VZCZCXRO8295
OO RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #1388/01 1791235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 281235Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5871
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHRMAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 001388 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR BAVERILL 
DEPT OF ENERGY PASS TO ADEALVAREZ 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017 
TAGS: EPET ENRG ECON PTER DHA SA
SUBJECT: JOINT WORKING GROUP MARITIME TEAM DEBRIEFS SAUDI 
COAST GUARD,  HIGHLIGHTS AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
 
REF: SECSTATE 
 
Classified By: ECONOMIC COUNSELOR BOB MURPHY FOR 
REASONS 12958 1.4 B, D, AND E 
 
---------- 
Summary 
---------- 
 
¶1.  (S)  On June 23, an assessment team in 
Saudi Arabia from the Joint Working Group (JWG) 
on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
debriefed members of the Saudi Coast Guard on a 
four-day visit to Coast Guard facilities 
at and near oil facilities in the Eastern 
Province.  While the maritime team will 
present its formal recommendations to the Saudi 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) at the next JWG meeting 
in late August or early September, they highlighted 
key observations regarding Saudi Coast Guard 
capabilities to respond to possible terrorist 
threats.  The team indicated the Saudi Coast 
Guard should improve their communication and 
integration with other government security 
forces, such as the Royal Saudi Naval Forces 
(RSNF) and Saudi Aramco security.  While the 
Saudi Coast Guard is charged with responding 
to maritime threats to oil infrastructure, 
it currently has no coastal radar in its command 
centers to allow it do so effectively.  The team 
also highlighted the need for the Coast Guard to 
improve its maritime interdiction capabilities, 
and for the government to acquire a helicopter 
response capability. In sum, the team privately 
assessed there were significant deficiencies in 
the Coast Guard's ability to detect or interdict 
a serious terrorist threat to the Ras Tanura or 
Ras al Juaymah oil facilities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Team Focused on Coast Guard Capabilities at 
Ras Tanura and Ras Al Juaymah Oil facilities 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  During four days in the Eastern Province, 
the team toured Coast Guard facilities and 
command centers at the Jubail port, Ras Tanura 
and Ras Al Juaymah oil facilities, and Dammam port. 
The team also assessed Coast Guard capabilities 
during a day-long maritime tour of  Ras Tanura 
and Ras Al Juaymah oil facilities.  The maritime 
expert team included Coast Guard subject matter 
experts Randy Rhodes and Keith Karl.  They were 
joined by Sandia National Laboratory representatives 
Dr. Susan Rhodes,  Jack Jones, and Frank Gerdin. 
Diplomatic Security Agent (DS/ATA) Maloy led the 
delegation. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Saudi Coast Guard Admiral Al Ghamdi, 
Assistant General Manager for Maritime Affairs, 
led the Saudi team present for the debriefing. 
His team included Coast Guard representatives 
Director for Naval Support Captain Radadi; 
Commander Al Zahrani, International Cooperation 
and Border Affairs; and officers from the training 
and information technology departments.  Dr. Khalid 
al Ageel, Director of the Ministry of Interior's 
High Commission on Industrial Security, and the 
JWG's most frequent counterpart, was also 
present for the session. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Coast Guard Flying Blind Compared to 
Navy, Saudi Aramco 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S)  During the June 23 debriefing, the 
maritime team noted the limitations on Coast Guard 
capabilities, while also  laying out some of its 
 
RIYADH 00001388  002 OF 003 
 
 
strengths.  The team praised the extensive ability to 
detect threats via human visual detection, with 
Coast Guard personnel extensively deployed 
on vessels and Saudi Aramco security personnel on 
vessels and oil platforms.  However, the Coast Guard 
has extremely limited awareness of its maritime 
domain, the area over which it exercises authority, 
especially compared to its partners in protecting 
Saudi oil infrastructure, the RSNF and Saudi Aramco. 
The Saudi Coast Guard has no coastal radar in its 
command centers to allow it to track its own or other 
vessels, including those with hostile intent. 
Instead, Coast Guard vessels radio in their 
positions at specific intervals.  The Coast Guard, 
Navy, and Saudi Aramco have no shared radar or other 
common systems, and hence no common picture of the 
maritime domain or potential threats therein. 
 
¶5.  (S)  The team also highlighted the need for 
the Coast Guard to improve its maritime interdiction 
capabilities and for the government to acquire a 
helicopter response capability.  The maritime team 
assessed that the Coast Guard has limited training 
and exercises, and  does not conduct any security 
team boarding of large commercial vessels to 
effect positive control upon approach to critical 
infrastructure. 
 
¶6.  (S)  Finally, the team noted the inconsistent 
identification of critical components within Saudi 
Arabias's energy facilities.  For example, Saudi 
Aramco and the Coast Guard representatives 
appeared to have inconsistent views as to the 
criticality of Ras Tanura's Sea Island and single 
point moorings (SPMs).  While all interlocutors 
agreed these facilities perform an important 
function in loading crude oil, there were 
divergent views on Aramco's ability to quickly 
deploy workarounds if they were significantly 
damaged in an attack. 
 
------------------------------------- 
On-Going Procurement Should Address 
Some Technology Gaps 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  According to Admiral Al Ghamdi and 
his team, some of the gaps identified by the 
maritime team will be addressed by a major Border 
Guard package already under procurement by the MOI. 
For example, the Coast Guard is acquiring fifty fast 
speedboats and a coastal radar package, which should 
address its most severe technology deficiencies. 
However, the Coast Guard leadership often seemed 
unaware of major procurement efforts underway at 
the MOI, or if they would receive any new equipment 
or capabilities as a result. 
 
 
¶8.  (C)  The Coast Guard leadership with whom 
the team interacted in the Eastern Province appeared 
to have had no input into defining their needs before 
major acquisitions of new equipment.  For example, 
the MOI is acquiring up to 40 Sikorsky helicopters 
for the Civil Defense Aviation Command.  The 
Coast Guard leadership, including Admiral Al Ghamdi, 
appeared unaware of this acquisition, or how it 
might impact their operations.  The officers generally 
indicated they put their faith in their leadership 
to know what sort of capabilities they needed 
to acquire. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Coast Guard: Urgent Need for Better Training 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  All of the Coast Guard officers present 
at the debriefing conveyed the request for more 
training.  They were keenly interested in potential 
 
RIYADH 00001388  003 OF 003 
 
 
training offered by the US Coast Guard, DS/ATA, 
and Sandia Labs.  The JWG team provided some examples 
of training offered by these institutions, and asked 
the Saudi Coast Guard to funnel formal training 
requests via the JWG.  Admiral Al Ghamdi invited 
the JWG team to tour the Coast Guard training 
facilities in the near future, and to discuss 
possible training cooperation. 
 
-------- 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶11.  (S)  A JWG maritime team assessed Saudi 
Aramco's maritime capabilities in March.  The contrast 
with the Coast Guard command centers could not have 
been more striking.  Saudi Aramco's port control 
center was filled with state of the art radar systems 
and computers.  Even then, extensive equipment 
upgrades were underway.  Saudi Aramco's Head of 
Industrial Security has essentially told us the 
Coast Guard is not welcome in his port control 
facility.  Of course, Saudi Aramco's security 
forces carry only personal weapons, and are not 
prepared to interdict a terrorist threat.  That is 
left to the Saudi Coast Guard.  Unfortunately, 
the Coast Guard appears to have little realistic 
ability to detect a threat in the area of Saudi 
Aramco's key facilities at Ras Tanura and 
Ras Al Juaymah, and so to mount a timely response. 
FRAKER