VZCZCXRO0994
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2184/01 1831238
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021238Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1997
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 002184 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: KURDS STILL STANDING BY MALIKI GOVERNMENT - FOR NOW 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 2115 
 
Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor Charles O. Blaha, reasons 1.4 
 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Former Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'fari is 
trying to cultivate support and position himself as an 
alternative to Prime Minister Maliki.  He claims to have 
assembled an informal group that has backing from some Shi,a 
and Kurdish Council of Representatives (CoR) members.  The 
extent of this group,s support is hard to ascertain.  While 
one Kurdish CoR member claims some Kurdish CoR members favor 
Ja'fari, neither Kurdish leaders nor the rank-and-file 
currently favor Maliki's removal - until there is a plan that 
can succeed.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Former PM Ja'fari Makes His Pitch 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a June 25 meeting with Meghan O,Sullivan, Former 
Prime Minister Ja,fari claimed that Council of 
Representatives (CoR) members from the Dawa Party, Tawafuq 
Front, Fadhila, along Sadrist bloc and the Kurdish Alliance 
members, had created a new political "alliance" and hoped to 
form a new government.  Ja,fari cited the current 
government,s sectarian make-up as a major obstacle to 
efficiency and said the new group would only appoint 
"technocrats" to the cabinet.  Ja,fari claimed 40-60 CoR 
members meet "every other Tuesday" to discuss a single policy 
theme, but deflected direct questions about the group,s 
leadership.  He provided O,Sullivan with an English-language 
version of the alliance,s program entitled "Rescue of Iraq" 
which calls for removing the Maliki government through a 
no-confidence vote in the CoR.  O,Sullivan strongly 
reiterated U.S. support for Prime Minister Maliki and 
underscored how damaging delays attendant on any change of 
government would be for Iraq. 
 
Kurdish CoR Member Claims a Political Alliance Led by Ja'fari 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) On June 27, Kurdish CoR member Abdullah Saleh said 
that members of the Kurdish Alliance, with Dawa and ISCI 
elements, had been meeting for "several months" and named 
Ja'fari as the group,s leader.  Saleh said Ja,fari was a 
natural choice because his leadership style was more 
inclusive, and because he had more pan-Arab credentials than 
the current PM.  Saleh claimed the new alliance already had 
enough members to form a majority in the CoR.  Asked about 
overall Kurdish support for the Ja,fari group, he answered 
that his association was "personal" and admitted that this 
did not have buy-in from top Kurdish leadership. 
 
¶4.  (C) Saleh expounded on Ja'fari's comments on the make-up 
of the new government, saying that when it was formed, the 
alliance would give the Arab Sunnis 20 percent of the 
ministerial positions.  Using the phrase "they are either 
with us or against us," he added these positions would not go 
to Sunnis in Baghdad, but to Sunnis who were working against 
al Qaeda in the provinces and had proven that they had real 
influence with the people.  The alliance would present their 
program to these tribal leaders and if the leaders accepted 
the program they would be asked to join the government. 
Saleh said sectarian divisions were paralyzing the current 
government, with disastrous consequences for the country. 
 
Ja'fari Group Reaching Out to Sadrists 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Saleh told PolOffs he would travel as part of a 
Kurdish group on June 28 to Najaf to engage with Muqtada al 
Sadr on linking a timetable for the withdrawal of coalition 
forces from Iraq with the progress of the Iraqi Security 
Forces (ISF).  According to Saleh, as the ISF reach certain 
benchmarks for numbers trained and demonstrate their 
competence and effectiveness, Coalition Forces would rotate 
to support roles and eventually rotate out of the country. 
 
¶6.  (C) Saleh said Sadr was the "most important" political 
player in Iraq and could be a constructive force if 
"approached properly" (NOTE: Saleh has known Sadr since he 
was a child and was a friend of both his father and his 
uncle.  END NOTE.)  Although Saleh initially denied the plan 
to change the government would be on the agenda, he said he 
would raise several of the group,s ideas, including 
peshmerga protection of the Samarra,s Golden Mosque, which 
he thought might placate Sadr and perhaps "bring him along." 
Saleh underscored that he was not traveling as the 
representative of the Kurdish leadership. 
 
Currently Little Kurdish Support for Ja'fari 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00002184  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7.  (C) Despite Saleh's position, other Kurdish CoR contacts 
said that neither senior Kurdish leadership nor rank-and-file 
Kurdish Alliance members support removing the Prime Minister, 
nor did they think Ja'fari would be the right person to 
replace him.  Some suggested this position might change, 
particularly if the Prime Minister,s Da'wa party began 
calling for Maliki,s removal, but underscored any support 
for changing the government would come at a price, probably 
involving Article 140.  Others dismissed the movement as 
merely the Baghdad manifestation of the struggle for 
political power in the southern part of Iraq between Sadrists 
and Abdul Aziz al Hakim,s ISCI. 
 
¶8.  (C) Respected Kurdish independent Mahmoud Othman told 
Poloff June 28 that the Kurdish leadership would not openly 
back a plan that replaced the Maliki government -- until it 
was clear it could succeed.  He observed that, while the PM 
is weak and ineffective (as was the rest of the government), 
finding a candidate to replace him would be very difficult. 
He did say that plans were in the works to replace all of the 
ministers with those that were competent and could work 
together - not those that simply fill a party quota - and to 
shrink the number of ministers to 20. 
 
¶9. (C) Othman also condemned the Group of Four's (KDP, PUK, 
ISCI, Da'wa) efforts to form a moderate front and former 
Prime Minister Allawi's efforts to form an opposition front 
with the Sunnis, saying that this was exactly the wrong thing 
to do to encourage reconciliation.  Two opposing sides were 
forming instead of working together to break down sectarian 
barriers, and nothing good would come of it, he said. 
 
Da'wa-ISCI Push Back Against Ja'fari, Hatch their Own Plots 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Othman pointed out that Da'wa and ISCI had formed a 
strategic council without Ja'fari (reftel) consisting of 
senior members of both parties to facilitate cooperation and 
(he claimed) to stave off Ja'fari's attempts to regain the 
position of prime minister.  Maliki, Ali Adeeb and two others 
would represent Da'wa, while VP Adel Abdel Mehdi, Humam 
Hammudi and two others would represent ISCI. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C) Saleh took care not to suggest senior Kurdish 
support for Ja'fari's group or for Maliki's removal, but 
Kurdish leaders are aware of Saleh's involvement and have not 
forbidden his participation.  Over the last few months, 
Kurdish CoR members have consistently asked about continued 
U.S. support for the Maliki government. 
CROCKER