VZCZCXRO1142
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #2280/01 2051701
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 241701Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6243
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

"S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 002280 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA FO 
NSC FOR NENA 
SECDEF FOR OSD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017 
TAGS: ECON EFIN KPAL MARR PGOV PREL SU EG IS IZ IR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE JULY 31 VISIT OF SECRETARIES 
RICE AND GATES TO SHARM EL SHEIKH 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone 
for reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) The Egyptians welcome the joint visit of the 
Secretaries of State and Defense as a clear signal of mutual 
 
SIPDIS 
recognition of shared strategic interests, despite recent 
highly publicized bilateral tensions.  President Mubarak and 
ministers Aboul Gheit, Tantawi, and Soliman, expect the focus 
of the bilateral sessions to be on restarting the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and Iraq.  They are also 
keenly interested in U.S. intentions towards Iran, and we can 
exploit the bilats to press on Sudan.  We should also remind 
the Egyptians that we want them to approach democratic 
political reform as a positive and enduring element in our 
relations, and neither a cause for antagonism nor a passing 
USG interest that they can successfully outwait.  At the 
""Gulf Cooperation Council Plus Two"" meeting, the Egyptians 
will work with us constructively, though typically with scant 
initiative, on addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
Iraq, Lebanon, terror, and weapons of mass destruction. 
 
THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM 
 
¶2. (S) The Egyptians are eager to see a re-energizing of the 
peace process. In public, they reacted moderately positively 
to the President's July 16 speech, though in private they say 
they see little new in it.  The instability of Gaza continues 
to vex the Egyptians.  Hamas' June takeover of Gaza has now 
left the GoE and Hamas face to face on the Philadelphi 
corridor.  The Egyptians have told us repeatedly that they do 
not seek immediate Hamas-Palestinian Authority rapprochement, 
but they do see this as ultimately necessary -- after first 
""squeezing"" Hamas.  The GoE evidently has maintained limited 
contact with Hamas, not so much to seek Palestinian 
reconciliation as to avoid clashes on the border, and to keep 
Egypt involved as ""a player."" 
 
¶3. (S) The Egyptians deeply resent Israeli complaints that 
Egypt either cannot or will not stop smuggling into Gaza, 
even as the Treaty of Peace precludes Egypt from stationing 
military forces on the border.  As we and the Israelis have 
stepped up the pressure on this issue, the MoD has begun more 
emphatically to assert a need to ""revisit"" with the Israelis 
the terms of the 28-year-old Treaty.  They also have invited 
any Americans who will take the trouble to observe first hand 
their efforts at combating smuggling along the Philadelphi 
corridor.  Two Congressional delegations have visited Rafah 
recently.  The Egyptians continue to communicate with the 
Israelis through EGIS and military channels in their efforts 
to find and destroy smuggling tunnels.  We have urged them to 
maximize the amount of Border Guard Forces allowed per 
GoI-GoE agreements, including in ""Zone B,"" and to use these 
increases to support their mission along Philadelphi.  We 
also have informed them of Israeli interest in increasing the 
channels of communication at the border, to include civilian 
security services. 
 
¶4. (C) The closure of the Rafah crossing since June 9 has 
stranded thousands of Gazans in Egypt.  The GoE, GoI, and PA, 
with our support, appear to have reached high-level political 
agreement on July 22 to allow the Gazans to return via 
Israel, but this process has not yet started on the ground. 
 
IRAQ 
 
¶5.  (S) Constantly in private and occasionally in public, 
Mubarak and Aboul Gheit continue to stress that a precipitous 
U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be a ""double"" disaster. 
Mubarak has led Arab political engagement with the Iraqi 
government.  Since receiving PM Maliki in April and hosting 
him again at the Iraq Neighbors Conference in Sharm in early 
May, Mubarak has received Iraqi (Sunni) VP Hashemi in June, 
and this month Egypt has hosted U.S.-sponsored training 
sessions for Iraqi technocrats.  The GoE views as further 
evidence of GoI incompetence the fact that the GoI has not 
responded to repeated GoE urging to nominate an Iraqi 
ambassador to Cairo.  While welcoming the visits of PM Maliki 
and his predecessor, as well as president Talabani, FM 
Zebari, and NSA Rubaei, the GoE also maintains discreet and 
limited contacts with legitimate non-violent Iraqi opposition 
figures, notably Ayad al-Allawy and Adnan Pachachi.  Mubarak 
frankly expects the Maliki government to fail, and continues 
to see a ""strong but fair"" leader as the most urgent 
requirement for Iraqi stability.  Egypt has scored some 
successes against the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq, but 
transit to Iraq through Syria (which does not require visas 
 
CAIRO 00002280  002 OF 003 
 
 
for Arab citizens) remains a problem.  Foreign Ministry 
contacts have told us the ""GCC Plus Two"" participants are in 
wait-and-see mode in expectation of General Petraeus' 
September report. 
 
POLITICAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP 
 
¶6. (C) We have two vital security interests with Egypt:  its 
peace with Israel, and unfettered U.S. military access to the 
Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace, including ground-based 
support for USAF operations. The Egyptian political and 
military leadership has long controlled and guaranteed both 
of these U.S. interests, despite negative popular attitudes. 
The GoE has made it clear that they directly link our FMF 
assistance to their protection of our strategic interests 
here.  Egyptian leaders have continued to express their ire 
at the recent congressional effort to place conditions on 
FMF, arguing that any reduction would send a powerfully 
negative message ""to the Egyptian people"" that the U.S. is 
reconsidering the strategic basis of the relationship, rooted 
in Camp David. 
 
¶7. (C) The GoE should work with us to strengthen and update 
the military relationship within the context of explicit 
shared interests, such as the global war on terrorism, border 
security, and PKOs.  In addition, we should be clear that 
Egyptian democracy and human rights issues are enduring, core 
American interests and will remain significant factors in the 
FMF assistance debate.  Our reduction of Bright Star to a 
table-top exercise sharply disappointed the MoD, but they now 
appear accurately to have grasped the reasons for this.  More 
recently, the Egyptians came through with emergency 
ammunition for Lebanon, ultimately reducing their initially 
inflated prices to fair levels.  A few words of thanks to 
Tantawi from SecDef would help us the next time we turn to 
MoD for such help. 
 
IRAN 
 
¶8. (C) Mubarak's long-standing suspicion of ""Shiite"" Iranian 
machinations is unabated, not least because he knows the 
general Egyptian populace is historically and theologically 
""soft on Shiism.""  Hamas' ascendancy in Gaza has only 
increased GoE leadership concerns about the need to counter 
Iranian influence over Hamas, particularly due to Hamas' 
links with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Gazan family 
ties to the Bedouin in Sinai.  President Mubarak and his 
national security team will seek a readout of our intentions 
on Iran.  They have told us outright that they suspect we are 
setting the stage for a military strike against Iran. 
 
SUDAN 
 
¶9. (C) Although Egyptian officials will say that Sudanese 
president Bashir,s acceptance of the hybrid force obviates 
the need for &further pressure,8 we should nonetheless push 
them to press Bashir on accepting UN command and control and 
a full Chapter VII mandate for the hybrid force in a UNSCR 
currently under discussion. Egypt,s primary concern 
continues to be the stability and territorial integrity of 
its southern neighbor, and Aboul Gheit has praised UN/AU 
initiatives to bring together Darfur Peace Agreement 
non-signatories as showing that the international community 
is united in pressing all parties for peace.  Increasing 
confrontations between Egyptian security forces and Sudanese 
refugees being smuggled into Israel have occurred recently, 
resulting in the deaths of several refugees.  The MFA has 
denied the GoI's claim, widely reported in the Israeli media, 
that Mubarak ""agreed"" with Olmert in Sharm in late June not 
to refoule Sudanese refugees, should Israel deport them to 
Egypt. 
 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 
 
¶10. (S) Egypt's domestic political situation has reverted to 
stagnation, as the country fatalistically awaits Mubarak's 
departure.  Economic growth continues, but the poorest 
Egyptians have yet to benefit proportionately to their 
numbers.  Prices continue to rise, and the freer media 
environment gives greater salience to populist opposition to 
continuing, though slower, privatization of public companies 
and banks.  Labor has also protested salary delays and 
perceived threats of layoffs, with wildcat strikes and 
occupation of factories -- another political phenomenon given 
greater impact by a freer media.  The GOE's campaign of 
arrests and intimidation of the Muslim Brotherhood resulted 
 
CAIRO 00002280  003 OF 003 
 
 
in the MB's ""independent"" candidates winning none of the 
seats in the June 11 Shura Council (upper house) elections, 
which were dominated by candidates from Mubarak's ruling 
National Democratic party.  The GoE continues to use a 
military tribunal to prosecute 40 MB activists on money 
laundering and related charges. 
 
DEMOCRACY 
 
¶11. (C) Elements of the GoE-controlled press attacked 
democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim for his participation 
in a late May meeting on Arab democracy in Doha, as well as 
his attendance at a June 6 meeting with President Bush in 
Prague.  Ibrahim is traveling outside Egypt.  NDP legislators 
and pro-GoE writers have called for his arrest and trial on 
treason charges upon his return, but Mubarak and Aboul Gheit 
have assured the Ambassador, albeit back-handedly, that 
Ibrahim and other such dissidents, whose cases we have 
pressed, have ""nothing to fear.""  We have also raised with 
Mubarak, PM Nazif, and Aboul Gheit the arrests and harassment 
by GoE security services of several religious activists. 
USAID continues to fund a robust range of democracy programs 
with Egyptian civil society, but we expect continued GoE 
controls and outright pressure on NGOs.  We maintain close 
contacts with Gameela Ismail, wife of Ayman Nour, who tells 
us that she is hopeful that Nour's request for a health-based 
parole will be granted on July 31.  We detect no change in 
the GOE's stance on Nour. 
RICCIARDONE 
"