VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0945/01 1651512
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141512Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7608
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0102

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000945 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EPS, EB/IFD, AND EB/ESC 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON EAID KHDP DMINE SU
SUBJECT: NAVIGATING SUDAN'S MINEFIELDS 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (U) A May 22-31 visit to Sudan by Col. Stu Harris, Deputy 
Director for Programs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in 
the Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs helped address 
the growing tension among Sudanese officials, local mine action 
groups and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). 
The departure of one mine action INGO, the detention of INGO 
personnel from another group, and increasing complaints from the 
South Sudan De-Mining Commission (SSDC) against many INGOs has 
signaled the need for more coordination between the Government of 
National Unity (GNU), the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), the 
United Nations (UN), INGOs, and international donors including the 
United States.  This assessment mission provided an opportunity for 
different parties to air their views and frame an agenda for future 
action.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
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¶2. (U) The Department contributed over USD 2,000,000 to mine action 
efforts in Sudan in 2006.  As the single largest contributor to mine 
action, the U.S. delivers its funds through the United Nations Mine 
Action Office (UNMAO) and the UN Development Program (UNDP).  This 
coordinated effort has helped clear over 1,800 km of road from mines 
and unexploded ordnance (UXO), educate over one million individuals 
about mine and UXO risks, and destroy over 4,000 mines and pieces of 
UXO in controlled demolitions.  Through the GoSS, the Department has 
also helped support the infrastructure of the GNU's National Mine 
Action Center and the Juba-based SSDC. 
 
¶3. (U) Less than three years into its existence, the SSDC is just 
beginning to develop its infrastructure with funding coming from the 
GoSS, UNDP, UNMAO, and other international donors.  Within the last 
six months, the SSDC has established its headquarters in Juba, 
developed a regional office in Yei, increased its personnel to 34 
full time staff, and purchased eight vehicles for official use. 
Despite its relative inexperience, SSDC has expressed a strong 
desire for more control over de-mining efforts in southern Sudan. 
 
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CHALLENGES 
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¶4. (U) While de-mining efforts have largely remained on course in 
northern Sudan, the fledgling SSDC has struggled to establish itself 
in the south.  After extended miscommunication with the GoSS and the 
SSDC, one respected INGO, the Halo Trust, decided to close its 
operations in Sudan in 2007.  Another, the Mines Advisory Group 
(MAG), recently experienced two separate incidents in which its 
personnel were subjected to harassment.  In 2007, the GoSS 
temporarily revoked the visa of MAG's Chief of Party after tense 
negotiations regarding MAG's property and hiring practices. 
Security officials also detained two MAG personnel after they 
demolished a serviceable mortar found by schoolchildren.  These 
personnel were detained for approximately six hours and put under 
house arrest for 17 days.  (Note:  Under their UN mandate, MAG 
personnel are entitled to demolish explosive remnants of war, land 
mines, and UXO.  End Note). 
 
¶5.  (U) These incidents also reflect a broader atmosphere of 
distrust.  In a May 25 meeting at the SSDC headquarters in Juba, 
Col. Harris and PolOff listened to SSDC concerns.  SSDC personnel 
drew sharp distinctions between the efforts of Sudanese mine action 
organizations and international de-mining groups.  They also 
described a competitive and antagonistic relationship with INGOs.  A 
central SSDC concern is what they believe is a lack of appropriate 
funding for both the SSDC and local mine action groups.  As the 
SSDC's printed briefing argued, "National [Sudanese] NGOs will carry 
out mine action more cost effectively and efficiently because their 
salaries are much lower than their expatriate counterparts, they 
have less of a 'stand-down period,' and . . .they will immediately 
remove any landmines/UXOs regardless as to mandates."  The SSDC also 
alleged that INGOs lack transparency, commitment, and motivation 
apart from financial gain.  (Note:  Full minutes of briefing have 
been sent to PM/WRA.  End Note.) 
 
¶6. (U) Separately, representatives from the UNDP, UNMAO, and several 
INGOs repeatedly expressed a sense of frustration and disappointment 
with the current state of relations with the SSDC.  In assessing 
this situation, one representative from the UNDP stated, "The SSDC 
is trying to sprint before it can walk."  Another senior UN 
representative from the Mine Action Office stated, "SSDC just 
appears to want to mimic the exact structure of the UN Mine Action 
Office."  UN officials added that through cooperation with 
international advisors, participation in UN-sponsored training 
programs, and further management experience for senior and mid-level 
managers,  the SSDC should be able to be entirely independent by 
¶2011.  Other UN officials emphasized  that the SSDC is a very new 
commission with recently appointed staff.  SSDC is also effectively 
isolated, according to these officials, from the existing the 
existing national mine action office structure.  The UN Mine Action 
Office of Southern Sudan has been managing the mine action program 
and training its own indigenous staff.  Officials acknowledged that 
these two parallel structures, UNMAO-SS and the SSDC, may be 
duplicating efforts. 
 
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WAYS FORWARD 
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¶7. (U) Aware of these issues prior to his visit, Colonel Harris 
directly addressed many of these challenges.  Envisioning a gradual 
transition from INGOs and UN leadership to Sudanese NGOs and SSDC 
control by 2011, Col. Harris urged all parties to adopt a more 
focused and structured approach to Sudanese capacity development. 
More institutional capacity can be achieved through further training 
for SSDC management at the mid and senior levels, internships in the 
UNMAO and UNDP office, and targeted institutional support for the 
SSDC.  Harris urged representatives from all major mine action 
players (including the UNMAO, UNDP, the GNU Deputy Secretary of 
Humanitarian Affairs and SSDC) to improve their communication and to 
work towards the de-personalization of conflicts.  Using the MAG 
mortar demolition as an example, Harris recommended that important 
issues such as these be elevated up the chain of command, and 
ultimately be decided by committees and review boards, as opposed to 
temperamental individuals.  He also recommended that donor embassies 
and consulates are involved early in the process. 
 
¶8.  (U)  Harris and UNDP leadership also explored the idea of 
strengthening the institution of the SSDC. Relatively simple 
concrete steps, such as developing an action plan, organizational 
chart, and a board of overseers, may help the SSDC become a more 
viable institution.  With respect to the parallel structures of the 
UNMAO-SS and the SSDC and the duplication of their efforts, Harris 
suggested clearer communication and delegation of tasks.  He also 
proposed that one organization deal with higher level management, 
while the other handles the day-to-day management of mine action 
efforts in South Sudan. 
 
¶9. (U) This visit also generated several other ideas for the 
improvement of de-mining efforts in Sudan.  Harris and senior UNDP 
leadership considered:  (a) the development of a database of trained 
Sudanese de-miners for quick deployment, as was used in Afghanistan; 
(b) the transformation of some SPLA troops into de-mining units in a 
pilot project;  (c) training for additional medics to be integrated 
into de-mining teams;  (d) the development of a competitive, 
structured de-mining team leader course; (e) the importance of 
cultural training for INGOs prior to beginning their work in Sudan; 
(f) the need for a central, controlled demolition site in Juba. 
 
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SUCCESSES 
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¶10. (U) Despite these challenges, thousands of kilometers of road 
have been physically cleared and certified safe from UXO and mines. 
Economic development has flourished along cleared transportation 
networks.  In particular, commodity prices have dropped along 
cleared railroads and roads.  In addition to the increased flow of 
goods and services, access to health care, education, and government 
services has increased.  Senior UNDP representatives confirmed that 
the Department of State funds are well administered, and that 
funding is at the appropriate level. 
 
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COMMENT 
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¶11.  (U) Any success or challenge cannot be evaluated outside of the 
very difficult working environment in South Sudan.  Extremely 
limited telecommunications, hazardous road networks, and major 
weaknesses in overall infrastructure make seemingly simple tasks 
logistical challenges.  The antagonism between the SSDC and the 
international actors should not be taken lightly.  Nonetheless, this 
tension may be seen as a natural and perhaps even healthy expression 
of a young institution's yearning for more autonomy and 
responsibility.  This visit helped address and ameliorate tensions, 
while underscoring U.S. commitment to de-mining efforts in Sudan. 
END COMMENT. 
 
¶12. (U) This reporting telegram has been cleared by Colonel Harris. 
 
FERNANDEZ