VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #2181/01 1722107
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 212107Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5950
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 4789
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7418
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0488
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ JUN QUITO 1297
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1342
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002181 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2017 
TAGS: PREL KMARR PGOV SNAR PE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PM DAS COULTER-LED JUNE 26-27 
POL-MIL TALKS 
 
REF: A. LIMA 994 
     ¶B. LIMA 513 
     ¶C. LIMA 3259 (06) 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Curtis Struble for Reasons 1.4 (c and d) 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Your visit to Peru to lead the first-ever 
Political-Military talks between Peru and the United States 
comes at a time when relations between Lima and Washington 
are in excellent shape.  Since assuming office in July 2006, 
President Garcia has maintained the solid macroeconomic 
fundamentals laid down by his predecessor.  This has kept the 
country on an arc of sustained economic growth -- 8 percent 
in 2006 and 7.5 percent annually for the first quarter of 
¶2007.  Garcia's challenge is to convert this economic growth 
into significant poverty reduction.  The ratification of the 
U.S.-Peru Trade promotion Agreement (PTPA) by our Congress is 
a vital foundation for a strategy of poverty reduction 
through economic growth.  For that reason, the President has 
made good relations with the U.S. a top priority. 
 
¶2.  (C) In its foreign policy, Peru sees itself as part of a 
moderate bloc of Pacific coast nations (Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico) that can provide a quiet counterbalance to Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez' radicalism.  Garcia feels that the 
best way to blunt the appeal of the Chavez model is not by 
confrontation or rhetoric but by proving that market based 
policies deliver more benefits to the people than does 
populism. 
 
¶3.  (C) Garcia's state reform plans include a special focus 
on the defense sector.  Defense Minister Alan Wagner has 
spearheaded this defense reform effort.  He has launched 
initiatives to reduce corruption and to gve Peru more 
effective control over its sovereign space, but the 
centerpiece reform is to refocus the military away from 
supposed conventional threats from neighboring countries and 
toward existing transnational threats of narcotics 
trafficking, international terrorism and Venezuelan-backed 
"Bolivarian" destabilization (Refs). 
 
¶4.  (C) Your visit gives us an opportunity to identify 
priority areas of cooperation in the context of our larger 
shared interests, support Peru's incipient defense reform 
effort, and fortify the political-military dimension of an 
already-strong regional partnership.  We have identified a 
number of priority issues for the draft agenda worked out by 
Post and Washington.  They are the following: 
 
Regional Security Picture: 
 
-- A discussion of regional challenges and dynamics. 
 
-- Peru's interest in reforming its military to meet the 
challenges of transnational crime (narcotics trafficking and 
terrorism). 
 
Security Cooperation Enablers: 
 
-- Article 98: The GOP has repeatedly told us that an Article 
98 Agreement as such will be difficult, but that an avenue 
for an accord might come through adjustments to the 1952 
U.S.-Peru Military Agreement (1952 Agreement), which 
established the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in 
Embassy Lima.  GOP counterparts told us several months ago 
that they had engaged the services of an international legal 
expert resident in Lima to determine if sufficient 
flexibilities exist in the 1952 Agreement to accommodate our 
Article 98 concerns (and/or a SOFA-like arrangement.) 
 
-- SOFA: We believe the Peruvians are trying to reduce the 
controversy normally associated with SOFA agreements by 
trying to put the accord in the context of longstanding 
bilateral or international agreements (1952 Agreement).  We 
should not be unduly concerned with formalities or 
unwittingly put the cart before the horse in focusing on the 
viability of using such an agreement as a basis for further 
discussion.  Rather, our priority should be to get the GOP to 
understand that a SOFA will facilitate our growing mil-mil 
relations and therefore that SOFA discussions should go at 
the top of our bilateral discussions, and to deal with other 
secondary issues as they come up. 
 
Expanding Peru's Peacekeeping Capabilities: 
 
 
-- We understand informally that the Peruvians are close to 
signing the proposed 505 Agreement that would give them 
access to USD 4.4 million of PSOI funds to help better equip 
and train units that will participate in global peacekeeping 
operations. 
 
Military-Military Relations 
 
-- Military Education: Much of what passes for education and 
training in the Peruvian army in particular remains mired in 
the outdated, nationalistic concept of the Velasco Era.  We 
should emphasize our willingness not only to extend training 
opportunities through IMET (within our limited IMET budget), 
but also to help the Peruvians enrich and update their own 
strategic studies curriculum within their military academies. 
 
-- DOS/DTRA Assistance Visit/Stockpile Management: In March, 
the DOS/DTRA team made a highly successful visit to Peru. 
Now we should press for follow-up.  The Peruvians have excess 
stockpiles that they can neither maintain nor use, and some 
of these weapons have already been siphoned to the FARC.  We 
should take this opportunity to emphasize how  modernization 
and trimming unusable arms caches can pay off in the form of 
better and more secure stockpile management, including 
improvements to facilities. 
 
-- Customs P-3: The Peruvians have approved Customs P-3 
flights in principle, but have put into place a number of 
onerous conditions, which we believe should be worked out in 
a special P-3 sub-group technical meeting scheduled for 
Wednesday 6/27.  It would be useful, however, to welcome 
their cooperation on this issue and express our eagerness to 
clear out remaining roadblocks and get this initiative moving. 
 
-- Ship Visits: The GOP has recently taken to requesting full 
crew lists for visiting US Navy ships.  We have underscored 
that such a requirement could impede future ship visits. 
 
Comment: Interest Strong, Sensitivities Remain 
--------------------------------------------- - 
¶5.  (C) Peru's interest in building up the political-military 
dimension of our solid bilateral partnership is genuine and 
strong, but sensitivities remain.  Following Defense Minister 
Wagner's March visit to Washington, there was a flurry of 
news reports regarding the U.S.'s supposed ambitions to 
establish a military base in Peru when the Manta CSL lease in 
Ecuador lapses.  GOP officials have firmly denied such 
reports, which continue to surface from time to time.  The 
GOP sees an opportunity in the post Manta environment, but to 
avoid counterproductive blowback we need to be extremely 
careful in framing this issue, particularly in our public 
interventions. 
STRUBLE