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PP RUEHFL RUEHNP
DE RUEHRO #1190/01 1520547
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P 010547Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8183
INFO RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE PRIORITY 2413
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 8686
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES PRIORITY 2577

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001190 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND ISN/CATR 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 
TAGS: ECON ETTC IR IT MARR PARM PREL
SUBJECT: AFTER THREATENING JSF FUNDING, GOI OFFICIAL 
DESCRIBES POLITICAL FACTORS BEARING ON GOI INVESTMENT IN 
DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS 
 
REF: A. EMBASSY ROME-USCG E-MAILS 
     ¶B. ROME 336 
     ¶C. 2006 ROME 343 
 
Classified By: Ecmin Thomas Delare for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S)  Summary.  In a May 21 meeting with Ecmin, Alfredo 
Cuzzoni, the Ministry of Economic Development official 
responsible for the Ministry's support for Italy's defense 
industry, described an Italian defense procurement system 
constrained by political infighting and limited budgets. 
Cuzzoni shed light on a kafkaesque bureaucracy obsessed with 
defense offsets and quid pro quo purchases from foreign 
defense companies.  While Cuzzoni apologized for a threat he 
made in a May 4 letter to the Embassy to withhold 
infrastructure funding for the Joint Strike Fighter, he made 
clear that in his view, commitments made by the GOI at the 
political level may be subject to later review to ensure they 
remain palatable to the left-most elements of the governing 
coalition.  Similarly, he noted that GOI commitments to 
programs which do not meet the political litmus tests of the 
Ministry's Under Secretary, a Reformed Communist Party 
representative in the Parliament, may encounter bureaucratic 
obstacles that delay the programs' implementation.  Embassy 
has already raised concerns about Cuzzoni's unique 
interpretations of Italian commitments, producing 
instructions (so far ignored) from the Ministry of Economic 
Development that Cuzzoni cease contacts with foreign 
officials.  End summary. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶2.  (S) Ref B reported Econ Counselor's February 9 meeting 
with GOI and Fincantieri officials in which they announced 
Fincantieri's decision not to pursue additional exports of 
marine diesel engines to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
under a "gentleman's agreement" with the GOI and Fincantieri. 
 In the same meeting, Fincantieri officials said that in 
order to offset the loss of sales to Iran, Fincantieri was 
interested in bidding on the engine subcontract for the U.S. 
Coast Guard's Response Boat-Medium (RB-M) program. 
Fincantieri subsequently competed for, but did not win, the 
engine subcontract being awarded by the Marinette Marine 
Corporation, the primary contractor for the RB-M program. 
 
"YOU'VE GOT MAIL!" 
------------------ 
 
¶3.  (S) On May 4, Econ Counselor received a letter from 
Alfredo Cuzzoni, Director of the Ministry of Economic 
Development office responsible for the Ministry's 
participation in the defense sector.  (Note.  In the GOI 
budget, the "industrial" portion of defense projects  comes 
out of the Ministry of Economic Development's budget. 
Cuzzoni's office is responsible for financing GOI industrial 
participation  in the defense sector and for GOI industrial 
involvement in NATO projects.  End note.)  In his letter, 
Cuzzoni alleged that Fincantieri was unfairly denied the RB-M 
engine subcontract by the USCG and concluded that the USCG's 
"arrogant carelessness" in its "unexplained decision to 
exclude us from the engine supply . . .  will make the 
funding of the final assembly and check-out (FACO) facility 
-- with funds from this Ministry -- at Cameri Airbase even 
more difficult."  The FACO facility to which Cuzzoni referred 
is a part of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program.  Embassy 
shared the letter with Ministry of Defense (MOD) officials 
involved in the JSF program, who confirmed that Cuzzoni and 
his office were in a position to withhold funds for the JSF 
FACO facility. 
 
¶4. (S) In a May 21 meeting requested by Ecmin to clarify the 
contents of his letter, Cuzzoni apologized repeatedly for the 
tone of his letter and his threat to withhold funds for the 
JSF FACO facility.  He told us that MOD officials had shared 
his May 4 letter with the Ministry of Economic Development's 
Diplomatic Advisor, and that he was under instructions 
(ignored) not to meet with any foreign government officials. 
Cuzzoni shed light on political maneuvering within the 
Ministry of Economic Development to steer GOI funding away 
from programs like the JSF in favor of "more European" 
projects such as the FREMM Frigate and an Italian project 
with Thales to develop a competitor to the Predator UAV. 
According to Cuzzoni, cooperative defense projects between 
the U.S and Italy face an uphill battle within the Ministry 
 
ROME 00001190  002 OF 003 
 
 
of Economic Development because of budgetary constraints and 
because Alfonso Gianni, the Under Secretary responsible for 
defense issues, for whom Cuzzoni works, is a Reformed 
Communist Party MP who is opposed to NATO and Italy's 
involvement with the JSF program.  Gianni is a pacifist who 
wants GOI spending on military programs cut.  Cuzzoni stated 
that Gianni's opposition to NATO is such that he refuses to 
sign any papers having to do with NATO, including his 
application for a NATO security clearance. 
 
¶5.  (S) Cuzzoni returned to the issue of the RB-M engines, 
and said that he was under the impression that Fincantieri 
would have a decisive edge in bidding for the engine 
subcontract because of its decision earlier this year not to 
pursue the export of similar engines to Iran.  Ecmin replied 
that the USG does not engage in that type of quid pro quo, 
and that the USCG played no role in the decision by Marinette 
Marine, the RB-M's manufacturer, to use engines other than 
those made by Fincantieri.  "The Coast Guard bought boats, 
not engines, and it was up to the individual boat 
manufacturers to choose the engine which they thought would 
best meet the RB-M's requirements."  Cuzzoni, who refused to 
make eye contact through the hour-long meeting, then began a 
detailed and bizarre description of defense offsets that, in 
his mind, were intended to balance one another and reward 
industrial partners for their participation in one program or 
another. In response, Ecmin restated his earlier point, that 
the USG does not engage in quid pro quo arrangements, and 
that Cuzzoni's theory of a interlocking system of defense 
offsets in unrelated contracts was misplaced at best. 
 
¶6.  (S) Cuzzoni moved on, noting that that under the current 
tight budgetary environment it is difficult for his office to 
find funding for military programs unless those programs have 
clear benefits to Italian industry and the Italian economy. 
The governing coalition's one-vote majority in the Senate 
means that defense-industrial projects have to pass a high 
political hurdle before they can be approved.  This is why 
the JSF program, which is seen as an "American program" by 
many far-left parliamentarians, is problematic for Cuzzoni's 
office.  That said, he understood that Italy will benefit 
from JSF participation and construction of the FACO, and said 
he would do what he can to find the funds needed for the 
program to move forward.  He added, however, that he will 
have to be "discrete" in order to avoid attracting the 
attention of Under Secretary Gianni and Cuzzoni's immediate 
superior, Director General Andrea Bianchi, who is also 
opposed to U.S.-Italian industrial cooperation in the defense 
sector. 
 
¶7.  (S) Ecmin responded that while he understands the 
financial constraints that the GOI faces, the GOI has made 
commitments at the political level to invest an additional 
one billion dollars in the JSF program, bringing Italy's 
total JSF investment to two billion dollars.  Additionally, 
the GOI has committed to a schedule for the construction and 
activation of the JSF FACO facility, to which we expect it to 
adhere.  Ecmin noted that the FACO facility, which the GOI 
plans to use as a JSF maintenance depot after the aircraft's 
initial delivery, will employ thousands of Italians and have 
a positive impact on the Italian economy in the range of nine 
billion dollars.  He concluded that other JSF partner 
countries would happily take on the FACO project if Italy is 
unable to fulfill its commitments.  More generally, Ecmin 
noted that Embassy efforts to encourage investment in Italy 
will be undercut by a GOI decision to walk away from its JSF 
commitments.  Cuzzoni said that he understood all of these 
points, repeating his earlier point that he would do his best 
to fulfill the GOI's commitment to fund the construction of 
the JSF FACO facility.  Almost as an aside, he noted that the 
money "would have to come from somewhere" and that he hoped 
the Ministry would be able to find the funds needed to 
fulfill commitments made in connection with the manufacture 
of Boeing 787 "Dreamliner" components in Italy.  (Note.  We 
believe Cuzzoni is referring to infrastructure upgrades the 
GOI has committed to in support of the Italian manufacture of 
787 components.  We are following up with Boeing on this 
matter.  End note.) 
 
¶8.  (S) Comment.  No cable can do justice to Cuzzoni's May 4 
letter, which was alive with bolded, italicized, and 
underlined text, and replete with references to obscure 
international treaties and Cuzzoni's childhood vacations in 
Normandy.  The letter was more akin to a ransom note than 
correspondence from another government.  That said, we had 
 
ROME 00001190  003 OF 003 
 
 
reason to take Cuzzoni's letter seriously.  Cuzzoni was 
previously a reliable Embassy contact, and well-placed 
contacts in the Italian MOD have noted that Cuzzoni, with 30 
plus years' experience in his office, can withhold funds and 
generally make life difficult for defense contractors if he 
chooses to do so.  Contacts in the MFA with whom Ecmin spoke 
subsequent to his meeting with Cuzzoni dismissed the threat 
against the JSF FACO facility as laughable, noting that the 
GOI has made commitments at a political level that Cuzzoni 
cannot reverse.  Our MFA contact noted he has "a drawer full 
of Cuzzoni's crazy letters," and that because of previous 
problems, Cuzzoni is no longer allowed to correspond directly 
with Italian Embassies overseas.  We received a similar 
reaction at MOD. 
 
¶9.  (S)  Comment continued.  His possibly exaggerated threats 
against the JSF program notwithstanding, Cuzzoni's 
observations about the rubric through which the Ministry of 
Economic Development views our defense cooperation are 
probably valid.  As we pointed out in ref C, the GOI views 
defense cooperation as a means through which to promote 
technology transfers and economic growth.  Cuzzoni's 
description of political forces driving his Ministry's 
decision-making process highlights the fact that now more 
than ever, defense industry projects in Italy need to have an 
economic justification in addition to a military one.  If a 
project is seen as not paying for itself, the project could 
be scaled back or cut unless the GOI and Italian industry can 
be convinced that the economic benefits of participation 
outweigh the costs.  End comment. 
Spogli