VZCZCXRO2462
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #2170/01 1841435
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031435Z JUL 07
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 002170 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2017 
TAGS: PREL PARM EUN IR KN KNNP
SUBJECT: U.S. AND EU-27 HOLD THIRD DIALOGUE ON VERIFICATION 
AND COMPLIANCE, JUNE 4, 2007 
 
Classified By: ACTING DEPUTY POLMINCOUNS VINCENT CARVER 
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Assistant Secretary (A/S) of the Bureau of 
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation (VCI) Paula 
DeSutter met with EU members of the Conference on 
Disarmament/UN and Non Proliferation Working Groups (CODUN 
and CONOP) June 4, 2007.  This third meeting followed a 
successful U.S. and EU Summit April 30 that reaffirmed our 
strategic partnership with the EU and highlighted in a joint 
political progress report what has been achieved.  The 
participants focused on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT) and The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) before reviewing 
the 10th Anniversary of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), the Second Review Conference of the CWC in April 2008, 
NPT prepcom and BWC Sixth Review Conference results, 
U.S./Russia Post START, U.S. Space Policy, North Korea and 
Iran.  All parties agreed that the discussion on these issues 
were fruitful and the expert discussion on the FMCT yielded a 
better understanding of the U.S. view on whether the FMCT is 
verifiable.  End Summary. 
 
Highlighting Key Issues 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) German Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking opened the third 
U.S.-EU Member State dialogue on Verification and Compliance 
by thanking Assistant Secretary DeSutter for her engagement 
with the EU on verification and compliance issues. Assistant 
Secretary DeSutter stressed the U.S.-EU strategic 
 
SIPDIS 
partnership, Russia,s concerns relative to CFE and its 
request for an extraordinary conference, and observed the 
success of the Sixth Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
Review Conference (RevCon). 
 
¶3. (C) A/S DeSutter highlighted Iranian and North Korean 
noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and the resultant negative impact on the regime.  She posited 
whether these developments provided "lessons learned" for the 
international community.  Russian threats to suspend 
implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
Treaty (CFE) were very disturbing, she said, but she hoped 
that Russia's objective in calling for an "Extraordinary 
Conference" was to help ensure the future of the CFE regime. 
 
¶4.  (U) A/S DeSutter also emphasized opportunities, such as 
the Second CWC Review Conference in April 2008, whereby, 
States Parties will meet to review the effectiveness and 
operation of the Convention.  It is an opportunity, she said, 
"to look forward to things well done." 
 
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Ambassador Luedeking said FMCT compliance is critical 
and highlighted enhanced detectability and action against 
violators as crucial, especially in regard to Iran.  The role 
of the UN, as final arbiter, should be strengthened. 
Reflecting on the CFE Extraordinary Conference, Luedeking 
stated the EU was firmly in support of mutually reinforcing 
agreements, which established a framework for long-term 
security on the European continent. 
 
¶6. (C) VCI Nuclear Affairs Office Director Dr. Stanley Fraley 
previewed his remarks by stating that, as reported to the CD 
in Geneva, the U.S. had conducted a study that concluded that 
an FMCT would not be effectively verifiable.  He focused on 
key verification issues: 
 
-     Detection of clandestine sites (which would be 
especially problematic under an FMCT because the nuclear 
weapons states would have facilities and nuclear materials 
that would not be subject to the agreement); 
 
-     Monitoring production at declared facilities; 
 
-     The allowed production of fissile material after 
entry-into-force for non-proscribed military purposes (such 
as for naval propulsion); 
 
-     Monitoring material declared after the cut-off date to 
verify that material is not diverted; 
 
-     Lack of application of an FMCT to material produced 
before the cut-off date; and 
 
-     Determining whether any material produced after the 
cut-off date was for a permitted or proscribed purpose. 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00002170  002 OF 005 
 
 
¶7. (C) Ambassador Luedeking said the EU position is that 
countries should enter an FMCT negotiation with no 
preconditions.  German Peace Research Institute FMCT 
specialist Annette Schaper added that the world is insecure 
because there exists a great deal of fissile material and its 
whereabouts are unknown.  She added that the U.S. is not a 
country of concern unlike Pakistan and Russia.  Russia 
rebukes related questions with "it is national business." 
International concern about fissile material should not be 
disregarded. 
 
¶8. (C) Schaper said that at the commencement of cut-off 
discussions, there was a need for international compliance, 
verified by the IAEA, for example.  A recommencement of such 
discussions would send a positive signal and be symbolic. 
She responded to Dr. Fraley's points by stating that it is 
clear there will be locations that are exempt.  But, why not 
treat sites outside the treaty as &Black Boxes,8 put 
"fences around the black box" and just monitor what goes in 
and out of the facility using a &Yes/No8 monitoring system 
to protect sensitive information. We cannot accept that it is 
hopeless, she said.  Luedeking agreed that one hundred 
percent verification is not possible, but measures that can 
be instituted for possible violations should be considered. 
Dr. Fraley pointed out that Black Boxes do not help because 
fissile material not subject to the treaty would be entering 
and leaving the facility.  Items would not be stopped or 
inspected even when the monitoring system gave a &Yes8 
reading. 
 
¶9. (C) A/S DeSutter noted that standards of verifiability 
change depending on the covered item, and there is always 
risk of cheating.  Fundamental challenges include the date 
the material was produced (i.e., before or after the cut-off 
date).  If the material was produced prior to the cut-off 
date, it is not subject to the FMCT.  We must be able to 
determine the purpose for which the material was produced. 
Verifiability depends on what one is attempting to monitor. 
 
¶10. (C) Luedeking said that one of the purposes of the IAEA 
is to insure non-diversion.  If arguments against 
verification are carried to the extreme, "then why bother 
with the IAEA and the Additional Protocol," he questioned. 
If we are so uncertain on the verifiability of FMCT, then why 
have the NPT? 
 
¶11. (C) Dr. Fraley emphasized that under the NPT safeguards 
regime, inspectors are allowed to look for undeclared fissile 
material, and its presence would be a violation.    The 
differences between the NPT and an FMCT are significant. 
 
Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Speaking on behalf of the EU, Luedeking said HCoC is 
"still in crisis."  He opined that the Sixth Annual 
Conference held on May 31 ) June 1, 2007  was an improvement 
over last year,s meeting, but Russia was obstructive and 
threatened a moratorium on pre-launch notifications.  Russia 
also criticized the U.S. for not submitting pre-launch 
notifications.  Luedeking reported that there has been an 
improvement in annual declarations, but acknowledged this was 
far from encouraging.  Although the EU has been active in 
demarching non-subscribing states, Luedeking noted that more 
needs to be done.  On May 30, 2007, the EU sponsored an HCoC 
seminar that went well, although the U.S. was criticized for 
not attending.  Luedeking admonished the U.S. to comply with 
requirements of pre-launch notifications; otherwise it could 
serve as an excuse for Russia to leave the agreement. 
Solana,s Personal Representative on Nonproliferation and 
WMD, Annalisa Giannella, noted concern about the survival of 
the agreement if there is no movement on this issue.  German 
representative, Luedeking was clear that something needed to 
be done soon, and he added that the U.S. and EU have long 
been "champions of compliance."  A/S DeSutter indicated she 
would discuss the issue with the appropriate officials in 
Washington. 
 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Discussions on CWC focused primarily on the Second 
Review Conference (RevCon) scheduled for April 2008 and 
ongoing activities celebrating the tenth anniversary of 
entry-into-force of the CWC.  On issues relative to the 
Review Conference, Luedeking said the EU would soon adopt a 
common position on the RevCon, and he provided some 
preliminary thoughts on a few key areas the EU are likely to 
strongly support.  These include: the General Purpose 
 
BRUSSELS 00002170  003 OF 005 
 
 
Criterion (Article I), Article VII joint action plan on 
National Implementation and the action plan on Universality. 
He also indicated that the EU would focus closely on a review 
of States Parties, destruction records and verification 
systems and is hoping for a successful outcome of the 
Conference.  As part of States Parties efforts to commemorate 
the 10th anniversary of the CWC, there are ongoing activities 
being planned throughout the year. 
 
¶14. (C) A/S DeSutter highlighted her recent participation in 
a ceremony in The Hague for the unveiling of a Permanent 
Memorial to all victims of Chemical Weapons as well as noted 
the congratulatory message from U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleeza Rice to the Director General of the OPCW, Rogelio 
Pfirter, on such a significant milestone.  The Italian 
representative noted the success of an April international 
conference to promote universality in the Mediterranean and 
Middle East regions, and the British representative agreed 
that universalization remains an important issue and there is 
a need to address the issue of terrorism.  He hoped the 
upcoming Global Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism meeting 
would present an opportunity to address these related issues. 
 The Polish representative indicated that they will sponsor 
an event during the UN First Committee meeting on September 
27 in New York. 
 
NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Luedeking noted that the objective of a smooth start 
during the May NPT PrepCom meeting was blocked due to Iran's 
disruptive tactics.  A/S DeSutter pointed out that 
cooperation between the U.S. and EU delegation was excellent 
and commended the EU and the German EU Presidency for 
effectively coordinating EU positions to help counter Iran's 
negative tactics. The Czech representative cited one positive 
outcome of the PrepCom as the "clear signal" that Iran was 
isolated.  He said the Iranians "sounded desperate" in the 
final minutes of the meeting when they realized they had lost 
support of the non-aligned movement countries.  He commended 
the U.S. delegation for its "good actions" whereby U.S. views 
were openly published and shared in advance and addressed 
"the lowest common denominator." 
 
¶16. (C) On Iranian compliance enforcement, A/S Desutter 
called the debate within and among groups of countries 
crucially important.  Other countries are watching the 
debate, she said, not just for nuclear weapons, but for 
biological and chemical weapons.  We must consider the 
consequences down the road if we fail on Iranian compliance. 
The Swedish representative said the international community 
is closer than ever in opposition to Iranian nuclear behavior 
and international pressure should continue.  He asked whether 
the time was optimal to begin discussing nuclear export 
controls more comprehensively -- for instance, multi-nation 
fuel supply in conjunction with UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540 alongside sanctions regimes on the DPRK.  He 
suggested that IAEA, Missile Technology Control Regime and 
Nuclear Supplier Group lists point to minimum standards for 
export regimes. 
 
¶17. (C) EU representative Giannella said it was a "big 
mistake" that the world did not react quickly to Iraq's use 
of chemical weapons on Iran years ago.  Developing countries 
must be convinced to cooperate with the west on weapons of 
mass destruction because these countries characterize the 
west as "obsessed" about the issue.  She said the west should 
emphasize it can offer technology, not only deny technology. 
In discussions regarding Iran, she suggested the west not 
emphasize "Iran has been isolated," but instead focus on the 
positive aspect of continued dialogue. 
 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶18. (SBU) As highlighted in A/S DeSutter opening remarks, she 
noted the success of the BWC Review Conference which adopted 
a new program of work for 2007-2010, and that work program 
should provide a solid basis for enhancing implementation. 
A/S DeSutter also raised the importance of timely and 
accurate investigations into allegations of BW use and noted 
the creation of a new BWC office under her Bureau which 
focuses on BW use and its implications.  She added that in 
order for investigations to be effective, there should be 
good baseline data on epidemiologic pattern of diseases to 
understand when events have occurred and how to trace them. 
That baseline should include a database of global isolates 
and strains in order to trace agents used in a BW event to 
specific regions of the world.  The UK representative said 
 
BRUSSELS 00002170  004 OF 005 
 
 
the UK is developing a related code of conduct and involving 
scientists in its preparation -- a critical effort. 
Luedeking noted the success of the previous BTWC meeting and 
said the EU would be putting forward working documents to be 
prepared by a dedicated task force. 
 
U.S. and Russia:  Post-START 
---------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) A/S DeSutter said that the START Treaty is scheduled 
to expire in December 2009, and the U.S. and Russia have 
agreed that it is not appropriate to extend START and are 
engaged in exchanges on a post-START arrangement that will be 
characterized by transparency and confidence-building 
measures.  European interlocutors expressed concern about 
Russian inter-continental ballistic missile tests and 
accompanying, negative rhetoric and threats.  Luedeking asked 
if Russia was contemplating leaving the Intermediate Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 
 
¶20. (C) A/S DeSutter said that it is sometimes difficult to 
convince countries to give up missile defense systems.  She 
added that the U.S. does not want Russia to feel threatened 
and that she hoped additional dialogue would help. 
 
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) A/S DeSutter indicated that the technical details of 
the Six-Party Talks' February Agreement is an important first 
step toward the complete, verifiable and irreversible 
denucleariztion of North Korea have yet to be effected.  In 
contrast to the case of Libya, the DPRK had not yet made a 
strategic decision to abandon nuclear weapons. 
 
Space Policy 
------------ 
 
¶22. (C) European representatives questioned why the U.S. was 
opposed to an overall space policy and expressed confidence 
that a code of conduct or "rules of the road" for operating 
and exploring in space would be useful.  Luedeking indicated 
that Germany is sponsoring a related seminar in Berlin in 
late June, entitled, "Challenges to Space Security."  The 
Italian representative said that space security concerns 
conventional arms countries, not only nuclear weapons states. 
 There is increased interest in confidence building measures 
and greater discipline in space operation/exploration. 
 
¶23. (C) While acknowledging EU concerns, A/S DeSutter told 
her counterparts the U.S. is very dependent on space, 
especially for commercial uses (commercial global positioning 
systems, telecommunications, etc.).  She indicated a series 
of dialogues had been held, including with NATO.  There is a 
need to reduce our collective vulnerabilities in an area of 
significant global dependence. 
 
¶24. (C) Luedeking countered that the U.S. perspective on 
space policy is quite different than the EU's.  The EU 
believes the response to a vulnerability should include 
enhanced cooperation, especially with partners, in order to 
collectively address the vulnerabilities.  He suggested the 
U.S. investigate "arms control approaches" to which States 
Parties' adhere for options.  An outer space treaty could 
serve as a "magna carter" that would enshrine basic norms 
with potential review within a multilateral framework. 
Luedeking recommended greater U.S.-EU in-depth discussions on 
the risks of outer space. 
 
¶25. (U) Participants 
 
European Union 
-------------- 
Ambassador Ruediger Luedeking, Deputy Commissioner of the 
Federal Government for Arms Control and Disarmament, Federal 
Foreign Office, Berlin (German Presidency Chair) 
Thomas Gobel, Deputy Head of Division, Nuclear Arms Control 
and Non-Proliferation, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin 
Mark Kamperhoff, Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation 
Division, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin 
Joao Corte-Real, Head of Department, Security and Defence 
Department, MFA, Lisbon 
Annalisa Giannella, Personal Representative of the High 
Representative for Non-Proliferation of WMD 
Andreas Strub, Team Coordinator, Office of the Personal 
Representative of the High Representative for 
Non-Proliferation of WMD 
Zuzana Sutiakova, Office of the Personal Representative of 
the High Representative for Non-Proliferation of WMD 
 
BRUSSELS 00002170  005 OF 005 
 
 
Representatives from 27 EU Member State Countries 
 
United States 
------------- 
Paula DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Verification, Compliance and Implementation 
Dr. Stanley Fraley, VCI Nuclear Affairs Office Director 
Johnathan Beckett, Foreign Affairs Officer and EU Coordinator 
Margaret Diop, Political Officer, U.S. Mission to the EU 
 
GRAY 
.