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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 000974 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2027 
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV LE SY
SUBJECT: LAHOUD'S LEGAL ADVISOR:  SECOND CABINET (OR 
LAHOUD'S NEXT EXTENSION) TO COME IN AUTUMN, NOT NOW 
 
REF: BEIRUT 708 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's amiable legal 
advisor, Selim Jeressaiti, told the Ambassador on 6/29 that 
-- based on Jeressaiti's advice -- Lahoud has begrudgingly 
delayed the appointment of a second cabinet from July until 
September.  If no consensus presidential candidate emerges by 
then, and if Siniora's cabinet has not yet been replaced, 
then Lahoud will take one of two actions:  he will either 
appoint a second cabinet, or he will announce that he will 
remain in Baabda Palace beyond his November 24 term 
expiration.  He will not turn over presidential powers to the 
"illegitimate" Siniora cabinet.  Jeressaiti's preferred 
solution (consistent with his earlier comments, reftel) was 
for PM Fouad Siniora to resign  -- to be replaced by a 
technocratic cabinet headed by Najib Mikati.  Told by the 
Ambassador that such an option was unlikely, Jeressaiti 
switched to promoting a national unity cabinet.  Asked why 
the Syrians had instructed their allies to reject Arab League 
proposals including a national unity cabinet only a week 
earlier, Jeressaiti said that, then, Lahoud and Damascus 
intended to move quickly on the second cabinet.  Now, with 
the second cabinet decision postponed, it is time to try 
again on a national unity cabinet or work for a consensus 
president.  Jeressaiti also quizzed the Ambassador 
extensively about the just-announced visa ban, suggesting 
that the President's proclamation is having its intended 
effect.  End summary. 
 
LAHOUD WANTED SECOND CABINET NOW; 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS PERSUADED HIM TO WAIT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Judge Selim Jeressaiti met with the Ambassador on 
6/29.  Asked whether all the talk about President Emile 
Lahoud's plan to appoint a second cabinet was bluff or 
indicated a real danger, Jeressaiti (who serves as Lahoud's 
legal advisor) said that, until a few days earlier, Lahoud 
and Damascus indeed planned to appoint a second cabinet by 
mid or late July.  Lahoud is "frustrated" by the continued 
illegitimacy of the Siniora cabinet, and Lahoud's "Syrian 
friends" were prodding him to move swiftly in naming a new 
cabinet that would enjoy sufficient popular and international 
support so as to weaken PM Fouad Siniora. 
 
¶3.  (C)  But Jeressaiti (who previously served on Lebanon's 
constitutional court) claimed to have used constitutional 
arguments to dissuade Lahoud, who reluctantly agreed and 
explained to Damascus that he could not move now.  Jeressaiti 
noted that, constitutionally, Lahoud would have to call for 
binding parliamentary consultations to replace the PM, and 
March 14 MPs (still clinging to a razor-thin majority despite 
assassinations) could easily renominate Siniora.  But if 
Lahoud waits until September 25, the date when Parliament 
Speaker Nabih Berri has called for presidential elections, 
then the parliament is an electoral body only.  At that 
point, MPs (in Jeressaiti's constitutional interpretation -- 
one we suspect other constitutional lawyers would dispute) 
cannot do anything except work to elect a president.  So 
Lahoud, if he wants to avoid having his choice of PM tied by 
the mandatory parliamentary consultations and having his 
second cabinet linked to a parliamentary vote of confidence, 
must wait until September to appoint a second cabinet. 
 
BUT IF NO PRESIDENT AND SINIORA REMAINS, 
THEN LAHOUD MIGHT JUST STAY IN BAABDA 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Asked by the Ambassador whether a second cabinet in 
September is the impending "Lahoud surprise" that has been 
rumored in Beirut political circles, Jeressaiti said that 
Lahoud, if he senses that he has insufficient support for a 
second cabinet from Hizballah, Berri, and Michel Aoun (who 
used a 7/1 New TV interview to express opposition to a second 
cabinet), may announce instead that he is staying in Baabda 
Palace indefinitely beyond the expiration of his term on 
November 24.  Lahoud will not turn over the powers of the 
presidency to an "illegal" president who was elected without 
a two-thirds parliamentary quorum.  And, if presidential 
 
BEIRUT 00000974  002 OF 003 
 
 
elections do not take place for lack of a quorum, he will not 
allow the presidential executive powers to be transferred to 
the "illegitimate" Siniora cabinet until the presidential 
vacuum can be filled.  The Ambassador asked how Jeressaiti 
would legally and constitutionally justify Lahoud remaining 
in Baabda beyond November 24.  Yes, Jeressaiti conceded:  it 
would be unconstitutional.  But a lesser sin, in Lahoud's 
view, then transferring power to a cabinet that lost its 
constitutionality when the Shia ministers submitted their 
resignations on November 11. 
 
TWO SOLUTIONS:  EITHER A CONSENSUS PRESIDENT, 
OR A CONSTITUTIONALLY LEGITIMATE CABINET 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  By convincing Lahoud to wait until September to act, 
Jeressaiti argued that he had provided an opportunity to the 
Lebanese and their international friends to fix the problem 
ahead of time.  There are two approaches, Jeressaiti said. 
If a consensus presidential candidate emerges who will 
elected in a parliament with a two-thirds quorum, then Lahoud 
will feel that the security and unity of Lebanon has been 
sufficiently safeguarded.  He will transfer power to that 
president and leave Baabda Palace peacefully and on time. 
Or, if there are no presidential elections but a 
constitutionally legitimate cabinet is in place, then Lahoud 
will transfer his powers to that cabinet until such time as 
presidential elections can be held.  There is no 
constitutional problem with either approach, Jeressaiti 
argued; "take your pick." 
 
DISCUSSING A "CONSENSUS" PRESIDENT 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  The Ambassador asked how realistic it was to come up 
with a true consensus president.  Won't Syria's allies push 
for a candidate who appeared to be a consensus figure but who 
was in fact entirely reliant on, and subservient to, 
Damascus?  Jeressaiti countered with another question:  if 
there was a true consensus figure, would the United States 
accept him?  Wouldn't the United States push for a "militant" 
March 14 figure?  The Ambassador explained that the USG was 
watching the process as much as the names.  If a credible 
presidential candidate emerges from a truly Lebanese process, 
that is fine with us.  But if it becomes clear that Syria's 
allies are manipulating the constitution and using 
intimidation to force acceptance of a so-called consensus 
candidate, then the international community will have a 
problem.  How a president is selected is as important as who 
the president is.  For the Lebanese, rather than talk first 
about names, perhaps it is best to talk about what the job 
will be over the next six years, to see who are those most 
qualified, the Ambassador suggested. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Is there any way for you to talk to Syria about the 
presidency, Jeressaiti asked.  No, the Ambassador responded, 
noting that none of the leading candidates opposed a positive 
relationship with Syria based on mutual respect.  Jeressaiti 
mused about finding the candidate subject to the least 
"vetoes."  He noted, as an example, that Nassib Lahoud would 
receive vetoes from Michel Aoun, Amine Gemayel, and Michel 
Murr, all for local Metn political reasons.  Emile Lahoud 
would veto his cousin.  The Syrians would veto Nassib, not 
wanting "a Saudi" to occupy both the premiership and the 
presidency.  (Nassib's wife, a Sunni, has a sister who was 
once married to King Abdullah.)  Berri and Hizballah, wary of 
Nassib's ties to Washington, would as well.  The Ambassador 
noted that Emile Lahoud and Syria do not cast votes in the 
presidential elections.  Asked who he thought might be a true 
consensus candidate, Jeressaiti shook his head:  "If I say 
anyone, you will think he's Syria's candidate."  He did list 
people he thought would be poor choices, including former 
Foreign Ministers Jean Obeid and Fares Bouez, both of whom, 
he said, are favored by Berri. 
 
SHIFTING FROM SINIORA'S RESIGNATION 
TO A NATIONAL UNITY CABINET 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Turning to the cabinet, Jeressaiti said (as he had 
earlier, reftel) that he believed Siniora's resignation would 
unlock the door to a solution.  Najib Mikati did an excellent 
job as PM for ten weeks during the 2005 transition period; 
why not replace Siniora's discredited cabinet with a 
 
BEIRUT 00000974  003 OF 003 
 
 
technocratic cabinet headed by Mikati?  The period of time 
before the presidential elections is about the same.  The 
Ambassador agreed Mikati did a good job as PM, but the times 
are not analogous.  Then, March 14 leaders knew that they had 
a chance to compete in parliamentary elections.  Now, they 
have no assurances that presidential elections will indeed 
take place.  If there are no presidential elections, then 
they will have given up their cabinet power with no easy way 
to regain it.  As long as two of the three most powerful 
constitutional offices remain in the hands of Syria's allies, 
March 14 will not volunteer to give up the premiership, the 
Ambassador argued. 
 
¶9.  (C)  So, Jeressaiti asked, what about a national unity 
cabinet, split 19-11, 18-12, or 17-13?  That is another way 
to avoid "Lahoud's surprise" in September.  The Ambassador 
said that the USG was not opposed, but it was up to the 
Lebanese themselves to come up with arrangements that 
provided appropriate assurances.  Just as we did not veto 
Siniora's inclusion of Hizballah representatives in his 
original cabinet despite our serious misgivings, we would not 
now impose a particular cabinet composition on Lebanon.  But, 
the Ambassador noted, only a week earlier, Arab League 
Secretary General Amr Moussa proposed a dialogue initiative 
 
SIPDIS 
that included on the agenda the idea of a national unity 
cabinet.  March 14 leaders accepted the idea, but Syria's 
allies, after initially saying yes, rejected it.  If the 
March 8-Aoun leaders want a national unity cabinet, why did 
they reject Moussa's proposal?  Jeressaiti said that, at the 
time, Syria and Lahoud hoped for the second cabinet to be 
announced soon.  Now, thanks to Jeressaiti's arguments, they 
know it can't be done until September, if they want to avoid 
parliamentary consultations.  So it is time to try again for 
a national unity cabinet. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  We do not know whether Jeressaiti's thinking 
mirrors that of Lahoud or not.  If Lahoud chooses between 
orders from Damascus and opposing constitutional arguments 
from Jeressaiti, he'll follow the Syrian orders.  (Usually, 
we suspect, Jeressaiti is tasked post-fact to justify legally 
whatever Lahoud is doing.)  But, while a week ago all signs 
indicated that a second cabinet was imminent, those fears now 
seem to be receding.  If it's true that Lahoud is postponing 
his decision until September, we suspect it has less to do 
with Jeressaiti's constitutional arguments and more to do 
with the fact that Michel Aoun and even Nabih Berri seem 
somewhat queasy about a second cabinet.  We note that, as the 
meeting came to a close, Jeressaiti quizzed the Ambassador 
extensively about the new Presidential Proclamation banning 
visas for Lebanese and Syrian officials.  We suspect that the 
visa ban is, as planned, dampening enthusiasm for the second 
cabinet.  And Jeressaiti's shocking suggestion that Lahoud is 
contemplating remaining in Baabda beyond his November 24 term 
expiration is probably rooted in realization that the second 
cabinet is more difficult than Lahoud initially thought. 
 
¶11.  (C)  One part of Jeressaiti's arguments was consistent 
with everything else we've heard:  that Lahoud will never 
turn over presidential power to the current Siniora cabinet. 
Therefore, given that we cannot yet say with certainty that 
presidential elections will take place as scheduled, we 
cannot therefore rule out altogether the second cabinet or 
the possibility of Lahoud trying to stay in place.  We will 
continue to seek ways to deter such destructive developments. 
FELTMAN