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DE RUEHTV #1705/01 1631507
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P 121507Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1589
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0225
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 7093
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001705 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM KPAL KWPB EG IS
SUBJECT: ISA CHIEF DISKIN OPPOSED TO BENCHMARKS, PROPOSES 
"STARTING SMALL" IN NABLUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones.  Reasons:  1.4 (b)(d). 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY:  In a June 11 discussion of the security 
situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (septel), Israeli 
Security Agency (ISA) Head Yuval Diskin told Ambassador Jones 
he personally opposes the benchmarks, viewing them as "a very 
dangerous plan" that could be easily agreed upon by Israeli 
and Palestinian negotiators, but impossible to implement, 
with deadly consequences for Israel.  Diskin stressed that he 
had and would continue to advise the government against 
accepting the benchmarks.  He explained that, in the ISA's 
analysis, the Palestinian people are not ready to see the 
benchmark obligations implemented, and that Palestinian 
Authority (PA) President Abbas and his security forces are 
neither capable nor willing to follow through on their 
responsibilities.  Moving forward on the benchmarks in such a 
situation would only saddle Israel with unacceptable security 
risks and expose it to terrorist attacks.  The Ambassador 
explained that the benchmarks had been designed to be 
sequenced with easier actions up front.  The idea was to 
build a record of success before moving onto the difficult 
steps.  No one expected Israel to take all the steps without 
matching efforts on the Palestinian side. 
 
¶2. (S) SUMMARY, CONT.  In an apparently sincere effort to 
provide an alternative way ahead, Diskin suggested instead 
that the Palestinians be urged to demonstrate a desire to 
impose security in a select West Bank location where they had 
the means to do so (e.g., Nablus) for a period of time.  If 
the Palestinians were able to do this, then Diskin said he 
would be able to convince the Israeli government to respond 
in a comparable way, thereby building confidence on both 
sides.  Stressing that such confidence building measures 
should start out small, he observed that efforts had been 
made in the past to get fugitives in Nablus to promise not to 
carry out violent activity, surrender their arms to 
Palestinian security forces, and remain in one location. 
This, he suggested, would be an activity that should not be 
beyond the abilities of the Palestinian security forces, and 
could help build confidence between the Israeli and 
Palestinian sides.  The key to success was strong high-level 
political support on the Palestinian side, which so far had 
been lacking.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (S) Diskin said that he wanted to be perfectly clear that 
he is "totally against" the benchmarks.  He said he had 
conveyed his strong opposition to them to USSC LTG Dayton 
shortly after they were shared with the Israeli side.  Diskin 
said that he sees the benchmarks as a "very dangerous plan": 
"I know where you are going with these, and that you want to 
accomplish something by the end of the year through 
negotiations.  This is a positive idea, but implementation of 
the benchmarks would lead to disaster."  Diskin explained 
that it would be easy for Israeli and Palestinian negotiators 
to reach a political agreement in the confines of meeting 
rooms abroad.  Everybody, he claimed, already understands the 
formula for a final agreement.  The problem, he stressed, is 
that the Palestinian people (the "street") are not ready for 
such an agreement:  "Nothing has changed in the Palestinian 
street.  If the benchmarks were agreed upon and led to a 
declaration of principles by the end of the year, this in 
itself would be fine.  But you would have a gap between the 
negotiating teams and 'the street,' and this would create a 
crisis.  You cannot build confidence when you do not have a 
strong partner on the other side."  Diskin stressed that in 
Israel's assessment, Palestinian Authority President Abbas 
and his security apparatus are not functioning in the West 
Bank or the Gaza Strip.  The Palestinians would not be in a 
position to implement their obligations under the benchmarks. 
 Israel, he said, would be required to assume all the risks 
that would ensue:  "How can I assume all the risks that would 
come from the lifting of roadblocks and the opening of 
passages between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank?  I 
cannot."  The Ambassador explained that the benchmarks had 
been designed to be sequenced with easier actions up front. 
The idea was to build a record of success before moving onto 
the difficult steps.  No one expected Israel to take all the 
steps without matching efforts on the Palestinian side. 
 
¶4. (S) As a way ahead, Diskin suggested that the Israeli and 
Palestinian sides focus their effort on one area, and try to 
make progress there before tackling other issues.  As an 
example, he raised Nablus.  Describing Nablus as a 
particularly problematic city for Israel -- from which 
numerous terrorist attacks and attempts have originated -- 
Diskin suggested that if the Palestinians took responsibility 
for security in Nablus, which they were capable of doing, 
this would be a start.  Diskin lamented, however, that the 
 
Palestinian leadership apparently is afraid or unwilling to 
do this.  He recounted that Palestinian businessmen had told 
him that Abbas does not want to do anything to upset the 
current situation, and that the Palestinian security forces 
currently in Nablus are unwilling to assert themselves, 
knowing that they will not get backup if they need it. 
 
¶5. (S) Visibly frustrated, Diskin said, "Let the Palestinians 
carry out the first confidence building measure.  Then I 
could remove roadblocks and free up travel."  He reiterated 
that Nablus and Ramallah are strategically the most important 
cities in the West Bank for Israel.  Fatah, he said, should 
focus on the West Bank, and "make it blossom."  In contrast, 
Diskin stressed that Israel does not want to press Abbas to 
put forces in Rafah or the northern Gaza Strip:  "He will not 
do it anyway, so why ask?  He could put forces in the West 
Bank that would be backed up by our security umbrella.  After 
all, we already have our forces there.  Let us see them take 
some responsibility in Nablus and start fighting anarchy 
there."  Diskin said that Israel could sign onto an agreement 
concerning fugitives who are hiding in Nablus:  "If they stop 
attacking us, we can stop chasing them.  We have tried this 
before.  The method is simple.  You get a promise from each 
fugitive that he will not attack us, and then you have him 
turn his gun over to the security forces."  Diskin said that 
previous attempts to reach such an agreement have failed 
because the security forces are afraid to enter into an 
agreement with the fugitives absent political top cover.  He 
added that such an agreement would also require the fugitives 
to stay in one location once they have signed onto it. 
 
¶6. (S) Diskin reiterated that small steps need to be taken 
first:  "Even a journey of a hundred miles starts with a 
first step."  The first step, he says, cannot be confidence 
building measures that entail unacceptable risks:  "If we 
lift the roadblocks in Kalkiliya, I can assure you that 
tomorrow we will have Mohammed from Kalkiliya blowing himself 
up in Tel Aviv."  Diskin noted that Israel's security barrier 
around the West Bank is not yet complete.  He observed that 
terrorists try to get into green-line Israel through 
Jerusalem because the barrier around it is porous.  This, he 
stressed, is the reason for the roadblocks along the 
Jenin-Nablus-Ramallah-Jerusalem corridor.  He added, "When we 
last lifted the roadblocks, we saw the terrorists adjust 
their tactics accordingly."  He also characterized the 
roadblocks as intelligence collection points.  Noting that 
some are permanent and others roving, he claimed that Israeli 
counter-surveillance at roadblocks has helped ISA to prevent 
terrorist attacks.  Diskin added that some roadblocks are 
placed where they are based on ISA recommendations.  In other 
cases, the IDF places roadblocks at locations based on ISA 
advice or on the IDF's own initiative:  "In these cases, some 
of these roadblocks could (safely) be removed." 
 
¶7. (S) Diskin concluded, "If the Palestinians could do 
something serious on security for a period of time in a 
certain area, then I believe I could convince my government 
to undertake something comparable." 
 
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