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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001091 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EUR/ERA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2017 
TAGS: EAID ECON EFIN IBRD PINR AF NL
SUBJECT: NEW DUTCH DEVELOPMENT MINISTER ON WORLD BANK 
PRESIDENT, AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 73691 
 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 325 
 
Classified by Ambassador Roland Arnall. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY.  In a meeting with Ambassador Arnall, new 
Development Cooperation Minister Koenders said Robert 
Zoellick was a credible World Bank presidential candidate but 
that future nominations should be open to candidates 
worldwide.  He said NATO should remain in Afghanistan, 
despite mixed results to date.  Improving the situation on 
the ground required a common approach to Afghan President 
Karzai and Pakistan as well as a careful balancing of the 
risks and rewards related to counter-terrorism efforts.  With 
extensive previous experience in development and Africa, 
Koenders can be expected to increase Dutch development 
efforts on that continent.  He will also remain an active 
voice in the Afghanistan debate.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
Zoellick a Credible Candidate for World Bank Leadership... 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (C)  Ambassador Arnall used a May 31 introductory meeting 
to deliver ref A points to Albert Gerard (Bert) Koenders, who 
took up his position in February as Minister for Development 
Cooperation in the center-left Balkenende IV cabinet (ref B). 
 Koenders said Robert Zoellick was an interesting and 
credible candidate whose background in trade and Africa 
improved his chances of becoming World Bank President.  With 
Wolfowitz's early departure, he added, it was "not illogical" 
that his replacement be an American.  Although pressed by 
Ambassador Arnall, Koenders stopped short of offering GONL 
public support for Zoellick's nomination. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
...but Future Nomination Process Should be Open 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶3. (C)  Koenders said future presidencies should be opened to 
candidates from all countries, as the World Bank was a global 
institution.  The world situation had changed since the 
institution was created in 1944, he noted.  If countries with 
large trade and aid flows were excluded, the Bank risked 
becoming "irrelevant," he argued.  This had already happened 
to the IMF, whose structure did not reflect the emerging 
economies of Asia and Latin America.  The World Bank and IMF 
were "key institutions," Koenders added, and their management 
structure needed to account for the rise of India and China. 
 
¶4. (C)  Ambassador Arnall expressed concern that opening the 
nomination process might subject it to political pressure. 
Koenders replied that any future nomination process would 
require broad support from the international community and 
World Bank and IMF staff.  To avoid politicizing the process, 
each country could have a voice weighted by the size of its 
economy, he added. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
NATO Should Stay in Afghanistan, but Results Mixed 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5. (C)  On Afghanistan, the Dutch military presence was 
playing a positive stabilizing role in the country and 
increased levels of U.S. aid were starting to improve 
economic conditions.  These were indicators NATO should stay, 
Koenders said.  While the future was unclear, he said the 
Dutch had a clear consensus to intervene.  He agreed that 
Afghanistan should not have been left alone during the 
crucial years of 2002-2003.  The resulting void was filled by 
the Taliban, Koenders noted, and it would be a "mistake" if 
NATO left now.  The Dutch, he added, were trying to work with 
the Canadians, Australians, and Germans to move forward in 
Afghanistan.  Koenders said the Germans were likely to 
increase funding, but that involvement in Afghanistan was an 
"uneasy" debate in Germany.  Meanwhile, the absence of the UN 
or EU was "a shame," he said. 
 
¶6. (C)  On the ground, Afghanistan was a "mixed bag" with 
some limited improvements, Koenders said. He added it was 
important to look at tangible results -- rather than just 
intentions -- when judging success. 
 
 
THE HAGUE 00001091  002 OF 003 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
Afghanistan's Drug Economy a Problem 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C)  Afghanistan had a drug economy, Koenders said, and 
NATO needed to act now to address it, as drug consuming 
countries were also responsible for the problem.  He 
suggested the right approach would include working with 
Pakistan and helping the Afghan police with counter-drug 
intelligence.  The wrong approach, he said, was increasing 
eradication and targeting small farmers.  This would simply 
lose "hearts and minds" while increasing support for the 
"guys we want to fight."  NATO should also stop working with 
warlords who contribute to the drug problem, Koenders said, 
although he acknowledged some of the same warlords also 
contributed to general security. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
As is the Lack of Consensus within NATO 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C)  In many ways, Afghanistan was "a test" for NATO, 
which was divided on three key issues, Koenders said.  First, 
NATO should send one, clear political signal to Pakistan. 
Second, Afghan President Karzai should receive a consistent 
message regarding concerns over warlords and drugs.  Third, 
NATO required a common approach that balanced 
counter-terrorism efforts with the risk that these same 
efforts might facilitate terrorist recruitment.  The risk, 
Koenders said, was that Afghanistan would become another Iraq. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Comment/Bio Info: Koenders Likely to Emphasize Africa... 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶9. (C)  Koenders (49) is no stranger to development issues. 
As a political advisor to the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General of the UN, he worked in Mozambique, South 
 
SIPDIS 
Africa, and Mexico.  He is also a former member of the 
Governing Council of the Society for International 
Development, Chair of the Board of the Parliamentary Network 
of the World Bank, and Chair of the Board of the Netherlands 
Atlantic Association.  A gifted speaker (both in English and 
Dutch), he has a degree in political and social sciences from 
the University of Amsterdam and also graduated from the Johns 
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies 
in Bologna, Italy, and Washington, D.C., specializing in 
international economics and international relations.  He 
later served as a visiting professor at the Johns Hopkins 
University School of Advanced International Studies in 
Bologna.  Meanwhile, his service as the Principal 
Administrator for the policy planning staff at the European 
Commission's Directorate-General for external relations, 
conflict prevention, and EU enlargement should make him 
friendly toward working through multilateral channels. 
 
¶10. (C)  Traditionally in the Netherlands, the Minister for 
Development Cooperation becomes the de facto Minister for 
Africa.  An advocate for preventive action and diplomacy as a 
means to prevent conflict and humanitarian crises, Koenders 
is likely to make Africa a higher priority than his 
predecessor, Ardenne van der Hoeven.  While Koenders has yet 
to announce any significant changes in Dutch development 
policy, he has already taken steps to end efforts -- began 
under van der Hoeven -- to include funding for security 
sector reform in the definition of official development 
assistance. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
...and Remain a Central Figure in the Afghanistan Debate 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11. (C)  As the Foreign Affairs spokesman for the PvdA (Labor 
Party) prior to the 2006 elections, Koenders is credited with 
convincing then-Party leader Wouter Bos to support the Dutch 
deployment to Uruzgan -- support that was critical in 
building the necessary Parliamentary majority for the 
mission.  Many rank-and-file members of the PvdA, however, 
believe this decision was a mistake which cost the PvdA at 
the polls.  Both Koenders and Bos (now Minister for Finance 
and Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government) are 
under pressure from within their party to oppose an extension 
of the mission past July, 2008.  Demonstrable success on the 
development front in Uruzgan, however, could help Koenders 
 
THE HAGUE 00001091  003 OF 003 
 
 
build a justification supporting extension. 
ARNALL