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PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #0832/01 1831240
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P 021240Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3387
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2224
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0622
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BAKU 000832 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/CARC, EUR/RPM, PM, S/CT, ISN, NEA; OSD PLEASE 
PASS TO DASD FATA, TONY ALDWELL, AND JON CHICKY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AJ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE U.S.-AZERBAIJANI JULY 9-10 
SECURITY DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. BAKU 00465 
     ¶B. BAKU 00280 
     ¶C. BAKU 00422 
     ¶D. BAKU 00660 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: The tenth anniversary of the bilateral 
security dialogue is an important opportunity to take stock 
of our existing strong cooperation and to achieve gains for 
U.S. interests by expanding our security agenda with a key 
Eurasian security partner.  The GOAJ has two goals for these 
security consultations: to develop the talks into an 
action-oriented forum and to demonstrate the strength of the 
U.S.-Azerbaijani security partnership, particularly to Iran 
and Russia.  The Embassy prposes that we create a list of 
follow-up items dring the consultations as a way to keep the 
talk results-oriented and to issue a joint statement atthe 
talk's conclusion that notes our expanding security 
cooperation.  We also provide below comments on all of the 
agenda items, focusing on the GOAJ's likely approach to the 
specific issue, along with suggested objectives or 
deliverables for the U.S. side.  End Summary. 
 
SECURITY COOPERATION ROBUST 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Azerbaijan is a key Eurasian security partner, 
central to advancing U.S. security and strategic interests in 
the region.  Our security cooperation with the GOAJ is strong 
and growing, but Azerbaijan's role as a geopolitical 
"corridor" or "bridge" state into Eurasia and the critical 
role it plays in support of coalition operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan suggest our security interests in this secular, 
majority Shia country are greater than the sum of our 
individual cooperative programs.  Azerbaijan is a key 
geopolitical pivot point for projecting U.S. influence along 
three vectors: Eurasia to the East, Russia and the Caucasus 
to the north, and Iran and the Middle East to the south. 
Azerbaijan is also the linchpin in the existing East-West 
energy corridor and U.S. plans to develop a new southern gas 
corridor.  Bolstering Azerbaijan's independence and 
territorial integrity advances U.S. interests of diversifying 
world energy sources, expanding political and economic 
freedom in a region that is vital to our interests, and 
ensuring Azerbaijan's continued strong support for operations 
critical to U.S. security. 
 
¶3.  (C) Because of Azerbaijan's broader geopolitical 
significance and against the backdrop of continuing U.S. 
efforts to elevate our bilateral relationship, we believe the 
10th anniversary of the bilateral security consultations is a 
key opportunity to take stock of our existing cooperation and 
look for ways to expand our security agenda.  In an 
indication of the importance the GOAJ assigns to this year's 
talks, the GOAJ has assembled the largest and most senior 
delegation in the ten year history of the consultations.  Per 
ref A, President Aliyev, Presidential Apparat Chief Ramiz 
Mehdiyev, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, and Deputy Foreign 
Minister Araz Azimov have sent the Ambassador the clear 
signal that the GOAJ assigns a high priority to these talks 
and hopes that the consultations will produce a clear focus 
on results, a new follow-up mechanism, and a strong public 
statement on the importance of our bilateral security agenda. 
 
¶4.  (C) The GOAJ has two broad goals for the security 
consultations.  First, the GOAJ would like to see the 
consultations develop into an action-oriented forum for 
deepening our security cooperation.  In particular, the GOAJ 
seeks to expand its capabilities to counter transnational -- 
especially terrorism and proliferation -- threats.  Second, 
the GOAJ wants to use the consultations to publicly showcase 
our bilateral security cooperation.  From the GOAJ's 
perspective, Iran and Russia are the key audience for this 
public aspect.  Accordingly, the GOAJ is strongly interested 
in a robust public statement outlining the purpose and 
results of this year's security consultations. 
 
MAXIMIZING THE SECURITY DIALOGUE'S IMPACT 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) We seek to ensure the security consultations develop 
into a powerful, invigorated forum that produces concrete 
results by creating an appropriate follow-up mechanism.  In 
the past, the efficacy of the talks has suffered from the 
 
BAKU 00000832  002 OF 005 
 
 
lack of a clear follow-up mechanism.  We also believe a 
robust press statement after the talks would deepen our 
security cooperation by addressing the GOAJ's concerns 
regarding Russia and Iran.  Accordingly, we propose the 
following: 
 
- Create a follow-up mechanism:  We suggest a notetaker keep 
a log of agreed-upon follow-up items during the security 
consultations.  This action-oriented list can be approved by 
both parties at the end of the consultations to serve as a 
clear roadmap for expanding our security cooperation. 
Ambassador Derse and Ambassador Yashar Aliyev could then 
report  to the co-chairs of the security dialogue in six 
months on the status of these action items. 
 
- Issue a Press statement:  We suggest Washington and the 
GOAJ issue a joint press statement at the conclusion of the 
July 10-11 security dialogue, marking the tenth anniversary 
of our consultations and noting the expansion of and the 
importance of this forum for addressing our growing security 
agenda.  This type of statement would address the GOAJ's 
repeated requests for public support, including President 
Aliyev's February request to former Department of Defense A/S 
Peter Rodman for, and A/S Rodman's offer to provide, "more 
public signs" from the USG of our support for Azerbaijan's 
independence and security in the face of regional pressures 
(ref B). 
 
AGENDA OBJECTIVES AND DELIVERABLES 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) The Embassy provides two types of comments on each 
agenda topic.  First, we seek to provide context on the 
GOAJ's likely approach to each item; second, we want to 
highlight suggested U.S. objectives and or deliverables on 
each point. 
 
¶A. NATO IPAP/SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS: 
 
(C) The GOAJ appears internally divided about the need for 
and the pace of implementing security sector reforms. 
Traditionally, the MFA -- especially DFM Azimov -- has been 
the key proponent for embracing such reforms, while elements 
in the Ministry of Defense and other officials are less 
receptive to reforms.  This intergovernmental tension is 
likely to be just below the surface during the security 
consultations.  Azimov's interest in security sector reforms 
stems from his genuine desire to move Azerbaijan closer 
toward western military standards and as a means for 
enhancing his personal bureaucratic stature.  In this 
connection, we note that Azimov has been unusually 
successful, in the GOAJ's often divisive bureaucratic 
environment, in developing a broad interagency process on 
national security led by the MFA, which produced the GOAJ's 
National Security Concept (NSC) this year.  Some senior 
officials almost certainly see reforms as a threat to their 
personal power base.  NATO Special Representative Bob Simmons 
in his most recent trip to Baku said that the GOAJ is making 
progress on its defense reform goals. 
 
(C) The U.S. can advance its broader reform and 
security-sector interests by engaging with the GOAJ on its 
NATO IPAP, in support of NATO's very active engagement, and 
encouraging the GOAJ impulse to embrace security sector 
reforms.  We believe the USG can use Azerbaijan's IPAP 
process as a tool to leverage our interests.  For example, 
Azerbaijan's May 2005 IPAP contains explicit language on the 
GOAJ's "strategic goal of integration into Euro-Atlantic 
political, security, economic, and other structures."  The 
GOAJ also committed itself to increased democratic control of 
the military in its IPAP.  The new NSC contains a 
surprisingly detailed account of necessary political and 
economic reforms. 
 
(C) The Embassy proposes the following objectives for this 
agenda item: (a) to ask for a preview of the key issues under 
discussion between the GOAJ and NATO regarding Azerbaijan's 
new IPAP and encouraging that the new IPAP be made public; 
and (b) to clarify the GOAJ's specific security sector 
reforms.   (NOTE:  IPAPs are rewritten every two years.  The 
GOAJ currently is working with NATO on its new IPAP to 
replace its May 2005 IPAP.  END NOTE.) 
 
(C) Azimov remains interested in U.S. participation in the 
informal advisory group that guided the drafting of the NSC 
 
BAKU 00000832  003 OF 005 
 
 
(similar to the IASB in Georgia).  The UK, Germany, and 
Turkey have been active in this forum.  The time commitment 
for a U.S. representative to engage in this process would be 
3-4 trips per year for 4-5 days at a time, according to the 
UK rep, General Sir Garry Johnson.  We believe it is strongly 
in our interest to engage in the experts groups which will 
continue to advise the GOAJ interagency group that has been 
charged by President Aliyev to draft Azerbaijan's Foreign 
Policy Strategy, Military Doctrine, and the other documents 
to support the NSC. 
 
¶B. COALITION CONTRIBUTIONS 
 
(C) Although the GOAJ recently announced plans to double its 
NATO contingent in Afghanistan, we believe it currently is 
reluctant to take on additional coalition contributions that 
are of a military nature (a reluctance we recognize could 
complicate Train-and-Equip Program discussions, see below). 
The GOAJ probably perceives it has adequately demonstrated 
support in a number of key coalition missions -- Afghanistan, 
Kosovo, and Iraq  -- and seeks to showcase these 
contributions.  The GOAJ, however, aspires to be seen as a 
regional power and support for coalition operations advances 
this goal.  The GOAJ is pursuing new civilian contributions 
in Afghanistan. 
 
(C) The suggested U.S. objectives are to secure new 
non-military and military contributions from the GOAJ and for 
the USG to brief the Azerbaijani delegation on the status of 
coalition efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Per ref C, Azimov 
told the Ambassador on April 12 that he will brief 
participants on several new non-military contributions to 
Afghanistan --  specifically, contributions to a Provincial 
Reconstruction team, funding the constructions of a girls 
school, and security and demining training in Baku for 
Afghanistan security units.  In our view, these are 
significant non-military contributions that we should 
encourage the GOAJ to continue making, given its growing 
energy wealth and stated desire to play a larger regional 
security role.  We should also use this opportunity to urge 
the GOAJ to join the International Compact for Iraq. 
 
¶C. CASPIAN MARITIME CAPABILITIES 
 
(C) The Azerbaijani Navy and the Coast Guard are the key GOAJ 
interlocutors regarding our maritime cooperation.  DFM Azimov 
perceives the goal of our bilateral cooperation in this area 
as "capacity-building" to address transnational threats.  The 
Navy and the Coast Guard, however, do not cooperate 
extensively. 
 
(C) Our bilateral assistance cooperation in this area is 
outstanding.  Azimov has even requested U.S. advice on 
crafting a comprehensive "Maritime Security Concept" for 
Azerbaijan, to "harmonize and synergize" the GOAJ's currently 
divided efforts.  We suggest the DoD elements at the Embassy 
be the relevant POC to address Azimov's request, and this 
item be noted in the dialogue's list of action-items.  We 
suggest that Washington use this agenda item to: (1) solicit 
the GOAJ's thoughts on next steps in advancing our maritime 
cooperation, including developing synergies among our 
existing programs to address transnational threats; (2) 
encourage enhanced inter-governmental cooperation; and (3) 
urge the maritime State Border Service to develop operational 
plans that include the Navy to advance our 
counterproliferation interests.  Another suggested action 
item is for both sides to come up with a clear list of 
possible synergies in our existing maritime and border 
security programs. 
 
¶D. MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
(C) The GOAJ seeks reassurances that the U.S. intends to 
consult closely regarding our discussions with Russia on the 
possible utility of using the Gabala radar facility in the 
U.S. missile defense architecture.  President Aliyev and 
Foreign Minister Mammadyarov have requested that the GOAJ be 
included -- in a bilateral or trilateral forum -- in 
developing any potential U.S.-Russian proposals for joint 
access to the Gabala radar station.  Aside from background on 
the U.S. missile defense architecture, the GOAJ would be 
grateful for any specific updates -- as available -- on our 
discussions with Russia. 
 
(C) We welcome Washington's suggestion to provide a 
 
BAKU 00000832  004 OF 005 
 
 
background brief on the U.S. missile defense system.  As 
possible, we suggest the U.S. side be as transparent as 
possible about the status of our consultations with Moscow. 
 
¶E. TRAIN AND EQUIP (TEP) 
 
(C) The security talks present a key opportunity to clarify 
both sides' positions regarding interest in a possible TEP. 
President Aliyev told the Ambassador on April 16 that he 
welcomed a discussion on TEP during the security dialogue, 
but said that any TEP mission could not be specifically 
linked to a deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan, as it was not 
in the case of Georgia (ref A).  This misimpression appears 
to have been corrected by Foreign Minister Mammadyarov, who 
later told the Ambassador that President Aliyev is prepared 
to commit in a TEP to deploy a trained unit to "peacekeeping 
operations" to Afghanistan or Iraq, but he does not want to 
mention specific countries in the TEP document due to the 
"Muslim factor."  We suggest that Washington clarify to the 
Azerbaijani delegation the necessary linkage in our view 
between TEP and a coalition contribution. 
 
¶F. CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
(C) The GOAJ seeks to strengthen its capabilities to protect 
Azerbaijan's critical energy infrastructure.  According to 
Azimov, the Azerbaijani delegation plans a presentation on 
this topic, and seeks greater engagement with the U.S. 
Senior Azerbaijani officials were very pleased by the NATO 
Riga Summit statement supporting "a coordinated international 
effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to 
promote energy infrastructure security."  Azimov told us the 
GOAJ would welcome an international (U.S. or NATO) assessment 
to identify gaps in Azerbaijan's current security posture. 
 
(C) We believe the GOAJ lacks a comprehensive approach to 
protecting its energy infrastructure (septel).  The U.S. has 
an inherent interest in helping the GOAJ develop such an 
approach, given Azerbaijan's central role in the BTC and the 
South Caucasus Gas pipelines  and indications of Iranian 
threats.  We recommend we discuss the feasibility of a U.S. 
team of experts performing a needs assessment of Azerbaijan's 
energy infrastructure.  The GOAJ would then be responsible 
for implementing and funding necessary security upgrades. 
This session could also seek to clarify the precise roles of 
individual GOAJ security agencies in protecting Azerbaijan's 
energy infrastructure, as the roles and responsibilities have 
been complicated by the introduction of the Ministry of 
Emergency Situations. 
 
¶G. AZERBAIJAN'S WIDER ROLE 
 
(C) We suggest this agenda item be used to solicit the GOAJ's 
specific plans for playing an increased role in enhancing 
security outside of the immediate Caspian region.  We believe 
the U.S. should largely be in listening mode to gauge how 
serious the GOAJ is about this issue.  The GOAJ repeatedly 
has focused on its role as a model Muslim country that can 
foster the value of religious tolerance, highlighting its 
contributions to coalition operations and its role in the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference.  (NOTE: Azerbaijan's 
year-long chairmanship of the OIC's Foreign Ministers' 
Conference ended in May, but Azerbaijan continues to play a 
key role as a member of the OIC troika.  END NOTE.)  For 
example, the GOAJ sees its military contributions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo as part of its effort to 
promote stability. 
 
(C) We suggest Washington encourage the GOAJ to use its 
growing energy revenues to match its declaratory commitments 
to spread the value of tolerance and play a larger regional 
role.  It would be useful to see what non-military 
contributions the GOAJ could bring to the table.  Azimov told 
the Ambassador he plans to brief the USG delegation on 
important new non-military contributions in Afghanistan that 
the GOAJ proposed in May to NATO, including the construction 
of a girl's school, participation in a provincial 
reconstruction team, and demining and police training for 
Afghani police (ref C).  The Department should also encourage 
the GOAJ to join the International Compact for Iraq as a 
clear demonstration of its declaratory commitments to play a 
larger regional role. 
 
¶H. BORDER SECURITY 
 
 
BAKU 00000832  005 OF 005 
 
 
(C) Our border security cooperation is robust and a bilateral 
success story.  In line with President's Aliyev's push to 
strengthen border security and interest in "buying equipment" 
from the U.S. for this purpose, Azimov told us the State 
Border Service will outline specific needs (ref C).  A second 
objective for this agenda item would be to highlight for the 
GOAJ the critical national security aspects of a transparent 
effective customs service, and to secure GOAJ commitment to 
further consider the February 2007 US Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) proposal for technical assistance (advisors) 
to the State Customs Committee on a fully reimbursable basis 
to help strengthen Customs role in border security.  We 
suggest encouraging the GOAJ to agree during the security 
dialogue to engage in consultations between CBP and the State 
Committee to see how the proposal can be made compatible with 
GOAJ legislation, including the new Customs Code.  The GOAJ 
could agree to report back on its decision within six months 
of the security dialogue. 
 
¶I. NONPROLIFERATION 
 
(C) The suggested objective of this session is to clarify the 
GOAJ's position on PSI and solicit the GOAJ's perspectives on 
how to deepen our non-proliferation cooperation.  The GOAJ 
has not yet commented substantively on our response to its 
detailed PSI questions (ref D), and promised that it would 
respond at the security talks. 
 
¶J. OSCE, UN, GUAM, EU 
 
(C) While the GOAJ has not clearly articulated its objective 
for this agenda item, the Azerbaijani delegation likely will 
focus on gaining USG support in these multilateral forums to 
bolster its position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. We 
have been clear that the OSCE Minsk Group is the key forum 
for resolving the conflict.  We could use this agenda item to 
underscore to the GOAJ that we will only support a UNGA 
resolution on the conflicts if it will contribute to a 
peaceful solution.  Concerning GUAM and the EU, we propose 
soliciting the GOAJ's goals for its participation in these 
two organizations. 
 
¶K. CT COOPERATION 
 
The suggested objective is to identify specific new areas for 
CT cooperation, to be followed up by Ambassador Derse and 
Ambassador Yashar Aliyev.  The Minister of National Security 
has expressed interest in more training and engagement on the 
non-intelligence aspects of our CT cooperation, including 
from the FBI.  There is already extensive CT-related 
information sharing between the U.S. and Azerbaijan.  Azimov 
has suggested that both sides can do more to address the 
ideological roots of terrorism (ref C).  Azimov also said the 
Ministry of National Security will propose increased 
operational measures and intelligence exchanges.  In line 
with the Department's talking points sent via email from PM, 
we agree that it is important to encourage the GOAJ to pass 
an effective terrorist finance legislation and to create a 
financial intelligence unit.  We suggest both sides agree to 
prepare a list of proposals and timeframes for enhancing CT 
cooperation in the security dialogue's minutes. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Embassy thanks PM and EUR for their leadership, 
interest, and support in preparing this year's security 
dialogue.  While our security cooperation is robust, this 
year's consultations are the perfect forum for providing 
strategic-level direction to and identifying new areas for 
cooperation.  The launch of an intensified security dialogue 
is a key step in implementing Secretary Rice's vision, 
outlined in her February 2007 letter to President Aliyev, to 
elevate, expand, and strengthen our strategic partnership 
with Azerbaijan, and will contribute directly to achieving 
critical U.S. national security goals with this key Eurasian 
security partner. 
DERSE