians cannot be trusted.  On the other hand, we were not 
surprised by the low rating the UK received (39%), given the 
widespread conspiracy theories we hear about continuing British 
"dominance" over Iran and "alliance with the mullahs." 
 
Attitudes toward government 
----------------------------------- 
 
11.(C) It is remarkable that 61% of respondents said over the 
phone that they strongly oppose (53%) or somewhat oppose (8%) "a 
political system where the 'Supreme Leader' rules according to 
religious principles and cannot be chosen or replaced by a 
direct vote of the people."  In the corollary question, 72% 
strongly supported and 7% somewhat supported a political system 
where the 'Supreme Leader,' along with all leaders, can be 
chosen and replaced by a free and direct vote of the people. 
This would indicate a high degree of disagreement with the 
concept of velayet-e faqih in Iran and a high desire for greater 
 
RPO DUBAI 00000047  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
democracy, which tracks with what Iranians tell us.  Because the 
wording of the question contain too many variables (existence of 
a 'Supreme Leader,' government based on religious principles, 
and issue of direct vote), however, it does not reliably measure 
level of overall approval of the existing government.  The very 
low degree of support (10%) for a return of a monarchial system 
tracks with what IRPO hears, although a number of people 
maintain that Iran "needs" an authoritarian leader. 
 
Financial assistance to terrorist groups 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
12.(C) The wording of several other questions - at least as 
translated into English on the organization's website 
terrorfreetomorrow.org - were also open to several 
interpretations.  The findings noted almost two-thirds of 
Iranians support "financial assistance" to groups like Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, Hizballah, and Iraqi Shia militias (notably a 
slighter larger "strong support" rating for Sunni Palestinian 
groups than Lebanese Shia Hizballah or Iraqi Shia militia 
groups).  This seems to contradict with what we largely hear - 
resentment that funds badly needed at home are shipped off to 
Arabs.  However, the question did not specify funds for 
humanitarian versus military support.  Groups like Hamas and 
Hizballah are widely recognized to be involved with many 
humanitarian projects, such as hospitals.  There is pervasive 
sympathy in Iran for Palestinian and Iraqi suffering, as well as 
fear that a normalized Iraq would once again turn against Iran. 
We also note that few Iranians with whom we talk seem to know 
anything about Iranian military assistance to Iraqi Shia groups. 
 Dividing the question would have given a more useful response. 
It is noteworthy in any case that support for this assistance is 
ranked lower than seeking trade and political relations with the 
West, even at the cost of recognition of Israel (55%).  Again, 
the economy is the Iranian people's primary immediate concern, 
with security likely a close second. 
 
Ranking priorities 
---------------------- 
 
13.(C) Another set of questions could be read in two different 
ways, at least in the English translation:  "I am going to read 
you a list of possible long-term goals for the government of 
Iran.  Please tell me whether you think these goals are very 
important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or not at 
all important for the government of Iran."  The respondents 
could have understood the question to ask if I think that the 
government should prioritize this or how I judge the government 
to be actually prioritizing this.  In any case, again, the 
economy by far got the highest rating of importance. 
BURNS