VZCZCXRO5152
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1733/01 1871439
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061439Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2869
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC//
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001733 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2017 
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: AKP IN THE PROVINCES - TOP DOWN IS THE 
TREND 
 
REF: ANKARA 1437 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment:  A series of trips to Turkey's 
provinces have made it clear that PM Erdogan's Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) has turned into the top-down Erdogan 
machine.  He picked the candidate lists, he set the 
priorities and the platform.  If AKP returns to government, 
all will be beholden to him.  On the provincial side, there 
is less of a sense of participatory democracy, though in most 
places they are working to maintain party solidarity, 
including by flashy Erdogan-led rallies.  It is an encore of 
the "great man", central government control complex that has 
always plagued Turkish politics.  End summary and comment. 
 
¶2. (C) Erdogan has always been top dog in AKP, even before he 
had his political ban lifted and replaced Abdullah Gul as 
prime minister in 2003.  Early on, AKP touted its democratic 
credentials and billed itself as an uncharacteristically 
Turkish internally democratic big tent party.  That has 
gradually eroded as Erdogan exerted ever-increasing control 
over party structures and appointments, culminating in this 
year's candidate lists for the July 22 parliamentary 
elections.  He has studiously moderated the party's profile, 
cutting MPs who voted "no" on March 1 (2003), trimming back 
those stemming from the Islamist National View perspective 
and pruning deadwood elsewhere.  He has also parachuted 
candidates into districts based on who he wants to get 
elected (as with Mehmet Simsek who tops the list in moderate 
Gaziantep) or whose district he wants to control (as with the 
number 1 candidate in Sivas, an Erdogan Istanbul protege who 
replaced Sivas' own, Deputy PM Abdullatif Sener, to the 
dismay of locals).  In a long-running Turkish tradition, this 
will give Erdogan solid control over his party; newly elected 
deputies will know they are beholden to Erdogan and 
understand the PM will not hesitate to axe them next election 
period if they do not toe the line. 
 
3.(C) The mirror image of such control is disillusionment, 
resignation and a drop in enthusiasm at the provincial level, 
where local AKP organizations feel Erdogan and his cronies 
ran roughshod over their internal primary system, rejecting 
candidates they had tabbed as qualified for those preferred 
by Ankara (as was the case in Van).  In Sivas, where the 
city's own Deputy PM did not make the election lists, 
purportedly because he disagreed with how they were drawn up, 
Sener's photo still graces AKP campaign posters and the 
locals seem perplexed at why an experienced politician -- and 
co-founder of AKP -- was given the brush-off.  In other 
places -- often the sub-provinces or poorer areas such as 
Yozgat, east of Ankara, the local party organization seems 
grateful for the PM's hand, and those who made the candidate 
lists are careful to include those who did not, introducing 
them formally to visitors.  In the sub-provinces, Erdogan 
worship is in full swing. 
 
¶4. (C) This was encapsulated in an Erdogan rally we witnessed 
in Yozgat on June 28.  Preparations were impeccable -- 
quality soundstage, large screen for those at the back, 
flags, enormous banners with candidates' pictures and 
slogans, decorations, music, confetti, balloons (all trucked 
in).  An MC - and a burning sun - warmed up the crowd for 
several hours.  When the main act arrived, the crowd was 
lukewarm on former Justice Minister Cicek and a local AKP 
candidate, generally (but not universally) polite to FM Gul, 
but people got to their feet for PM Erdogan.  While crowd 
numbers did not approach the 50,000 AKP organizers were 
touting (it was a work day, it was hot, and a number of those 
who attended were clearly spectators vice supporters), there 
were probably 30,000 in a traditional National Action Party 
(MHP) stronghold.  Gul, who did not connect well with the 
crowd, focused on how AKP (and he personally) had been the 
victim in the abortive April presidential election; the PM 
touted actions taken to make the average working Turk's life 
easier, and what AKP still planned to do.  Finally, Erdogan 
worked hard to pump them up, western campaign style, to shout 
out the AKP election slogans, before departing by helicopter 
for his next rally of the day. 
 
 
ANKARA 00001733  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶5. (C) In the provinces, AKP candidates and provincial 
chairmen are unfailingly upbeat and optimistic about the 
numbers they will gain on July 22.  But AKP is starting to 
look more like an old-style Turkish party than a new, 
internally democratic one.  The party lost one potentially 
potent calling card with the enormous youth vote:  with early 
elections AKP was not able to offer candidacies to those 
under 30 (25-29), since that constitutional amendment will 
not take effect until the fall.  AKP's strength has been its 
base and its volunteer grassroots organizations;  these 
remain committed to AKP and Erdogan.  But Erdogan's top-down 
tactics may dim enthusiasm at the mid-level, and AKP -- along 
with other parties -- is looking for every vote it can 
muster. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON


id: 115136
date: 7/12/2007 8:19
refid: 07ANKARA1778
origin: Embassy Ankara
classification: CONFIDENTIAL
destination: 07ADANA78
header:
VZCZCXRO0288
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1778/01 1930819
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120819Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2935
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5// PRIORITY
RHMFISS/39ABG CP INCIRLIK AB TU PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/425ABS IZMIR TU//CC// PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

----------------- header ends ----------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001778 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/05/2022 
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY:  THE PRO-KURDISH DTP - ITS ELECTION AND 
POST-ELECTION PROSPECTS 
 
REF: ADANA 78 
 
Classified By: PolCouns Janice G. Weiner, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: The largest and most influential pro-Kurdish 
political party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), running 
candidates as independents, seems set to take some two dozen 
seats in the July 22 parliamentary election.  This is enough 
seats to form a parliamentary group and -- if DTPers stick to 
their moderate rhetoric -- potentially wield some clout in 
the new parliament.  The DTP, however, has links with the 
terrorist PKK and it is unclear just how moderate their voice 
will be.  Their candidacies stand in sharp contrast to a rise 
in PKK violence, which seems aimed at creating further 
divisions and instability in Turkey's southeast.  PM Erdogan 
has called on DTPers who enter parliament to be responsible 
political actors, not beholden to a terrorist organization. 
How DTP acts in parliament will prove a bellwether for openly 
Kurdish aspirations in Turkey for years to come.  End summary. 
 
DTP Endorsing "Independent" Candidates 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) In recent meetings throughout southeastern Turkey, 
local politicians, journalists and businesspeople told us 
that DTP-endorsed independent candidates are expected to win 
up to two dozen seats in Parliament in the July 22 elections. 
 In the region's most populous provinces, Diyarbakir and Van, 
the party is expected to win a total of eight seats, while 
winning one or two seats in 10 other southeastern provinces 
plus in selected regions of western Turkey (reftel).  Should 
they win at least 20 seats, they will have enough to form a 
formal parliamentary group, entitled to floor time and 
allowed to present legislative proposals.  DTP officials, 
including party chairman Ahmet Turk, have stressed that their 
parliamentarians will work to achieve their objectives by 
working responsibly with other parties and avoiding the type 
of confrontational stunt -- specifically, insisting on 
speaking in Kurdish when taking the oath of office -- that 
landed their predecessors (including Turk himself) in hot 
water in the early 1990s. 
 
¶3. (C) PM Erdogan has publicly thrown down the "moderation" 
gauntlet to DTP, calling on those who enter parliament after 
the July 22 elections to be responsible political actors.  He 
implied that, should he lead Turkey's next government, that 
government could work with (though not be in coalition with) 
the DTP if their aims and behavior are moderate.  The PM also 
made clear that if DTP wants to play a constructive role in 
parliament, it cannot be beholden to the terrorist PKK.  The 
PM's Justice and Development Party (AKP) believes it can 
benefit from DTP support within parliament on democratic 
reforms, but not if the votes are PKK-tainted. 
 
¶4. (C) That there are links between the DTP and the terrorist 
PKK is clear.  Some noted to us that the DTP has parachuted 
candidate into districts, which will make them answer to the 
group that put them there -- a political practice in Turkey 
not unique to DTP.  In previous meetings with DTP chairman 
Ahmet Turk, we have urged him unequivocally to condemn PKK 
violence; he has demurred, saying that while he abhors 
violence, it would be political suicide for him to issue such 
a public statement.  In indications of Turk's attempt to push 
the envelope, he condemned the May Ankara bombing; attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to place some relatively independent Kurdish 
moderates on the election lists, such as Diyarbakir Bar 
President Sezgin Tanrikulu, and tried (again, unsuccessfully) 
to enter an election alliance with two small Kurdish parties, 
KADEP and HAK-PAR, both untainted by any association with 
violence.  Regarding the still-born election alliance, 
HAK-PAR chairman Serdac Bucak told us that Kurdish society 
wants unity, "but the decision was made elsewhere - by the 
PKK."  And with respect to his proposed candidacy, Tanrikulu 
explained to us that, based on his discussions with the DTP 
about his candidacy, it was clear they wanted obedient 
servants, not independent thinkers (also hardly unique among 
political parties, unless the organization pulling strings is 
the PKK). 
¶5. (C) But some of the DTP's established figures are not 
helping to convey a moderate party image.  A case in point is 
 
ANKARA 00001778  002 OF 002 
 
 
Diyarbakir mayor Osman Baydemir, under investigation for 
remarks he made in a recent interview on pro-PKK Roj TV, in 
which he categorized the PKK as fighters (not terrorists). 
 
PKK Breathing Fire 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Equally puzzling is the PKK's stepped up activities in 
recent weeks, further raising the temperature in an already 
tense region and political race.  Many observers are 
suspicious that the PKK's increased attacks are deliberately 
intended to provoke stepped up Turkish military activity in 
the southeast, further aggravating pre-existing cleavages 
between Turks and Kurds.  It is also possible that the PKK, 
which does not exercise absolute control over DTP, may not 
want the party to succeed in the political arena, where a 
group of pro-Kurdish MPs could steal the limelight and media 
attention, as well as rob the PKK of its primacy on the 
Kurdish issue. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) The July 22 general election remains an opportunity 
for DTP and Turkey's Kurds.  How they choose to play their 
card -- how brave they are in the face of inevitable PKK 
pressure -- may determine the voice, or lack thereof, in 
Turkey of those with Kurdish ethnic aspirations for years to 
come. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/ankara/ 
 
WILSON