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DE RUEHME #2947/01 1571936
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061936Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7386
INFO RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 2304
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0965
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0137

C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 002947 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PASS USOAS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2017 
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNHRC MX OAS HUMAN
SUBJECT: NORTH AMERICAN PARTNERS DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS 
COUNCIL 
 
REF: MEXICO 2886 
 
Classified By: MCPA CHARLES V. BARCLAY, REASONS: 1.4(B/D). 
 
 ¶1.  (C) Summary:  This is the second of two cables 
summarizing trilateral talks on human rights cooperation with 
Canada and Mexico held in Mexico City on May 29.  This cable 
focuses on issues relating to the UN system, with a 
particular focus on those before the UN Human Rights Council 
(HRC); reftel summarizes issues relating to the upcoming OAS 
General Assembly.  As detailed in reftel, the U.S. delegation 
was headed by DRL DAS Erica Barks-Ruggles and included 
representatives of IO, DRL and L bureaus, as well as Embassy 
Mexico City. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary continued:   The talks covered a broad range 
of subjects, including the draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (DRIP), women,s rights, the Durban review 
process, the Community of Democracies, and issues relating to 
the institutional development of the HRC.  Although the U.S. 
and Canada agreed on nearly all the issues raised, they both 
found numerous points of disagreement with the Mexicans, most 
significantly with respect to the DRIP and the 
institution-building of the HRC.  Notwithstanding these areas 
of disagreement, all three delegations concurred that the 
candid discussions were very useful.  The delegations 
tentatively agreed to meet again in early 2008 in Ottawa. 
End Summary. 
 
HRC Institution-Building: Consensus vs. Substance 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶3.  (C) The Mexicans stressed their optimistic goal of 
reaching consensus on as many institutional issues as 
possible before their HRC presidency ends on June 18.  The 
Mexicans specifically want to see completed a Universal 
Periodic Review mechanism (UPR), special procedures, and 
reform of 1503.  They are willing to put off the code of 
conduct, and may let the agenda and working procedures slide, 
as well as the advisory committee.  Both the U.S. and Canada 
strongly emphasized that in striving for consensus, the GOM 
should not sacrifice substance or institutional quality. 
Both stressed the need not to view the end of the Mexican HRC 
presidency as what the Mexicans had called &an end game,8 
as the HRC,s institutional development would inevitably 
continue into subsequent presidencies.  The GOC made clear it 
would not vote for flawed procedures and that it would be 
better to leave unresolved issues for the next presidency, 
rather than to approve flawed procedures now, with the 
expectation of fixing them later. 
 
HRC Membership 
-------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) In discussing future HRC membership, all three 
countries agreed the primary consideration should be a 
country,s human rights record, as judged according to 
objective criteria, and that regional &clean slates8 would 
lead to the election of unqualified members and undermine the 
HRC,s credibility.  The Mexicans lamented that most regional 
groups had not followed the agreed-upon instructions for 
selecting candidates, proposing that in the future, the HRC 
should hold a workshop explaining the credentials required of 
those seeking membership.  DAS Barks-Ruggles noted that 
Belarus, candidacy presented an  example of a country 
seeking membership solely to block international scrutiny of 
its human rights record.  The Mexicans said they considered 
U.S. membership vital to the success of the HRC and hoped 
that a successful 2nd year of the HRC would convince the USG 
to join in the future. 
 
Funding for HRC vs. OHCHR 
------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Among the biggest points of contention between the 
USG and GOC, on the one hand, and the GOM, on the other, was 
the relationship between the HRC and the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).  The GOM opened 
the discussion on HRC institution-building by complaining the 
OHCHR had refused to provide all the financial and political 
support requested by the HRC, which lacked adequate resources 
of its own.  Mexico argued that in 2005 the UNGA had doubled 
the OHCHR budget in order to provide support to the HRC and 
that such support was particularly necessary to carry out the 
 
UPR process.  Mexico also believed the OHCHR needed to 
coordinate its work more closely with that of the HRC, 
focusing much of its technical assistance on countries 
identified by the HRC as having human rights problems. 
 
¶6.  (C) The USG and GOC both strongly rebutted Mexico,s 
argument about OHCHR support for the HRC, noting that the 
OHCHR budget had been doubled before the HRC,s creation. 
DAS Barks-Ruggles explained that  OHCHR,s budget had been 
doubled to help that institution build its global field 
presence, and its budget should not be seen as a &bank that 
can be robbed by the HRC.8  If the HRC needed further 
resources to carry out its mandate, it should approach the 
Fifth Committee in New York, with a specific and well 
justified request, as that is the appropriate venue.  Both 
the USG and GOC argued strongly that the OHCHR has a separate 
mandate and that it was and should remain institutionally 
independent of the HRC.  Supporting the HRC is only one small 
part of the OHCHR,s mandate.  Canada argued that the HRC,s 
fundamental problem was not a lack of resources but rather a 
lack of political will amongst its members. 
 
Universal Periodic Review 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Mexico,s vision of the role of UPR differed sharply 
from that of Canada and the U.S.  While the GOM saw UPR as 
being the HRC,s key tool, and hoped to reach consensus about 
its use at the June HRC session, the U.S. and Canada 
reiterated that UPR was a process that will begin after the 
HRC,s institution-building phase is completed, and that it 
would inevitably be a work in progress, evolving over time. 
In a private conversation on the sidelines of the talks, DAS 
Barks-Ruggles and the Canadian delegation head laid down a 
very hard marker to Mexican Ambassador Gomez Robledo that 
even once agreement on UPR is reached, independent, 
country-specific resolutions in both the HRC and the UNGA 
Third Committee must be retained as an important tool in the 
international community,s efforts to advance human rights. 
Barks-Ruggles noted that while UPR had the possibility to 
greatly change the HRC,s dynamic, it would do so only if it 
were truly universal, treated all states equally, had results 
that could be compared between countries and over time, and 
included input from civil society. 
 
Country Specific Resolutions 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) Citing Cuba and Belarus as examples, DAS 
Barks-Ruggles added the USG was &absolutely opposed8 to 
retiring any of the country specific special procedures when 
target countries had been uncooperative.  She warned that the 
two June sessions and the September session would set the 
tone for future HRC sessions.  She added the HRC had to prove 
itself capable of clear follow-up on Sudan and begin 
addressing the situations in such recalcitrant countries as 
Burma, Zimbabwe, and the DPRK, in order to establish its 
credibility. 
 
¶9.  (C) Mexico expressed doubt as to the effectiveness of 
condemnatory resolutions, arguing that in closed societies 
such as Burma, the population never learned of such 
resolutions.  DAS Barks-Ruggles rebutted the Mexican 
argument, noting that news of a recent UNSC resolution on 
Burma had reached detained opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi 
within 48 hours of its passage, and that Belarusian 
opposition leaders had quickly learned of resolutions against 
their country.  She argued that the international community 
had a moral obligation to stand up for universal rights and 
defend the victims of oppression. 
 
¶10.  (C) The Canadians argued that while country-specific 
resolutions must be maintained, they should be used 
sparingly.  Nevertheless, country-specific resolutions must 
not be relinquished in the hope that the as-yet undetermined 
UPR process might one day take their place.  They agreed with 
the U.S. that the UPR will take time to evolve and that until 
the HRC proves itself, both UNGA Third Committee resolutions 
and further HRC country specific resolutions would remain 
vital tools. 
 
Country Specific Mandates 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) The U.S. said it could not accept the elimination of 
country-specific mandates at the HRC and that it also could 
not accept &horse trading8 to eliminate some mandates while 
preserving others.  The U.S. further noted the high 
likelihood of the loss of other mandates in the future after 
the loss of even one mandate, as opponents such as Cuba and 
Belarus would be emboldened to sharpen their attack on 
mandates.  While the GOC publicly agreed, in a U.S.-Canada 
breakfast meeting prior to the formal talks, the Canadians 
opined that the Cuba mandate stood little chance of renewal. 
Canada is still debating on whether to call for a vote on the 
Belarus mandate and appears to be balancing the support it 
believes is coalescing for keeping the mandate with the fear 
of exposing other mandates to a vote as well. 
 
Permanent Agenda Items 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The U.S. and Canada took similar positions on the 
issue of permanent agenda items, with both laying down a hard 
marker that they could not accept a permanent agenda item on 
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) or the 
right to development (RTD), and insisting that a broad 
&country issues8 type item could encompass OPT as well as 
other country-specific issues.  The Mexicans stated that 
while they understood the U.S. and Canadian concerns, the 
inclusion of an agenda item on Israel and the OPT reflected 
&political realities8.  The Canadians noted that if one 
country,s pet issues were put on the agenda, such as OPT and 
RTD, other issues -- as examples, they cited women's rights 
and indigenous rights -- would need to be added to balance 
the agenda. 
 
1503 Procedures 
--------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) The Canadians expressed serious concern that the 
1503 procedure was losing relevance, citing the loss of the 
confidential Iran procedure.  The Mexicans did not agree, 
 
SIPDIS 
saying they saw it, along with the UPR and countries, 
internal legislation, as being one of the three key tools for 
protecting human rights. 
 
Election or Selection of Expert Advisors 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (C) While all three countries agreed that experts, 
selection should be depoliticized as much as possible, DAS 
Barks-Ruggles pointed out that in crafting an acceptable 
selection process, &the devil would be in the details,8 and 
that considerable thought needed to go into this process. 
The process must ensure that those selected truly are 
experts, a point with which the Mexicans agreed.  The U.S. 
and Canada both emphasized that expert advisors should be 
selected ) not elected ) in order to depoliticize the 
process.  The Canadians proposed that states and 
stake-holders could present a list of qualified candidates 
for advisor positions, with the HRC President choosing from 
among this list of qualified candidates.  They noted that 
member states should not have the ability to filter out 
candidates they deemed undesirable; candidates from any state 
should be eligible for consideration, as long as they were 
truly experts. 
 
¶15.  (C) The Mexicans agreed the process should be 
depoliticized as much as possible, and that candidates should 
in fact have substantive expertise.  Nevertheless, the 
Mexicans preferred that experts be elected by a simple 
majority of HRC members from the slates of qualified 
candidates, rather than selected. 
 
¶16. (C) The three delegations agreed that the selection of 
Special Rapporteurs should continue by the High Commissioner 
and not be subjected to elections.  All agreed that a 
potential roster could be maintained of qualified and 
independent experts for her to choose from.  This contrasted 
with opinion on independent experts for the expert advice 
body, where Mexico was willing to allow elections.  Canada 
noted that elections would politicize the issues, but Mexico 
thought that elections for the expert,s body would not be 
harmful. DAS Barks-Ruggles emphasized that decisions on these 
issues should not be rushed and could be reached after the 
June HRC session. 
 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶17.  (C) The U.S. and Canada, on the one hand, and Mexico, on 
the other, disagreed significantly with respect to the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP).  As 
discussed in detail reftel with respect to the draft OAS 
DRIP, the GOM strongly supported the passage as is ) with 
only a &covering resolution8 clarifying certain points in 
the UN DRIP, notwithstanding its admitted flaws.  The GOM 
argued that given the large size and increased political 
engagement of its indigenous population, it was under 
considerable internal political pressure to support the DRIP. 
 The Mexicans said that 68 countries had signed a letter to 
the UNGA President urging that the DRIP be approved as 
drafted by the HRC and that specific concerns over its 
content be addressed in the text of the UNGA resolution by 
which the DRIP would be approved.  (Note:  The delegation and 
subsequently the Embassy have repeatedly requested a copy of 
the letter from the GOM, which has not yet provided it.  End 
note.) 
 
¶18.  (C) Both the U.S. and Canada laid down a hard marker 
that problematic portions of the DRIP text had to be changed 
before their two governments would be able to consider 
support.  Canada stressed that simply including 
clarifications in the UNGA resolution approving the DRIP 
would be absolutely unacceptable.  Canada noted that the 
DRIP, although not legally enforceable, had serious domestic 
legal implications for it, which is why they could not 
overlook potential problems in its text. The Canadians 
asserted that while they supported the principle of a 
declaration on indigenous rights, the GOC would only vote in 
favor of the DRIP if the final text was amended and broadly 
accepted.  The Canadians specified six issues in the current 
text about which they had particularly strong concerns, 
including the issues of land ownership, free and informed 
consent, intellectual property rights, self government, third 
party rights, and military issues. 
 
¶19.  (C) DAS Barks-Ruggles firmly stressed the DRIP should 
not/not permit exceptions on a regional or national basis, as 
some African states were advocating, as such exceptions would 
undermine the instrument,s impact.  She noted the USG was 
particularly concerned about how the DRIP dealt with such 
issues as the right of self-determination of indigenous 
peoples, restitution, reparations, and the possible creation 
of a new set of rights not recognized under international 
law.  The U.S. delegation noted that the text as it stood was 
not implementable and contradicts some existing U.S. 
regulations and laws.  The U.S. and Canada also expressed 
concern about the inevitable inconsistencies between the DRIP 
and the OAS declaration, which were being negotiated 
simultaneously but separately.  The Mexicans observed that 
the current effort - asking the UNGA to consider revising an 
instrument that had already been approved by the HRC ) is 
unprecedented and expressed a strong preference for not 
amending a UNHRC-passed text. 
 
Women,s Rights 
-------------- 
 
¶20.  (C) The Mexicans highlighted some of their recent 
domestic gender equality initiatives, including legislation 
dealing with domestic violence and gender equality.  They 
said these laws reflected GOM efforts to bring national 
legislation in compliance with Mexico,s international 
commitments.  The GOM strongly supports international 
mechanisms designed to strengthen women,s rights and agrees 
with the UNSYG,s proposal for a new UN &architecture8 to 
deal with gender issues.  At this fall,s UNGA, they plan to 
submit a resolution on discrimination faced by rural women, 
to give the problem greater visibility. 
 
¶21.  (C) The Canadians said they, too, supported a new 
institutional architecture to deal with women,s rights at 
the UN, including the creation of an A/SYG position to direct 
these efforts.  They were adamant that instruments supporting 
women,s rights should not be subject to a cultural 
specificity clause.  The U.S. delegation expressed support 
for the GOM and GOC positions, adding that two additional 
topics that needed to be addressed internationally were the 
issues of honor crimes and violence against women committed 
by UN peacekeepers.  The Mexicans referred to a 
 
recommendation from the CEDAW committee following Mexico,s 
recent periodic report to the committee about the need to 
generate equality of opportunities for women within NAFTA. 
Mexico said it would welcome information from the U.S. and 
Canada about any programs undertaken to advance economic 
opportunities for women in their NAFTA implementation 
efforts. 
 
Community of Democracies 
------------------------ 
 
¶22.  (C) With respect to the Community of Democracies (CD), 
the GOM expressed three areas of concern.  First, the 
Mexicans were concerned about the process for reviewing 
invitations, as they were concerned about &redoing this 
effort8 every time the CD meets.  Second, they were 
concerned that Mali had made declarations about HRC elections 
in May without consulting all CD Convening Group members, a 
tactic they did not want to see repeated.  Finally, they 
disagreed with the proposal to create a CD secretariat, which 
they thought would only bureaucratize the CD and which 
conflicted with the Calderon administration's emphasis on 
austerity.  DAS Barks-Ruggles responded that the trilateral 
mechanism did not offer an appropriate mechanism in which to 
discuss CD invitations, since Canada was not a CD Convening 
Group member.  She said that while the USG did not want to 
see the CD become bureaucratic, it supported the creation of 
a very small secretariat, which would help those CD members 
like Mali which had small foreign ministries to better 
support CD coordination and activities. 
 
Human Rights and Terrorism 
-------------------------- 
 
¶23.  (C) DAS Barks-Ruggles said the USG was concerned that 
some governments, such as Russia, were using the fight 
against terrorism as a pretext for restricting human rights 
and personal freedoms.  Likewise, the HRC resolution dealing 
with defamation of religion had been twisted by some 
governments, including Egypt and Libya, into an excuse for 
restricting freedom of religion and expression.  (Note: The 
Canadians pointedly added that some countries might see the 
USG,s War on Terrorism as providing political cover enabling 
them to restrict or violate human rights. End Note.) 
 
Durban Follow-up 
---------------- 
 
¶24.  (C) DAS Barks-Ruggles expressed USG concern over the 
potential politicization of the Durban review conference in 
Geneva.  She added that the review conference should stay 
focused on racism and practical measures to address it, and 
should not branch out into further declarations or 
discussions of new and unrelated topics such as defamation of 
religion, as some countries were urging.  She said while the 
USG would support efforts to move forward on practical steps 
to combat racism, it could not support the Durban review 
conference as it was currently formulated.  She urged the GOM 
to serve as a bridge to such developing countries as India 
and South Africa, which could help steer the conference in a 
more productive direction. The Mexicans were non-committal 
about the Durban review conference, noting that fighting 
discrimination was a domestic priority and that international 
instruments often facilitated domestic action. 
 
¶25.  (U) DAS Barks-Ruggles has reviewed this cable. 
 
 
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BASSETT