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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 002794 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2017 
TAGS: MCAP MOPS PGOV PK PREL
SUBJECT: F-16 SECURITY NOTES:  REQUEST FOR TWO SPECIFIC 
CHANGES THAT WILL BENEFIT COALITION OPERATIONS. 
 
Classified By: Charge Peter Bodde 1.5 (b), (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Pakistan's September 2006 agreement to purchase 18 
new F-16 aircraft marked an important milestone in our 
alliance.  The agreement signaled Pakistan's and the United 
States' intent to continue strengthening our security 
relationship.  We are grateful for both State's and DoD's 
enormous efforts to facilitate both this sale and the 
separate transfer of Excess Defense Article F-16s. 
 
SECURITY ISSUES 
 
¶2.  (C)  For the sake of our own national security, as well 
as to safeguard the long-term viability of our security 
assistance relationship with Pakistan, maintaining the 
security of technology related to F-16s is preeminently 
important.  We understand and support most of the security 
notes that accompany the September 2006 Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance for new F-16s.  That said, we believe two specific 
provisions of the security notes will harm Pakistan's 
operational effectiveness and may negatively impact Coalition 
operations in Afghanistan. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Paragraph 9 of the security notes place two unusual 
requirements on Pakistan: 
 
--The F-16 Aircraft, armaments, and related equipment and 
technical data must be housed on separate pre-designated 
Pakistan Air Force bases to ensure no unauthorized access. 
Furthermore, Pakistan may not have non-U.S./non-Pakistan 
origin aircraft or personnel at any of the bases with these 
F-16 aircraft and related equipment. 
 
--No foreign units or personnel may be permanently or 
temporarily assigned at the bases where F-16 aircraft are 
assigned, parked, maintained, or stored, or while deployed. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Post understands the importance of ensuring that 
non-Pakistani, non-U.S. personnel do not have access to 
restricted U.S. technology.  That said, requiring separate 
bases for the F-16s does not necessarily further this goal 
beyond what would be possible using other techniques. 
Indeed, restricting the access of Pakistani-owned foreign 
aircraft to F-16 bases does not directly correlate to 
restricting the access of foreign nationals to those bases. 
Meanwhile, the above-noted restrictions could cause serious 
humanitarian, safety, logistical, and operational 
difficulties for Pakistan.  Not incidentally, the requirement 
that third countries, including our NATO allies, be denied 
access to special F-16 bases could impede our own operational 
effectiveness. 
 
¶5.  (C)  We note that: 
 
--Pakistan's search and rescue helicopters are primarily of 
Russian and French origin.  Some of Pakistan's air lift 
capacity is European-manufactured Casa 235s.  If Pakistan 
cannot base these aircraft with the F-16s, Pakistani 
personnel (and U.S. trainers) could be unnecessarily 
endangered.  At the very least, operational effectiveness 
would be hurt by lack of access to Casa 235 capabilities. 
 
--Not allowing foreign units or personnel to deploy to F-16 
bases would deny non-U.S. Coalition aircraft operating in 
Afghanistan access to those facilities.  Such a policy would 
be counterproductive to our interests in the region. 
Similarly, our Long War needs require Pakistan to be flexible 
in its deployment capabilities.  Restricting Pakistan's 
access to its own bases would limit this flexibility, as 
would denying Pakistan access to Coalition bases outside of 
Pakistan. 
 
 
ISLAMABAD 00002794  002 OF 002 
 
 
--The basing restrictions prevent Pakistan from launching a 
unified strike package of U.S. and non-U.S. aircraft from a 
single air base.  As pre-mission briefings are essential to 
safety and effectiveness, this would be a serious handicap 
for the Pakistan Air Force. 
 
--Currently, all Pakistan Air Force fighter pilots train 
employment tactics at a single air base.  Under the F-16 
security restrictions, F-16 pilots would be required to train 
at a separate facility, an expensive and inefficient 
proposition. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
¶6.  (C)  In light of the potential for paragraph 9 of the 
current security notes to adversely impact both Pakistan's 
and the United States' operational effectiveness, we propose 
that the note be changed so that the F-16s can be stored in 
"separate but co-located" portions of existing air bases. 
Under such a plan, the U.S. would establish stringent 
requirements for the foundation and maintenance of "separate 
but co-located" basing facilities for the F-16s.  We believe 
that, so long as the U.S. ensures adequate attention to 
detail as we establish requirements for co-located 
facilities, we could ensure as much security for our 
technology as at a dedicated air base. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Other recommendations: 
 
--There should be a waiver process for more of the F-16 
security requirements.  Currently, many of the requirements 
can only be waived or changed by amending the Letter of Offer 
and Acceptance.  A waiver requiring "the written permission 
of the Department of State" is available for some of the 
requirements; we believe it would be appropriate for many of 
the others.  Authorizing such waivers would enable Coalition 
or third country (NATO ally) access to bases during 
humanitarian emergencies and other urgent situations. 
 
--The U.S. should begin security training regarding the F-16 
program as soon as possible.  The more Pakistani personnel 
familiar with security requirements at an early date, the 
better. 
 
 
 
BODDE