VZCZCXRO4473
RR RUEHCHI RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHPB
DE RUEHHI #1261/01 1980918
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 170918Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY HANOI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5831
INFO RUEHZU/ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 HANOI 001261 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP AND OES 
USDA FOR FAS (SMITH/BEASLEY) 
USDA FOR FSIS (MACZKA) 
HHS FOR FDA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO PTER APECO EAGR ETRD CA JA RS AS TH VM ID MY
RP, MX, RS, SN, BX, PP, HK, CH, CI, NZ, KS, PP, PE, TW 
SUBJECT:  NO SECURITY - NO BUSINESS: READOUT FROM JUNE 2007 APEC 
FOOD DEFENSE WORKSHOP IN VIETNAM 
 
REF: 2006 STATE 184154 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary: On June 14-15 in Hanoi, Vietnam, the United States 
and the Government of Vietnam hosted the follow-on Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) bioterrorism workshop to protect the 
food supply from deliberate contamination, in support of the APEC 
Food Defense initiative "Mitigating the Terrorist Threat to the APEC 
Food Supply."  The workshop focused on the potential threat to the 
food supply and distribution system, ways to communicate information 
among the various stakeholders, developing the appropriate 
supportive infrastructure, writing food defense plans that work for 
industry, and developing food defense communication strategies in 
advance of, during, and post event.  Speakers and participants 
continued to emphasize the importance of building a relationship 
between the private sector and government counterparts, engaging law 
enforcement (as well as the intelligence community), sharing 
information with all stakeholders in a timely manner, and 
prioritizing what areas need to be addressed first based on each 
economy's individual needs.  The discussions also led to the 
drafting of the groundbreaking APEC Food Defense Principles that the 
United States hopes to have endorsed by APEC Leaders and Ministers 
in September 2007.  By endorsing these Principles, APEC would be 
taking an unprecedented progressive stance on food defense, 
exceeding that of any other multilateral forum.  The meeting 
concluded with a consensus among APEC participants for the 
importance of continuing the dialogue and encouraging follow-on APEC 
discussions in the years to come.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (U) In 2006, the United States, along with co-sponsors Australia 
and Chile introduced and began implementing the "Mitigating the 
Terrorist Threat to APEC Food Supply" initiative at the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum's Counter-terrorism Task Force 
(CTTF).  This initiative looks to strengthen protection of the food 
supply from deliberate bioterrorist contamination through the use of 
vulnerability assessment tools applied to the food distribution 
system and to identify countermeasures to threats. 
¶3.  (U) In November 2006 the United States and Thailand co-hosted 
the first-ever APEC Food Defense Workshop in Bangkok, Thailand 
(reftel).  APEC Leaders also committed to working together to 
protect the food supply from deliberate contamination (APEC 2006 
Leaders' Statement issued in Hanoi). 
¶4.  (U)  Building on these 2006 efforts, the United States and 
Vietnam co-hosted a follow-on workshop in Hanoi in June 2007, which 
focused on building appropriate infrastructure, developing risk 
communication strategies, and building partnerships between 
governmental bodies and the private sector.  Fifteen APEC economies 
participated in the Hanoi workshop.  In addition to building on the 
work from the Bangkok workshop, the experts in Hanoi prepared a 
draft set of voluntary "APEC Food Defense Principles" that APEC 
economies are reviewing.  These principles put APEC in the forefront 
of international thinking on critical issues in protecting the food 
supply against deliberate terrorist contamination -- and help pave 
the way for sustained APEC counterterrorism efforts on food 
defense. 
---------------------------------  ------------------------- 
THE APEC "FOOD DEFENSE" WORKSHOP:  DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE FOOD DEFENSE 
STRATEGIES IN APEC ECONOMIES 
---------------------------------- ------------------------- 
 
¶5.   (U) The two-day workshop in Hanoi addressed the overarching 
goal of "Developing Effective Food Defense Strategies in APEC 
Economies" by focusing on four strategic topics: potential 
information sharing mechanisms, developing supportive infrastructure 
within the government and between governmental entities and the 
private sector, writing and developing food defense plans, and 
developing food defense communication strategies in advance of and 
during a food defense incident.  The United States and Vietnam set 
the tone at the outset of meeting by highlighting the 
interconnectivity of the global food supply in their welcoming 
remarks.  Both emphasized the importance of this on-going dialogue 
and called for a Food Defense deliverable at the APEC Summit later 
this year. 
 
¶6.  (U) Over the course of two days, several key themes emerged and 
were self-reinforcing.  Participants acknowledged the importance of 
establishing and strengthening public-private partnerships.  Several 
speakers (as well as participants) emphasized the importance of law 
enforcement's role in food defense preparedness and response, and 
the intelligence community's role in supporting food defense 
 
HANOI 00001261  002 OF 003 
 
 
activities.  (Comment:  This was particularly notable given that 
earlier discussions had indicated reticence about the law 
enforcement inclusion -- signaling a maturation in APEC economies' 
understanding of the truly multi-sectoral nature of addressing 
bioterrorism, including food defense. End Comment)  All presenters 
repeatedly emphasized that food defense builds on a strong food 
safety foundation.  Participants noted the importance of timely and 
transparent reporting and information sharing in order to minimize 
the risk to human health, trade, and society.  The developing 
economies also inquired how their economies could begin building 
such infrastructure given limited resources.  The last session of 
the workshop, in which the experts began developing potential Food 
Defense Principles, clearly reflected the exchange of ideas 
throughout the meeting. 
 
---------------- 
NOT A NEW THREAT 
---------------- 
 
¶7.  (U) Harry Gardiner from Canada's Food Inspection Agency touched 
on these elements, noting that targeting the food supply and 
distribution system was not a new threat, nor should it come as a 
surprise that it is a soft target given the ease in which one might 
target a node along the farm-to-food continuum.  He outlined steps 
Canada has taken to address food defense concerns, such as 
conducting threat and vulnerability assessments, exercises, building 
partnerships with Canadian private sector firms, and identifying 
gaps in risk assessments to determine S&T needs.  Both publicly and 
privately, he applauded U.S. efforts to address food defense 
concerns. 
 
------------------------- ------------------------------ 
NO SECURITY, NO BUSINESS: THE PRIVATE SECTOR PERSPECTIVE 
------------------------- ------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (U) Participation and engagement from individual companies and 
trade associations were particularly critical to the workshop's 
discussions and success.  Given that the private sector owns most, 
if not all, of the infrastructure, these participants described why 
it is important to build better relationships with the government, 
what type of regulatory landscape they need to implement or enforce 
certain measures, how to prioritize and implement certain food 
defense measures, and what they see as the risks if they do not take 
action.  At each opportunity, the private sector noted the 
importance of incorporating food defense into every aspect of their 
enterprise.  One of the private sector experts summed it up by 
succinctly stating, "NO SECURITY, NO BUSINESS" - meaning that lack 
of planning and preparedness would be disastrous in the event of a 
hoax or a deliberate contamination. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
DEVELOPING PLANS FOR DIVERSE STAKEHOLDERS 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U)  It was very clear that developing economies are thinking 
about how to begin building food defense infrastructure (e.g., 
specialized offices and lab capacity) and creating effective 
public-private partnerships to protect the food supply from 
terrorist attack.  Much discussion, for example, focused on how 
those just beginning to address food defense should do so with 
limited or no budgets.  The United States noted that it had faced 
similar dilemmas of limited or no resources when initiating efforts 
and emphasized the importance of prioritizing and adapting to 
individual needs.  The private sector also acknowledged there would 
be upfront costs, but noted many of the efforts improved efficiency 
over the longer term and in some instances, added to product 
marketability. 
 
------------------- 
INFORMATION SHARING 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) Both the private sector and government experts emphasized 
the importance of communication among ALL stakeholders - noting that 
this includes not only the obvious stakeholders, such as health, 
food regulators, agriculture, and affected sectors, but also law 
enforcement and intelligence communities.  Additionally, all agreed 
for the need to share information in a timely and transparent 
manner.  For example, New Zealand (NZ) noted during its presentation 
that an economy runs the risk of losing its international market 
share if it is not forthcoming with trade partners, citing NZ's own 
response to minimize the impact of an accidental contamination to 
their export market.  WHO's Jenifer Bishop presented WHO's work on 
 
HANOI 00001261  003 OF 003 
 
 
the International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN), as a 
potential example for sharing information internationally.  She 
noted that the newly-revised and adopted International Health 
Regulations (IHR) specifically included food defense under the 
public health emergencies of international concerns (PHEIC) and that 
INFOSAN would be responsible for the dissemination of the 
information in such an event. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
DEVELOPING APEC FOOD DEFENSE PRINCIPLES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) To move APEC's food defense work forward, experts from the 
range of economies collaborated on the development of "APEC Food 
Defense Principles" -- fundamental areas of importance in protecting 
the food supply from deliberate contamination.  The draft principles 
represent the start of a process that could help put APEC on the 
road to giving multilateral voice to an important issue.  The United 
States indicated it will push for APEC endorsement of the 
principles, and signaled its desire for acknowledgement of the work 
in this year's APEC Leaders' and Ministerial Statements. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Comment:  The level of interest and awareness among APEC 
economies has increased considerably since the 2006 Bangkok meeting 
- resulting in more robust and lively exchange among economies on 
how to address food defense across the spectrum of stages of 
economic development.  Unlike the Bangkok meeting where it was clear 
that only the United States, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand were 
focusing on food defense, the other economies came this time seeking 
information on ways to introduce and begin implementing food defense 
efforts in their respective economies.  (Note: Canada did not attend 
the last meeting. End Note.)  One reason for possible increased 
awareness and engagement is likely due to the fact that many of the 
experts participated in the first meeting in Bangkok. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
U.S. DELEGATION OBSERVATIONS ABOUT SELECTED ECONOMIES 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶13. (U) PERU - During side bar conversations, it was apparent Peru 
is thinking ahead to its own APEC host year.  Peru expressed strong 
interest in hosting any follow-on work in 2008, and intimated having 
funds to support the activity.  It also appears that Peru was trying 
to obtain regional support and possibly assistance from its 
neighboring APEC members. 
 
¶14. (U) THAILAND - Technical experts from Thailand noted that 
Thailand would begin incorporating food defense into their internal 
dialogue, noting that it hoped the United States would provide 
speakers to their national Food Safety meeting.  They also inquired 
if the United States would be willing to co-host the event.  The 
U.S. delegation indicated it would have to consult with Washington 
and asked for a written request (proposal), which could be shared 
with the appropriate USG agencies for review. 
 
¶15. (SBU) On a final note, while none of the economies have directly 
or overtly accused the United States of using food defense as a 
means of creating a trade barrier, at least within APEC, some have 
questioned whether this will inadvertently happen.  To date, the 
United States has managed to address all trade concerns raised by 
various economies and has avoided any contentious discussions during 
the food defense discussions.  The United States should be aware 
that these unvoiced concerns might be a subtext for future 
discussions.  (Australia and New Zealand both candidly acknowledge 
they participate in this effort not only out of mutual concern, but 
also to learn about any changes or efforts underway that may impact 
their exports to the United States.) End Comment. 
 
¶16.  (U) The U.S. delegation drafted and cleared this cable.  Any 
questions regarding this workshop and these efforts should be 
directed to OES's Office of International Health and Biodefense 
(COMELLANX@STATE.GOV; 202-647-4689). 
 
¶17. (U) Posts' and Department's work, along with the strong 
interagency collaboration with USDA's Food Safety and Inspection 
Service (FSIS) and Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), and HHS's 
Food and Drug Administration helped make the APEC Food Defense 
Workshop a success. 
 
MARINE