VZCZCXRO9500
PP RUEHLMC RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0264/01 2040731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 230731Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3631
INFO RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0593
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 0959
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0193
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0738
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNMCM/MCC COLLECTIVE
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3009

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, IO, INL 
USUN FOR RICHARD MCCURRY 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
DOD/OSD FOR DASD CLAD AND IPSEN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/23/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MAAR ASEC KPKO UN TT
SUBJECT: USG ENGAGEMENT WITH TAUR MATAN RUAK 
 
REF: A) 2006 DILI 517 B) DILI 120 
 
DILI 00000264  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Major Ron Sargent, US Defense Representative, 
U.S. Embassy, Dili, East Timor, Department of Defense. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
Summary 
-------- 
 
¶1. (C) In October 2006, a UN commission of inquiry recommended 
that the Timor Leste judicial authorities prosecute Brigadier 
General Ruak, chief of the local defense force, as a result of 
his actions during the spring 2006 crisis.  The Timor Leste 
prosecutors reportedly began an investigation, but indicated to 
us that it may be shelved due to lack of evidence.  Meanwhile, 
both our Australian allies and the leadership of the United 
Nations in Timor maintain strong and active engagement with BG 
Ruak - the Australians have invited him to a Pacific Armies 
conference in Sydney in August 2007.  As a respected member of 
the political leadership in East Timor, we believe that 
interaction with Ruak is essential in order to reform the Timor 
security sector, including the evolution of its military in the 
medium term towards modest national and coast guards.  To this 
end, we recommend that BG Ruak be invited to PACOM's October 
2007 Chiefs of Defense Conference.  We would immediately 
reassess our engagement should the Timor prosecutors at some 
point in the future hand down an indictment against Ruak.  End 
Summary. 
 
Future USG engagement with Brigadier General Ruak 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (C) The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) report on the Timor 
Leste crisis of May/April 2006 recommended that Brigadier 
General Taur Matan Ruak, Chief of the Timor Leste Defense Force 
(F-FDTL), be prosecuted for distributing weapons to civilians at 
the height of the conflict.  The COI also recommended that some 
sixty other individuals be prosecuted for separate actions. 
While there may have been mitigating factors to help explain 
TMR's actions at the height of the April/May 2006 crisis, the 
allegations suggest serious lapses of judgment and leadership. 
This poses a question for the USG: when and to what end do we 
engage with TMR as long as he remains subject to possible 
indictment and prosecution? 
 
¶3. (C) The COI itself emphasized that it was "neither a tribunal 
nor a prosecuting authority."  Its recommendations remain just 
that: recommendations to the Timor Leste judicial authorities. 
Very senior contacts in the government of East Timor Office of 
the Prosecutor General (OPG) indicate they may shelve their 
investigation of TMR's actions due to a lack of evidence.  Atul 
Khare, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) in Dili, told the Ambassador on July 20 that the UN is 
intent on assisting the OPG complete all its investigations and, 
to this end, will soon dispatch one additional international 
staff from Geneva and will launch a fundraising appeal to 
further augment OPG resources.  In any case, in a strict legal 
sense, although an investigation may/may someday lead to an 
indictment and prosecution, TMR currently is subject to neither. 
 
¶4. (C) Within Timor Leste's very small pool of effective 
leadership, TMR stands out as a highly respected leader deriving 
from his 25 years of active resistance against the Indonesian 
occupation in the mountains of Timor.  He is seen as a peer by 
President Ramos-Horta, former President Gusmao and the rest of 
the local political elite, and his counsel has been solicited as 
this leadership strains to form a new government.  Although TMR 
indicated in 2005 interest in resigning his command perhaps to 
pursue political aspirations of his own, he is fully expected to 
continue to serve as commander of the F-FDTL in the new 
government.  During the past electoral cycle, TMR stoutly 
ensured the military's political neutrality.  In a conversation 
with the Ambassador, SRSG Khare assessed TMR as being in command 
of his troops and, when contacted by Khare with a request, quick 
to act and effective. 
 
To what end should we engage TMR? 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Timor Leste's military organization is in tremendous need 
of further professionalization and clarification of its mission. 
 
DILI 00000264  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 Together with our Australian allies we can assist through 
interaction with other elements of the F-FDTL leadership, but 
engagement with TMR is critical given his stature and command of 
the organization.  Our goal, in coordination with Australia and 
the UN, should be to urge the F-FDTL to a medium term evolution 
towards a national guard and a proper coast guard relevant to 
Timor's needs.  Given the absurd, outlandish Force 2020 proposal 
that TMR has at least formally embraced, we will need to be 
patient and persuasive in helping to redefine the country's 
future force structure.  But at present we can only do this 
through engagement with TMR himself. 
 
¶6. (C) Our allies, the Australians, with more than a thousand 
active troops on the ground in Timor Leste, continue to interact 
with Brigadier General Ruak.  In recent conversations with the 
ambassador, both the Australian ambassador and the 
soon-to-depart International Security Force commander 
characterized their interaction with TMR as close and improving. 
 Accordingly, the GOA has invited TMR to the August 6-9, 2007, 
Pacific Armies Commanders' Conference in Sydney (co-hosted by 
the U.S.).  In the case of the UN, with 1600 police personnel 
in-country, SRSG Khare told the ambassador he is in regular 
contract with TMR and has repeatedly relied on him for effective 
assistance in keeping the peace. 
 
Recommendation 
-------------- 
 
¶7. (C) We recommend the USG continue its engagement with BG Taur 
Matan Ruak with the objective of encouraging his leadership in 
the reform of Timor's security sector, including the role and 
mission of the F-FDTL.  Our engagement should include an 
invitation to TMR to attend PACOM's 2007 Chiefs of Defense 
(CHOD) Conference. 
 
¶8. (C) We will immediately reassess this recommendation should 
the Timor Leste Office of the Prosecutor General at some point 
in the future decide to indict TMR and again if such an 
indictment lead to his prosecution.  We would also make a 
reassessment should the Embassy independently obtain evidence 
that would substantially alter our view of TMR's actions in 2006 
or at any other time. 
 
Additional background 
--------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Below find additional background on the events of 
May/April 2006 and TMR's role drawn primarily from the COI 
report, as well as our own sources and observations during that 
period.  We also provide detail on the status of the Prosecutor 
General's consideration of the COI recommendations. 
 
¶10. (U) The United Nation's Special Commission of Inquiry (COI) 
was established following an invitation from then-Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Jose Ramos-Horta to the UN 
Secretary General.  Its mandate, outlined in UN Security Council 
 
SIPDIS 
Resolution 1690, was to establish the facts and circumstances of 
the incidents that took place on April 28-29, and May 23-25, 
2006, and related events or issues that contributed to the 
crisis.  Additionally, it was to clarify responsibility for 
those events, and recommend measures of accountability for 
crimes and serious violations of human rights committed during 
these periods.  It is important to note that the COI itself in 
its final report emphasized that it was "neither a tribunal nor 
a prosecuting authority.  It makes no conclusions about the 
guilt beyond reasonable doubt of specific persons.  Rather, it 
identifies individuals reasonably suspected of participation in 
serious criminal activity and recommends that these people be 
prosecuted under the domestic law." 
 
¶11. (C) The COI's report addressed two key events involving the 
F-FDTL: its intervention in response to the April 28 riots, 
during which there were allegations that a massacre had been 
carried out and then covered up; and the May 25 incident in 
which soldiers opened fire on unarmed national police (PNTL) 
being evacuated from their headquarters under UN escort. 
 
DILI 00000264  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
Regarding the events of April 28, the COI found that the 
Government failed to follow the requisite legislative procedures 
in calling out the F-FDTL, but that there was no massacre as 
alleged.  (Note: TMR was out of the country at the time the 
decision was taken and was not consulted.)  Regarding the events 
of May 25 the COI found that, although TMR failed to exhaust all 
avenues to prevent or stop the F-FDTL versus PNTL conflict, he 
could not be held criminally responsible for the shooting of the 
unarmed PNTL officers by F-FDTL soldiers.  However, the report 
included a recommendation that TMR be prosecuted for 
distributing weapons to civilians.  This was based on an order 
TMR gave on May 24 to arm 206 civilians, a group which comprised 
a large number of ex-FALINTIL guerilla fighters and 64 National 
Police (PNTL) officers who had sided with F-FDTL only days 
prior.  The order was given with the knowledge of then-Defense 
Minister Roque Rodrigues, likewise recommended for prosecution, 
and possibly of then-Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri.  Eleven of 
the thus armed individuals were tasked by TMR to conduct 
security operations on May 25 in Central Dili near F-FDTL's 
operational headquarters.  These individuals, including the 
leader of this group - a well-known ex-FALINTIL fighter known as 
Oan Kiak - were also recommended by the COI for prosecution as a 
result of a murder and a shooting injury which occurred at this 
site.  (Oan Kiak's case remains under investigation and is 
expected to eventually result in indictment.) 
 
¶12. (C) East Timor's Office of the Prosecutor General (OPG) has 
been slowly tackling the COI recommendations, in some cases 
pursuing indictments and in others determining that there is 
insufficient evidence to do so.  (The OPG's is operating with 
extremely constrained personnel resources, with only two 
international prosecutors assigned to the COI cases.)  Recently, 
the Deputy Prosecutor General, Ivo Valente, whom Post and other 
international observers regard highly, informed us that the OPG 
will soon conclude its investigation of TMR.  Valente stated 
that based on present information, the OPG is coming to the 
conclusion that TMR did not take steps to intentionally break 
the law, and would "likely not pursue an indictment against TMR 
due to lack of evidence".  Instead, he said, the case will 
likely be archived soon. 
 
¶13. (SBU) UN SRSG Khare told the ambassador on July 20 that a UN 
staff member from Geneva will soon be dispatched to the OPG to 
assist investigations flowing out of the COI report.  In 
addition, Khare said that an international donor appeal would be 
launched in the fall/winter of 2007 to raise $6 million to 
further augment the OPG with international judicial expertise to 
conclude investigations on all COI recommendations.  Khare said 
it is the UN's policy to stress to the OPG that all 
recommendations must be fully investigated.  In the meantime, as 
long as TMR remains unindicted, Khare's personnel engagement 
with the commander is regular and unconstrained. 
 
¶14. (C) Post notes that TMR's decision to arm 206 individuals 
who were not members of the F-FDTL was ill-considered and 
ultimately served to further inflame an already violent and 
complicated situation.  It can be viewed in the broader context 
of the state of an institution still in transition from a 
resistance / guerilla organization to a national defense force 
and the circumstances in which the decision was taken.  By 
mid-May 2006, Timor Leste had seen the desertion of over 600 
disaffected soldiers-a loss of nearly 40 percent of the defense 
force.  At the same time, TMR was contemplating the rise of a 
multiplicity of dissident forces to include the military 
petitioners, the well-armed Major Alfredo Reinado Group, and a 
mix of other dissidents.  Many in these groups aligned 
themselves against F-FDTL because of claims of discrimination 
within its ranks, and because it intervened on the basis of 
illegal orders on April 28-29.  At the time, accusations that 
the F-FDTL had carried out a massacre on April 28-29 (an 
allegation for which the COI found no basis) were further 
focusing anti-F-FDTL sentiment.  Rumors of impending attacks and 
gathering dissident forces in the hills were rife, causing Dili 
residents to stream out of the city, and as it turned out were 
not entirely unfounded.  Without question, TMR's defense force 
was in shambles, and his ability to manage its many challenges 
 
DILI 00000264  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
was faltering.  In addition, PNTL units around Dili were 
splintering along similar regional and political lines. 
 
¶15. (C) On May 23 the dissident group led by Major Alfredo 
Reinado, who had left his post as commander of the military 
police only 20 days earlier, opened fire on F-FDTL in the hills 
overlooking East Dili initiating a deadly exchange causing 
losses on both sides.  On May 24, the armed conflict in and 
around Dili widened to include hours of battle between various 
dissident forces in the hills West of Dili and the F-FDTL 
headquarters at Tasi Tolu, which at the time appeared to be the 
target of attack.  On the same day, TMR's home in Dili was 
attacked while his family, including young children, was in the 
house.  In this context, as TMR himself stated to COI 
investigators, it had become obvious to him that his defense 
force lacked the capacity to manage these near simultaneous 
attacks, and he was becoming increasingly concerned about the 
lack of control his defense force was able to project both in 
Dili and the surrounding countryside.  These were the 
circumstances in which he made the call to arm what he saw as a 
"reserve" force comprising primarily former resistance fighters 
loyal to him.  As he saw it, the capital city appeared to be 
surrounded by several hundred rebels in the hills and was on the 
brink of chaos.  Of the 850 or so soldiers still with the 
defense force at this time, TMR probably had at his disposal no 
more than 400-600. 
 
¶16. (C) TMR has always characterized his decision on May 24 as 
focused on the arming of "reservists", and not of "civilians", 
and therefore not illegal.  F-FDTL originally was supposed to 
comprise 1,500 active troops consisting of a mix of ex-FALINTIL 
guerillas and new recruits, and 1,500 reservists consisting 
primarily of ex-FALINTIL guerillas and clandestine operatives. 
Although this reserve force had yet to be formally constituted, 
it is clear from TMR's statements following the May 23-25 period 
that he regarded it as a reality.  From their shared roots in 
the 24-year struggle against the Indonesian occupation, TMR and 
his "reservists" already possessed a relationship that 
transcended in their view the need for a formal organization. 
Virtually all of the weapons issued under TMR's orders were 
recorded and returned shortly thereafter. 
 
¶17. (C) TMR bears responsibility for leadership of the 
institution during this period.  That said, he had to maneuver 
in a situation in which the F-FDTL was severely constrained as 
an institution by incompetence and neglect by the Ministry of 
Defense; where other national leaders endeavored to push F-FDTL 
into becoming more of a political actor than a national and 
impartial force; and while F-FDTL sought to transition from a 
resistance / guerilla force to a national defense force. 
Moreover, it should be noted that following the violent events 
of May 2006, TMR maintained F-FDTL discipline.  For example, 
F-FDTL fully observed political neutrality during the three 
election rounds despite a tense and at times violent campaign 
environment. 
 
¶18. (C/NF) While fully acknowledging the F-FDTL role in last 
year's crisis and the long-term challenges of the institution, 
the Government of Australia has continued full engagement with 
all facets of the Timorese defense establishment.  This reflects 
both a conviction that close engagement is the only way to 
influence the institution's direction, and the concern that 
disengagement would only push the F-FDTL further into the arms 
of less conscientious donors such as Beijing.  During the height 
of the crisis, uniformed Australian military Defense Cooperation 
Program (DCP) advisors were both near TMR and imbedded within 
the F-FDTL hierarchy.  They have consistently proven able to 
offer clear insights into the Timorese decision-making processes 
occurring throughout last year, and corroborate the above 
portrayal of TMR's actions.  Australian officials in Dili 
continue to convey to us that the GOA remains fully committed to 
its support of F-FDTL, and acknowledge that a key aspect of this 
is their continued close engagement of TMR.  Most recently, the 
Australian Ambassador confirmed that the GOA invited TMR to the 
August 6-9 Pacific Armies Commanders' Conference in Sydney to be 
co-hosted by Australia and the U.S. 
KLEMM