VZCZCXRO4100
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #1459 1641307
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131307Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2714
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L KYIV 001459 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2017 
TAGS: MARR MCAP PARM OPRC PREL RS AZ US UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MISSILE DEFENSE TALKING POINTS DELIVERED: 
FURTHER QUESTIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 80555 
 
     ¶B. STATE 77010 
     ¶C. KYIV 779 
     ¶D. KYIV 615 
 
Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d). 
 
¶1. (U) This is a request for guidance.  See para 6. 
 
¶2. (U) Ambassador, accompanied by Army Attache and poloff, 
met with Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko June 11 to 
deliver the response to Ukrainian missile defense questions 
(ref B).  We provided written talking points, a Ukrainian 
courtesy translation, and the power-point briefing slides. 
Hrytsenko thanked Ambassador for the information, and then 
clarified that he was seeking not an unattributed non-paper 
but a signed, official communication with the U.S. position. 
He was specifically seeking a response for three questions to 
which Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Director Lt. Gen Obering 
had provided oral, affirmative answers during his visit to 
Kyiv (ref D).  In amplifying remarks, Hrytsenko suggested 
that U.S. willingness to undertake certain steps could 
function as a kind of security and confidence building 
measure that he wanted to be able to share (presumably with 
the Russians, among others) to allay fears and counter 
Russian arguments. 
 
¶3. (U) Hrytsenko continued that the three questions were: 
 
-- Would the U.S. be willing to share early warning data 
regarding missile launches with third countries? 
 
-- Would the U.S. be willing to permit "verification" visits, 
to ensure that the Polish and Czech facilities were being 
maintained and operated according to U.S. stated intentions? 
 
-- Would the U.S. be willing to allow the stationing of 
Ukrainian, Russian, or other third-country experts at the 
facilities? 
 
On the last question, Hrytsenko noted the main reason for 
wanting Russians (and Ukrainians) on site was to take away 
the threat of Russians targeting the facilities. 
 
¶4. (C) When we tried to explain that more explicit language 
regarding U.S. willingness to host visits had been precluded 
by Czech and Polish sensitivities, Hrytsenko reacted 
skeptically.  He argued that he could convince his Polish and 
Czech counterparts "in five minutes."  The statement was not 
about what the U.S. would do, but what the U.S. would be 
willing to do, which did not in fact require Polish or Czech 
agreement.  He dismissed our point that the domestic 
political situation in both countries made Czech and Polish 
officials reluctant to make such controversial statements. 
Domestic opposition in the two countries, Hrytsenko rebutted, 
would welcome statements that met Russian concerns halfway. 
He opined that the U.S. had not tried very hard to convince 
its allies. 
 
¶5. (C) Ambassador also asked for Hrytsenko's reaction 
regarding the Russian proposal to use the Gabala radar in 
Azerbaijan (ref A).  Ambassador noted the Gabala radar would 
likely not substitute for the planned facilities, but might 
be employed in addition.  Hrytsenko opined that use of the 
existing Russian strategic warning systems, including the 
radar in Ukraine, would be a good step that demonstrated that 
missile defense also protected Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, 
as well as Western Europe. 
 
¶6. (U) Request that Department coordinate with MDA either to 
issue a letter containing ref B talking points or to 
authorize us to transmit the talking points under cover of 
our transmittal letter.  We further request that Department 
provide a letter with responses to Hrytsenko's three 
additional questions. 
 
¶7. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Taylor