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C O N F I D E N T I A L        SHENYANG 00108

SIPDIS
CXSNY:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO/RF ECON RF

DISSEMINATION: POL /1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: ACG:DBRIZZEE
DRAFTED: POL:AJHANTMAN
CLEARED: BJ POL: MTESONE

VZCZCSHI082
PP RUEHC RUEHOO RUEHBJ RUEHUL RUEAIIA RUEKJCS
RHHJJAA RUCGEVC RHEHAAA RUEKJCS RUCNDT
DE RUEHSH #0108/01 1560431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050431Z JUN 07
FM AMCONSUL SHENYANG
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8081
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 7821
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1738
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC 0031
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC 0022
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUCGEVC/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 0012
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 0054
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0002

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SHENYANG 000108 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR INR, EAP/CM, EAP/K 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TEN YEARS AFTER KOREAN UNIFICATION 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ECON KN KS CH
SUBJECT: DPRK NUKE AFTERMATH, UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT IN 
CHINA: THE STORY OF ONE BORDER ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
Classified By: ACTING CONSUL GENERAL DAVID BRIZZEE. 
REASONS: 1.4(B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Hours after Pyongyang's October 9, 2006 
nuclear test, the PLA dispatched a team to Changbai--the 
PRC border locality closest to the site of the explosion-- 
to test for contamination, according to  Changbai County 
Communist Party Secretary Miao Chunxiu.   Miao said he 
learned about the test "immediately" and was "terrified," 
though citizens were not notified.  Changbai Customs 
officials claimed to be enforcing UNSCR 1718 and reported 
no change in volume or value of Changbai's trade with North 
Korea.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) During a May 10-11 visit to Changbai County--the 
PRC's sole ethnic Korean autonomous county, situated in 
Jilin Province across the Yalu River from the large North 
Korean border city of Hyesan--Poloff met a number of 
officials who described the local impact of the North's 
October 2006 nuclear test, as well as their actions in 
enforcing UNSCR 1718. 
 
CHANGBAI REACTS TO NEARBY NUKE TEST: PLA TEAM, NEWS CONTROL 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3. (C) In a dinner with Poloff on May 10, Changbai County 
Communist Party Secretary MIAO Chunxiu (strictly protect) 
relayed what transpired in Changbai on the day of 
Pyongyang's October 2006 nuclear test.  Miao claimed that 
he was "immediately" notified of the nuclear test though he 
provided no further details on this.  He said he was 
"terrified," given that Changbai is only 70 kilometers away 
from the North's test site, which, he stated, is why he 
believes Beijing immediately focused its attention on 
Changbai.  "A few hours" following the explosion, Miao 
recalled that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) dispatched 
a team of experts to monitor Changbai's air and water for 
contamination, but found no cause for concern.  He said his 
heart lightened upon hearing this, and seemed to think that 
the "rain and wind" later in the day also boded well for 
Changbai. 
 
¶4. (C) The over 80,000 residents of Changbai County were 
not in a state of panic, Miao explained, because his 
government did not notify them that North Korea had 
detonated a nuclear device nearby.  Miao said he personally 
was particularly concerned about the potential impact of 
the test on Changbai's investment environment, but added 
that he has recently become more sanguine as a result of 
"progress in the Six Party Talks" and the number of 
exploratory investment delegations that have come to 
Changbai in the past several months. 
 
UNSCR 1718 ENFORCEMENT, INSPECTIONS IN CHANGBAI COUNTY 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5. (C) Several Changbai officials also spoke of their 
efforts in implementing UNSCR 1718.  Party Secretary Miao, 
for one, seemed well aware of UNSCR 1718 and claimed that 
his county--linked with Hyesan via a land bridge--was 
"enforcing" the resolution, but demurred when pressed on 
specifics.  In a separate meeting on May 10, Deputy 
Director Liu of Changbai Customs (strictly protect)--who 
declined to give anything but his surname--explained that 
following the passage of UNSCR 1718, the General 
Administration of Customs in Beijing required local customs 
offices to "strengthen inspections," an instruction which 
Liu claimed Changbai "strictly implemented." 
 
¶6. (C) Asked about Changbai's inspections of outgoing 
traffic bound for Hyesan, Liu explained that most trucks 
passing through Changbai Port are open-bed trucks, which 
officers can inspect "with their eyes."  For larger 
shipments, cargo can generally be pre-cleared at a customs- 
monitored warehouse, where goods are stored, inspected and 
then loaded onto trucks bound for the port and then, the 
DPRK. 
 
¶7. (C) For incoming traffic from Hyesan, Liu said North 
Korean vehicles and goods are inspected and taxed 
"according to international regulations."  Customs is on 
alert, he claimed, for "sensitive" prohibited items, 
including drugs and nuclear materials.  Liu mentioned that 
Changbai Customs' inspections process can also include 
"sampling."   When asked what specific tools or 
technologies Changbai Customs uses to detect the presence 
of restricted items, Liu replied that none are needed, 
since customs personnel could conduct visual inspections. 
Liu declined to answer how long the typical inspection 
took, but said that since last year, Customs had found 
nothing transiting Changbai Port in contravention of UNSCR 
¶1718.  (NOTE: Port authorities rejected Poloff's request 
for a visit to Changbai Port, citing the sensitivity of the 
North Korean side.  END NOTE.) 
 
¶8. (C) Changbai, Liu added, has seen essentially no change 
in the volume and value of its trade with North Korea since 
the passage of UNSCR 1718, primarily because the types of 
good flowing through the port are not restricted by UNSCR 
¶1718.  He said Changbai primarily imports lumber, as well 
as minerals and herbal products from North Korea and 
exports daily consumables, grain and garments to Hyesan. 
 
LUXURY GOODS 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C) In a meeting with Poloff on May 10, Director Wang of 
Changbai's Port of Entry Administration Office (strictly 
protect)--who also declined to give his full name-- 
expressed surprise when Poloff informed him that the United 
States had formulated an official list of specific luxury 
goods prohibited for export to the DPRK in accordance with 
UNSCR 1718.  Wang was curious about specific goods the U.S. 
had prohibited and inquired at several points about the 
overall purpose of the luxury goods restrictions.  He, like 
Liu, declined to offer specifics on Changbai Port's 
measures to enforce the luxury-goods provisions of UNSCR 
¶1718. 
BRIZZEE