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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 002643 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR 
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR, NEA, AF, AND OES 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO UNO UNMIK YI RS IR IS LE
KPAL, SENV, SU, ECON, ETRD 
SUBJECT: YOUR JUNE 24-25 VISIT TO PARIS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Madam Secretary: 
You will be arriving in a France whose mood is up-beat for 
the first time in years.  Sarkozy's energy and determination 
to meet challenges head-on and break with the past have 
lifted national morale.  His resounding presidential victory 
May 6 -- notwithstanding the French electorate's decision in 
the June 17 legislative elections to bolster the Socialist 
opposition -- has given Sarkozy a broad-based mandate to 
undertake long overdue economic and social reforms.  Sarkozy 
hopes that his upcoming whirlwind of reform -- on a range of 
areas from taxes and labor markets to university admissions 
-- will trigger a "shock of confidence" that will lead to 
increased national productivity and competitiveness. 
Sarkozy's larger goals are to adapt France to globalization 
and to renew the country's confidence in itself as an 
international actor.  To achieve them, he is seeking renewed 
economic growth to reduce France's chronically high 
unemployment rate (especially for youth) and to win 
maneuvering room to address the economic and social 
rigidities that have caused France to languish for a 
generation.  Although it is difficult to predict at this 
stage how much popular resistance he will encounter, Sarkozy 
is off to a fast start.  That same dynamism is also infusing 
France's international engagement, magnified still further by 
Foreign Minister Kouchner's iconoclastic, trademark activism. 
 
¶2.  (C) We have gotten off to a good start with the new 
Sarkozy administration.  From the President on down, France's 
new leaders are pledging a relationship of mutual confidence 
and continuing close coordination on most of the issues that 
matter: Lebanon/Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Russia, 
Darfur, and counter-terrorism.  For our part, Secretary Gates 
and U/S Burns have sent a loud and clear message about 
France's importance to the U.S., and our proposal for a ship 
visit by the nuclear carrier Enterprise has been welcomed by 
Defense Minister Morin.  Tone will not always translate into 
substance:  Sarkozy has continued to make the point that 
friendship does not mean automatic alignment with the U.S. 
France will continue to develop its own positions based on 
its own analyses of situations and its understanding of 
French interests.  We nonetheless believe that the French 
will be less inclined than in the recent past to take a 
position at variance with ours simply in order to assert 
France's difference.  (In that regard, they have already 
promised a less theological approach to NATO.)  We are also 
finding it easier to engage practically with the new 
government, ranging from easier access to franker exchanges. 
 
¶3.  (C) All that said, France's early initiatives -- on 
Lebanon, Syria, Kosovo, and Darfur -- were launched with 
insufficient coordination.  Sarkozy's and Kouchner's activism 
and the strength of their convictions also make them partners 
that are not always easy to manage even when they do 
coordinate with us.  Sarkozy has effectively built up 
critical support for a June 21-22 EU Council decision on a 
simplified treaty on EU institutional reforms, putting France 
back at the center of EU decision-making, shifting the burden 
for any failure to others, and potentially enabling the EU to 
speak with a louder voice on the international stage.  But 
his adamant opposition to Turkish EU accession, and his push 
for a Mediterranean Union including Turkey as a (poor) 
substitute, threaten to antagonize a strategic Ally.  Initial 
indications were that Sarkozy would allow accession 
negotiations to proceed so long as three EU chapters not 
related directly to accession were left unopened.  There are 
signs now, however, that Sarkozy may veto opening a chapter 
related to monetary union.  The spillover from EU-Turkish 
tensions continues to bedevil NATO-EU cooperation and has 
prompted the Turks to withdraw blanket overflight clearance 
for French ISAF flights. 
 
¶4.  (C) Sarkozy is pushing an impressive domestic economic 
reform agenda, but he is no free-trader.  He lacks the ties 
to France's agricultural sector of his predecessor, but his 
rhetoric in defense of French agricultural interests has been 
as strong as that of President Chirac.  As Finance Minister, 
Sarkozy energetically defended the government's bailout of 
French industrial giant Alstom before EU competition 
authorities.  Sarkozy has generally indicated that he sees a 
role for the state in promoting national -- or European -- 
 
PARIS 00002643  002 OF 004 
 
 
corporate "champions." 
 
¶5.  (C) FM Kouchner has taken advantage of your visit to 
schedule a Darfur ministerial on his signature issue of the 
moment.  We have an interest in using your bilateral meetings 
with Kouchner and President Sarkozy to follow up on U/S 
Burns' June 12-13 meetings by taking Sarkozy up on his word 
"to help us get out of Iraq"; reviewing the evolving 
situation in Lebanon and Kouchner's proposal for a national 
dialogue under his personal aegis; planning next steps on 
Iran; charting our strategy on Kosovo; and discussing Russia 
management.  We would expect the French side to raise the 
Palestinian crisis and climate change.  Your discussions with 
Defense Minister Morin can build on Secretary Gates' June 6 
meeting to reaffirm that France will stay the course in 
Afghanistan and to discuss the need for good NATO-EU 
coordination in any Kosovo settlement follow-up. 
 
¶6.  (C) Iraq: It is not too early to engage President 
Sarkozy's government on providing more help to Iraq, 
suggesting four specific contributions: 
-- First, France should commit to maintain its 
ambassador/embassy in Iraq for at least the next year.  This 
battle was in fact already fought and won in the French 
bureaucracy earlier this year, but we should get a commitment 
against the day when there may be a clamor to reduce France's 
diplomatic presence. 
-- Second, France should issue a statement in support of 
national reconciliation in Iraq within the context of Iraq's 
constitutional, elected government.  The French recognize the 
need for reconciliation in principle, but need to replace 
calls for international conferences that might or might not 
supplant Iraq's elected government and its constitution with 
helpful statements that support Iraqi sovereignty. 
-- Third, France should reinforce our message by telling Iran 
to match its actions in Iraq to its declared policy.  This 
would be consistent with France's advocacy of dialogue with 
Iran for the purpose of encouraging it to behave more 
responsibly in the region. 
-- Fourth, France should make an additional, concrete 
contribution to assist Iraqi refugees in Jordan. France has 
already donated one million euros, but more humanitarian 
assistance will help the Jordanians as well as the Iraqis. 
 
¶7.  (C) Lebanon/Syria: France is sending two contradictory 
signals to the Lebanese: On the one hand, they say that 
French policy has not changed; on the other hand, they alter 
that message by saying Sarkozy will not be so tightly allied 
with the Hariris.  The Lebanese and Syrians are ignoring the 
first message and focusing on the second.  Sarkozy's offer to 
begin a dialogue with Syria, Michel Aoun's visit to Paris 
(where he met twice with FM Kouchner), and FM Kouchner's 
proposed Lebanese dialogue (with the inclusion of Hizballah) 
have all contributed to the perception that France is 
drifting away from March 14.   The good news is that our 
concerns have registered with the French, who have been at 
pains recently to assure us of their desire for continued 
cooperation, and that FM Kouchner personally canceled 
Ambassador Cousseran's scheduled visit to Damascus on June 16 
after the assassination of Walid Eido and invited Lebanese PM 
Siniora to visit Paris before the end of the month.  But 
Kouchner currently intends to go ahead with the Paris 
conference.  We need to impress on them that their hasty 
outreach to the Lebanese opposition is demoralizing March 14 
and that the murder of Walid Eido is Bashar's way of testing 
Sarkozy.  If the French blink, Bashar wins. 
 
¶8.  (C) Iran: The French are ready to press for an ambitious 
third UNSC sanctions resolution, and we should seek their 
help in building international support for it.  They also 
understand the importance of non-UN sanctions, and will cite 
the cuts they've already made in export credits, as well as 
the reduction in French banking ties to Iran.  We should 
encourage them to do more, while respecting their view that 
we should be discreet about such measures so as not to 
undermine ourselves in the Security Council.  They may 
express concern about whether Congress will impose sanctions 
on European firms doing business with Iran; such sanctions, 
they believe, would be disastrous to the unity we have 
carefully built. 
 
¶9.  (C) Afghanistan:  France has assured us that it will 
 
PARIS 00002643  003 OF 004 
 
 
maintain its military commitment in Afghanistan.  It warns us 
that European support for military engagement is fragile, and 
posits a need to begin to frame an eventual exit strategy 
since "neither side can win."  As a gesture of solidarity, 
France now plans to increase the number of French 
"Operational and Mentoring and Liaison Teams," or OMLTs, from 
one to four.  Although he has not rejected outright leading a 
PRT, Sarkozy prefers a sector-based assistance approach to a 
geographic contribution.  But he is nonetheless studying the 
option, and you can offer further encouragement. More 
importantly, your visit provides an opportunity to confront 
French and European wobbliness over remaining in Afghanistan 
until the job is done. 
 
¶10.  (C) Kosovo: Your meeting with Sarkozy is an opportunity 
to obtain his firm commitment to our current Kosovo strategy, 
including the GOF's recognition of an independent Kosovo in 
the event we cannot secure an acceptable UNSCR in the face of 
Russian opposition.  Sarkozy believes that everything is 
negotiable so long as Kosovo achieves independence in the 
end.  FM Kouchner believes it is also important that the West 
be seen to be making every conceivable attempt to get the 
Russians to abstain on a UNSC Resolution providing the legal 
basis for recognizing Kosovo's independence and for a NATO/EU 
military presence there.  If additional negotiations fail to 
produce an agreement with the Russians, France would prefer 
not to push the draft resolution to a vote, and would be 
prepared to join us in recognizing Kosovo's independence at 
the appropriate time. 
 
¶11.  (C) Russia:  We expect Russia policy under Sarkozy to be 
more coordinated with the EU, with less consideration for 
Chirac's France/Germany/Russia axis.  The French have no 
illusions about Russia -- on Kosovo, MD, Iran, or even CFE, 
not to mention human rights and democracy -- and its wedge 
tactics.  The GOF advocates finding a middle road between 
"complacency and confrontation."  They will want to reward 
the Russians if they cooperate on Kosovo, and avoid irking 
them further if they do not (for instance when it comes to 
NATO/Georgia).  They may argue for increased flexibility on 
CFE given our firm position on MD, and their sensitivity to 
Russia's fear of encirclement.  Despite the increased 
prominence Sarkozy has given to human rights, he is still 
seeking a positive relationship with Putin, albeit with only 
limited success.  Despite these nuances, he will be open to 
your arguments about the need to deal with the Russians with 
firmness as necessary. 
 
¶12.  (C) Darfur Conference:  Darfur has taken on remarkable 
prominence in French public opinion, and Kouchner wants a 
deliverable as a demonstration of French leadership.  The 
Ministerial will bring together the P-5 and other G-8 
countries, the UN, and China, in addition to lead (primarily 
European) donor partners.  African participation may be 
limited to Egypt and the Bank of African Development; African 
Union Chairperson Konare has endorsed the event but does not 
plan on AU participation, because of its non-African venue. 
The Ministerial will highlight the need for a coherent 
political process on Darfur, address the humanitarian and 
security dimensions of the crisis, and emphasize its regional 
character -- the spillover into eastern Chad and the Central 
African Republic.  On June 17 the French military began a 
food airlift to Darfur refugees and Chadian IDPs within 
Eastern Chad.  This may grow into a short-term French and 
European military protection effort that would later 
transition to UN leadership. 
 
¶13.  (C) Climate Change:  Sarkozy signaled during his 
election victory speech that climate change was his top 
priority, and he called on the U.S. "to take the lead" in the 
fight against global warming.  The President's proposal for 
nationally determined emission reduction targets that would 
involve China and India among others and approach to the 
issue at the G8 Summit is gradually forcing France and others 
to take a more realistic approach.  Sarkozy may nonetheless 
continue to advocate binding constraints on greenhouse gas 
emissions as a necessary ingredient of a post-2012 Kyoto 
follow-on agreement in order to defend Europe's CO2 emissions 
trading system (ETS).  You can impress on Sarkozy the U.S.'s 
interest in intensifying collaboration with France in 
developing climate-friendly energy technologies and in 
sharing approaches to energy efficiency. 
 
PARIS 00002643  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶14.  (C) Palestinian Crisis:  Your French hosts will want to 
learn more about the U.S. approach to dealing with the 
current Palestinian crisis, and will want to exchange views 
on how to stabilize the situation in the Palestinian 
Territories.  They will be looking for ways to reinforce 
Abbas, but may be reticent about publicly endorsing his 
emergency cabinet or adopting tough measures against Hamas. 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
STAPLETON