VZCZCXRO1553
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2185/01 1940818
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130818Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6970
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0685
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA PRIORITY 0377
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0017
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU PRIORITY 0217
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002185 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E 
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
CJTF-HOA AND USCENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SO ET ER AU BN
SUBJECT: SOMALI TFG AMBASSADOR REVIEWS SOMALILAND, AMISOM, 
AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 1507 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: ERIC WONG, ACTING DCM.  REASON: 1.4 (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY.  According to Ambassador Abdulkarim Farah, 
the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia's (TFG) 
Ambassador to Ethiopia and PermRep to the African Union, 
African foreign ministers meeting in Accra unanimously 
rejected a Ghanaian motion to establish an AU committee to 
examine Somaliland issues.  Kenya, as IGAD chair, objected to 
such a proposal being raised before the AU Council of 
Ministers, prior to being discussed at the sub-regional 
level.  Citing sanctions on Eritrea for unpaid arrears, 
ministers also denied the Eritrean foreign minister the right 
to address the Council, when he attempted to castigate 
Ethiopia and the United States for "destroying" Somalia. 
Stating that Ethiopia needed to withdraw troops soon from 
Somalia, Amb. Farah said Benin was ready to contribute two 
battalions to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 
and that Nigeria had provided USD 2 million to AMISOM.  The 
TFG will propose that the AU PSC endorse a six-month 
extension of AMISOM's mandate to December 2006.  On the 
political front, Farah asserted that Somalia's 
long-anticipated National Reconciliation Conference would 
begin July 15, albeit "slowly," but criticized TFG leadership 
for disproportionate appointments of ethnic Darood and weak 
commitment to transition in 2009.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) On July 7, visiting AF DAS James Swan, accompanied by 
Ambassador and A/DCM, met with TFG Ambassador Abdulkarim 
Farah.  Farah had just returned from the semi-annual AU 
Summit in Accra, and was due to travel with TFG Prime 
Minister Ghedi to Jeddah for a visit with Saudi King 
Abdullah.  According to Farah, Ghedi would seek direct 
financial assistance for the TFG from Saudi Arabia; Riyadh's 
previous interest in hosting a meeting on Somali 
reconciliation, and its engagement of Council of Islamic 
Courts (CIC) representatives, were other possible topics. 
Commenting on the AU Summit, Farah said that while Senegalese 
President Wade had backed Libya's Qadhafi, South African 
President Mbeki had joined with Ethiopian PM Meles and 
Ugandan President Museveni to urge a slow approach to African 
political integration; the compromise declaration adopted 
highlighted the need for economic harmonization, with 
political integration as an ultimate goal, Farah said. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
MINISTERS REJECT SOMALILAND MOTION; REBUT ERITREA 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3. (C) Amb. Farah reviewed discussions on Somalia among the 
AU Council of Ministers in Accra.  At the conclusion of 
prolonged deliberations on unrelated topics, the Ghanaian 
Foreign Minister had unexpectedly introduced a motion to 
establish a ministerial committee to examine Somaliland 
issues and to report to the next AU Summit in January 2008, 
Farah said.  Farah had objected, observing that while peace 
in Somaliland was encouraging, establishing such a committee 
risked setting a precedent for Puntland, Jubaland, and 
possible future entities, while challenging Somalia's 
sovereignty.  As Somalia's Transitional Charter had called 
for a weak federal government and strong regional government, 
Somaliland could be an entity in accordance with such an 
arrangement. 
 
¶4. (C) Farah said AU ministers unanimously opposed Ghana's 
pro-Somaliland motion.  South Africa had supported the TFG's 
objection, noting that Somaliland had hired a consulting firm 
that the South African government had accused of organizing 
secessionist meetings.  Kenya, as chair of IGAD, had argued 
that the issue should be raised first at the regional level, 
prior to the AU Council of Ministers, and that the motion 
risked "sabotaging" the TFG.  Even Egypt had argued for 
respecting Somalia's sovereignty, Farah said. 
 
¶5. (C) According to Farah, the only reference to the United 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002185  002 OF 003 
 
 
States arose when Eritrea's Foreign Minister had complained 
at the AU ministerial that Ethiopia and the United States 
were "destroying the life of Somalia."  The Eritrean FM was 
then denied the floor, when AU legal advisors agreed with 
Farah's point of order that Eritrea was under sanction (due 
to arrears), and therefore should not be recognized.  Farah 
had responded that there was not a single U.S. soldier in 
Somalia, and that only Eritrea was destabilizing the country, 
by shipping arms to Somalia and by harboring terrorists. 
Somalia was participating in the global war on terrorism, 
while Eritrea was providing safehaven.  Ethiopian FM Seyoum 
had also rebutted Eritrea, Farah added. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
BENIN, BURUNDI, NIGERIA AMONG TCCS FOR AMISOM 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The TFG did not seek to discuss extending AMISOM's 
mandate at the recently concluded AU Summit, Farah said. 
Instead, Farah said he planned to propose to Nigeria (holding 
the monthly chair of the AU Peace and Security Council) that 
the AU PSC endorse a six-month extension of AMISOM's mandate 
to December 2006.  TFG PM Ghedi had sought only a two-month 
extension, assuming that a July 18 UNSC meeting on Somalia 
indicated the UN would soon assume control of the operation. 
Citing the recent UNSC PRST, Swan said the USG had 
consistently called for UN planning on Somalia, but agreed 
that two months was too short for the UN to assume control: 
logistical and administrative preparations, identification of 
TCCs for a force that UN DPKO has indicated would number 
approximately 20,000 troops, and a UNSCR mandate for a UN 
operation would be needed.  Moreover, a short extension of 
AMISOM, particularly if coupled with another postponement of 
the National Reconciliation Congress, could signal lack of 
progress in Somalia. 
 
¶7. (C) Ethiopian troops now needed to withdraw from Somalia, 
Farah said.  Potential troop-contributing countries (TCCs) 
for AMISOM included Benin, Burundi, Ghana, and Nigeria, who 
had no objection to immediate deployment.  According to 
Farah, Benin had complained that the TFG had not consulted 
its government earlier, but was now ready to deploy two 
battalions after completing final training.  (COMMENT:  We 
have not heard previously of this purported commitment from 
Benin and are verifying Farah's report.  END COMMENT.) 
Burundi only awaited logistics support and equipment (some of 
which had been provided by France) to deploy French-trained 
troops, and could deploy within two weeks, if provided 
strategic lift.  Nigeria's president had said his defense 
minister would approve deployment, but was awaiting the 
formation of a new government; Nigeria had also provided USD 
2 million to the AU to support AMISOM. 
 
¶8. (C) Swan noted that the USG has some funding available for 
equipping TCCs.  Deploying AMISOM or even UN troops 
alone-whQe important--would be insufficient to assure 
security in Somalia, Swan added.  Seeking a political 
solution was the necessary element, as was training and 
improving the capabilities of TFG forces (through Ugandan, 
Ethiopian, or Tanzanian trainers).  Farah questioned why the 
USG did not provide direct support to the TFG police and 
military, choosing instead to use third parties; Swan replied 
that the USG recognized the importance of improving TFG 
security forces but sought to have the AU and neighboring 
African governments play the leading role. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
DAROOD APPOINTMENTS DISCOURAGE HAWIYE; 2009 ELECTIONS KEY 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶9. (C) On internal Somali political issues, Farah asserted 
that the National Reconciliation Congress (NRC) would finally 
proceed on July 15, albeit "slowly."  Farah underscored his 
personal commitment to forming a viable Somali government, 
citing his three years of service as TFG PermRep, despite a 
recent USD 5 million bounty on his head by the CIC.  Farah 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002185  003 OF 003 
 
 
complained that the TFG leadership's inability to formulate 
policy was a "serious problem," citing power struggles among 
President Yusuf, Prime Minister Ghedi, and Parliamentary 
Speaker Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nurr.  Yusuf's Majertain sub-clan 
and Marehan sub-clan members were struggling with each other 
in Kismayo, he added.  Yusuf was likely too old to be a 
candidate for office in 2009, but had suggested extending the 
TFG's mandate beyond 2009.  Citing the need for a multi-party 
system, Farah said such an extension would be "political 
suicide."  PM Ghedi may seek to delay the current political 
process in order to position himself better for 2009 
elections, Farah said.  High illiteracy among MPs made it 
difficult to identify a suitable ministerial candidate from 
Parliament; the Transitional Federal Charter's requirement 
that cabinet ministers be selected from MPs also discouraged 
Somali professionals from the diaspora from participating in 
the TFG. 
 
¶10. (C) Disproportionate appointments of members of President 
Yusuf's Darood clan discouraged the Hawiye clan, Farah said; 
the first five generals appointed were Darood, as were 21 of 
34 ambassadorial appointments that would soon be announced 
(including key appointments to Addis Ababa, Washington, the 
League of Arab States, Brussels, and London).  (NOTE: Farah 
said he was slated to transfer to South Africa, but that 
Ethiopian PM Meles and FM Seyoum had approached Yusuf about 
his remaining in Addis.  The TFG would likely seek agrement 
soon for a Darod appointee to Washington, he added.  END 
NOTE.)  PM Ghedi was not supported by his own Hawiye clan, 
nor did he have the full confidence of President Yusuf. 
While pressure on the TFG had led to Hawiye being appointed 
as National Police Commander and as Governor of Benadir, they 
were former warlords, Farah said.  Farah expressed 
appreciation for USG support of the TFG, as well as for 
pressure on the TFG to promote inclusiveness.  Swan responded 
that failure to accommodate disaffected Hawiye, via the NRC 
or another mechanism, risked driving them to seek other 
alternatives, such as supporting Somali dissidents in Asmara 
or those condoning violent attacks. 
 
¶11. (C) Farah noted that three distinct groups were united in 
their opposition to the TFG but were driven by different 
interests: 
-- Some Hawiye/Habr-Gedir/Ayr with business interests in 
illicit trade or occupied properties were "not interested at 
all" in the NRC or in establishing a Somali government. 
-- Others (including some in the Ayr sub-clan) had a genuine 
interest in power-sharing, and needed to be encouraged by the 
TFG.  The Ayr community would be represented in 
power-sharing, Farah said. 
-- Former CIC leaders such as Adan Hashi Ayro and Sheikh 
Hassan Dahir Aweys were extremists who supported Usama 
bin-Laden and Al-Qaida.  The Somali people would not allow 
them to return to Somalia to form a political party, Farah 
said; instead, they would support their own clan leaders. 
 
Farah agreed that the TFG would make little progress until it 
focused on engaging political leaders, rather than stressing 
the "social reconciliation" favored by PM Ghedi.  A "sensible 
political program" needed to be discussed along with the NRC, 
to include a census and establishment of a national electoral 
commission for 2009 elections.  Those who asserted they were 
alternatives to the TFG needed to campaign for that, Farah 
said. 
 
¶12. (C) COMMENT.  As Somalia's PermRep to the African Union 
(and Ambassador to Ethiopia), Amb. Farah has been one of the 
most visible proponents of the TFG, as well as of Ethiopia's 
military intervention in Somalia.  His frank comments on 
internal divisions within TFG leadership, and on the 
disproportionate nature of TFG appointments, echo those made 
in earlier meetings with USG officials (reftel).  END COMMENT. 
 
¶13. (U) AF DAS Swan cleared this cable. 
YAMAMOTO