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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 002690 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ENRG EPET JA RU
SUBJECT: ABE-PUTIN G-8 SUMMIT: RUSSIA AGREES TO 
""ACCELERATE"" TALKS ON NORTHERN TERRITORIES 
 
REF: TOKYO 01267 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer.  Reasons 1.4 (B) (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  During their June 7 summit, PM Abe and 
President Putin agreed not to shelve the Northern Territories 
issue, and Putin promised to instruct his deputies to 
""accelerate"" the negotiations, according to MOFA Russian 
Division Director Muto.  On North Korea, Putin expressed 
frustration at what he claimed was a lack of transparency by 
the U.S. in the Six-Party process, but showed greater 
understanding of Kim Jong-il's complex nature and the 
abduction issue.  Russia has begun to express more interest 
in the Asia-Pacific region, Muto noted, a move stoked by 
new-found Kremlin concerns about the rise of China.  Japan is 
prepared to assist Russian integration into the region, but 
only if Moscow acts in a ""transparent"" and ""helpful"" manner 
that includes both public and private entities.  Muto 
specifically asked Embassy Tokyo to convey the message that 
the U.S. ""can play a role"" in furthering this process.  End 
Summary. 
 
---------------- 
Abe-Putin Summit 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) European Affairs Bureau Russian Division Director 
Akira Muto briefed Embassy Tokyo Deputy Political Chief June 
12 on recent developments in Japan-Russia relations, 
including PM Shinzo Abe's June 7 meeting with Russian 
President Putin on the margins of the G-8 Summit.  Muto 
offered that Japan used the summit opportunity to re-vitalize 
an exchange in Russia-Japan dialogue.  Tokyo officials were 
pleasantly surprised that Putin failed to say anything 
negative about bilateral relations with Japan.  Putin, 
referring to the 2003 Japan-Russia six-part action plan, said 
that relations were progressing well in five of the six 
fields - the sixth being conclusion of a peace treaty. 
 
¶3. (C) The two leaders agreed that they would not shelve the 
Northern Territories issue, Muto related.  Putin, according 
to Muto, said he was ready to talk, wanted to remove any 
obstacles to settlement, and hoped to avoid stagnation in the 
discussions.  Muto asserted that Putin promised to instruct 
his deputies to ""accelerate"" the negotiations.  Abe asked for 
a clarification of Russia's plans to ""introduce the 
reciprocity principle"" in restricting foreign vessels from 
fishing in Russian territorial waters; Putin indicated that 
it would be forthcoming.  Muto surmised this might mean that 
Moscow would begin to charge fishing vessels to fish in 
domestic waters - a practice similar to that done for 
aircraft crossing Russian Siberian/Arctic air space. 
 
 
¶4. (C) Japan offered a new proposal to the Russians entitled 
""Initiative for the Strengthening Japan-Russia Cooperation in 
the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia"" (e-mailed to EAP/J) 
which highlights 8 areas for potential cooperation: energy, 
transportation, information/communication, environment, 
security, health/medicine, promotion of trade and investment, 
and Japan-Russian exchanges. 
 
----------- 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
¶5. (C) According to Muto, who attended the G-8 and the 
Russian summit meeting, Putin attempted to discuss the Banco 
Delta Asia (BDA) issue at the G-8 plenary session, but was 
quickly asked by President Bush not to raise the topic in a 
public fashion before other G-8 members.  Putin, Muto 
surmised, raised the issue as a way of highlighting Russian 
frustration at what it claimed is a lack of transparency by 
 
TOKYO 00002690  002 OF 003 
 
 
the U.S. in the Six-Party negotiations.  Putin reportedly 
asked the President to provide more information, particularly 
about intentions to use a Russian bank to transfer BDA funds. 
 
¶6. (C) Putin appeared to hold a ""different attitude"" toward 
the DPRK during the G-8 session, Muto observed.  Putin 
reportedly said that he now understood how complex Kim 
Jong-il was, and expressed a fuller understanding of the 
abduction issue.  Japanese officials assessed that Putin's 
""threat recognition"" concerning North Korea had not changed 
substantially, but that his understanding of the DPRK's 
impact on the region had shifted.  Muto stated that Russia's 
original goal of obtaining as much benefit from the Six-Party 
process as possible appeared to have changed as well in favor 
of a more helpful posture. 
 
¶7. (C) Japan did not attempt to raise the abduction issue at 
the bilateral because of time constraints, according to Muto. 
 Describing Japan's prior conversations on the issue, he 
noted that the Russians have said they want to be helpful on 
the abduction issue, but ""don't count on us"" to resolve the 
problem.  Moscow did not want the abduction issue to restrict 
Russia's room for maneuver with the DPRK. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Reassessing Russia,s Role in the Asia-Pacific 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Russia has begun to express more interest in the 
Asia-Pacific region, according to Muto.  The implications of 
this new-found interest would not be limited to bilateral 
affairs but would extend throughout the region.  According to 
Muto, Russia began to re-evaluate Japanese bilateral ties 
""early last year"" when a new Moscow assessment raised Kremlin 
concerns about the growth of China.  This re-examination 
forced Russia, in Muto's view, to view Japan-Russia relations 
in a security context, rather than as simply an economic one, 
as Moscow has previously done.  Russia's new perspective on 
the altered security environment in East Asia acted as the 
primary incentive behind Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov's 
February 27-28 Tokyo visit (reftel), FM Aso's May 3 
discussion with FM Lavrov, and the DFM Denisov-VFM Yachi 
strategic dialogue on June 3.  Moscow also expressed concern 
about the PRC's ASAT test, and environmental issues such as 
the chemical pollution of the Amur River. 
 
¶9. (C) Russia also appeared to be motivated by concerns about 
oil resources, Muto claimed.  Denisov told his Japan 
interlocutors that Moscow placed a high priority on 
increasing the percentage of Russia's oil exports to Asia 
from 3% to 30%, and to shift some production from West to 
East Siberia by 2020. 
 
------------------ 
Responsible Russia 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C) Muto said that Japan wants to see a responsible 
Russia integrated into the Asia-Pacific region.  Tokyo was 
prepared to assist Russian development in the region, but 
only if Moscow acted in a ""transparent"" and ""helpful"" manner. 
 Japanese officials would not provide direct investment in 
Russia, but would target assistance at areas  which the 
private sector had already identified as profitable.  Muto 
noted, by way of example, Japanese plans to take up tenders 
being offered by firms associated with Sakhalin 1. 
 
-------------------- 
Areas of Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Cooperation in the field of high-speed rail 
transportation, Muto observed, provided another possible 
 
TOKYO 00002690  003 OF 003 
 
 
field of cooperation.  The Russians seemed interested in 
obtaining Japanese technology as Moscow considered 
establishing rail links between Moscow-St. Petersburg; 
Moscow-Sochi; Moscow-Nizhniy-Novgorod; and 
Khabarozsk-Vladivostok.  Japanese telecommunications company 
KDDI hoped to place optical fiber lines between Vladivostok 
and Naoetsu, Japan, a step that would decrease internet 
response times for Japanese internet users from the current 
0.30 seconds (via trans-Pacific lines to the U.S.), to 0.18 
seconds using direct Russia-Japan links.  That tiny 
difference loomed large for industries conducting numerous 
financial transactions, he said.  Muto, employing 
good-natured needling, warned the KDDI plans would negatively 
affect its U.S. competitors. 
 
------------------ 
Russia-China Wedge 
------------------ 
 
¶12. (C) Muto asked the Deputy Political Chief to communicate 
to Washington that Japan was attempting to involve Russia in 
a constructive manner in the Asia-Pacific region.  Failure to 
encourage Moscow's integration increased the risk that Moscow 
and Beijing might forge a closer strategic partnership - one 
that could provide unconstructive proposals.  Japan hoped to 
""drive a wedge between Russia and China,"" Muto noted. 
 
¶13. (C) Muto also requested the message be conveyed to 
Washington that the Japanese government believes the U.S. 
""can play a role"" in promoting Moscow's desire to become more 
involved in the region.  Japan's on-going program of 
financing the dismantlement of retired Russian strategic 
nuclear submarines, Muto said, offered opportunities on the 
security and environmental front.  The main point was that 
the U.S. and Japan should avoid the perception that the two 
countries were ""ganging up"" on Russia, but were instead 
offering to cooperate.  Japan was interested in the 
environment impact of the dismantlement work and would be 
glad to ""divide the labor."" 
SCHIEFFER