VZCZCXRO0174
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHIHL #0096/01 1810850
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300850Z JUN 07
FM REO HILLAH
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0832
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0899
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIHL/REO HILLAH 0958

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 HILLAH 000096 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/30/2017 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PTER PINR IZ
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: KARBALA: GOVERNOR PUTS HIS HEART INTO THE 
TRANSFER OF THE SECURITY FILE 
 
REF: REFTEL 000005 
 
HILLAH 00000096  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Andrea Donnally, Acting Team Leader, Karbala 
Provincial Reconstruction Team, DOS. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (U) This is a corrected copy of Hillah 00000095 (wrong 
classification) a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Karbala 
classified cable. 
 
¶2. (U) SUMMARY: On June 27, Karbala Governor Aqeel Mahmood 
al-Khazali met with 3ID Deputy Commanding General (DCG) and PRT 
representatives at the Regional Embassy Office (REO) in 
al-Hillah.  This was the first meeting between these parties 
since the PRT was denied access to the province ostensibly under 
the Governor's command.  The meeting began with a discussion of 
the Anbar Salvation Council and a seemingly similar committee in 
Karbala province.  Feigning heart palpitations, the Governor 
shifted the conversation to manageable topics such as the 
transition to Iraqi control, an upcoming tourism conference and 
a future Anbar-Karbala security dialogue.  The Governor agreed 
without hesitation to the transition of Karbala to Iraqi control 
and is scheduled to travel with 3ID representatives in July to 
present the request for consideration to senior Coalition Forces 
(CF) and Embassy representatives.  Al-Khazali was apologetic 
about the PRT's recent difficulty in accessing the province and 
agreed that free access is needed.  The PRT continues to seek 
out alternatives to facilitate travel and engagement 
opportunities with Karbala government and non-government 
interlocutors.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶3. (C) General Cardon opened the meeting by showing the Governor 
a recent news clipping describing a newly formed Karbala 
security committee.  Before complaining of heart palpitations 
and requesting medication, al-Khazali explained that he inspired 
its formation.  He did not elaborate further on the committee or 
its specific function, however, the PRT did report on the 
formation of this committee on May 12 in a situational report to 
the Office of Provincial Affairs.  This committee was formed 
after the two April car bombs in downtown Karbala that wounded 
and killed more than 400 civilians and resulted in the arrest of 
15 suspected terrorists.  Media reporting from that period 
attributes the formation of these committees to Sistani's 
representatives at the holy shrines in Karbala as a response to 
the insecurity created by the car bombs.  Six other committees 
were formed at the same time to engage parliament members, the 
local religious Hawza, the tribes, and the media.  The last two 
committees that were formed provide social support and 
coordinate the efforts of the other six committees.   Governor 
al-Khazali agreed to provide the PRT with further information 
about the security committee.  It is unclear what relationship 
any of these committees have with local security forces (ISF) 
and the provincial government (SEPTEL). 
 
¶4. (C) Governor Al-Khazali immediately agreed to the DCG's offer 
to transfer the Karbala security file.  The Governor explained 
that he had obtained authorization from the Ministry of Defense 
for two Iraqi Army brigades, which is in addition to recent 
authorization granted by the Ministry of Interior for two 
thousand foot police.  He explained that the GEN Mahon, the 
director of the Joint Coordination Center (a security 
coordination cell in the Governorate), is having success 
fighting militias and that security is generally good.  During 
the last six months Governor al-Khazali balked and hesitated 
about the transfer of security citing militia infiltration and 
instability as the reason for his disinclination.  The Governor 
was both stalling for time with CF and lobbying both CF and GOI 
for equipment, training and Iraqi soldiers.  Upon receiving his 
wish list from the GOI, he made clear his intention to sever 
military cooperation with CF.  On June 28, locally engaged staff 
and CF reported that GEN Mahon was unexpectedly transferred to 
Basra and that a LTG Salah has taken his place.  The number of 
monthly assassinations and other terrorist activities appear to 
be stable, however USG interpreters continue to be under severe 
threat of assassination.  On June 26, a long time Karbala police 
officer and interpreter for CF was assassinated.  This raised 
fears with PRT staff and the few remaining CF interpreters in 
the province. 
 
¶5.  (C) In May, the Mayor of Ain Tamur, a northwestern district 
that shares a border with Anbar, requested PRT assistance in 
engaging the Anbari government in a dialogue about cross border 
terrorist activities.  For the last six months, Karbala ISF has 
been reporting suspected Sunni extremist and AQI terrorist 
movement around the Anbar-Karbala border, threatening the 
security of the province.  Following up on that request, at the 
meeting, the PRT inquired about the Governor's interest in 
meeting with his Anbar counterpart.  Al-Khazali expressed an 
interest in meeting with his Anbari counterpart and appeared 
 
HILLAH 00000096  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
flexible regarding a date.  He reminded the PRT of a recent 
assassination in Ain Tamur of six individuals, including a local 
council member by unknown assailants.  PRT Anbar has already 
laid the groundwork with the Anbar Governor and it appears that 
there is potential for a dialogue, a first for these two 
Governors.  Where Anbar is a predominantly Sunni province, 
Karbala is its Shi'a counterpart, except for Ain Tamur which is 
rural, mostly tribal and a little of both.  The PRT is in close 
contact with PRT Anbar and is monitoring developments. (SEPTEL) 
 
¶6. (C) The investigation into the January attack on CF at the 
Governance Compound (REFTEL) and PRT mobility are closely 
intertwined.  CF repeatedly requested the results of the ISF 
investigation into the January attack, however the local 
government has been less than forthcoming.  At this meeting the 
DCG pressed the need for Karbala to share the results of its 
investigation to which al-Khazali hesitated.  He cited the 
inconclusiveness and poor level of professionalism of the 
report.  Despite his hesitation, on June 28, al-Khazali emailed 
the PRT an Arabic and English translation of the report, which 
has since been forwarded to 3ID.  As al-Khazali claimed, the 
interviews with police officers at the scene were short and 
superficial.  The conclusions reached through the investigation, 
based primarily on the profile of the attack, forms the basis 
for the governor's current justification for restrictions the 
PRT movement. 
 
¶7. (C) Upon arriving to the REO, al-Khazali asked the PRT 
representative about their recent trip to the province.  Such a 
jab obviated the need to address the mobility of the PRT during 
the meeting.  Governor Aqeel cited the profile of the PRT 
security convoy as problematic given the province's current 
security posture.  He cited the findings of the January 
Governance Compound attack as the logical basis for the 
restriction.  He also reminded his interlocutors that a recent 
attack on the Ministry of Finance that resulted in the 
kidnapping of five British citizens employed a similar profile 
to the January attack in Karbala.   Governor al-Khazali 
recommended that the PRT provide his office with 24-hour advance 
notice of PRT movement to the province with the names of the 
principals, the routes and the times of travel.  This detail of 
information sharing is unacceptable for a province that claims 
to have severe militia infiltration among the ISF, general 
insecurity and is known to have a historically anti-American 
leaning.  A veiled threat to stop reconstruction project funding 
inspired the Governor to concede that the PRT should enjoy 
unfettered access to the Province.  Despite the Governor's 
recognition of PRT's need for mobility, at this time it is 
difficult to assess if a consensus can be reached to the 
satisfaction of Embassy security requirements and within reach 
of the Karbala security posture. 
 
¶8. (U) The meeting ended with the al-Khazali agreeing to support 
a future south central regional governor's conference in the 
near future.  He explained that the monthly Governors' 
conferences in Baghdad were going well and that at the last one; 
representatives from all 18 provinces were present. 
 
¶9. (S) COMMENT: Engagements with the Karbala Governor are always 
unpredictable.  He likely feigned a medical condition to disrupt 
the flow of the meeting and to ensure a plausible escape route 
if discussion topics became too difficult.  His condition 
limited the depth of the conversation, but did not prevent 
considerable advancements in the Karbala-USG dialogue.  The 
Governor's solid approval of the transfer of the security file 
was an unusual turn of events in that previous discussions on 
the topic revealed the Governor's concern about militia 
infiltration in the ISF, particularly the police, and an 
unraveling security condition.  Over the course of the last two 
months a new Police Chief and Emergency Response Unit Commander 
(suspected of having very close ties to the Prime Minister) may 
actually have turned the tables on militia activity in the 
province.  Additionally, more than 4,000 more Iraqi Army and 
Karbala foot police are expected to be on the ground and working 
in the very near term.  More is not always better, but in the 
case of a province with 60 percent unemployment and more than 3 
million pilgrims visiting monthly, the additional law 
enforcement may be a much needed reprieve for the over burdened 
police force. COMMENT CONTINUED 
 
¶10. (S) COMMENT CONTINUED: Karbala PRT movement is most likely 
untenable.  Intelligence reports on militia activity, whenever 
available, describes a severe risk environment to American 
convoys.  Moreover, Embassy security protocols call for convoys 
to pass unrestrained through security checkpoints, which is in 
direct conflict with Provincial security procedures.  The 
Governor agreed to provide the PRT with a letter of transit and 
offered an Iraqi Army escort, however these options conflict 
with Embassy protocols, which makes them a non-starter.  The 
Karbala PRT is negotiating mobility with the Governor from a 
 
HILLAH 00000096  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
disadvantaged position, where it is imprudent to demand 
unfettered access, and yet cooperation with the local government 
may increase the risk level against the PRT.  However, the 
increased resources and focus of the newly arrived MND-Central 
3ID Division command, has the PRT cautiously optimistic about 
the potential for mobility within the province.  The PRT is 
keenly aware that limited engagement on a random and infrequent 
basis is more likely to draw negative attention to our 
interlocutors and undermine their security than further the USG 
mission. Therefore, with the support of the 3ID leadership and a 
moderately cooperative Karbala Governor, the PRT will continue 
to use creative methods of engagement and seek opportunities to 
travel when prudent to do so.  END COMMENT 
ADONNALLY