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C O N F I D E N T I A L BUJUMBURA 000543 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017/07/26 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL BY
SUBJECT: BURUNDI'S CNDD-FDD PARTY SEEKS USG HELP IN 
POLITICAL STALEMATE 
 
 
Classified By: Classified By: Ambassador Patricia Moller for reasons 1. 
4b and d. 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  On July 26, the President of Burundi,s 
ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces 
for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) party, Jeremie 
Ngendakumana, appealed to Ambassador Moller for assistance 
in resolving the government,s impasse with Burundi,s major 
political opposition parties, Front for Democracy in Burundi 
(FRODEBU) and Unity for National Progress (UPRONA). 
He wanted particularly to know the  real reasons, for 
FRODEBU,s reluctance to cooperate with the current 
government 
of Burundi (GOB), and to ascertain why UPRONA feels it 
deserves more representation -- at the highest levels of 
government -- than Burundi,s constitution allows. 
Ngendakumana 
accused FRODEBU of actively seeking an alliance with the 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL, and chided UPRONA for insisting upon 
additional positions at the highest levels of Burundi,s 
government with little regard for the political structure 
set forth by Burundi,s constitution. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Responding to Ngendakumana, the Ambassador expressed 
support for a solution agreed-to by all parties, and said she 
would convey the same message to UPRONA and FRODEBU.  Laying 
the onus to maintain a dialogue squarely on the government, 
Ambassador Moller stressed the need for negotiation, warning 
that, if no solution could be found, consequent political 
instability would eventually negate the great progress made 
by Burundi over the last two years, and jeopardize donor and 
other international cooperation.  Importantly, a failure by 
Burundi,s President Nkurunziza and his ruling CNDD-FDD party 
to resolve this political impasse would virtually demolish 
their ability to govern effectively and give impetus to the 
eddying whispers of possible impeachment proceedings. 
She said it would be a tragic failure (for Burundi) to lose 
the ability to govern itself and urged all the political 
principals, notably CNDD-FDD, to act out of patriotism and 
regard for the future of Burundi and its people, rather than 
to seek personal and political gain.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Historical Context 
------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) Burundi,s election of 2005 resulted in a decisive 
win 
for the CNDD-FDD party and its leaders, Burundi,s new 
President Pierre Nkurunziza and party head, Hussein Radjabu. 
The ruling government quickly came under fire from FRODEBU 
and UPRONA.  Both loudly claimed that CNDD-FDD was exploiting 
its clear majority by ignoring the dictates of the Burundi 
constitution in doling out key ministerial positions, handing 
them to CNDD-FDD members rather than proportionally to 
members of other parties, in accordance with election 
results. 
Despite repeated calls to adhere to the law, CNDD-FDD party 
leaders Nkurunziza and Radjabu appeared to manage the 
executive branch of the government according to their own 
wishes.  Following the removal of Radjabu as president of 
CNDD-FDD at the congress of Ngozi on February 7, 
a major schism has developed within the ruling party, 
exacerbated by Radjabu,s claim that he would form a new 
party as a CNDD-FDD off-shoot.  This perceived new weakness 
within the CNDD-FDD has emboldened opposition parties, in 
particular FRODEBU, to challenge CNDD-FDD,s stranglehold on 
Burundi,s political process and to work actively to destroy, 
or at the very least, to discredit Nkurunziza,s government. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In the wake of President Nkurunziza,s most recent 
cabinet appointments that again fail to accommodate the 
demands of the minority parties, there have been renewed 
calls for action to restore the political legitimacy of 
the government including, albeit tacitly, whispers of 
possible impeachment proceedings against the President. 
Although a successful impeachment of the Nkurunziza is 
unlikely (See Comment a.), the very fact of its consideration 
in Burundi,s parliament would effectively moot the 
President,s ability to manage the proceedings of the 
executive branch of the government.  In the worst case, 
if the President were successfully impeached, his successor 
(See Comment b.) would be ineffectual domestically and 
Burundi would be considered outside its borders as 
politically 
unstable.  The real tragedy of an impeachment attempt, 
successful or not, would be that the government would be 
 
hamstrung in its ability to progress toward the economic and 
social development so desperately needed by Burundi,s 
people. 
(Comment:  a. An impeachment of the president can only be 
successful with a 2/3 majority in total of both Burundi,s 
National Assembly and Senate.  b. In the event of a 
successful 
impeachment of President Nkurunziza, another member of his 
CNDD-FDD party must be elected by the Burundi parliament. 
End Comment.) 
 
---------------------------- 
Meeting with the Ambassador 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  At his request, CNDD-FDD ruling party president 
Jeremie Ngendakumana, former Burundian Ambassador to Kenya, 
met privately with Ambassador Moller on July 26. Ngendakumana 
expressed his concern over the constitutional validity of 
Burundi President Pierre Nkurunziza,s newly named cabinet 
and the potential for increased political strife its 
composition would cause.  In particular, Ngendakumana 
criticized the two major political opposition parties, 
FRODEBU and UPRONA, for their reluctance to actively 
participate in the creation of an acceptable coalition 
government according to the results of the 2005 elections. 
He explained that, on several occasions, President Nkurunziza 
had afforded both opposition parties the opportunity to 
nominate candidates for each of the government,s ministerial 
positions but had received no response.  Without input from 
the opposition, and interpreting their silence as 
unwillingness to join his government, President Nkurunziza 
named a new cabinet, which continues to be dominated by his 
own party.  Ambassador Ngendakumana cited what he claimed 
were the roadblocks erected by FRODEBU and UPRONA to the 
successful formation of a coalition government. 
 
------------------------------ 
FRODEBU - A Disruptive Force? 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C)  Ngendakumana claimed that FRODEBU is actively 
working 
to discredit Nkurunziza,s government, and actively seeking 
an 
alliance with the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to advance its political 
aims 
during Burundi,s next round of elections in 2010. The 
CNDD-FDD 
party head claims that FRODEBU is  scared, that the recent 
success of Burundi,s Partner Roundtable and its potential to 
dramatically improve the lives of ordinary Burundians will 
only serve to strengthen President Nkurunziza and his ruling 
party.  Ngendakumana further maintained that FRODEBU will be 
a 
disruptive force to any of the economic and social 
improvement 
projects generated through donor cooperation. 
 
¶7.  (C) Ngendakumana accused FRODEBU of engineering the 
recent 
exodus of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL.  Additionally, according to 
Ngendakumana, FRODEBU believes that CNDD-FDD,s success in 
the 2005 elections can be attributed, in part, to the 
existence of a military wing of the party.  So, he surmised, 
FRODEBU,s recent association with the militaristic 
PALIPEHUTU-FNL is the beginning of an alliance that FRODEBU 
believes will help ensure its political success in 2010. 
Despite his assertions regarding the PALIPEHUTU-FNL role in 
the degradation of Nkurunziza,s government, Ngendakumana 
believes that the rebel PALIPEHUTU-FNL will soon be back at 
the negotiating table. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
UPRONA - Demanding a Right or an Advantage? 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  According to Ambassador Ngendakumana, the UPRONA 
party is persistently demanding greater representation at 
the highest levels of Nkurunziza,s government, despite 
having 
already garnered a disproportionate number (15) of high 
political positions (See Comment a.), including Burundi,s 
First Vice President, Dr. Martin Nduwimana. (See Comment b.) 
 
Ngendakumana pointed to the historical dominance of UPRONA 
-- in power from 1966 - 1994 and from 1996 - 2003 -- as their 
 
impetus for demanding a greater presence in the current 
government.  Ngendakumana claims to have asked UPRONA leaders 
if their requests for additional government positions were 
being made to realize a constitutional right or simply as a 
way to gain political advantage, promising no CNDD-FDD 
support 
for the latter motive.  (Comment: a. Ngendakumana,s tally of 
UPRONA,s positions of power within the current government 
may 
be inflated since he tallies as "ministerial equivalents" 
such 
non-traditional posts as advisors to the First Vice 
President. 
b. Complicating these issues further, some within UPRONA 
maintain that First Vice President Nduwimana is no longer a 
member of the party, since he earlier refused to resign his 
post in solidarity with UPRONA,s stand against Nkurunziza,s 
government.  End Comment.) 
 
¶9.  (C)  As recently as July 19, Jeremie Ngendakumana claims 
to have met with UPRONA President Aloys Rubuka to head off 
what UPRONA considered a brewing political crisis; however 
the meeting wrought only further attempts by UPRONA to gain 
additional political footholds.  At that meeting Ngendakumana 
agreed in writing to support UPRONA,s bid for an open Senate 
seat in return for UPRONA,s support of CNDD-FDD in the 2010 
elections.  UPRONA then promised to deliver UPRONA,s list of 
nominees for ministerial positions to President Nkurunziza 
within the next few hours, but the list was never forthcoming. 
 
---------------------- 
And in conclusion.... 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  While speaking in general terms regarding the 
malaise Ngendakumana considers to be plaguing the current 
government, he expressed his belief that it is only a small 
group of people who are consistently at the heart of 
continued disruptions.  To manage public perceptions of the 
ongoing crisis, and noting President Nkurunziza,s personal 
popularity, Ambassador Moller suggested that it may be 
prudent for Nkurunziza to use the media to communicate 
to the Burundian people directly his desire and his 
determination to resolve the ongoing political tussle. 
Ngendakumana is also convinced that talking with opposition 
leaders, he is not speaking to the real "decision makers" 
but rather to interlocutors for former Burundian Presidents 
Domitien Ndayizeye and Pierre Buyoya. 
 
-------------- 
Comment: 
-------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Unsurprisingly, the picture Ngendakumana painted of 
CNDD-FDD was of a reasoned, judicious, and above all 
constitutionally sensitive political party doing its best to 
negotiate with intransigent self-seeking spoilers who seek 
nothing more than the perquisites of power.  Although 
doubtless many of his assertions and his historical context 
for the present conflict are true, he appears to have 
forgotten it was CNDD-FDD,s arrogance following the 2005 
election that led initially to bad feelings between his and 
the other parties, and that now they see greater advantage 
in rebuffing CNDD-FDD,s recent energetic approaches. 
He seemed a bit disappointed that the Ambassador failed 
wholeheartedly to endorse his disingenuous portrait, but 
rather that she advocated strongly for CNDD-FDD to continue 
vigorously its pursuit of a negotiated agreement adopting, 
if necessary, a more conciliatory posture in order to end 
the conflict and sidestep a stalemate in Burundi,s ability 
to govern itself and for the welfare of the 
country and its people.  End Comment. 
MOLLER