VZCZCXRO1991
RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #0332/01 1520236
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010236Z JUN 07
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5892
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1147
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0701
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0681
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0809
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0703
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0573
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6299

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 000332 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
FRANCISCO FRB FOR CURRAN/GLICK/LUNG; NEW YORK FRB FOR 
CLARK/CRYSTAL/MOSELEY 
STATE PASS CFTC FOR OIA/GORLICK 
CEA FOR BLOCK 
USDOC FOR ITA DAS KASOFF, MELCHER AND OCEA/MCQUEEN 
TREASURY FOR OASIA - DOHNER/CUSHMAN 
TREASURY FOR IMFP - SOBEL/MOGHTADER 
NSC FOR KURT TONG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON PREL CH
SUBJECT: A FUND MANAGER'S VIEW ON THE CHINA MARKET 
 
REF: SHANGHAI 251 
 
(U) This cable is sensitive but unclassified and for official 
use only.  Not for distribution outside of USG channels. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Lombarda China Fund Manager Ian Midgely told 
visiting Embassy Finatt, on May 16, that the Chinese government 
was attempting to rein in an overvalued stock market without an 
overly heavy-handed approach that would undermine the market 
reforms put in place to promote capital market development.  The 
real problem, said Midgely, was that there was simply too much 
liquidity in China and not a broad enough array of financial 
products, most importantly a vibrant government bond market. 
Foreign joint venture fund management companies enjoy a de facto 
level playing field with Chinese counterparts, unlike the 
situation in securities and banking.  Launching financial 
futures derivatives products would be "suicidal" in the current 
overheated and speculative environment, he said.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Visiting Embassy Finatt met with Lombarda China Fund 
Manager Ian Midgely, the only non-Chinese fund manager in China, 
on May 16.  Midgely said that there were currently 58 fund 
companies in China; 32 of these were 100 percent Chinese-owned 
and 26 were joint ventures between Chinese and foreign 
investors.  Chinese mutual funds were currently split 75 percent 
to 25 percent between retail and institutional investors. 
Midgely described most managers of funds in China as "traders, 
not managers."  Their turnover rate was over 500 percent. 
Midgely said his own approach was much more conservative since 
he tried to base investments on sound fundamentals. 
Highlighting the competitive challenges of using traditional 
stock selection techniques in China's raging bull market, 
Midgely noted his returns were not as high as some of his 
competitors.  Nonetheless, he would be somewhat embarrassed to 
show his investments to his peers in Hong Kong or London. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Too Much Money, Not Enough Options 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Midgely noted that the Chinese government was 
attempting to let air out of the market without using an overly 
heavy-handed approach that would run counter to the many 
market-oriented reforms instituted in the last several years. 
Part of the problem, he said, was that most people did not think 
the problem was as bad as it actually was.  He described the 
disconnect between CSRC public statements that claimed to have 
"warned" fund managers about risks and the actual circular that 
fund managers received from CSRC.  The memo actually commented 
on how well things were going.  The basic problem, Midgely said, 
was that there was simply too much money in China's "massively 
inefficient" banks and not enough in other financial assets. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Midgely said that, in the short term, overheated 
speculation in China's stock markets could be dampened by 
raising the required reserve ratio by 1 percentage point and 
raising the interest rate by 50 basis points.  The fundamental 
problem would remain, however.  Chinese investors simply did not 
have enough financial products to choose from.  (Note: Two days 
after the meeting, on Friday, May 18, China hiked the one-year 
lending rate by 18 bps and the one year deposit rate by 27 bps. 
China also raised the reserve requirement ratio by another 50 
bps to 11.5%, effective 5 June.  End note.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Launching Financial Futures Would Be Suicidal 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Midgely said that since China did not have an effective 
bond market and lacked a risk free yield curve, it was almost 
impossible to accurately price riskier assets like equities.  To 
strengthen its financial system, China needed to develop both 
its interbank and exchange-traded bond markets. 
 
¶6. (SBU) It would be "suicidal" for China to launch its 
 
SHANGHAI 00000332  002 OF 003 
 
 
financial futures market, which would most likely start with a 
stock index futures, in the current frothy and speculative 
market environment, said Midgely (Ref A).  Chinese investors 
were not educated about the risks inherent in a futures market, 
he added, with too many believing that futures trading only had 
an upside and was without risk.  (Note: In separate recent 
conversations, Shanghai Financial Services Office Deputy 
Director Fang Xinghai and JP Morgan Greater China General 
Manager Andrew Zhang said they expected the China Financial 
Futures Exchange to launch a stock index fund in late June or 
early July.  Both claimed that risk could be controlled by 
limiting access for those eligible to trade in the product.  End 
note.) 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Fund Management is a Level Playing Field 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In contrast to the situation in more developed markets, 
fund management companies in China were more profitable than 
full service securities firms.  Midgely attributed this to the 
fact that Chinese brokerages were hugely overstaffed, along the 
lines of traditional state-owned enterprises, and full of people 
who had no idea what they were supposed to be doing.  This 
inefficiency was further exacerbated by the relatively low 
commissions they earned per trade, and by traders reluctant to 
take aggressive positions.  One exception, Midgely noted, was 
Citic.  Should a foreign company be allowed a minority stake in 
a JV brokerage with a Chinese partner, Midgely was pessimistic 
as to the possibility of that company's success.  "Unless they 
have real control of the company, they will have real problems," 
he said. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Midgely speculated that the CSRC had allowed foreign 
companies to own up to 49 percent of fund management companies, 
rather than the more restrictive equity caps in securities, 
since fund managers could only deal in products that already 
existed, he said.  Real power, he said, was in the hands of the 
securities firms since they were able to create products and 
influence which firms are able to come to market.  For foreign 
firms, "fund management is a level playing field," said Midgely. 
 "There is no reason why a foreigner shouldn't do well here." 
The restrictions Lombarda faced were those requiring a certain 
number of years of experience before offering new products, an 
issue not unique to foreign firms. 
 
------------------------- 
More Discretion is Coming 
------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) The CSRC would soon grant approval for fund managers to 
set up individually tailored fund management products. 
Currently, investors in funds - be they large investors or small 
investors -- were only allowed to purchase shares in existing 
funds.  This meant that large investors, who would be able to 
sustain more risk, were not given the types of products best 
suited to their needs.  Discretionary fund management products, 
said Midgely, would be open to investors with a minimum of RMB 
50 million (USD 6.5 million).  These investors would be able to 
work with fund managers to tailor a product that fit their 
investing goals.  CSRC would control the fees that the fund 
managers could charge to at least 60 percent of what the fund 
charged normal customers. 
 
¶10. (SBU) According to Midgely, CSRC was implementing this 
discretionary fund innovation to address the burgeoning problem 
of unregulated "private funds."  These illegal private funds (in 
Chinese, ziwo jijin) now number in the thousands.  Private funds 
had staged a comeback, along with the rising stock market, since 
they operated outside of CSRC's controls and thereby more 
cheaply and with a more individually tailored investment 
approach.  Of course, being unregulated, these private funds 
also represented a greater risk to their customers.  Midgely 
noted that lots of legal fund management firms had lost staff to 
 
SHANGHAI 00000332  003 OF 003 
 
 
these unregulated funds. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Anatomy of a JV: The Lombarda China Fund 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) According to Midgely, the Lombarda China Fund was a 
joint venture between Banca Lombarda e Piemontese (49 percent), 
Guodu Securities (47 percent) and Pingdingshan Coal Group (4 
percent).  The JV fund was formed in May 2006 and received China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) permission in January 
2007 to launch its first fund.  Under the terms of the 
partnership, Lombarda's Chairman and Chief Compliance Officer 
were nominated by the local partners while the Chief Executive 
Officer, who exercised operational and managerial control, was 
nominated by Banca Lombarda.  Midgely noted that resolving 
management and cultural problems had been an ongoing process. 
These disputes included such things as questions of 
responsibility, the rate of fund enlargement, and employee 
compensation. 
 
¶12. (U) Embassy Finatt cleared this cable. 
JARRETT