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FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8566
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0805
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PARIS 002787 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO UNO UNMIK YI RS IR IS LE
KCFE, MARR, PTER 
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED AND COUNSELOR COHEN DISCUSS KOSOVO, IRAN 
AND CFE WITH FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR 
 
 
Classified By: AMB Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  In a June 25 meeting on the margins of the 
Secretary's visit to Paris -- and prior to the ministerial 
 
SIPDIS 
meeting that evening on Kosovo -- A/S Fried and Counselor 
Cohen discussed Kosovo, Iran, and Russia/CFE with MFA 
Political Director Araud.  They generally agreed on the three 
options dealing with Kosovo's inevitable independence -- A) 
the current draft UNSC Resolution likely to be vetoed by 
Russia if forced to a vote; B) a "minimalist" UNSCR designed 
to legitimize a continuing international presence and prepare 
the ground for independence but itself ambiguous on status; 
and C) a 120-to-180 day period at the end of which decisions 
would be taken on a new UNSCR or proceeding to independence 
in the absence of a UNSCR.  Araud and Fried differed on 
operational "nuances," with Araud arguing for more ambiguity 
to bring along the Russians, and A/S Fried stressing the 
importance of clarity about independence to reassure the 
Kosovars.  They agreed that any future negotiations should 
probably be under the auspices of the Contact Group to avoid 
the creation of "a new Ahtisaari" and to try to gain Russian 
buy-in and isolate Serbian PM Kostunica as the obdurate 
party.  On substance, Fried suggested focusing on 
implementation of the Ahtisaari recommendations, with Araud 
more receptive to reopening them to some degree to 
demonstrate that the negotiations were real.  There was a 
brief discussion of how to respond in the event of Kosovar 
UDI.  A/S Fried stressed the importance of firm rejection of 
any Russian attempts to link Kosovo's independence to 
recognition of Abkhazia. 
 
¶2.  (C) In a discussion with Counselor Cohen on Iran, Araud 
supported an additional UNSC Resolution on financial 
sanctions, while complaining about lack of U.S. coordination 
in tabling its latest draft.  In response to the Counselor's 
presentation on Iranian machinations, Araud argued that 
Hizballah at times in some respects was playing by the rules 
of the "Lebanese political game" and that Iran's role there 
was not necessarily nefarious.  Arguing the necessity for 
France of engaging Iran as a means of influencing the 
situation in Lebanon, he also objected to the U.S. 
characterization of Hizballah as a terrorist organization. 
 
¶3.  (C) On CFE, worried that Russia's suspension of its CFE 
obligations could take on a life of its own, the French 
argued for a new initiative: agreement to negotiate a new 
treaty to prevent what they saw as a risk of de facto 
unraveling of the CFE regime that would free Russia to deploy 
forces anywhere on its territory.  A/S Fried cautioned 
against rewarding the Russians for bad behavior and said that 
any new negotiations would need to be based on continuing 
compliance with the existing treaty during that time.  He 
noted that Russia, at least for the moment, appeared 
comfortable with the offensive tactic of controlled 
confrontation with the West.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Accompanied by the Ambassador, EUR A/S Fried and 
Counselor Cohen met June 25 with MFA Political Director 
Gerard Araud on the margins of the Secretary's June 24-26 
visit to Paris.  Araud was accompanied by his Deputy 
Veronique Bujon-Barre, AS-equivalent for Strategic Affairs 
Philippe Carre and a desk officer, FM Kouchner cabinet 
advisor Philippe Errera, and executive assistant Gael 
Veyssiere.  NSC Senior Director Bradley, DCM and POL Deputy 
(notetaker) joined on the U.S. side. 
 
Kosovo Options 
-------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Citing President Sarkozy's remarks at the G8 Summit 
in Germany, Araud said France viewed Kosovo's independence as 
inevitable, foresaw a six-month negotiation period between 
the parties to attempt to come to additional understandings, 
and was prepared to recognize Kosovo's independence at the 
end of the six-month period come what may.  It would also 
seek the support of other EU member states for this approach, 
including recognition of Kosovo's independence when the time 
came. 
 
¶6.  (C) A/S Fried responded that the French position as 
described by Araud formed a solid basis upon which to prepare 
that day's later ministerial meeting on Kosovo.  He then 
recapitulated the three-option plan as presented the previous 
day with Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Jean-David Levitte: 
(A) Determine whether the Russians will refuse the current 
draft UNSC Resolution based on Sarkozy's idea of independence 
after four to six months of negotiations; A/S Fried assured 
 
PARIS 00002787  002 OF 006 
 
 
Araud that the U.S. would not force a vote on the UNSCR and 
risk a Russian veto without prior coordination with the 
Europeans; (B) Pursue a "minimalist" UNSCR aimed at 
legitimizing the presence of the EU and the International 
Office (IO), and possibly NATO if UNSCR 1244 was considered 
insufficient for this purpose, combined with four to six 
months of negotiations at the end of which there would be 
recognition; and (C) if it turned out that no UNSCR would be 
possible, four to six months of negotiations would commence, 
with a final attempt being made at the end of that period 
either to pass a final UNSCR and proceed immediately with or 
without a UNSCR to recognition.  A/S Fried judged that while 
we were currently following plan (A), we would likely need to 
move to plan (B) following Putin's meeting with the President 
at Kennebunkport. 
 
Engaging the Russians 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Araud agreed that prospects for plan (A) were dim, 
given Russian UNSC PermRep Churkin's contemptuous rejection 
of the current draft UNSCR.  He nonetheless held out hope 
that plan (B) might still be achievable, given that the 
Russians had discerned some moves in their direction, even if 
they were deemed insufficient, and that it had rejected a 
four-month negotiating period as too short.  Araud informed 
A/S Fried that he planned to travel to Moscow July 2-4 to 
engage the Russians in further discussions.  So far the 
Russians had not engaged, but he had called Russian 
Ambassador to Paris Avdeyev to urge him not to view diplomacy 
as a zero-sum game, to extol the virtues of constructive 
ambiguity, and stress the importance of political will to 
compromise.  But he had received no response. 
 
¶8.  (C) A/S Fried assured Araud that the U.S. could accept 
plan (B), which would provide an umbrella for the 
international presence and set the stage for subsequent 
recognition.  He urged caution, however, in exploring a 
minimalist UNSCR with the Russians, lest they attempt to 
insert "poison pill" language that would effectively exclude 
a change of status for Kosovo.  Ambiguity was acceptable, 
unless of course they actually were prepared to take a more 
positive approach.  Araud agreed that the question to be 
answered was whether the Russians would be prepared "to play 
the diplomatic game" of accelerating ambiguity.  He agreed 
with A/S Fried that it was unlikely the Kennebunkport meeting 
would lead to Russian acceptance of plan (A). 
 
Need to Reassure Kosovars Also 
------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) A/S Fried reminded Araud that managing the next four 
to six months also meant maintaining the confidence of the 
Kosovars, who would be willing to accept further delay only 
if it was accompanied by clarity and Western unity with 
regard to the end result of independence.  An absence of 
clarity could equally lead to panic and disorder, even 
disintegration if the Kosovars came to believe the West was 
deceiving them and reopening the Ahtisaari findings. 
Operationally, it would be important that the June 25 
informal meeting of ministers on Kosovo produce an agreement 
that plans (A), (B), and (C) were acceptable only so long as 
the bottom line remained that independence was unavoidable 
and without more delay.  The difficulty was that this message 
also needed to be conveyed to the Kosovars, which 
contradicted the goal of bringing along the Russians through 
ambiguity.  A/S Fried reminded Araud -- citing the 
President's and Secretary's statements -- that U.S. policy 
has been to tell the Kosovars clearly that they would achieve 
independence, and be recognized by the U.S. and key European 
allies. 
 
¶10.  (C) Thinking aloud, Araud wondered whether it might be 
best to take national approaches to Kosovo's independence: 
France could rely on Sarkozy's statement, just as the U.S. 
could cite the President and the Secretary.  But he saw a 
problem in the putative dilemma -- which he said FM Kouchner 
had raised with the Secretary -- of claiming simultaneously 
that negotiations were real and that they would produce a 
specific outcome.  A/S Fried reiterated the importance of 
assuring the Kosovars that they would achieve independence in 
the end.  Araud, noting the difference of "nuance" in the 
U.S. and French positions, suggested that time would tell 
whether it would be possible to have it both ways. 
Suggesting that the U.S. could afford to take a less 
"constrained" view, he reiterated that France saw a need to 
try to keep Russia on board with the promise of "real" 
 
PARIS 00002787  003 OF 006 
 
 
negotiations without a pre-determined outcome.  A/S Fried 
reiterated that it was enough for now for France simply to 
repeat that independence was unavoidable, suggesting it would 
be possible to avoid saying now what would happen in the 
event of a Russian veto.  For his part, he would respond to 
questions by saying that the President's views were well 
known, that Sarkozy had called independence unavoidable, and 
that the U.S. hoped to negotiate a UNSCR. 
 
Timing 
------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Carre noted that timing needed to be considered in 
addition to the substance of the message, arguing against 
being too clear too soon with respect to plans (B) and (C). 
A/S Fried responded that the Kosovars had already panicked 
over Sarkozy's original message, despite its clear 
identification of the end result.  He repeated that the 
tension would remain between more ambiguity, which was good 
for Russia, and a more dangerous situation on the ground in 
the absence of clarity.  Turning to the evening ministerial 
meeting, he assured Araud that word of the meeting would 
inevitably leak, and that it was therefore important to have 
a message ready.  Araud said he would check with the 
Presidency, suggesting again that citing Sarkozy's earlier 
statement would probably be the recommended course of action. 
 
Modalities 
---------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Araud asked how Fried envisioned the upcoming 
negotiation period, noting that the U.S. had said it wished 
to keep Ahtisaari "in the loop."  A/S Fried clarified that 
Ahtisaari wanted "a" role in the process, but did not wish to 
run it himself.  Araud suggested that the negotiations could 
perhaps proceed under the auspices of the Contact Group, at 
the end of which it could call the two parties to Vienna for 
a final round of mediation.  But other questions remained: 
who would lead the negotiations?, or, should the final 
conference last one day or occur in Rambouillet format? 
Making clear he was only thinking aloud, A/S Fried said it 
would be important to involve the U.S. to assure the 
Kosovars, and the Europeans to bring along the EU.  (He added 
that he was considering travel to Pristina in July to discuss 
next steps with the Kosovars, and told Araud he would want to 
coordinate with him on the public message he should convey 
about the European position.)  Since it would also be 
important to isolate Serbian President Kostunica, it might 
also be necessary to include the Russians. 
 
¶13.  (C) Araud wondered again who should mediate the 
negotiations, agreeing with Fried indirectly that they should 
occur under the auspices of the Contact Group.  At the same 
time, he thought it would be impractical for all six Contact 
Group reps to shuttle between Belgrade and Pristina.  A/S 
Fried said he preferred a group approach, since it was 
important to avoid creating "a new Ahtisaari."  Araud 
appeared to agree.  Fried reminded Araud that the Serbs or 
Kosovars might be tempted to walk away from the negotiations 
at some point. 
 
Substance 
--------- 
 
¶14.  (C) On the substance of the negotiations, A/S Fried said 
it would be important not to re-open the Ahtisaari 
compromises, but perhaps they could focus on the timing and 
means of implementing them.  Noting Putin's predilection for 
"surprises," he speculated that he would arrive in 
Kennebunkport with a Serbian proposal for new negotiations. 
Araud argued that reopening the Ahtisaari recommendations 
should not be excluded a priori, since they focused primarily 
on minority protections and took no position on independence. 
 He asked whether a "Taiwan model" consisting of one country 
with two systems and no UNSC seat for Kosovo might be a way 
out.  A/S Fried responded that postponing a UN seat for 
Kosovo could perhaps be part of a solution. 
 
UDI 
--- 
 
¶15.  (C) Araud asked A/S Fried how the U.S. would respond if 
Kosovo did not accept U.S. advice and moved to a unilateral 
declaration of independence (UDI).  A/S Fried assured Araud 
that the U.S. continued to advise the Kosovars against UDI. 
If they nonetheless did declare independence, he conceded 
that this would put the USG under pressure to recognize 
 
PARIS 00002787  004 OF 006 
 
 
Kosovo, although recognition would not be automatic.  How the 
U.S. responded would depend at least in part on how the 
Europeans planned to respond. 
 
Abkhazia Linkage 
---------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) Araud noted that a six-month negotiating period 
would move final decisions past the Duma elections and 
speculated that this might make things easier for the 
Russians.  A/S Fried responded that the Russians were still 
making linkages to Abkhazia.  It was not clear at this stage 
whether they were bluffing, but it would behoove the West to 
make clear to the Russians that recognition of Abkhazia was 
unacceptable and to support Georgian President Saakashvili. 
Failure to provide such support could force the Georgians to 
send troops to Abkhazia in the face of a likely provocation 
from the Abkhaz side, for instance the expulsion of ethnic 
Georgians.  The Russians should not be permitted to become 
"revisionist and revanchist."  Araud commented that they were 
already clearly revisionist. 
 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶17.  (C) Counselor Cohen, noting that he had discussed the 
Iranian nuclear program that same morning with Secretary 
General for National Defense Francis Delon, said the U.S. saw 
an Iranian hand in Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, and now Afghanistan. 
He said the U.S. intended now to push for further sanctions 
against Iran given that they appeared to be having some 
effect.  Araud characterized the most recent meeting between 
EU High Rep Solana and Iranian negotiator Larijani as a "new 
failure," saying that the Iranians were now trying to reverse 
conditionality and put the onus on the West to take the first 
step.  (He agreed that a third UNSC Resolution on sanctions 
was necessary, while using the occasion to complain that the 
U.S. had not consulted with France and the UK prior to 
tabling its latest.  France would have liked to include 
sanctions against individuals, and also believed that Russia 
and China would not accept U.S. language on restricting 
Iranian access to international financial institutions.) 
Araud said France was on board for additional sanctions 
outside the UN framework, although getting there would 
involve a complicated interagency process.  He reminded A/S 
Fried that some financial sanctions would fall under EU 
competence, where Germany and Italy were likely to resist. 
 
France Fixed on Lebanon 
----------------------- 
 
¶18.  (C) Araud told Counselor Cohen that France viewed Iran 
in large part through the prism of Lebanon, where its 
influence was judged to be not entirely negative.  He 
described Iranian policy -- unlike Syria's -- as focused 
primarily on giving the Shia more power via Hizballah, in a 
way that respected the "Lebanese political game" and was not 
always destructive.  Hizballah, he asserted, had accepted 
UNSCR 1701 at Iran's urging, even if Iran continued to 
smuggle weapons to Hizballah.  The Syrians, not the Iranians, 
were behind the recent rocket attacks on Israel originating 
from southern Lebanon.  He judged that Hizballah had no 
interest in inflaming southern Lebanon, given that the 
Hizballah-Israel conflict of summer 2006 had undermined its 
standing with its main constituency.  Hizballah's main goal, 
he insisted, was simply to obtain a larger share of the power 
within Lebanon.  If Arab League Secretary General Amr 
Moussa's recent mediation had failed, this was not because of 
Hizballah but Nabih Berri, "the voice of Syria." 
 
Engaging with Hizballah 
----------------------- 
 
¶19.  (C) Araud judged that there was no alternative to 
engaging with Hizballah, given that it had legitimate 
grievances and that the central power had long ignored 
southern Lebanon.  It was thus also necessary to engage with 
Iran, even if it was not entirely trustworthy.  There was an 
opening with respect to Lebanon, and France believed that 
Iran was promoting the welfare of the Shia rather than war. 
Counselor Cohen reminded Araud that Hizballah, supported by 
Iran, was behind attacks on Israeli interests and that Iran 
was active against U.S. interests in Iraq and NATO interests 
in Afghanistan.  Nor did the U.S. believe that Hizballah was 
committed to preserving the integrity of the Lebanese state; 
a parallel state with its own institutions was not 
acceptable.  He reminded Araud that the U.S. also viewed 
 
PARIS 00002787  005 OF 006 
 
 
Hizballah as a terrorist organization. 
 
¶20.  (C) Araud claimed that Hizballah was last implicated in 
a terrorist act in Buenos Aires in 1994, and not since, and 
asked whether the U.S. had new information.  Counselor Cohen 
assured him that Iran was working against the West in the 
Middle East, even if it was patient and disciplined.  Araud 
said France viewed Iran as taking advantage of a situation in 
the Middle East rather than being engaged in a general 
offensive; it was a brutal regime ready to exploit a given 
situation.  The U.S. intervention in Iraq was a gift to Iran, 
he said, destroying the Sunni rampart against the Persians. 
Araud described Lebanon as Iran's last hope for exporting its 
Islamic Revolution, and suggested that Iran was acting 
counter to its own interests in supporting the Taliban in 
Afghanistan ("we destroyed their worst enemy"). 
 
¶21.  (C) Counselor Cohen argued that the Iranian presence in 
southern Iraq was already extensive before the Iraq 
intervention, and noted that the Iranians appeared willing to 
work with extremist Sunnis as well as Shia.  Araud asked 
whether the U.S. distinguished between the Iranian government 
and the IRGC; Cohen responded that the IRGC was not a rogue 
actor.  Araud asked why the Iranians did not remain quiet 
until the Shia majority assumed power in Iraq;  Cohen 
responded that Iran had broader hegemonic aspirations, and 
that generational change was also hardening the Iranian 
position.  Araud commented twice that the Iranians appeared 
to believe time was on their side. 
 
Russia - CFE 
------------ 
 
¶22.  (C) Carre worried that the Russian "suspension" of its 
CFE obligations had set in train a process that had taken on 
a life of its own and could no longer be arrested.  He was 
doubtful that Russia would ever take sufficient steps (toward 
implementation of its Istanbul commitments) that would allow 
the U.S. to proceed toward ratification of the adapted Treaty 
(A/CFE).  This could easily lead to the de facto unraveling 
of the CFE treaty within the next year and a half.  France 
viewed the treaty as a minimum assurance for stability, and 
did not wish to see Russia in a position to deploy troops on 
its territory at will and without transparency.  Russia was 
becoming increasingly unpredictable, with negative 
implications for Missile Defense (MD), Georgia-NATO 
relations, and possibly even Kaliningrad.  He argued that it 
was time to consider new ideas, such as opening the treaty to 
accession by new members in advance of ratification, or 
negotiations on a revamped Treaty. 
 
¶23.  (C) A/S Fried questioned whether France was in favor of 
renegotiating the Treaty even if Russia withdrew.  He also 
asked whether any renegotiation would be contingent on Russia 
remaining within the current Treaty.  He cautioned that any 
negotiation should not legitimize what was in fact a 
unilateral Russian breach of the treaty, noting that there 
was a risk that long negotiations would leave the Russians 
without real constraints over a period of years.  Carre took 
A/S Fried's points but insisted that there was a need to move 
rapidly -- in the next six to nine months -- to prevent 
Russia from doing something irreversible.  Fried repeated 
that Russia would need to be in compliance with the Treaty 
before any negotiations could commence.  He feared that 
Russia was not truly interested in negotiations, however, and 
that Putin was tempted to renounce the Treaty for political 
reasons.  Araud and Carre cited Russian paranoia about 
encirclement; Fried countered by noting the Russian 
proclivity for basing relationships with neighbors on fear 
and domination. 
 
¶24.  (C) Araud suggested that the Allies might need to take 
legal steps if the Russians were in breach of the treaty, 
with Carre interjecting that clarifying the situation was not 
in anyone's political interest.  Fried repeated that it was 
the Russians who would likely be shortly in breach of the 
treaty, whether this was stated publicly or not.  He proposed 
that Allies negotiate among themselves on next steps and be 
prepared to respond firmly.  Araud lamented that a Russian 
decision to withdraw from the treaty would be extremely 
negative for the Europeans; "we would have to go back to 
spying."  A/S Fried suggested that the Russians appeared to 
be comfortable in a controlled confrontation with the West. 
 
¶25.  (U) This message was cleared by A/S Fried. 
 
 
 
PARIS 00002787  006 OF 006 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON