VZCZCXRO0629
OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #0977/01 1830615
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020615Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8661
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1264
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1379
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1297
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIRUT 000977 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SY IS LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: ARE MODERATE SHIA THE ANSWER TO MARCH 
14'S POLITICAL WOES? 
 
REF: BEIRUT 896 
 
Classified By:  Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for Reasons: Section 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Recent discussions with two political figures from 
opposite sides of the confessional spectrum revealed a common 
thread in terms of broadening March 14's political alliances 
-- the need to secure the support of moderate Shia.  While 
one advocated an alliance with Amal as a means for March 14 
to secure a candidate of its choice in the upcoming 
presidential elections, the other viewed broader outreach to 
Shia not affiliated with either Amal or Hizballah as 
necessary to ensure March 14's longer-term political 
viability.  Interestingly, neither figure exhibited much 
trust in his group's traditional political allies.  End 
summary. 
 
CHRISTIANS:  AOUN OUT, BERRI IN? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Elie Khoury, Political Advisor to Lebanese Forces 
(LF) leader Samir Geagea, told Pol/Econ Chief June 28 that 
LF, as a Christian party, would prefer an alliance with 
General Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) in March 
14's efforts to form a national unity government.  However, 
the LF doesn't trust Aoun, who frequently changes course 
according to the prevailing political winds in his 
never-ending quest for the presidency.  Khoury viewed Aoun's 
constant maneuvering as short-sighted and, by putting 
personal ambition before the needs of the country, in part to 
blame for the Cedar Revolution's loss of momentum.  Case in 
point:  Khoury, referring to Aoun's recent statements that a 
second government would be better than the status quo, said 
Aoun does not really want a second government, but is evoking 
it as a scare tactic to provoke March 14 into making more 
concessions on a national unity government.  (Note.  Just ten 
days earlier Aoun had agreed with the Ambassador's assertion 
that a second government would be "catastrophic" -- reftel. 
End note.) 
 
¶3. (C) Khoury said LF was therefore considering an 
alternative strategy whereby it would try to peel Parliament 
Speaker Nabil Berri's Amal party away from Hizballah to 
secure enough votes for March 14 to elect a president of its 
choice.   Under Khoury's scenario, March 14 would have 70 
seats in parliament (assuming it wins the August 5 
by-elections to replace assassinated MPs Pierre Gemayel and 
Walid Eido, which Khoury was confident it would if the 
elections go forward as planned).  Adding the Amal bloc's 15 
votes, March 14/Amal would have a total of 85 votes, just one 
vote short of the 86 needed to elect a president in the first 
round of voting, where a two-thirds quorum is required. 
Khoury believes March 14 can easily get at least one of the 
less-committed Aounist parliamentarians to jump ship and vote 
with the majority. 
 
¶4. (C) Of course, Khoury acknowledged, this strategy hinged 
on agreement with Amal on the presidency;  Nassib Lahoud and 
Boutros Harb were the most likely candidates, in his view. 
Khoury was not concerned that the opposition would boycott 
the presidential vote, citing Berri's repeated claims that he 
will convene parliament on September 15.  Khoury interpreted 
this to mean Amal will be present and will vote, adding that 
usually when Berri says he will do something specific like 
this, he does. 
 
SHIA: BERRI, HIZBALLAH OUT, THIRD-WAY SHIA KEY TO ELECTORAL 
SUCCESS 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶4. (C) Independent Shia and former Amal MP Mohamad Baydoun, 
offered a longer-term prescription for March 14's political 
troubles.  Criticizing Future Movement leader Saad Hariri and 
PM Fouad Siniora for their naive trust in Berri, Baydoun said 
the GOL continues to view Amal and Hizballah as partners when 
it should be treating them as rivals.  He argued March 14 
should be pursuing a broader policy to woo those Shia who 
don't support Amal or Hizballah, i.e., those who aren't 
represented politically by these groups and haven't 
 
BEIRUT 00000977  002 OF 002 
 
 
benefitted from their financial assistance following last 
summer's war. 
 
¶5. (C) Baydoun feared that, unless March 14 starts today, it 
faces a very real possibility that Hizballah will take over 
parliament in the 2009 elections.  Moreover, there is an 
urgency now for immediate outreach to southern Shia who are 
angry with how the government paid indemnities after last 
summer's war between Hizballah and Israel.  If Hariri were 
smart, Baydoun said, he'd reach out to these people and make 
sure they see the government's financial assistance to the 
south and the Biqa'.  These groups could be easily mobilized 
in favor of the current government.  Expanding the Lebanese 
Armed Forces to integrate many young Shia would also dampen 
Hizballah's attraction to moderate Shia youth, Baydoun added. 
 
 
¶6. (C) In terms of March 14's immediate challenge of electing 
a president of its choice, Baydoun warned about a Hizballah 
plan to physically prevent parliament from meeting. 
According to Baydoun's reading of the constitution, parties 
can legally boycott parliament during the first month (Sept. 
25 - Oct. 25) of the two-month period running up to the 
expiration of President Lahoud's mandate.  However, since 
they have a constitutional duty to elect a president within 
the two-month period, they must be present and vote during 
the second month.  Although March 14 does not have enough 
votes to elect a president the first round of voting (when a 
two-thirds majority is required), it would win the second 
vote requiring only a simple majority.  Hence Hizballah's 
plan to block MPs access to the voting sessions. 
 
¶7. (C) Entirely on his own initiative (and speaking the day 
before the President's June 29 visa ban proclamation against 
individuals threatening Lebanon's sovereignty and democracy), 
Baydoun urged the US to take action targeting the financial 
assets of those working against the current government.  A 
ban against individuals is not enough, he argued; we need to 
hit them where it hurts -- in their pocketbooks. 
 
¶8. (C) Comment.  Using Baydoun's reasoning, March 14 
(assuming no more of its MPs are assassinated) has no way it 
can lose the presidency under the constitution.  However, 
each new day in Lebanon seems to bring a new interpretation 
of the constitution to light.  Even if Baydoun's reading is 
correct, we don't share his faith that opposition MPs 
wouldn't boycott the elections regardless, despite Khoury's 
(somewhat optimistic, in our view) assertion that Berri will 
stick to his word.  The opposition is determined to see a 
candidate of its (Syrian overlords') liking in Baabda Palace; 
failing that, it will pursue whatever means necessary to 
prevent the elections from going forward.  End comment. 
FELTMAN