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Viewing cable 07UNVIEVIENNA384, IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL FOR COOPERATION,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07UNVIEVIENNA384 2007-06-18 08:01 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0384/01 1690801
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 180801Z JUN 07
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6572
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000384 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT:  IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL FOR COOPERATION, 
NOTE CONCERN OVER FADING INSIGHT INTO IRAN'S PROGRAM 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) Director General ElBaradei's opening statement noted 
that Iran has continued to place additional limitations on 
IAEA verification activities, which has resulted in a 
"deterioration" of the IAEA's knowledge of some aspects of 
Iran's nuclear program.  Almost all country and bloc 
statements called on Iran to improve its cooperation with the 
IAEA, and even the NAM and Venezuela asked Iran to continue 
cooperating.  Thirteen statements, including the EU and EU3 
statements, called on Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions on 
Iran and almost a dozen states asked Iran to reconsider 
recent decisions to suspend Code 3.1 of its Safeguards 
Agreement, to end Design Verification Inspections at Arak, 
and/or to de-designate IAEA inspectors. 
 
2. (SBU) A number of NAM countries gave tougher statements 
than in the past, calling on Iran to increase its cooperation 
with the IAEA.  Russia delivered a fairly strong statement, 
stating its regret that Iran has not complied with BOG or 
UNSC resolutions and expressing its hope that Iran would 
reconsider its decision to move Arak outside of IAEA 
verification.  China, however, provided a very weak statement 
that only noted UNSCR 1747 as "a development" and said that 
sanctions and pressure would not yield a solution.  The 
Chair's summary, while not accurately reflecting the weight 
of opinion against Iran, was far more balanced than in the 
past, accurately describing the various points against Iran. 
End Summary 
 
-------------------------------- 
DG: "Deterioration" of Knowledge 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's opening statement on June 11 noted 
that Iran continues to provide the IAEA access to its nuclear 
material and facilities and that the Agency has been able to 
verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, but 
quickly turned to highlight concerns over Iran's reduced 
cooperation. He reiterated that Iran has not taken the steps 
called for by the Board or the UNSC, and is continuing 
"steadily to perfect" enrichment-related knowledge, is 
expanding its enrichment capacity, and has continued 
construction on its heavy water reactor at Arak.  He 
emphasized that Iran has continued to place additional 
limitations on IAEA verification activities which has 
resulted in a "deterioration" of the IAEA's knowledge of some 
aspects of Iran's nuclear program.  The DG also urged that 
dialogue and diplomacy are the only way to achieve a 
negotiated solution. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Chairman Petric Calls the Meeting to Order 
------------------------------------------ 
 
4. (SBU) Board Chairman Petric, noting the UNSC resolutions, 
the DG's report, and the June 6 technical briefing, opened 
agenda item 6(e) to discuss the implementation of safeguards 
in Iran on the afternoon of June 13.  Country statements 
immediately ensued. 
 
------------------------------- 
NAM Reads Ministerial Statement 
------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) The Cuban Ambassador, representing the NAM, provided 
a verbatim reading of principles from the September 2006 NAM 
Ministerial: states' rights to peaceful nuclear cooperation 
in conformity with their legal obligations; that voluntary 
confidence-building measures should not be construed as legal 
obligations; that the IAEA is the sole competent authority 
for safeguards verification; a pitch for a Middle East 
nuclear weapon free zone; Israel's need to join the NPT; 
opposition to threats of attacks against nuclear facilities 
devoted to peaceful purposes; and support for negotiations 
without preconditions.  She highlighted Iran's voluntary and 
continuing cooperation with the IAEA and positive aspects of 
the DG's report, including that the Agency has no evidence of 
diversion, that no reprocessing is taking place, and that 
Iran has allowed unannounced inspections of Natanz. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
But Some NAM Country Statements Much Tougher 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Many NAM counties associated themselves with the NAM 
statement, but virtually every one called on Iran to 
cooperate with the Agency to resolve the outstanding issues. 
South Africa said Iran's cooperation has deteriorated and 
called on Iran to comply with the UNSCRs and to reconsider 
 
its implementation of the Additional Protocol and DIV access 
to Arak.  South Africa recalled that it had warned the 
international community that moving Iran's file to the UNSC 
would escalate the crisis and reduce the information 
available, which had happened. 
 
7. (SBU) Other NAM states also called on Iran to increase 
cooperation with the IAEA, but were not quite as strong. 
Thailand emphasized positive statements from the DG's report 
including Iran's continued provision of access, expressed 
hope for diplomacy and noted that Thailand is complying with 
UNSCR 1737.  Belarus and Indonesia (under Rule 50, which 
allows non-Board members to speak) delivered short statements 
that said the issue should only be resolved through 
diplomacy.  Indonesia stated Iran should cooperate to resolve 
outstanding issues. Belarus more vaguely called on states to 
be transparent. Egypt said that Iranian cooperation was 
important to show that it has a purely peaceful program, 
which is within its rights, though half of the statement 
reiterated its familiar calls for an international focus on 
the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle 
East including the denuclearization of Israel.  Libya called 
the ignorance of Israel's nuclear program discriminatory, 
called for a freeze of UNSC 
 action, and said that the UNSCRs left no leeway for the 
Board or the DG to convince Iran to be more cooperative, 
though it encouraged Iran to be more transparent with the 
IAEA. 
 
8. (SBU) Syria, Cuba, and Venezuela (which spoke under Rule 
50) were Iran's only defenders at this Board meeting.  Syria 
delivered a short statement focusing on positive elements of 
the DG's report such as non-diversion and Iran's continued 
cooperation and argued Iran has ceased only voluntary 
measures and not legal obligations.  Syria reiterated the 
NAM's claim of a double standard in the Board and noted that 
Israel's reactors are not under safeguards.  Cuba delivered a 
long country statement that claimed that political interests 
are driving international actions on Iran and that these 
actions are discriminatory and threaten international peace 
and security.  Cuba also called US actions a violation of the 
"multi-polar" system Cuba endorses and said that US 
anti-ballistic missile activities threaten peace. It claimed 
Iran is being used by a pretext for nuclear weapons states to 
develop arsenals.  Cuba called requests for the Board to be 
constantly informed of Iran's cooperation and activities an 
"unacceptable 
" change in procedure.  Venezuela echoed the NAM and Cuban 
statements, but said it wanted continued Iranian cooperation. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Germany Delivers Strong EU Statement 
------------------------------------ 
 
9. (SBU) Germany, representing the 27 EU countries and some 
dozen associated countries, "deplored" Iran's failure to 
cooperate with both the IAEA and the UNSCRs, noting 
specifically that while UNSCR 1737 made an enrichment 
suspension mandatory, Iran has instead expanded its 
activities.  The statement highlighted that Iran cannot 
unilaterally modify Code 3.1 of its Safeguards Agreement and 
urged Iran to comply with requests for Design Information 
Verification (DIV) inspections at Arak given the Agency's 
continuing right to verification at the facility.  Germany 
listed a number of outstanding issues that are still awaiting 
Iranian clarification, including polonium activities and 
Iran's work on a missile reentry vehicle, and called on Iran 
to reconsider the de-designation of 38 IAEA inspectors.  The 
EU reiterated with concern the DG's statement that the IAEA's 
knowledge of some of Iranian nuclear activities is 
deteriorating. The EU reaffirmed it support both for the UNSC 
process and diplomacy, noting that the P5 1 offer is still on 
the table as a basis for negotiations. 
 
------------------------------------ 
EU3 and "Like-minded" Echo EU Themes 
------------------------------------ 
 
10. (SBU) The UK (speaking for the EU3 and EU High 
Representative Solana) focused on Iran's increased 
restriction of the IAEA's access and how this -- in 
combination with Tehran's "race" to complete nuclear 
capabilities not necessary to fuel Bushehr instead of 
returning to negotiations -- is making it more difficult to 
confirm that Iran's program is peaceful. The EU3 also 
reiterated that its members are still interested in a 
negotiated solution and had addressed Iran's desire for 
nuclear technology again in Madrid two weeks ago during 
Solana's meeting with Larijani. The UK closed by making clear 
that if Iran did not increase its cooperation in compliance 
with the UNSCRs, they would "return to the UNSC." 
 
11. (SBU) Canada's statement noted that there has been no 
progress in resolving a long list of outstanding issues and 
that Iran continues nuclear activities proscribed by the IAEA 
and UNSC resolutions.  Canada went further than other 
like-minded states in stating that ending DIV inspections at 
Arak called into question the access Iran will provide in the 
future and will make it difficult for the IAEA to develop a 
safeguard approach for Iranian facilities.  Canada stated 
that although Iran promised cooperation and transparency in 
October 2003, over the next two years, few of these issues 
were resolved and more issues arose, implicitly questioning 
Iran's attitude toward cooperation.  Australia made a strong 
statement along these themes that called Iran's rejection of 
DIV inspections "unacceptable," called for cooperation to 
resolve outstanding issues, and asked that the DG report to 
the Board on the implementation of Technical Cooperation with 
Iran and Iran's involvement in IAEA projects.  Norway, the 
Republic 
of Korea, and Japan also made short but fairly strong 
statements on these themes.  New Zealand under Rule 50 
reiterated these themes. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Russia Pushes Iran, China Says Sanctions Will Fail 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
12. (SBU) Russia stated its regret that Iran has not complied 
with the IAEA or UNSC resolutions, including suspending 
enrichment and its heavy water projects, and expressed its 
hope that Iran would reconsider its decision to move Arak 
outside of IAEA verification. However, Russia did highlight 
Iran's agreement to additional safeguards at Natanz as a 
positive step and noted that this should allow an adequate 
level of insight into the facility.  Nevertheless, Russia 
called on Iran to cooperate more fully as it had in the past 
and said that resolution of the Iran issue could only be 
achieved through negotiations and with respect for the rights 
of NPT signatories to peaceful nuclear technologies.  Russia 
did not mention the possibility of additional UNSC action if 
Iran does not increase its cooperation or comply with 
existing UNSCRs. 
 
13. (SBU) China provided a very weak statement that only 
noted UNSCR 1747 as "a development" and said that sanctions 
and pressure would not yield a solution.  The remainder of 
the short statement emphasized dialogue, patience, and the 
P5 1's willingness to enter negotiations. 
 
------------------------------- 
South American States Back UNSC 
------------------------------- 
 
14. (SBU) The Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile) each delivered tough statements calling on Iran to 
cooperate and requesting compliance with the UNSCRs, which 
Brazil called "mandatory."  Chile mentioned Iran's positive 
step of allowing unannounced inspections at Natanz though 
stated that questions about Iran's activities remain. Both 
Brazil and Argentina mentioned Code 3.1 and the cessation of 
DIV inspections at Arak in passing, but Brazil said that 
there was no statement, presumably by the IAEA, on whether 
DIV inspections should take place between when the initial 
design information was given and 180 days before the 
introduction of nuclear material. 
 
---------------------- 
Iran: Aggrieved Victim 
---------------------- 
 
15. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh endorsed the NAM 
statement and cherry-picked positive aspects from DG reports 
over the past several years; e.g., he cited every instance 
the DG had said there were no indications of diversions of 
declared material. He emphasized that Iran has declared all 
of its nuclear activities as requested.  He argued that there 
is thus no reason for Iran to remain on the Board agenda. 
Soltanieh also claimed Iran has mastered enrichment.  He then 
reiterated Iran's rationale for its continued nuclear 
activities, stressing that it has a right to peaceful nuclear 
activities, that it has learned it needs to be 
self-sufficient in nuclear technology, that it had to reduce 
cooperation with the IAEA to abide by a law passed by its 
parliament, and that the EU3 has created a "confidence 
deficit" and escalated the situation.  Nevertheless, 
Soltanieh said Iran is fully prepared to cooperate but will 
not stop its peaceful nuclear activities, including uranium 
enrichment. 
 
16. (SBU) Soltanieh warned that UNSC involvement in the issue 
needed to end and that Iran will promptly react to any UNSC 
actions in accordance with the mandate by its parliament. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Chairman Provides Balanced Summary 
---------------------------------- 
 
17. (SBU) Chairman Petric noted that some countries expressed 
concern that progress has not been made in resolving 
outstanding issues in Iran, that Iran has further restricted 
its cooperation leading to a deterioration of knowledge about 
Iran's program, and that it has not complied with UNSCRs. He 
noted that countries asked Iran to reconsider its 
de-designation of IAEA inspectors, and its suspension of Code 
3.1. 
 
18. (SBU) However, he then noted "other country" concerns and 
themes from the official NAM statement, including states' 
rights to peaceful nuclear activities, calls for a nuclear 
weapons free zone in the Middle East, and that the IAEA is 
the sole authority to consider technical nuclear issues.  He 
ruled that, per country requests and no objections, the DG's 
report would be made public. 
 
------------------------------------ 
U.S. Statement, As Delivered June 13 
------------------------------------ 
 
19. (U)  Mr. Chairman, 
 
The United States Government thanks the IAEA Secretariat for 
its thorough and professional efforts to execute the Agency's 
safeguards mandate in Iran and to verify Iran's compliance 
with the requirements of the UN Security Council. 
 
The Director General's report and his opening statement 
confirm that Iran has failed to comply with multiple 
resolutions of the IAEA Board and the UN Security Council. 
 
The Director General describes two disturbing trends: 
 
      first, Iran's continued pursuit of capabilities to 
enrich uranium and produce plutonium in direct violation of 
UN Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737, and 1747; and 
 
      second, Iran's progressive withdrawal of cooperation 
with the IAEA, causing a troubling deterioration in the 
Agency's knowledge of Iran's nuclear activities. 
 
The latest two instances of Iran withholding cooperation from 
the IAEA are its suspension of Code 3.1 and its denial of 
inspector access to conduct Design Information Verification 
inspections at Arak. 
 
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's Safeguards 
Agreement was part of the Board's efforts to strengthen the 
safeguards system.  Iran was the last state with a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and significant nuclear 
activities to accept the current Code 3.1 and now, despite 
the Board's serious concerns about Iran's nuclear activities, 
has announced its unilateral decision to suspend it. 
 
Code 3.1 requires Iran to provide early declaration of any 
decision to construct a new nuclear facility or to modify an 
existing one and to provide early design information on the 
facility.  The IAEA has informed Iran that Code 3.1 cannot be 
modified unilaterally and that there exists no mechanism in 
the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions 
agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. 
 
The Director General's report also describes Iran's refusal 
to permit the IAEA to conduct a Design Information 
Verification inspection at the heavy water reactor under 
construction at Arak.  Iran claims that this decision is 
based on its suspension of the early declaration provisions 
of its Subsidiary Arrangement.  Yet, the Arak reactor has 
already been declared to the IAEA and, as the Director 
General's report authoritatively states, "the Agency's right 
to verify design information provided to it is a continuing 
right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction 
of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility." 
 
Iran's latest denials are cause for serious concern for a 
number of reasons. 
 
First, these new denials constitute new violations of Iran's 
international obligations. 
 
Iran has no right to unilaterally suspend Code 3.1 or to deny 
inspections at Arak.  The Director General makes this clear 
in his report.  Iran's denial of inspections at Arak is an 
apparent breach of its Safeguards Agreement, and its refusal 
to provide early design information on any new nuclear 
facilities shows a clear willingness to commit future 
breaches. 
 
 
Moreover, the denial of access to IAEA inspectors violates 
Resolution 1737 of the UN Security Council, which requires 
Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in addressing 
outstanding issues. 
 
Second, these new denials cast new doubts on the nature of 
Iran's nuclear activities and the intentions of its 
leadership. 
 
By denying early design information, Iran's leaders are 
indicating that they will not inform the IAEA of new nuclear 
facilities until just before nuclear material is introduced. 
This signals the possibility of Iran building new, sensitive 
nuclear facilities in secret and only informing the IAEA just 
before operations begin. 
 
This is of serious concern given Iran's past record of hiding 
nuclear installations like Natanz from the IAEA, Iran's 
repeated failures to declare sensitive nuclear activities, 
and Iran's continued refusal to provide the IAEA information 
on all aspects of its centrifuge activities, including its 
work on advanced centrifuges. 
 
 
By denying inspections at Arak, Iran is preventing IAEA 
inspectors from verifying that the facility is being built as 
Iran has declared.  The IAEA is being denied the ability to 
ensure effective safeguards implementation that covers all 
aspects of the reactor's design, such as irradiation 
channels.  This is especially serious given Iran's proven 
history of undeclared irradiation of uranium targets that 
were later used for reprocessing experiments.  Moreover, the 
continued denial of access would mean that the IAEA would not 
know until shortly before the reactor begins operations 
whether Iran has installed hot cells or the capability to 
reprocess spent fuel and extract plutonium on a scale 
sufficient to produce nuclear weapons. 
 
Mr. Chairman, let's recall the heavy water reactor under 
construction at Arak is well designed to produce plutonium. 
This is why the UN Security Council has required Iran to 
suspend work at this facility and why this Board denied 
technical cooperation in its construction. 
 
Mr. Chairman, if Iran's leaders claim their pursuits are 
transparent and peaceful, why do they persist in violating 
their international obligations and refusing cooperation with 
the IAEA?  If Iran's leaders want the world's confidence, why 
are they keeping inspectors out of Arak and refusing to 
provide early information on new nuclear facilities? 
 
The United States joins with other Board members in 
supporting the Agency's request of April 18, 2007, that Iran 
both reconsider its decision with regard to Code 3.1 and 
permit the Agency to carry out Design Information 
Verification at Arak at the earliest opportunity. 
 
Mr. Chairman, Iran's latest refusals to cooperate only add to 
a long list of previous refusals by Iran to provide 
necessary, and in many cases required - cooperation, 
information, and access to the IAEA.  Another recent example 
is Iran's denial of designation for 48 inspectors to Iran. 
The Director General reports that this remains an unresolved 
matter. 
 
The United States firmly supports the Secretariat's request 
to reverse the denial of inspector designations.  This is 
particularly important now that an unannounced inspection 
regime has been established at Natanz, a regime that will 
presumably impose additional requirements for Iran-designated 
inspectors. 
 
My delegation asks the Director General to report to the 
Board immediately if Iran's denial of inspectors hinders the 
implementation of safeguards in Iran. We also ask the 
Director General to report immediately if there are 
additional Iranian denials of any IAEA requests. 
 
 
Mr. Chairman, we are disappointed that Iran's leaders have 
ignored international concerns and violated Iran's 
international obligations.  We are disappointed that Iran's 
leaders have not taken advantage of the willingness of the 
United States, Europe, Russia, and China to engage in 
diplomatic negotiations on the basis of last June's 
six-country offer. 
 
The six-country offer and the offer of direct talks with the 
United States remain on the table.  Iran's leaders need only 
to comply with their international obligations to the IAEA 
and Security Council. 
 
 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman 
SCHULTE