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O 011312Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0812
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 002590 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MARR KNDP ETRD OREP NELSON LOTT RS
SUBJECT: CODEL NELSON-LOTT MEETS WITH FM LAVROV 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  U.S.-Russian Senate-Federation Council 
Interparliamentary Working Group Co-Chairs Senator Ben Nelson 
and Senator Trent Lott, accompanied by Senators Evan Bayh, 
Judd Gregg, and Richard Burr, met May 29 with Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov to discuss current bilateral and 
multilateral issues.  Lavrov highlighted cooperative elements 
in the bilateral relationship -- nonproliferation, 
counterterrorism, and civilian nuclear energy -- but outlined 
strong differences on missile defense, Kosovo, and CFE. 
Lavrov cautioned against "megaphone" diplomacy in the run-up 
to elections in both countries.  End Summary. 
. 
U.S.-Russian Relations 
---------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Senator Nelson underlined that the U.S. wanted a 
strong bilateral partnership with Russia.  FM Lavrov stressed 
the role that bilateral relations had on global stability and 
noted mutual interests in tackling new threats.  Lavrov said 
Presidents Bush and Putin had established a high level of 
trust and there were many areas where the U.S. and Russia 
cooperated effectively, including on nuclear 
nonproliferation, the development of civilian nuclear power, 
and counterterrorism.  Productive efforts in these areas did 
not garner the same attention that differences did, but 
neither side should lose sight of the benefits of a healthy 
relationship. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  At the same time, Lavrov added, neither side could 
honestly state they were satisfied with the current state of 
bilateral ties.  Both countries should avoid holding the 
relationship hostage to electoral cycles.  Both needed to pay 
careful attention to questions of tone and to avoid public 
comments that added fuel to disagreements.  Russia was ready 
for "sincere" discussions, but "megaphone" diplomacy and 
scoring points in the press detracted from trying to find 
common solutions.  Lavrov said we have enough serious 
problems to address without adding to our burdens.  On North 
Korea, the Middle East, and Iran, we were working well 
together, while on Kosovo, missile defense and CFE, we 
disagreed in principle on the correct approach or we had 
sharply different views of the situation.  On frozen 
conflicts, Russia believed the West too often aimed at making 
immediate gains to the detriment of long-term solutions. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  Responding to Senator Lott's call for finding 
areas where the U.S. and Russia could work together, Lavrov 
said that there was much productive work that drew little 
media attention.  In a fast-changing, increasingly multipolar 
world dominated by Asia's rise, the U.S. and Russia should be 
partners across the board, but partnership would require 
respect for each state's key interests and the maintenance of 
a strategic balance. 
. 
Missile Defense 
--------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Acknowledging Russian complaints about U.S. plans 
to place MD sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, Senator 
Nelson pressed Lavrov on the implications of Russian 
objections to the planned deployments.  Lavrov responded by 
challenging the validity of the threats that the U.S. cited 
in justifying MD.  On DPRK, Lavrov asserted that the 
resolution of the Korean nuclear issue was on the right track 
and that the Six Party Talks were likely to lead to a 
resolution that would allow the nuclear arms file to be 
closed.  At the same time, the U.S. was already deploying 
interceptors to address this threat.  On Iran, Russia had 
concluded that Tehran was not likely to be capable of 
launching an attack on Europe, much less the U.S., for many 
years, perhaps decades.  Iran was not close to building a 
nuclear warhead and lacked the capability of building a long 
range ballistic missile capable of hitting Europe. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Lavrov also challenged the U.S. rationale for 
placing the MD interceptors in Poland, arguing that putting 
them in southern Europe made more sense if they were really 
designed to address an Iranian threat.  The interceptors in 
Poland could be replaced with ballistic missiles with MIRV'ed 
warheads in silos that could accommodate more than one 
missile.  Moscow saw this possible development as part of 
U.S. efforts to develop a global MD system tying together 
interceptor bases in Alaska, radar sites in the UK, Greenland 
and the Pacific, and fleet-based maritime MD systems in the 
Mediterranean.  From the Russian General Staff's perspective, 
this looked like a system that surrounded Russia (and China 
as well).  Intentions could change, and the U.S. was busy 
creating facts on the ground that were creating a perception 
that it could be seeking a disarming, first strike 
capability.  The Russian leadership had an obligation to take 
precautions to prevent a shift in the strategic balance that 
 
MOSCOW 00002590  002 OF 003 
 
 
underpinned Russian security and global stability. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Lavrov stressed that in the absence of a credible 
threat from Iran for many years, Russia had serious concerns 
about why the U.S. was seeking to put into place an MD system 
now in Europe.  Russia, not Iran, would be the state most 
threatened by such a system.  The U.S. had been sending mixed 
signals on MD for several years.  Early on during the Bush 
Administration, the U.S. had offered to work together with 
Russia on technology, but that interest waned.  If the U.S. 
were really interested in MD cooperation, it would first work 
with Russia to develop a joint threat analysis.  The U.S. and 
Russia "should start from scratch," and not present Russia 
with a fait accompli. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Senator Lott said he was surprised that Moscow had 
judged that the MD system was designed to threaten Russia and 
said that such misperceptions underlined the need for closer 
cooperation.  We need to identify disagreements and find room 
for cooperation.  Senator Bayh noted that there were 
differences within the USG on MD plans, but he stressed there 
was absolutely no intention on the part of the U.S. to 
threaten the U.S.-Russia strategic balance.  MD plans were to 
address a threat from Iran.  If there were only a 10 percent 
chance that Tehran would be able to develop the capacity to 
launch a nuclear-armed missile at Europe or the U.S., then 
the U.S. needed to do something to address that threat. 
. 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  Turning to Iran, Lavrov provided the MFA's 
assessment of the Iranian nuclear program.  Moscow judged 
that Iran was committed to developing a complete nuclear fuel 
cycle, but stressed there was no proof that Tehran had 
enriched uranium to weapons grade or had an intention to do 
so in the immediate future.  Lavrov acknowledged that the 
IAEA was seeking clarification from Tehran on documentation 
that contained schematics for a nuclear warhead and that Iran 
had so far refused to comply.  Russia was seriously concerned 
about the direction of Iran's program; this had prompted 
Russia to work with the P-5 Plus One and in the UN Security 
Council to develop a step-by-step approach to address Iran's 
program. 
. 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  Senator Lott raised the issue of Kosovo's status, 
noting Lavrov's opening comment that the U.S. and Russia 
differed not only on tactics, but on ultimate goals.  Lott 
emphasized that Kosovo's independence had to be handled 
carefully and with appropriate safeguards for minority 
rights.  Lavrov asked rhetorically, "why the rush?"  Lavrov 
argued that everyone knew that Serbia would pursue membership 
in the EU and NATO and would need to resolve the Kosovo 
problem as part of those processes.  In the meantime, Kosovo 
had de facto independence.  Lavrov said that Serbia's 
European future would make it easier to swallow its "national 
humiliation."  Threats of violence on the part of Kosovars 
could not justify independence; KFOR had been established and 
empowered to handle threats to civil order. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  Lavrov said Russia advocated a more cautious 
approach that would build consensus.  Whether the U.S. and 
Europe accepted it or not, the "imposition" of a settlement 
on Serbia would create a precedent that many other national 
groups would pursue.  Russia would face serious pressures to 
recognize and protect Abkhazians and South Ossetians if 
Kosovo gained its independence and this would create further 
turmoil in Russia's North Caucasus.  The current process in 
the UN Security Council was putting Russia into "an 
impossible position" of accepting Kosovar independence based 
on the principle of self-determination while denying 
independence to others who made the same arguments.  Senator 
Lott noted that the subject of Kosovo had been raised during 
a May 29 phone call between Presidents Bush and Putin.  He 
stressed that the Ahtisaari process had been deliberate. 
. 
Counterterrorism 
---------------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Senator Burr emphasized the importance of ongoing 
counterterrorism cooperation between the U.S. and Russia.  He 
noted and Lavrov agreed that changing demographic patterns in 
the U.S., Russia and Europe would complicate how we handle 
counterterrorism problems. 
. 
Jackson-Vanik 
------------- 
 
 
MOSCOW 00002590  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  Lavrov raised repeal of Jackson-Vanik 
legislation, noting that once Russia acceded to WTO, Moscow 
would be entitled to deny to U.S. firms the benefits that the 
U.S. had negotiated with Russia if the legislation was not 
repealed.  Senator Gregg touched on the history surrounding 
attempts to repeal the statute; Lavrov pointed out that 
Jackson-Vanik was no longer a "legacy" issue, but could have 
real world effects. 
. 
Nuclear and Post-START 
---------------------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU)  Lavrov highlighted productive bilateral 
discussions on nonproliferation and developing civilian 
nuclear energy through the Presidential Initiative.  Russia 
and the U.S. needed to work together to strengthen the 
international legal framework for nonproliferation without 
reopening the Nonproliferation Treaty.  The two countries 
also needed to look at a follow-up to the START Treaty and 
discuss what mechanisms were realistic.  Lavrov noted that 
this year's commemoration of the 200th anniversary of 
bilateral ties gave us an opportunity to take stock of where 
the relationship was headed. 
 
¶16.  (U)  CODEL Nelson-Lott has cleared this message. 
BURNS