Amy Marie Newcomb  01/22/2008 04:29:36 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  ECO-POLShare

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UNCLAS    SENSITIVE     NICOSIA 00475

SIPDIS
CXNICOSI:
    ACTION: EXEC DCM
    INFO:   DAO RAO ECON POL

DISSEMINATION: EXEC
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:RSCHLICHER
DRAFTED: POL:AMYIALLOUROU;GMA
CLEARED: DCM:JZ; POL:GM

VZCZCNCI439
RR RUEHC RUEHZL RUCNDT RUEHBS
DE RUEHNC #0475/01 1521037
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011037Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7877
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0860
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000475 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL CY
SUBJECT:  AKEL FERMENT DENTS SENSE OF INEVITABLE PAPADOPOULOS SECOND 
TERM 
 
Ref:  Nicosia 426 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY:  As late as mid-May, Communist party AKEL looked 
certain to back the re-election of Cypriot President Tassos 
Papadopoulos and the continuation of the three-party (AKEL, EDEK, 
DIKO) governing coalition.  Papadopoulos likely considered the 
Communists' support a given when he revealed May 15 that he would 
stand in the February 2008 election regardless of whether AKEL or 
the other parties had blessed his decision.  The President's display 
of confidence -- or arrogance, some say -- seems to have unleashed 
an unintended consequence that has the island abuzz.  In a first, 
AKEL's Central Committee May 21 tabled the possible presidential 
candidacy of Secretary General Dimitris Christofias, tasking its 
base organizations with choosing between Papadopoulos and 
Christofias as AKEL's preferred standard-bearer (the results are not 
binding, however; the final decision will not come until the party 
congress in early July.) 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Pundits' first reaction was to characterize AKEL's 
about-face as a tactical maneuver aimed at securing further 
concessions from Papadopoulos in his second term.  Developments 
since -- a high-profile May 30 meeting between Papadopoulos and 
Christofias, public bickering between DIKO and AKEL leadership, and 
preliminary polling that showed Christofias winning over 85 percent 
of party voters -- would seem to disprove this theory, however. 
Regardless of AKEL's final decision, a bland presidential race 
suddenly seems spicier, and the once-strong sense of the 
inevitability of a second Papadopoulos term has been shaken.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Backed Into a Corner, AKEL Fights Back 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Two days after receiving partner EDEK's endorsement, and 
assured of his own DIKO party's support in February, Tassos 
Papadopoulos revealed May 15 his intention to seek re-election.  The 
President's decision, purportedly taken without first consulting 
AKEL, left Communist leaders red-faced and seething (Reftel). 
Further, many rank-and-filers questioned how many more embarrassing 
moments the future might hold for their party, should AKEL support 
deliver Papadopoulos a second term.  Prominent editorialists 
questioned whether the President might even dump the Communists once 
he took office in February, much like former Cypriot President 
Spyros Kyprianou did to his partners after winning re-election in 
¶1983. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Reacting to the party base's dissatisfaction and dismay 
over the President's intentions, AKEL's Central Committee decided 
May 21 to inaugurate a grass-roots debate at the party's 600-plus 
local branches, to culminate in a run-off between Christofias and 
Papadopoulos to select the party's 2008 nominee.  This is the first 
time since Cyprus's independence in 1960 that AKEL formally has 
considered entering its own candidate in a presidential election. 
Party officials repeatedly have stressed, however, that the result 
of the internal vote will not be binding for the Central Committee, 
which will meet again in late June to formulate its official 
candidate proposal for the July 8 Congress.  The Congress, AKEL's 
supreme organ, will then vote to accept or reject the Central 
Committee's choice (historically, in true Communist fashion, Central 
Committee proposals are adopted with nearly 100 percent of the 
Congress vote.) 
 
--------------------------- 
Early Reaction?  Skepticism 
--------------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) The media and most political parties initially viewed the 
AKEL move with skepticism.  AKEL's deeply-rooted tendency to avoid 
risks, coupled with continual reiterations by party officials that 
their ultimate goal was to preserve the three-party coalition and 
stop DISY from climbing back into power, suggested the party was 
simply setting the scene for a hard bargain with Papadopoulos.  Such 
a tack would pressure the President to agree to an election 
manifesto tailor-made for AKEL's needs -- heavy on social benefits 
for the middle and working classes, for example -- and help silence 
those dissidents unhappy with the President's hard-line management 
of the Cyprus Problem (and AKEL's support thereof.) 
 
¶6. (SBU) Former Interior Minister and current Mayor of Limassol 
Andreas Christou, a long-time AKEL member, disagreed with this 
widely-held view.  In a meeting with Embassy officials May 23, 
Christou claimed that, irrespective of its public insistence that 
the bases' vote was non-binding, the Central Committee would have no 
choice but to adopt the outcome, especially if it indicated 
overwhelming support for Christofias.  Supporters of the General 
Secretary's candidacy fell into three separate groups, the Mayor 
 
SIPDIS 
believed:  those like Christou himself who disagreed with 
Papadopoulos's Cyprus Problem policy, those who believed that AKEL 
had paid a high electoral cost for sharing power with DIKO, and 
those who simply felt it was Christofias's turn to be elected 
president.  Together, they comprised 70 percent of the party base, 
Christou calculated. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Intended or Not, Candidacy Gathers Steam 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The tone of general scuttlebutt and media reporting had 
changed by the long "Cataclismos" weekend (May 26-28), lending more 
credence to an independent AKEL run for the presidency.  A former 
Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary (D-equivalent) with reputable 
sources in AKEL told us May 25 that early results from the base 
elections showed Christofias garnering between 85 and 100 percent of 
the vote.  The General Secretary's candidacy was all but assured, 
our contact argued, since AKEL leadership could not ignore such a 
clear mandate -- especially since the rank-and-file had the power to 
elect and remove Central Committee members. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Opposition daily "Politis" has become  Christofias's head 
cheerleader in recent days.  Believing his candidacy the only manner 
of preventing five more years of Tassos Papadopoulos, "Politis" 
journalists have dwelled on the inconceivability of the Central 
Committee siding with the President in 2008, against the will of 
AKEL's base.  Unnamed, high-ranking AKEL sources allegedly told the 
paper May 26 that officials have tired of being patronized by the 
coalition's smaller, centrist parties.  "What is at stake is the 
cohesion of AKEL," the source concluded.  One particularly 
optimistic "Politis" story May 27 argued that Christofias would 
defeat either Papadopoulos or DISY-supported candidate Ioannis 
Kasoulides in a Round 2 runoff, claiming AKEL would secure the 
backing of DISY (if the runoff opponent were the President) or DIKO 
(if Christofias faced Kasoulides), respectively.  Finally, the paper 
May 27 published unofficial results from a number of AKEL's 
greater-Nicosia base organizations, showing Christofias winning 
approximately 90 percent of the vote. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) AKEL Spokesman and MP Andros Kyprianou, long-considered a 
strong proponent of a Christofias candidacy, was admittedly evasive 
in a May 30 discussion with Emboffs.  "You'll know our decision July 
8," he chuckled.  Dismissing those who believed AKEL had tabled the 
General Secretary's candidacy in anger over a perceived Papadopoulos 
slight, Kyprianou asserted that the Political Bureau had begun 
deliberating the move a year ago.  Similarly, he discounted the 
reliability of "Politis's" electoral figures, noting that barely ten 
percent of the vote had come in. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Under party by-laws, the Central Committee was free to 
formulate its proposal to the Congress as it saw fit.  That said, 
Kyprianou, too, doubted the body would overturn a 90-10 or 80-20 
vote in order to recommend backing Papadopoulos.  A Christofias 
candidacy would spell the end of the three-party coalition, he 
added, with AKEL ordering its four ministers to resign.  Reacting 
defensively to a query over the likelihood of dissension within AKEL 
ranks over abandoning the coalition -- since many higher-ups would 
lose cushy jobs and other perks -- Kyprianou retorted that he had 
gained nothing from the party tie-up.  "There is no distance between 
the base and the leadership," he insisted. 
 
--------------------------- 
"Summit" Sheds Little Light 
--------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) The media predicted fireworks at the May 30 
Papadopoulos-Christofias meeting and questioned whether the AKEL 
leader would reveal his future plans to the President.  Christofias 
was in no mood to satisfy reporters' demands for information at the 
conclusion of the gathering, however, revealing only that the men 
"had discussed the gamut of issues."  Both "Politis" and 
pro-government "Phileleftheros" ran similar headlines May 31, 
explaining that AKEL sought a temporary "velvet divorce" -- in other 
words, its decision to run Christofias against Papadopoulos in Round 
1 should not keep the coalition partners from rejoining forces in 
Round 2, should only one of them advance. 
 
¶12.  (U) "Velvety" could hardly describe the atmospherics at a 
televised May 30 gathering of coalition figures Yiorgos Colocassides 
(DIKO), Andros Kyprianou, and Yiorgos Barnabas (EDEK).  Their 
discussion over various Round 1 / Round 2 scenarios quickly 
descended into histrionics, chiefly between the DIKO and AKEL 
representatives.  Kyprianou urged his coalition mates to cooperate 
primarily to ensure that opposition DISY not return to power. 
Responding, Colocassides claimed DIKO was focused on offense -- 
cooperating to elect the coalition's chosen candidate -- and not on 
defending the office from any one party. 
 
-------- 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Developments of the last ten days have shaken the 
widely-held belief that AKEL's support for Tassos Papadopoulos was 
iron-clad.  According to Mayor Christou, his party "finally will do 
the proper thing," assuaging the majority of rank-and-file members 
who never accepted the utility of the AKEL-DIKO marriage and "who 
want no link to the politician who could be responsible for the 
permanent partition of the island."  Undoubtedly, AKEL's base will 
offer a strong vote of confidence in leader Christofias, presenting 
the Central Committee with a difficult decision:  ignore the masses' 
wishes in order to back a candidate (Papadopoulos) who, despite his 
unpopularity in AKEL circles, offers sure victory in February, or 
honor the base's wishes to put forth an AKEL candidate who still 
appears unelectable in the second round.  We recently learned that a 
north Nicosia university purchased a $10 million IBM supercomputer, 
allegedly the 57th most powerful machine in the world.  It could get 
a lot of use figuring the possible permutations of the suddenly 
interesting race.  One thing is fairly clear, however:  a genuine 
three-party contest will undermine the air of inevitability that 
Tassos Papadopoulos is a shoo-in for a second five-year term. 
 
SCHLICHER