VZCZCXRO5633
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #2402/01 2110827
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 300827Z JUL 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 002402 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/11/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL MARR PARM OSCE EUN XH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR FINLEY DISCUSSES OSCE AND COE WITH EU 
 
Classified By: USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers, for 
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
-------- 
¶1.  On June 27, U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe Julie Finley led the 
U.S. delegation to the COSCE (the EU's OSCE working party) 
troika. During the four hour consultations, the EU declared 
its hope for reforms in Kazakhstan in light of its CiO bid 
and agreement to downsize the OSCE mission in Croatia.  The 
United States and EU concurred on the utility of pursuing a 
declaration for the November 2007 Madrid Ministerial as 
well as separate statements on selected regional and 
thematic issues.  EU interlocutors expressed concerns about 
the feasibility of an OSCE Mission training mission in 
Afghanistan, preferring to focus on their own training 
programs, and raised the possibility of adapting a regional 
border management program.  Discussions reaffirmed the 
mutual desire to resolve the frozen conflicts in 
Georgia and Moldova and the need to involve Russia in the 
solution.  Sequencing of 
a political settlement and internationalization of a PKO 
in Moldova remained a question of debate.  As discussions 
regarding Russia continued, the EU stressed its commitment 
to the CFE and raised the question of Russia's true 
intentions regarding the OSCE and ODIHR.  Although the 
United States and the EU differed in their tactical 
approaches to issues as disparate as Afghanistan and 
Croatia, the troika reaffirmed the overall complementarity 
of U.S.-EU objectives in the OSCE.  END SUMMARY 
 
Participants 
------------ 
¶2.  Ambassador Finley was joined by Gary Robbins, Director 
of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs 
and Samuel Laeuchli, USOSCE Political Counselor, and USEU 
POLOFFs. German EU Presidency's Federal Foreign Office OSCE 
Division Head Margit Hellwig- Btte led the EU Troika. 
German MFA participants included CoE Division Head 
Johann-Adolf Cohausz, and OSCE Division Desk Officer 
Jan-Thede Domeyer.  Representing the Council Secretariat 
was the Director of the Policy Unit, Helga Schmid, and the 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Unit's OSCE and CoE Desk 
Officer, Leo Schulte Nordholdt.  OSCE and CoE Head of Unit 
Gilbert Dubois and Desk Officers Bertrand Rochard and 
Alenka Zajc were present from the European Commission's DG 
RELEX.  Representatives from the Portuguese Presidency Unit 
were Incoming Chair of the COSCE Paulo Rufino and OSCE Desk 
Officer Ana Coelho. 
 
 
Madrid Ministerial Preparations 
-------------------------------------- 
¶3.  Ambassador Finley previewed U.S. objectives for the 
November 2007 OSCE Ministerial in Madrid, including a 
Ministerial Declaration that contained strong language on 
fulfillment of Istanbul commitments and decisions on 
possible assistance to Afghanistan, border security in 
Central Asia, closure of the Croatia mission, selection of 
a new Chair in Office (CiO) for 2009, and support for the 
Kosovo final status settlement.  In addition, Finley 
highlighted our interest in separate resolutions in support 
of human rights defenders, promotion of tolerance, and the 
situations in Moldova and Georgia respectively.   The 
German EU Presidency agreed to aim for a ministerial 
declaration, including, in particular, language on regional 
conflicts. 
 
Kazakhstan CiO Bid 
------------------------- 
¶4.  On Kazakhstan's CiO bid, both sides reaffirmed their 
support in principle for the Kazakh bid, but agreed that 
the GOK had not demonstrated a commitment to certain 
democratic reforms.  The EU Troika expressed hope for signs 
of reform, citing the country's August 18 elections as a 
possible opportunity to give positive impetus for 
progress.  Paulo Rufino, the incoming Portuguese Chair of 
the COSCE working group reiterated that there was no EU 
common position on Kazakhstan's bid and noted that the 
Spanish CiO was "open" to consultations on the issue. 
Ambassador Finley also expressed her desire to see 
Kazakhstan fulfill its commitments but questioned how long 
we could wait to see action before a decision must be 
made.  She pointed out that the CiO must be able to 
represent all three aspects of the OSCE- the 
political-military, economic and environmental, and the 
human dimension.  EU officials conceded that the GOK had 
not enacted any of the reforms that External Relations 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner had identified as important to 
the CiO bid. 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00002402  002 OF 004 
 
 
Afghanistan 
--------------- 
¶5.  An exchange of views on the possibility of an OSCE 
mission to Afghanistan was inconclusive.  EU showed little 
enthusiasm for exploring the concept of an OSCE mission in 
Afghanistan.  The German Presidency insisted on looking 
into the conditions and a potential U.S. proposal before 
committing to any possible action.  Hellwig-Botte and 
Rufino asserted that the EU could consider adjusting OSCE 
border management programming in Central Asian countries 
that would indirectly benefit Afghanistan, but that it was 
not inclined to support projects in country.  The Germans 
expressed concern that a direct involvement would be too 
security and cost intensive.  Hellwig-Botte further argued 
that the EU was already heavily involved in Afghanistan 
with a police training mission and that to launch another 
mission would possibly duplicate efforts and complicate 
existing structures. 
 
¶6.  Ambassador Finley emphasized that the U.S. wanted to 
determine the interest in the concept of OSCE involvement 
before considering concrete action proposals.  She pointed 
out that 21 non-EU and non-NATO countries, including 
Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors, had expressed 
interest in seeing stability in Afghanistan through the 
OSCE.  The OSCE could provide a vehicle through which these 
same countries could make a contribution and, in doing so, 
create a multiplier - and not a duplicative --  effect for 
EU and NATO efforts.  Finley observed that the EU's new 
police training mission would still leave critical gaps at 
lower levels and left unanswered President Karzai's request 
for OSCE assistance.  An OSCE effort could add value by 
filling that gap.  The EU representatives reiterated 
skepticism for the concept and alluded to policy fatigue, 
noting that they are already involved in two projects 
within the country and were reluctant to begin another. 
Hellwig-Botte suggested that the Afghans needed to clarify 
their request to the OSCE. 
 
Russia - CFE 
------------ 
¶7.  Council Secretariat Policy Planning Director Helga 
Schmid, reaffirmed the EU's belief in the value of the CFE 
and the need for an adapted CFE "in the light of global 
security changes."  She was reassured by the U.S. 
commitment to an adapted CFE, but asked for clarification 
of the USG's position on ratification of the treaty in 
light of recent remarks by Senator Lugar that advice and 
consent to the adapted treaty would be conditioned on 
Russia fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments in Georgia 
and Moldova.  At the May 18 EU-Russia summit, EU leaders 
pressed Putin on implementation issues.  PSC Troika 
Ambassadors had placed the issue on the agenda of their 
June 27 meeting with Russian Permrep Chizov as well. Schmid 
asked for U.S. views on the Russian threat of a moratorium, 
prospects that Azerbaijan and Armenia would join it, and 
whether the OSCE was the appropriate forum to discuss it. 
 
¶8.  Robbins affirmed U.S. commitment to the CFE 
and said ratification of A/CFE remained linked to Russian 
fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments, as noted by Sen. 
Lugar.  He  confirmed that the U.S. would use 
established channels for CFE discussions, but is also willing 
to reach out to partners in other settings.  U.S. 
participation in the OSCE's Extraordinary Conference on CFE 
showed our commitment to engage.  Robbins informed Schmid 
of our intent to seek clarification of the Russian 
cancellation of three planned CFE inspections due to "force 
majeure."  The United States was, of course, opposed to a 
Russian moratorium.   On Istanbul commitments, there was 
also the question of who decides when these criteria are 
met.  The countries involved (i.e., Georgia and Moldova) 
should definitely be included in this determination. 
 
OSCE Charter and Russian Reform Proposals 
----------------------------------------- 
¶9. EU and U.S. delegations confirmed Transatlantic 
opposition to the OSCE Charter, and agreed that it was 
necessary to gain a clearer understanding of Russian 
intentions for pursuing one.  EU Policy Unit Director Schmid 
stated that refusing flat-out to discuss the charter will 
cause problems with Russia. Ambassador Finley suggested 
that partners should consider whether and how we could 
address other Russian interests in the OSCE in order to 
hold the line against a charter.  Hellwig-Botte (German 
Presidency) agreed that it is a question of finding out 
the Russian plan and what they really want.  USOSCE 
Polmincouns pointed out that Russian insistence on the 
charter was perhaps part of a larger Russian effort to be 
aggressive against the OSCE.  Commission Russia Unit Deputy 
Tibbels doubted that Russia had any overarching 
strategy behind its rhetoric and actions other than to 
 
BRUSSELS 00002402  003 OF 004 
 
 
demonstrate that Russia was back on the world stage and 
that nothing can be solved without their involvement. 
Russian domestic succession politics informed the tactics 
of Russian diplomats who were increasingly reluctant to 
concede anything in international fora. 
 
Parliamentary Assembly, Election monitoring & ODIHR 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
¶10. The German Presidency and the Commission assessed that 
Russia would invite ODIHR to monitor the Duma elections in 
December, but anticipated problems that could have broader 
repercussions for the OSCE.  Helwig-Botte expressed concern 
that Russia might try to constrain ODIHRs operations in an 
effort to create a precedent for future OSCE election 
observation missions.  Helwig-Botte repeatedly stressed 
that the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's quarrel with ODIHR 
was interlinked with ODHIR monitoring in Russia.  The 
German EU Presidency urged careful preparation for the 
likely discussion in Madrid on the Russian election 
monitoring mission.  Helwig-Botte urged like-minded 
partners to caution MPs critical of ODIHR not to play into 
the hands of Russia in its efforts to destroy ODHIR. 
Finley added that we could undercut Russian's efforts by 
quietly nudging ODIHR to use softer language in reports 
without surrendering the principles. 
 
 
Georgia and South Ossetia 
-------------------------- 
¶11.  EUR/RPM Director Robbins provided an overview of the 
situation in South Ossetia, noting that the water dispute 
threatened to impede summer reconstruction plans, including 
the building of schools.  The terms of the closure of the 
Russian base at Gudauta was also a point of contention. 
USDEL urged the EU to support expansion of the OSCE 
monitors at the checkpoints.  Schmid provided a more upbeat 
picture based on her visit to Georgia in March to meet with 
the JCC.  She observed that CBMs as well as security, and 
customs and border management measures had begun to be 
implemented.  Although the Russians were not particularly 
enthusiastic about OSCE involvement in these measures, 
these concerns were not big obstacles to progress.  She 
stressed the need to get the Russia on board with any new 
measures.  Schmid conceded that the Georgian-backed South 
Ossetian leader Sanakoyev supported the OSCE's economic 
rehabilitation program for the breakaway republic as well 
as the initial confidence building measures, but rejected 
the idea of EU meetings with Sanakoyev as it would 
undermine EU credibility with all the parties. (NOTE: 
During his June 26 visit to Brussels, Sanakoyev met with 
Caucasus policy experts at the Commission, but not with 
Council Secretariat officials. End Note.)  Both the EU and 
USDel agreed on the need for more CBMs between Georgians 
and South Ossetians. 
 
Transnistria 
------------- 
¶12.  USDEL reviewed for EU counterparts the benefits of and 
objectives for internationalizing the current peacekeeping 
force in Moldova, noting that DAS Kramer had recently 
circulated a proposal to NATO Allies.  Robbins pointed out 
that Moldova supported this effort, and that Russia could 
contribute to such a force.  The concept would allow Russia 
to fulfill a key Istanbul commitment and open the way for the 
ratification of the adapted CFE treaty.  Robbins and EU 
counterparts confirmed that the "5 2" negotiating format 
was important in reaching a final political settlement. The 
U.S. also supported the creation of an informal contact 
group on Moldova at the OSCE, similar to one created to 
discuss Georgia. 
 
¶13.  Schmid acknowledged that the unraveling of the 
CFE could bring about new impetus for negotiations of a 
multilateral PKF for Transnistria.  However, in several of 
its discussions on changing the PKO composition, the 
Council's Political and Security Committee continued to 
oppose such a move in the absence of a political settlement 
first.  That being said, Transnistria was perhaps the 
easiest frozen conflict to solve.  Russia has been sending 
mixed signals regarding its cooperation.  Moscow had not 
pushed the Transnistrian side to participate in the 5 2 
discussions, and at the same time had reduced financial 
support to the breakaway region.  Schmid further reported 
that Ukrainian leaders believed that Russia would abandon 
Smirnoff by the end of the year. In any case, she urged 
that there be "no surprises" from the United States on the 
issue.  (Comment:  Given the large format of the US -EU 
Troika and the sensitivity of many member states to the 
idea, we were not surprised that Schmid failed to mention 
the Council Secretariat's interest in pursuing Transnistria 
as a test case for EU ESDP cooperation with Russia.) 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00002402  004 OF 004 
 
 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
----------------- 
¶14.  The EU Troika asked for U.S. views on 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  The U.S. and EU delegations shared 
concerns about the deterioration of media freedom in 
Azerbaijan as well as the widening income gap between 
Azeris in N-K and Azerbaijan. Ambassador Finley agreed with 
the German EU Presidency that the situation deserves to be 
closely watched. 
 
 
Central Asia 
------------- 
¶15.  Both sides agreed that Central Asia was perhaps the 
most important region for OSCE work. EU Troika participants 
believed that the OSCE could "add value" to the EU's new 
Central Asia strategy, particularly in the area of border 
management.  The USDEL rebutted the EU's assertion that the 
OSCE should adapt to the EU's strategy and not the other 
way around. If the OSCE were only used as a secondary 
player, it would become marginalized and ineffective when 
it was most needed. 
 
Croatia 
------- 
¶16.  The USDel and EU Troika agreed that Croatia had made 
good progress on meeting commitments.  While there was not 
yet an EU position on the closure of the OSCE's Croatia 
Mission, the U.S. was ready to take that step. If others 
felt strongly otherwise, however, the U.S. could consider 
closing the Mission and opening a small office in Zagreb or 
Vienna as a penultimate step.  The German EU Presidency 
noted that most of the EU member states were in favor of 
downsizing, but want to be sure that Croatia completely 
fulfilled its commitments before closing the mission 
completely. Commission representatives (who are the 
fiercest opponents of Mission closure) noted outstanding 
implementation and monitoring issues associated with war 
crimes trials and the return of refugees.  Commission 
representatives remained largely silent during the 
discussion, but the German Presidency was careful to 
highlight their concerns which are related to Croatia's bid 
for EU membership.  The USOSCE Polmincouns reiterated that 
we could consider a different and smaller type of OSCE 
presence to address the remaining concerns, but not merely 
downsizing the current mission. With regard to the budget 
issue, Ambassador Finley stated the U.S. would bring no 
money to the mission. Hellwig-Botte promised to look into 
the issue with USOSCE in a future meeting in Vienna. 
 
 
Kosovo 
------- 
¶17.  Robbins stated that the U.S. favors maintaining a 
mission in Kosovo at its current level.  After its final 
status 
is decided, it is very important to consolidate and focus 
efforts on local reform, human rights, and the welfare of 
immigrants and minorities. 
 
 
Council of Europe 
------------------ 
¶18.  According to German MFA COE Director Cohausz, the main 
outcome of the EU-Council of Europe summit in Strasbourg in 
May 2007 was a political commitment to create more synergy 
between the two institutions.  Cohausz briefed on the 
creation of the European Fundamental Rights Agency in March 
2007, replacing the European Monitoring Center on 
Xenophobia.  It will help to improve cooperation on human 
rights policy in Europe.  They want to avoid the 
possibility of developing different standards and are in 
the process of creating a formal agreement due this 
autumn.  The EU highlighted its disappointment with 
Russia's unwillingness to ratify Protocol 14.  They felt 
this was deplorable since Russia had helped to create it in 
the first place.  If it is not ratified by June 29, they 
will have to use the old procedure to elect judges to the 
court.  This will have severe budgetary implications.  The 
CoE delegate felt that Russia is just trying to make it 
clear that they will not accept rules above the sovereignty 
of the Russian state. 
 
 
¶20.  This message has been cleared by U.S. Head of Delegation 
Ambassador Finley and the Bureau of 
European Affairs. 
GRAY 
 
 
 
.