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O 061320Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8698
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 1309

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001005 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2027 
TAGS: PREL PTER KCRM LE SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  RIZK ON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL "HOMEWORK," 
WORRIED ABOUT HARIRI JUDGE 
 
REF: BEIRUT 963 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey Feltman, Ambassador, per 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (S)  Minister of Justice Charles Rizk told the Ambassador 
in a 7/5 meeting that he and PM Siniora had agreed that, at 
the beginning of next week, Siniora will send to the UN the 
candidates for judges and deputy prosecutor for the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon.  Rizk would like us to whisper quietly 
to UN officials which four are Lebanon's preferred choices 
out of the twelve judicial nominations.  Rizk also expressed 
deep concern about Hariri investigative judge Elias Eido.  He 
fears Eido, appointed during the Syrian occupation, may order 
the release of the four Lebanese general incarcerated without 
charges since summer 2005.  Given the devastating political 
impact their release would have on March 14 morale, Rizk is 
trying to use some legal sleights of hand to delay the 
possibility.  But he urged that the UN appoint the Special 
Tribunal general prosecutor as quickly as possible, so that 
the fate of the four generals falls clearly within the 
tribunal's authority.  End summary. 
 
SINIORA AGREES NOT TO REQUEST CABINET APPROVAL 
OF NOMINEES FOR SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S)  Receiving the Ambassador on 7/5, Minister of Justice 
Charles Rizk described a lengthy go-around with PM Siniora 
the previous day regarding just how Lebanon should submit its 
Special Tribunal homework assignment to the UN.  Siniora at 
first proposed that the list, provided reftel, of twelve 
judicial nominees (from which the UN will pick four) and two 
deputy prosecutor nominees (for one position) should receive 
cabinet blessing.  Rizk pushed back with three points: 
first, a cabinet decree will delay matters, as the cabinets 
waits the requisite two weeks to overcome President Emile 
Lahoud's inevitable refusal to sign.  Second, unless the 
cabinet takes special care, the decree could end up joining 
the other decrees for publication in the Official Gazette, 
thus revealing the candidates' names and increasing their 
security risks.  Third, the cabinet decree route would 
guarantee that Lahoud -- and thus the Syrians -- would know 
the names of the nominees, also increasing the security risks 
against them. 
 
¶3.  (S)  Siniora accepted Rizk's arguments but still wanted 
some kind of cabinet action, so that he could be seen as 
acting not individually but on behalf of a collective 
decision.  Eventually, he and Rizk agreed that he would 
inform the cabinet on Saturday (7/7) that he is sending the 
names to New York at the beginning of next week.  The cabinet 
will bless the idea but will not see the names, in an effort 
to help protect those listed.  Rizk showed the Ambassador a 
copy of the packet to be sent to New York that includes 
extensive c.v.s on the candidates.  Describing enormous 
differences in competence and quality, Rizk expressed hope 
that, once the letter is passed, that "your people in New 
York" will make sure that Legal Advisor Nicolas Michel and 
UN/OLA staff take into account Lebanon's wishes for which of 
the four judges to select.  (Reftel notes the names, 
including those preferred by Rizk.)  The Ambassador urged 
Rizk to let the Embassy know when the GOL has delivered its 
nominations to the UN, which Rizk promised to do. 
 
ACCELERATING SPECIAL TRIBUNAL IMPLEMENTATION 
IN ORDER TO AVOID RELEASE OF FOUR GENERALS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S)  Rizk also asked the Ambassador to enlist USG help in 
getting the UN to move extremely swiftly in completing its 
own homework regarding the Special Tribunal.  Specifically, 
he said, the UN needs to appoint the prosecutor, so that 
Lebanon is relieved of the burden of the four former security 
chiefs who were arrested in 2005 at the request of 
then-UNIIIC Commissioner Detlev Mehlis.  Officially, Rizk 
said, the four generals now fall under the jurisdiction of 
Investigative Judge Elias Eid, who was assigned to the Rafiq 
Hariri murder case when the notorious Syria-aligned judge 
Adnan Addoum was still Lebanon's Prosecutor-General.  Syrian 
troops still occupied Lebanon at the time.  That means, Rizk 
said, that Syria must have had a say in Eid's appointment. 
 
¶5.  (S)  Rizk said that, based on a three-hour meeting with 
Eid the previous day, he is convinced that "it's not just 
March 14 propaganda" that indicated that Eid is considering 
releasing the four generals for lack of evidence.  The 
Ambassador asked why, when Eid had let the four generals in 
jail for nearly two years, his pro-Syria sympathies would 
prompt him to make the releases now.  Admitting that he did 
not know, Rizk speculated that Syria may have calculated that 
now is the time "to really mix things up," to weaken March 14 
and discredit the Siniora cabinet even further.  The four 
generals, once freed, will be played up as victims and 
martyrs.  Their release will have a "chilling effect" on 
March 14, Rizk said, since everyone will assume that, 
especially, Jamil al-Sayyed will work with Syria to regain 
his once omnipotent role. 
 
¶6.  (S)  To combat this, Rizk said that he is taking two 
steps.  First, he has announced that the Ministry of Justice 
will consider an appeal from lawyer Mohamad Mattar, 
representing the families of other victims of the Hariri 
assassination, to remove Eid from the case.  During the 
one-month appeal, Eid cannot change the status of the case. 
Second, Rizk is encouraging Eid, who was recently 
hospitalized briefly for stress-related issues, to take six 
weeks or two months to leave Lebanon to unwind.  "I'll pay 
for his vacation myself to get him out of here," Rizk said. 
All in all, Rizk estimated that he can use bureaucratic means 
to ensure that the four generals are not released by the 
Lebanese for at least two months.  But after that, they need 
to be under UN custody.  Therefore, Rizk hopes the UN is 
moving rapidly to set up the tribunal infrastructure, 
particularly the naming of the prosecutor. 
 
¶7.  (S)  The Ambassador noted that an international 
prosecutor could very well order the release of one or more 
of the judges for lack of evidence.  After all, all of us 
have heard from UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz that the 
detention of some if not all is "awkward," given the dearth 
of credible evidence.  The four were arrested because of the 
testimony of witnesses who later recanted, their testimony 
now thoroughly discredited.  Yes, Rizk said, but a release 
from the UN would be different than a release from the GOL. 
If the GOL releases them now, "it will be a scandal."  People 
will say, "why did you hold them for two years?"  If the UN 
releases them, however, the situation is different:  The GOL 
picked them up at the request of the UNIIIC and then held 
them until they could be transferred to the Special Tribunal. 
 So, in this case, the GOL merely acted on behalf of the UN. 
If Eid releases them, by contrast, it appears as though the 
GOL had authority all along and chose to ignore it. 
 
¶8.  (S)  The Ambassador noted that it is now clear that there 
will be a tribunal with a prosecutor.  Couldn't a case be 
made, therefore, that, regardless of the start-up time, the 
GOL is merely at this point a custodian of all evidence, 
witnesses, suspects, etc. until the tribunal is operational? 
Couldn't Judge Eid and others be persuaded that it would be 
morally wrong and perhaps even legally suspect for them to do 
more than the bare minimum of caretaker duties as everyone 
awaits the Special Tribunal to take over?  Rizk agreed to 
consider this possibility. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (S)  We have heard from UNIIIC Commissioner Brammertz 
that appointing the Special Tribunal's prosecutor in advance 
of the rest of the Special Tribunal's implementation is not a 
sensible approach.  But, whatever the merits of their initial 
arrests and however awkward the continued detention of one or 
all is, we agree with Rizk that Syria's Lebanese allies would 
score an enormous victory, should the four generals be 
released now.  We will explore with UN Special Coordinator 
for Lebanon Geir Pedersen whether the UN could pass a message 
to the Lebanese that would ask that no dramatic steps 
regarding the Hariri case be made in advance of the 
commencement of the Special Tribunal.  If the Lebanese would 
see themselves as just temporary custodians responsible for 
only caretaker functions. then we can be much more confident 
that, when the case of the generals is reviewed, the 
decisions regarding release or indictment will be made by 
credible figures operating under normal international 
standards.  Judge Eid does not seem to be in that category. 
If he would release any of the four generals, March 14 
leaders would suspect Syria's hand at play, further deepening 
the distrust and divisions in this country.  But if an 
international prosecutor makes the same decision, it will be 
viewed as one based on the legal merits of the case. 
FELTMAN