VZCZCXRO1996
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #0334/01 1520237
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010237Z JUN 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5897
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1152
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0706
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0686
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0814
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0708
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0578
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6304

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SHANGHAI 000334 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EEB 
STATE PASS USTR FOR STRATFORD/WINTER/MCCARTIN/ALTBACH/READE 
STATE PASS FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOR JOHNSON/SCHINDLER; SAN 
FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK/LUNG; NEW YORK FRB FOR CLARK/CRYSTAL/MOSELEY 
STATE PASS CFTC FOR OIA/GORLICK 
CEA FOR BLOCK 
USDOC FOR ITA DAS KASOFF, MELCHER AND OCEA/MCQUEEN 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN 
TREASURY FOR IMFP - SOBEL/MOGHTADER 
NSC FOR KURT TONG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL CH
SUBJECT: HAITONG SECURITIES ON CHINA'S STOCK MARKET 
 
REF: A. SHANGHAI 251 
 
     ¶B. SHANGHAI 325 
 
(U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and for official 
use only.  Not for distribution outside of USG channels. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Representatives from Haitong Securities 
Company told visiting Embassy Financial Attache (Finatt) on May 
16 that competition from foreign companies would ultimately 
strengthen China's securities industry.  Haitong has struggled 
to accurately value China's listed companies and manage risk in 
the face of insufficient information and an overheated stock 
market.  Haitong's joint venture relationships with two foreign 
banks in the fund management business had increased its risk 
control and management abilities although there had been some 
conflicts caused by cultural differences.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Visiting Embassy Finatt met with Haitong Securities 
Company Internatonal Business Department General Manager Liao 
Rongyao and Haitong Securities Research Institution Deputy 
Director Zheng Zu on May 16.  Haitong Securities was a 
full-service brokerage that conducted initial public offering 
(IPO) underwriting, institutional investing and proprietary 
investing.  Haitong also had two joint venture (JV) mutual fund 
management companies and was considering opening a venture 
capital company, according to Liao. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
Companies Only Grow Strong With Competition 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Liao said that its JV fund management companies, one 
with Bank of Montreal and the other with Fortis Bank and other 
domestic investors, had been very successful.  She noted that in 
its four years of cooperation with the foreign companies, 
Haitong had "learned a lot" about risk control, investment 
processes, and technical and managerial skills.  Nevertheless, 
there had been "conflicts in working styles."  Liao said that 
according to regulations, a securities fund was allowed to be a 
part of only two fund management companies.  Liao also noted 
that Haitong had plans in place with unnamed foreign companies, 
to form JV securities brokerages should regulations allow JV 
investment in underwriting, asset management and financial 
consulting.  Haitong also was also in discussions with foreign 
firms to create partnerships that would give it access to 
foreign know-how in the financial derivatives business (Ref A). 
 
¶4. (SBU) While discussing the possibility of foreign securities 
companies being permitted to open in China, Zheng acknowledged 
that competition brought "both good things and bad things." 
Zheng said that China's brokerages would benefit from 
competition in terms of an increased service level to clients 
and improved risk management abilities.  The downside of 
competition was, of course, "competition" he said.  "Companies 
only grow strong when there is competition; they do not grow 
under protectionism," he added. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Interest Rate Hikes Aimed at Economy, Not Markets 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Zheng said despite the recent increases in value of 
China's equities market, it still only represented a very small 
portion of China's overall economy and thus any macroeconomic 
impact of a downturn in the market would be limited.  He 
believed that interest rate hikes were aimed at cooling the 
whole economy, not just aimed at an over-heated stock market. 
In general, interest rate hikes did have an effectively negative 
impact on the market, although the recent hikes had not affected 
the market.  Zheng said that the most effective way to cool the 
market was to increase the number of good quality IPOs.  By 
increasing the supply of stocks, prices would stabilize. 
 
 
SHANGHAI 00000334  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Haitong's Liao agreed that overheated equity market was 
due to being lack of investment channels for Chinese investors. 
Increasing market supply was the only way to cool the markets 
down.  One way to increase the supply of listed stocks, Liao 
said, was to allow foreign companies to list in the Chinese 
equity market.  She had heard that HSBC might list on Shanghai 
Stock Exchange. 
 
----------------------------- 
Managing Risk in a Hot Market 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Haitong's Zheng told Finatt that it was especially 
difficult to manage risk in such a volatile market (Ref B). 
Haitong's Research Department's investment philosophy was to 
look at the value of the company.  A year ago, he said, it had 
been "easy" to recommend stocks based on the company's intrinsic 
value.  Now, however, given the massive market gains and high 
price/earnings ratio, "this year was very hard."  Zheng said at 
times he "felt very embarrassed" with customers when trying to 
explain why a stock Haitong "had valued at RMB 20 had gone up to 
RMB 30."  Outlining the risks, he said, "In this market, it was 
very difficult to keep a clear mind and not follow the sentiment 
of the market." 
 
¶9. (SBU) Despite the current bull market mood amongst investors, 
Zheng said that eventually the market would go down.  Haitong 
was not concerned that it would be liable for customer losses, 
however, and Zheng asserted that Chinese investors were not 
blind to the dangers inherent in a market.  "Customers had four 
years of a bear market; they know the risks of the market and 
understand that no one will compensate them," he said. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Liao said that when Haitong customers opened new 
trading accounts, they signed risk disclosure statements.  "But 
we do not know if they can afford that risk.  That is another 
issue," she said.  Applicants for new accounts were required to 
show their government-issued identification card.  Liao 
acknowledged the difficulty that most of Haitong's customers 
would have accessing or understanding research reports. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
The Mechanics of Haitong's Risk Assessment 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) Zheng said that his department tried very hard to get 
an accurate picture of the companies that it was researching. 
Nevertheless, he acknowledged that the information Haitong's 
analysts received was "less than 100 percent."  Haitong had 120 
branches throughout China, and he relied on staff at the local 
branches to "have good relations and contacts with listed 
companies" in their area.  This local knowledge allowed his 
researchers to know "who was upstream and who was downstream." 
In the face of incomplete information, Haitong's researchers 
would "evaluate what we do not know so as to control risks." 
(Comment: Should foreign securities firms be permitted to 
operate in China, it would be unlikely that they would have a 
similar network of branch offices from the start.  End comment.) 
 
¶12. (U) Embassy Finatt cleared on this cable. 
JARRETT