VZCZCXRO2537
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #2516/01 1631312
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 121312Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8155
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES  PRIORITY
RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT PRIORITY 0158
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0017
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 0340
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0032
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT PRIORITY 0225
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3739
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 3235
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 2022

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002516 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS NATO OSCE ZK EU GM FR
SUBJECT: GOF: KAKAHK 2009 OSCE BID AND MORE ENGAGEMENT IN 
CENTRAL ASIA 
 
REF: A. PARIS 2197 
 
     ¶B. STATE 80727 
 
PARIS 00002516  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO 
NS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The MFA's Central Asia desk officer told us 
June 11 that the GOF's relationship with Central Asia was 
changing, but not dramatically.  The key element: Central 
Asia policy would no longer depend on Chirac's personal 
relationship with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev.  France 
was working closely with the EU, and would continue to 
support EU Special Representative for the region (and retired 
French diplomat) Pierre Morel as he undertook to implement 
the soon-to-be adopted EU Central Asia strategy.  After 14 
years of neither a French Presidential nor Foreign Minister 
visit to the region, the its 2008 EU Presidency was an 
opportunity for France to show a little more interest. The 
GOF has not yet come to a policy decision on Kazakhstan's 
2009 OSCE chairmanship bid, notwithstanding former FM 
Douste-Blazy's December 2006 EU intervention in apparent 
support of the Kazakhs. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Poloff also sought and obtained the 
GOF's support in convincing SCO countries to avoid any 
negative positioning on U.S. and allied military 
installations in Central Asia (ref B).  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------------ 
INCREASED ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) MFA Central Asia desk officer, Helene Roos, told 
poloff on June 11 that the GOF's relationship with Central 
Asia was changing with the new French government, while 
cautioning us not to expect a dramatic shift, given that the 
region was still "quite far from Paris."  Chirac's 
relationship with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev had long 
defined the GOF's engagement in Central Asia, she said, and 
so Chirac's departure naturally meant a shift in perspective. 
 While the GOF would still likely follow the German "lead" in 
the region, it would also be playing a key role in 
implementing the EU Central Asia strategy on the ground. 
 
¶4. (C) France, she explained, will hold the local EU 
Presidency in Astana and Ashgabat from July 2007 through 
December 2008, and would also hold the local EU Presidency in 
Dushanbe and Tashkent from January 2008 through December 
¶2008.  (Note: Portugal and Slovenia do not have embassies in 
Central Asia, and therefore need a local representative 
during their EU presidencies.  France will fill this role in 
the lead up to its own presidency in July 2008-December 2008. 
 France's accredited Ambassador to Bishkek is in Astana.) 
France, she said, recently passed the message to Central 
Asian governments that neither a French President nor a 
Foreign Minister had visited the region in 14 years and that 
the GOF saw the EU presidency as a possible opportunity to 
step up engagement. 
 
------------------------------------- 
KAZAKHSTAN 2009 OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP BID 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Roos informed us that the GOF had taken no formal 
position on Kazakhstan's candidacy for the 2009 OSCE 
chairmanship.  Despite former FM Douste-Blazy's December 2006 
EU intervention on the subject, which some Kazakhs 
interpreted as a de-facto endorsement of their candidacy, 
France continued to carefully study the issue.  Some in the 
MFA, she said, believed that supporting Kazakhstan's 2009 bid 
was particularly important to Russia's support for the OSCE 
during a difficult and complicated period (see reftel A). 
Others, she insisted, were not convinced of this argument. FM 
Kouchner did not yet appear wedded to either position. 
 
¶6. (C) Roos said that the GOF, like others, had tried to 
encourage the Kazakhs to withdraw their candidacy while they 
instituted democratic reforms, but that this strategy did not 
appear to be productive.  She asked if the U.S. had engaged 
the Kazakhs on the substance of their proposed chairmanship. 
Roos argued that positive engagement with the Kazakhs on 
 
PARIS 00002516  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
their substantive program might demonstrate our commitment to 
their candidacy in principle-- something that could help us 
argue for delay.  Roos also stressed that Astana's complete 
lack of substantive proposals for its chairmanship provided 
additional reasons to ask the Kazakhs to withdraw their 2009 
bid and delay until 2011. 2011 was the latest possible date, 
she added, as Nazarbayev is not likely to relent unless he 
has sufficient confidence that the Kazakhstan chairmanship 
would occur before Nazarbayev's reelection campaign in 2012. 
 
¶7. (C) The Germans, Roos insisted, were the key in obtaining 
EU support for a recommendation to Astana that it withdraw 
its candidacy for 2009.  The GOF, she said, would not want to 
risk further EU divisions concerning Central Asia, and was in 
a difficult position as long as Germany supported Astana's 
bid.  She explained that following the renewal of sanctions 
against Uzbekistan, many of her contacts (including the 
Uzbeks) confirmed that Berlin informed Tashkent that the 
renewal was "not our fault" and "against our counsel."  Roos 
suggested that Paris could probably still be convinced to put 
more pressure on the Kazakhs if Berlin showed some movement 
in its position.  Roos very frankly noted that most GOF 
officials did not believe a Kazakh chairmanship was ideal for 
the OSCE, but that the organization might face more damage if 
only a handful of Western countries opposed the Kazakh bid. 
EU unity on the issue, she added, would probably be the only 
way France could oppose Kazakh's candidacy. 
 
-------------------------- 
HELLO ASHGABAT, WE'RE BACK 
-------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Engaging Turkmenistan, Roos told us, was a key element 
in France's thinking about Central Asia.  Like many U.S. 
officials, Roos said she believed that there was a window of 
opportunity to engage Ashgabat in constructive dialogue and 
promote reform.  As the local EU President in Ashgabat for 
the next 18 months, the GOF was examining its priorities in 
line with the EU strategy, Roos said, and she hoped that 
Washington and Paris would increase their cooperation in the 
country.  Turkmen officials, she added, never failed to point 
out that high ranking U.S. diplomats were in Ashgabat "every 
month."  Roos informed us that Turkmen FM Rashid Meredov 
would likely be coming to France in October, followed by 
Turkmen President Berdimuhammedov in November 2007.  The 
French FM may return the visit during France's EU Presidency 
(July-December 2008).  A Presidential visit by Sarkozy has 
not been ruled out, but is not cuurently in the works. 
 
--- 
SCO 
--- 
 
¶9. (S//NF)  Poloff informed Roos that the U.S. would be 
encouraging Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members 
to avoid any statements or actions during their August 2007 
meeting that might complicate the use of military bases in 
Central Asia for countries participating in Operation 
Enduring Freedom (ref B).  Roos noted that she understood the 
importance of Manas Air Base and said that the French base in 
Dushanbe was also vital to their contributions in 
Afghanistan. France, she added, supported our efforts without 
any reservations.  Roos agreed that unity on the issue was 
important and would see if a similar demarche by the GOF 
could be delivered. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) Roos seemed to indicate that some new GOF officials 
could still be convinced to put additional pressure on 
Kazakhstan to withdraw its bid for the 2009 OSCE 
chairmanship.  Without a change in Berlin's position, 
however, Paris does not seem likely to use its political 
capital on this particular issue. 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
 
PARIS 00002516  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
STAPLETON