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FM AMEMBASSY MINSK
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USMISSION USEU PRIORITY 0226
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 1584
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MINSK 000463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2027 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM BO
SUBJECT: BELARUSIAN-CHINESE RELATIONS: MORE HYPE THAN 
SUBSTANCE 
 
REF: A. 06 MINSK 1234 
     ¶B. MINSK 425 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Karen Stewart for reason 1.4 (d) 
 
 Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Lukashenko has referred to China as its most 
important strategic partner with increasing regularity.  Not 
only do GOB officials routinely claim that trade between the 
countries is developing rapidly, they note that Beijing's 
ability to spur economic growth while maintaining "political 
stability" could serve as a model for economic reform in 
Belarus.  However, a senior Chinese diplomat in Minsk and 
several foreign policy experts confirm that the political and 
economic relationship between China and Belarus remains 
relatively superficial and is not likely to deepen 
significantly in the near future.  Moreover, observers remain 
convinced that Lukashenko is too obsessed with power to make 
the necessary economic reforms to replicate the Chinese 
model.  End summary. 
 
Belarus Looking For A Friend, Tutor In China? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Since Russia first announced in April 2006 that it 
would drastically cut energy subsidies for Belarus in 2007, 
Lukashenko has placed even greater emphasis on strengthening 
political, economic, and cultural ties with China.  MFA 
Americas Desk Counselor Andrei Rzheusskiy recently confirmed 
for Pol/Econ Chief that China enjoys a unique and important 
position in Belarus' new foreign policy, which is aimed at 
minimizing Russia's ability to influence the political and 
economic development of the country (ref A).  According to 
Rzheusskiy, Lukashenko measures the effectiveness of his 
foreign policy by the extent to which Belarus is able to 
secure political support and profitable economic deals with 
wealthy, sympathetic governments.  Political analyst 
Aleksandr Alesin and Belarus-China relations professor Igor 
Malevich summarized the determining factors in Belarus' 
pursuit of a special friendship with China: it maintains a 
policy of non-interference in domestic affairs of other 
nations, it offers Belarus an en 
ormous consumer market, and it has a seat on the UN Security 
Council. 
 
¶3.  (C) Moreover, we have heard from observers with reliable 
contacts in the GOB that Lukashenko is considering applying 
the "Chinese model" of political and economic development to 
Belarus.  Significantly higher energy prices, Lukashenko's 
precarious relationship with the Kremlin (at least for now), 
and the unlikelihood of sustained economic growth beyond 
2007, have all contributed to Lukashenko's interest in 
selectively opening up the economy to foreign investment 
while maintaining a tight grip on the political system. 
Although he could not confirm the information, Rzheusskiy had 
even heard that the Presidential Administration set up a 
private commission to research China's development path. 
 
China Not Complaining About The Relationship... 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶4. (C) Chinese DCM in Minsk Jiang Xiaoyang asserted that 
China finds its relationship with Belarus to be "useful." 
Belarus serves as a key trading route for Chinese exports 
into the European Union and Russia, and Belarus vigorously 
defends China's foreign policy interests, including those 
relating to Taiwan, in international fora.  Jiang explained 
that, in general, China is willing to "cooperate" with any 
government that respects and supports China's policy 
interests.  From Beijing's perspective, China's relationship 
with Belarus falls into the category of "constructive 
partner, nothing more." 
 
...But There's Not Much To It 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Jiang and several foreign policy experts confirmed 
that, as with Belarus' other self-proclaimed international 
partners (ref B), there is much more hype in the 
Belarus-China relationship than substance.  Jiang stated 
categorically that Belarus greatly exaggerates the level of 
cooperation between the two countries.  Chinese leaders have 
never employed -- nor do they plan to in the near future -- 
such language as "strategic partner," or even "important 
partner," in describing China's relationship with Belarus. 
Jiang speculated that this rhetoric is primarily for domestic 
 
MINSK 00000463  002 OF 002 
 
 
consumption; Belarusians undoubtedly remain anxious about how 
their president's estranged relationship with President Putin 
will affect the Belarusian economy. 
 
The Numbers Tell the Story 
-------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Senior GOB officials repeatedly claim that bilateral 
trade between Belarus and China reached anywhere from USD 900 
million to USD 1 billion in 2006 and that trade volume should 
reach USD 2 billion in the next few years.  However, Jiang 
noted that Belarusian statistics significantly differ from 
those of his government.  Beijing estimates that bilateral 
trade reached only USD 625 million in 2006, and "there is no 
reason to believe" the volume will go up significantly in the 
near future.  Alesin added that China is mainly interested in 
those Belarusian goods that would help China develop its 
agricultural sector -- potassium-based fertilizer and certain 
heavy trucks and equipment. 
 
¶7.  (C) Belarus is also eager to attract Chinese foreign 
investment.  Jiang revealed that Belarus on several occasions 
has asked that Beijing invest at least USD 1 billion in the 
Belarusian economy, including the establishment of a Chinese 
bank in Belarus.  When Belarus realized that the Chinese 
government would not direct Chinese investors to embark on 
"unprofitable" ventures, the GOB approached Beijing for a 
loan in the same amount.  Jiang said Beijing provided the 
regime a similar answer.  Currently, the largest Chinese 
investment in Belarus is a multi-year cellular phone system 
joint venture worth USD 200 million, an investment which 
Jiang characterized as "negligible." 
 
¶8.  (C) Political analyst Valeriy Karbalevich and Minsk 
commercial real estate investor Yuriy Popov noted that 
Chinese investors periodically make visits to Minsk, but they 
almost always leave empty handed.  Alesin added that China is 
likely interested in Belarus' Soviet-era military and space 
technology, but the regime strictly controls the information 
about this possible area of cooperation. 
 
China Is Not Belarus' Tutor 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Emphasizing that China's foreign policy is governed 
by pragmatism and not ideals, Jiang said China is not 
interested in assisting Belarus dig itself out of its deep 
economic hole.  When Pol/Econ Chief shared with the Chinese 
diplomat the possibility that the Presidential Administration 
set up a commission to study Chinese development strategy, 
Jiang said he had never heard of the commission and thought 
it was a useless endeavor.  Jiang speculated that Lukashenko 
would ultimately refuse to transition to a market-driven 
economy, which Jiang described as a central feature of 
Chinese economic growth.  Malevich agreed with Jiang's 
assessment, adding that China relied on Western material and 
technical assistance to modernize its economy.  Malevich 
doubts that Lukashenko perceives the economy to be in such 
disrepair that he would concede to U.S. and EU conditions -- 
i.e., massive political reform -- to receive similar support. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Senior GOB officials and Belarusian diplomats are 
knocking on the doors of many governments -- any government 
-- to find a helping hand.  Several governments have not 
conditioned their participation in trade or investment 
projects on political reform, including Russia, Venezuela, 
Iran, India, Azerbaijan, UAE, and China.  However, with only 
a few exceptions, even these governments are not interested 
in giving something for nothing. 
Stewart