VZCZCXRO3215
OO RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #0435/01 1522054
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 012054Z JUN 07
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1999
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1121
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1022
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 000435 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2017 
TAGS: CD CT PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: NO SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1706 AS HYBRID BASIS FOR 
DARFUR 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 75006 
 
     ¶B. USUN NEW YORK 00407 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
¶1. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad convened a June 1 meeting of the 
Security Council Permanent Three Members to deliver ref A 
points.  Participating in the meeting were UK Permanent 
Representative (PR) Emyr Jones Parry, UN Counsellor Paul 
Johnston, French Charge Jean-Marie Lacroix, French Counsellor 
Nicolas de Riviere, French Poloff Clement LeClerc, USUN 
Deputy PolCouns and Poloff. 
 
NEED NEW RESOLUTION AS A PRACTICAL MATTER . . . 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
2.(C) Ambassador Khalilzad presented to P3 counterparts the 
importance of proceeding under the authority of UNSCR 1706 
(2006) to mandate the United Nations (UN) - African Union 
(AU) hybrid operation in Darfur.  Consistent with previous 
discussions, neither UK PermRep Jones Parry nor French Charge 
Lacroix saw any way for the Council to authorize the hybrid 
based solely on 1706.  Jones Parry commented that to do so 
could hurt the Council, since 1706 never received Sudanese 
consent, as indicated in OP1 of that resolution, and was 
accordingly never implemented (NOTE: Jones Parry and Lacroix 
made absolutely clear that the UK and France read OP1 of 1706 
as requiring, vice inviting, Khartoum's consent to any UN 
peacekeeping operation as a practical if not legal matter. 
END NOTE).  To link the hybrid to such an un-implementable 
text "would not get us anywhere," Jones Parry declared.  UK 
Counsellor Johnston noted that de-linking the two resolutions 
could also help secure Sudanese consent, since Khartoum had 
objected to several provisions of 1706, including OP8(j) and 
(k) on restructuring the police service and promoting rule of 
law. 
 
¶3. (C) French Charge Lacroix agreed, adding that 1706 had 
been adopted "in a completely different context."  He 
expressed hope that if Sudanese consent were secured for a 
new hybrid resolution, the text could potentially be adopted 
by consensus, signaling "a new page" in the Council's 
dealings on Darfur.  Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(DPKO) Africa Director Titov said as much to Deputy PolCouns 
on May 29 when he advised that "if you want to 'rough up 
Khartoum,' go with 1706; however, if you want to try to start 
a new, cooperative chapter, go with a new resolution using 
the language of the UN-AU report." 
 
. . . ALSO FOR FINANCIAL REALITIES 
---------------------------------- 
¶4. (C) In addition to the political rationale behind seeking 
a new resolution on the hybrid, Jones Parry argued there were 
financial reasons as well.  A new resolution would be 
necessary to avoid ambiguities in approaching the Fifth 
Committee for funding.  DPKO Africa Director Titov confirmed 
this logic to Deputy PolCouns on May 29, explaining that the 
UN Comptroller needed "explicit text" to implement the Addis 
Ababa Agreements, beyond the scope of a letter from the 
Security Council President to the Secretary-General (SYG), as 
was done to finance the Heavy Support Package (HSP), or a 
Presidential Statement.  DPKO noted it had been hard enough 
to get the UN Comptroller to move on the HSP with only a 
letter, let alone on a package exceeding a billion dollars 
per year. 
 
UN-AU AGREEMENT ON REPORT STILL OUTSTANDING 
------------------------------------------- 
¶5. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad stressed that effective 
protection of civilians, as demanded by 1706, was essential, 
a point with which both the UK and France heartily agreed. 
Jones Parry said that if the hybrid report, stillQnder 
negotiation between the UN and the AU, were insufficient in 
this regard, "then we'll send it back to them."  DPKO 
Under-SYG Guehenno needed P3 support to come to an agreement 
with AU Commission Chairman Konare, according to Jones Parry. 
 According to UKUN, SYG Ban had threatened to forgo agreement 
with Konare on the hybrid report if it meant backing down on 
specific provisions, presumably those dealing with command 
and control.  To avoid a UN-AU split on their joint 
peacekeeping venture, all P3 members agreed to encourage 
quietly both Ban and Konare to agree the report as soon as 
possible.  Otherwise, Ambassador Khalilzad warned, the 
planned June 5-6 consultative briefings with the Sudanese 
Government on the text would not take place and the whole 
process would be delayed (NOTE: In subsequent Security 
Council consultations, SYG Ban announced that the AU had 
reverted with changes to the hybrid report as submitted to 
the Council per ref B.  We will report on these changes 
 
USUN NEW Y 00000435  002 OF 002 
 
 
septel.  END NOTE). 
KHALILZAD