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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001144 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2017 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KCFE KOSCE CU SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH POLDIR ON CFE, CUBA, ALLIANCE OF 
CIVILIZATIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 75239 
     ¶B. STATE 77371 
     ¶C. MADRID 1099 
     ¶D. HAVANA 539 
 
MADRID 00001144  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Hugo Llorens for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)  SUMMARY:  The DCM met with Spanish MFA Political 
Director Rafael Dezcallar June 7 to discuss the need for 
unity at next week's extraordinary CFE Treaty conference in 
Vienna.  Dezcallar reiterated Spain's strong commitment to 
NATO and expressed concern at the tone of Putin's recent 
rhetoric.  Dezcallar also took the opportunity to provide a 
readout of his recent trip to Cuba to participate in the 
Spain-Cuba bilateral dialogue on human rights, which took 
place May 29-30 in Havana.  He said the trip was generally 
positive, and he expected the results to bear out the 
correctness of Spain's policy of engagement.  The DCM told 
Dezcallar that the U.S. strongly disagreed with Spain's 
approach and was skeptical that Spain's engagement would 
produce tangible results - an appreciable increase in 
democracy in Cuba - and not merely a legitimation of Castro 
II.  Dezcallar asked whether the U.S. would be able to 
provide a contribution to the Alliance of Civilizations as 
had previously been discussed by the Secretary and FM 
Moratinos.  Finally, he expressed interest in a trip to 
Washington, perhaps in July, following the success of the 
Secretary's visit. END SUMMARY. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
¶2. (C)  The DCM met with Spanish MFA Political Director 
Rafael Dezcallar on June 7 to emphasize the need for Alliance 
unity at next week's CFE Treaty conference (refs A-C).  DCM 
told Dezcallar that the U.S. would seek to assist the Russian 
Federation in fulfilling the Istanbul Commitments but would 
not waver in conditioning A/CFE ratification on fulfillment 
of those commitments.  The U.S. was taking Russian President 
Putin and FM Lavrov's comments seriously and was alarmed by 
the tone of Russia's preparatory work for the conference. 
Dezcallar responded that Spain also was alarmed by Putin's 
recent comments, and he reiterated Spain's commitment to NATO 
and to unity at the CFE treaty, thanking DCM for the 
non-paper on a possible response to the Russian draft Final 
Document. 
 
¶3. (C)  The DCM said that the Secretary had expressed great 
satisfaction with her trip and the substantive agenda, of 
which the Cuban aspect was only one part of the overall 
successful visit.  Dezcallar agreed and noted that it was no 
surprise to him that some Spanish media outlets had chosen to 
highlight the differences on Cuba rather than the overall 
success of the visit.  In this respect, the Secretary's 
public critique on Cuba had opened the government to 
criticism on a visit that was intended to show the 
normalization of the bilateral relationship.  The DCM 
responded that the Secretary felt very strongly about the 
Cuba issue and wanted to make sure that Spain's leaders 
understood the U.S. position. 
 
//HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH CUBA// 
 
¶4. (C)  Dezcallar then gave a more detailed readout of his 
late May trip to Cuba for the first bilateral human rights 
dialogue with the Cuban government.  He stressed that this 
was the first time the Cuban government had ever agreed to a 
dialogue on Cuban internal human rights policy, saying "this 
was no small accomplishment."  He sought to draw a 
distinction between this effort and previous engagement 
between former Spanish President Felipe Gonzalez and Fidel by 
saying that Gonzalez' effort had been a one-off, whereas the 
Spaniards were conducting this process via a systematic, 
consistent and protracted dialogue according to international 
standards. 
 
//DISSIDENTS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS// 
 
¶5. (C)  He said that the Spanish had stressed to the Cubans 
the need for freedom of movement and association for 
 
MADRID 00001144  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
dissidents and the need for dissidents to be able to travel 
internationally.  The Spanish delegation told the Cubans that 
they needed to stop regarding dissidents as delinquents and 
recognize them as legitimate opinion-holders.  They also told 
the Cubans that positive human rights developments would have 
positive consequences for Cuba's relationship with the EU. 
 
¶6. (C)  On political prisoners, Dezcallar said that the 
Spanish delegation read off a list of political prisoners, 
some from Amnesty and Human Rights Watch and other sources, 
and called for their release.  He said that a sign of Cuba's 
interest was the fact that they took down all of the names in 
question rather than simply ignoring the exercise.  The 
Spanish also said that the ICRC should get unlimited access 
to Cuban prisons immediately. 
 
¶7. (C)  To the Spaniards' surprise, the Cubans took them to 
visit three different prison facilities, as reported in ref 
¶D.  Dezcallar told the DCM that he was not really qualified 
to judge the conditions at the prison facilities, but he 
acknowledged that the conditions were not good.  He 
emphasized with the Cubans that it was not the Spanish who 
should be seeing these facilities but international experts. 
The DCM added that international experts would have wanted to 
see some of the notorious maximum security facilities on the 
island, not three low security facilities in Havana. 
Dezcallar said that he made that point as well.  The Cubans 
told Dezcallar that if the EU COLAT and discussions on the 
Common Position went well, then Cuba might be amenable to 
receiving visits from UN special rapporteurs and UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Chanet. 
 
//LEGAL REFORM// 
 
¶8. (C)  Dezcallar said that the Spanish told the Cubans that 
their legal framework, particularly "Law 88", the law of 
penal processing, and certain other elements of their penal 
code, were not in line with international norms and should be 
changed.  The Spanish offered to organize a conference 
between Spanish legal experts and Cuban judiciary officials 
to discuss possible reforms. 
 
//BLAME U.S. ON INTERNET ACCESS// 
 
¶9. (C)  Dezcallar also said that the Spanish pressed the 
Cubans on internet access.  The Cubans replied that Havana 
does have internet cafes, but the Spanish stressed that they 
were very few and prohibitively expensive for the average 
Cuban.  At this point the Cubans suggested that they would 
love to provide cheap and fast internet access, but the U.S. 
was blocking their access to bandwidth.  The DCM told 
Dezcallar that we understood this to be false and would 
follow up with Washington immediately for a clarification. 
 
//TIMELINE FOR RESULTS?// 
 
¶10. (C)  The DCM conveyed his doubt about whether this 
process would succeed and asked whether the Spanish had a 
time horizon at which point they would be able to evaluate 
whether their efforts were achieving any tangible improvement 
of freedom in Cuba.  Dezcallar bristled, responding that 
Spain's strategy at least had the advantage that all other 
tactics had failed to produce any tangible improvement of 
freedom in Cuba.  According to Dezcallar, if external 
isolation and pressure would ever have produced a change 
within Cuba, it would have happened last summer when Fidel 
first surrendered power.  He said that the GOS would keep 
their process completely transparent and would continue to 
engage with the USG on its efforts, but they were absolutely 
convinced of the correctness of their policy.  He said that 
the Raul Castro regime recognizes that it will not be able to 
sustain the status quo and that the historical moment has 
changed from Fidel's era. 
 
¶11. (C)  The DCM noted Spain's effort to change the EU Common 
Position and lift restrictive measures on Cuba, and he said 
that this would represent the abandonment of European 
 
MADRID 00001144  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
commitment to democracy in Cuba.  The DCM emphasized that the 
USG would continue to press not just Spain but all EU members 
to maintain pressure on Cuba.  Dezcallar replied that the 
measures were already suspended, and he thought that they 
would be eliminated.  Dezcallar said Spain recognizes that 
Cuba is a national security issue for the U.S., but he said 
the U.S. should consider what kind of change in Cuba would be 
best for U.S. security.  He noted the Secretary's admonition 
that the Raul Castro regime must not be legitimated, and he 
countered that the only people who could legitimate the Raul 
regime were the Cubans themselves.  Nobody is under any 
illusions about who Raul Castro is and what his regime has 
represented, he said.  The Spanish presence in the island was 
not to give legitimacy to Raul but to try to help the Cuban 
people.  The DCM pointed out that Spain's engagement with a 
dictatorship would not reflect well on the human rights 
policies of Spain and the entire EU.  Dezcallar again 
responded that nothing else had worked so far in Cuba.  The 
DCM noted that clearly the U.S. and Spain had serious 
differences on the issue, but he thanked Dezcallar for the 
readout and said he hoped that the Spanish would continue to 
keep the U.S. in the loop. 
 
//ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS, TRIP TO DC// 
 
¶12. (C)  Dezcallar then briefly touched on the Alliance of 
Civilizations and asked whether the USG had made any 
decisions about a contribution to fund a program, as per the 
"gentleman's agreement" between the two governments after 
Spain's one million dollar contribution to the Foundation for 
the Future.  Dezcallar said that the Alliance would be 
organizing a forum shortly to unveil the work plan and set in 
motion some projects, and he suggested that this would be a 
good opportunity for the U.S. to announce its contribution. 
(NOTE: The USG has said it would look to support a project 
once specific project proposals are identified by the work 
plan. END NOTE.) 
 
¶13. (C)  Lastly, Dezcallar said that he hoped to make a visit 
to Washington in July, "in the wake of the Secretary's visit" 
in order to share the GOS' evolving perspectives on 
Afghanistan, Iran, Kosovo, Darfur and other issues.  The DCM 
said this was an excellent idea and asked Dezcallar for dates 
as soon as possible so that EUR could set up a excellent 
high-level program for him. 
 
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Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/ 
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AGUIRRE