VZCZCXRO5554
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTH #1522/01 2110851
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 300851Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9814
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4837
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 2869
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 001522 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/27/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU CYP CY
SUBJECT: TURKISH ELECTIONS: A VIEW FROM ATHENS 
 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOMAS COUNTRYMAN.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AN 
D (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Following the re-election of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in Sunday's elections, the mainstream 
Greek political elite breathed a sigh of relief.  PM 
Erdogan's first term was a period of Greek-Turkish stability, 
offering Greeks a more secure vision of their bilateral 
relations.  While problems still exist -- notably the 
division of Cyprus and Turkey's treatment of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and Halki seminary -- most contacts expressed 
optimism at the continuity a second AKP term would bring. 
Conversely, there was widespread distancing from the 
Republican People's Party (CHP) opposition and its 
leadership, who are seen as losing credibility with Turkish 
voters.  The inclusion in the Parliament of the nationalist 
National Movement Party (MHP) alsoproved worrying but most 
Greek observers weretaking a wait-and-see attitude.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
------------------ 
View from the Top 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (U) The Turkish elections were closely watched in Greece. 
Following the announcement of AKP's victory, Athens, like 
most European capitals, was quick to offer congratulations. 
PM Kostas Karamanlis telephoned Turkish PM Erdogan from 
Sarajevo to offer congratulations.  According to press 
reports, Karamanlis invited Erdogan to continue working 
together to increase and improve cooperation between their 
two countries.  In public statements, Karamanlis stressed 
that he hoped the AK re-election would contribute to an 
increased pace of reform efforts.  He stressed that Greece 
continued to support Turkey on its path to EU accession. 
Opposition PASOK leader George Papandreou sent a similar 
message in a letter to Erdogan, saying he would support 
Erdogan in fulfilling Turkey's obligations to resolve the 
Cyprus problem and respect the rights of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate as Turkey proceeds in its EU accession process. 
FM Bakoyannis expressed satisfaction at the smooth, 
democratic process in Turkey, noting that AK offered the 
Turkish people a stable, democratic, European-oriented 
government.  In a statement to the press following her June 
25 meeting with the visiting Cypriot FM, Bakoyannis stated 
that Greece fully expected the re-elected AKP to take 
tangible actions on the Cyprus issue. 
 
------------------ 
View from the MFA 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) In a meeting with visiting Greece Desk officer on June 
26, Stavros Venizelos (Internal Turkish Politics) and Ioannis 
Ghikas (Bilateral Political-Military Affairs) in the A-4 
Directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs echoed 
Bakoyannis, comments but were less optimistic on the Cyprus 
problem or Aegean tensions.   However, they agreed the AK 
victory was good for the bilateral relationship, continuing 
the stability of the last few years.  The &stars8 of AK 
(Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, and Ali Babacan) represented the 
modern face of Turkey and the electorate seemed to be behind 
them.   Venizelos surmised that the June 6 shake-up in the 
AKP,s list of candidates served a two-fold purpose: to 
reassure Turks that an AK victory would not usher in an 
Islamic state, and to entrench AK as THE party with a firmly 
modern outlook, capable of leading Turkey towards the 
European Union.  Ghikas emphasized that the GOG has never 
believed that a re-elected AKP would lead Turkey towards an 
Islamic revolution ala Iran.  AK voters supported the party 
not only because AK had ushered in a period of stability and 
growth in the Turkish economy, but also as a protest vote 
against the military's actions following the nomination of 
Gul for the presidency. 
 
¶4. (C) Venizelos and Ghikas believed CHP is moving against 
the current of mainstream Turkey.  They attributed this to 
the heavy-handed approach of Deniz Baykal and the CHP party 
leadership, which allied itself with the military. 
Venizelos also speculated Kemalism as an ideology was 
becoming outdated, more suitable to Turkey in the 1920,s 
than to the modernizing path most Turks now see their country 
heading down.  Perhaps the Turkish electorate was not ready 
for AKP to decide on the President this time around, Ghikas 
mused, but four years from now, if AK continued on the same 
path, it would be a different story. 
 
 
ATHENS 00001522  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5. (C) Nonetheless, both Venizelos and Ghikas noted that 
there were still significant irritants in the bilateral 
relationship, which would be difficult to overcome, even by a 
more secure Erdogan/AKP led government.  Ghikas pointed to 
the hardening of Turkish positions in Aegean affairs over the 
last year, including: disputes over fishing and research 
vessels, an increase in Turkish overflight "violations," and 
at NATO (implicitly referencing the Agios Efstratios incident 
in February).  He noted Turkey still maintained three casus 
belli: over oil exploration of the continental shelf, 
territorial waters and territorial airspace.  He admitted the 
Greek press was often an obstacle to progress as the GOG is 
always portrayed as having made concessions to Turkey.  The 
government was working to shift the media's mindset away from 
a zero-sum game, but that was an uphill battle.  He also 
blamed the Turkish media and Turkish military for spurring on 
the Greek media in a negative fashion.   As an example, he 
noted a posting on the Turkish General Staff's website last 
spring listing instances of Greek "harassment" of Turkish 
planes.  He noted that in addition to the false nature of 
these claims, posting them on a public website did nothing to 
lower tensions in the region. 
 
---------------------------- 
Cyprus, Aegean Still Issues 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Ghikas and Venizelos were equally pessimistic about a 
possible solution to the Cyprus problem. They noted the 
on-going dispute between Turkey and Cyprus was threatening 
Turkey's EU accession.   Both dismissed Turkish accession to 
the EU as long as there was a dispute with Cyprus and casus 
belli against Greece.  DeskOff agreed that Turkey still 
needed to undertake reforms before becoming a full member, 
but that it was important to keep Turkey on the EU path. 
DeskOff continued that eleven years ago, following the 
Imia/Kardak crisis, it would have been unthinkable for Greece 
to be a firm supporter of Turkish accession, but much has 
changed since then.  The important thing was not to close the 
door on Turkey.  Ghikas and Venizelos agreed, but argued 
Turkey needed to do something significant, not to convince 
just Greece, but all of Europe -- and soon.  Europe would be 
looking for serious moves on Article 301, the Kurds and/or 
Halki and the Ecumenical Patriarchate following the 
elections.  DeskOff reiterated these were impor 
 
------------------ 
A View from PASOK 
------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) A well-connected PASOK-affiliated university Professor 
took much the same view of the elections as the MFA 
officials.  Erdogan's victory was good because it meant 
continuity and the continued stabilization of relations 
between Greece and Turkey.  While most Greeks did not trust 
Erdogan because they viewed him as an Islamist, she noted 
they appreciated the sense of security his re-election 
brought.  Of course there was concern about the nationalists 
entering Parliament, but people were waiting to see how they 
behaved.  As for the CHP, despite being the party which 
represented the same leftist ideological roots as PASOK, 
PASOK was becoming more and more uncomfortable with the 
relationship.  This was largely due to Baykal and the current 
CHP leadership, though other CHP members, especially Kemal 
Dervish, could prove to be the future of CHP, reintegrating 
the party into mainstream Turkish politics and the European 
left.  Ultimately, the re-election of Erdogan was viewed as 
being helpful as the PASOK elite made its case for supporting 
Turkey's accession to the EU to the Greek public.  Even 
within PASOK's membership it was a tough sell: a recent 
internal party poll showed 75 percent of members responding 
negatively to Turkey's possible EU membership. 
COUNTRYMAN