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Viewing cable 07HELSINKI416, SCENESETTER: FINNISH FM KANERVA,S VISIT TO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
07HELSINKI416 2007-06-01 13:04 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXYZ0060
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHHE #0416/01 1521304
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011304Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3412
INFO RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 4079
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 4714
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK 0313
RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 0854
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 8633
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 4175
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 3169
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0937
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L HELSINKI 000416 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS FI
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: FINNISH FM KANERVA,S VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON 
 
Classified By: POLCHIEF GREGORY THOME FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
Scenesetter: Finnish FM Kanerva's Visit to Washington 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: FM Kanerva's June 11 visit gives us an 
excellent opportunity to capitalize on the new GOF's 
stated goal of improving relations with Washington. 
Finland has a center-right government for the first time 
since 1995, and the right message from the Secretary will 
lay out our expectations and help Kanerva and his 
coalition turn words into deeds on several US priorities. 
Finland has already been a strong partner in many areas; 
however, the new GOF shows a willingness to do more to 
support ISAF operations in Afghanistan; to promote 
democracy in Russia and Europe's near neighborhood; and 
to enhance Finland's relationship with NATO.  Kanerva 
will not promise anything he cannot deliver but, for the 
first time in seven years, Finland offers a FM who is 
keenly interested in US views and will actively seek out 
areas in which the US and Finland can cooperate more 
effectively.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
TURNING THE RIGHT INSTINCTS INTO ACTION 
--------------------------------------- 
2. (C) Since coming to office in mid-April, Finland's new 
government has said literally all the right things 
concerning US-Finnish relations.  During the Ambassador's 
first round of courtesy calls and our early meetings at 
other levels, it has become abundantly clear that the new 
center-right coalition (Finland's first since 1995) has 
all the right instincts.  The Cabinet and Parliament's 
leadership have stated in the clearest possible terms 
that they want to build a warm relationship with 
Washington.  FM Ilkka Kanerva's visit is timely for two 
key reasons:  First, the visit gives us an important 
early opportunity to spell out exactly which issues are 
of the highest priority to us, and to discuss what we 
expect from a pro-active friend and partner.  Second, the 
FM is genuinely determined to undo damage done to the 
bilateral relationship by his predecessor.  Because 
Kanerva is eager to put the tone and substance of the 
bilateral relationship back on track, he will be very 
receptive to any suggestions Secretary Rice makes for 
turning the GOF's stated desire for improved US-Finnish 
relations into action. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
TARGETED AREAS OF COOPERATION: CONCRETE RESULTS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
3. (SBU) With this in mind, the Embassy sees the greatest 
opportunities for concrete results with the new GOF in 
three areas:  (1) increased support for NATO/ISAF efforts 
in Afghanistan in the short-term; (2) increased, tangible 
Finnish contributions to NATO and other security 
operations -- and greater domestic dialogue on NATO 
membership -- in the short- and medium-term; and (3) 
concrete programs and focused diplomacy to help promote 
freedom and democracy in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and 
the Balkans. 
 
------------------------- 
DOING MORE IN AFGHANISTAN 
------------------------- 
4. (SBU) Finland's solid contributions to NATO/ISAF 
peacekeeping operations (PKO) and to Afghanistan's 
reconstruction can be expected to continue; our challenge 
now is finding ways to help the new government do more. 
The GOF currently has 106 peacekeepers on the ground at 
PRTs in Meymaneh and Mazar-al-Sharif, along with a small 
but highly effective civilian team that supports PKO with 
appropriate, targeted development assistance. 
Afghanistan is at the top of Finland's list for 
reconstruction aid, with $12 million in annual funding 
secured for at least the next six years.  Finland 
recently transmitted to NATO an extensive list of non- 
lethal equipment it intends to donate to support both the 
ANP and the Afghan National Army (ANA).  Looking forward, 
targets of opportunity to further enhance Finland's role 
in Afghanistan include: 
 
 -- MORE TROOPS: The 220-troop engineering batallion will 
conclude its mission in Southern Lebanon this calendar 
year.  The Finns will likely reassign some resources to 
other missions in Lebanon and may seek to augment their 
presence in Kosovo.  However, we should also encourage 
them to bolster their current numbers in Afghanistan. 
 
 -- PRT LEADERSHIP: Despite the recent death of a Finnish 
soldier at Meymenah, political will and public opinion 
strongly favor the Finnish mission in Afghanistan.  The 
MOD is planning for eventual Finnish leadership of a PRT, 
and the Secretary may be able to secure an early 
commitment from Kanerva that Finland will do so when 
either Hungary or Sweden relinquish leadership of their 
PRTs at some point over the next 1-2 years. 
 
 -- EXPANDING FINLAND'S CIVILIAN CM MODEL: Finland has 
very successfully "embedded" a civilian crisis management 
(CM) team within the Norwegian-led PRT at Meymenah.  The 
team identifies development and reconstruction projects 
that directly support the PRT, and its work has been 
hailed by ISAF as a model for small countries.  We should 
encourage Finland to "exprt" this model to other PRTs, 
particularly if it akes leadership of one. 
 
-- COUNTERNARCOTICS ANDRULE OF LAW: Thanks in part to 
the excellent exprence Finland had with the Iraqi 
police trainin mission in Jordan (to which Finland 
provided 11trainers), it now intends to provide ten 
trainersto the new program for the Afghan National 
Police (ANP), along with three experts for the NATO- 
Russia Council counternarcotics operation.  Finland also 
contributed $1 million to the Law and Order Trust Fund. 
Kanerva will likely be receptive to the Secretary's 
suggestions regarding how the GOF could do even more in 
the counternarcotics fight. 
 
 -- LETHAL WEAPONS DONATION: We understand the new 
government is "re-examining" the previous GOF's decision 
to reject our request for a donation of AK-47s to support 
the ANP and ANA.  However, this issue remains politically 
difficult domestically. The Finnish opposition (i.e., the 
now-out-of-power Social Democrats who scuttled the 
donation in the first place) will pounce on it if the GOF 
is too aggressive, and President Halonen does not favor 
it.  If an opportunity to press our case arises, Kanerva 
will be forthcoming and welcome our advice.  However, our 
other goals in Afghanistan are more "do-able" in the 
short term, and the GOF may seek to move forward with 
other Afghanistan projects before challenging the 
opposition and the President on this one. 
 
---------------- 
NATO COOPERATION 
---------------- 
5. (C) While many in Kanerva's Conservative Party 
actually favor Finland's joining NATO, their Center Party 
coalition partners and President Halonen both oppose 
membership.  Nevertheless, the new GOF's platform clearly 
calls for enhancing Finland's cooperation with the 
Alliance.  Substantial roles in NATO's Afghanistan and 
Kosovo operations will continue, and the Finns are  now 
sending very positive signals regarding the NATO Response 
Force (NRF) and the Strategic Air Consortim (SAC). For 
the Kanerva meeting, targets of opportunity on NATO 
include: 
 
 -- A CLEARER TIMELINE ON NRF:  Finland has EU 
Battlegroup commitments through mid-2008, but MOD and MFA 
sources both see the benefit of complementing Battlegroup 
commitments with NRF commitments.  The new government 
would like to attend the Global Force Generation 
conference this fall, and we have urged them to see that 
as a good target for making a commitment to the NRF.  A 
strong statement from the Secretary in support of Finnish 
NRF ambitions will help move this process along. 
 
 -- ENCOURAGE SAC BUY-IN: The MOD is eager to join the 
airlift consortium and sees the advantages for Finland of 
doing so.  Finland also hopes to produce a letter of 
intent before the June 11 SAC conference.  A clear 
statement from the Secretary on the importance we attach 
to the SAC will help Kanerva firm up the political-level 
across the GOF. 
 
 -- NATO MEMBERSHIP: Long a taboo topic for any 
politician in Finland, this issue now appears open for 
discussion.  MOD Hakamies became the first MOD in Finnish 
history to openly proclaim that he favors membership, and 
while Kanerva has not said so publicly we know he agrees. 
Public opinion polls in Finland do not show majorities in 
favor of NATO membership, but the Conservatives 
understand that this will only change if the government 
shows leadership.  As noted, they also face obstacles in 
President Halonen and their own Center Party partners, 
but a show of support from the Secretary will bolster 
leadership instincts on the NATO membership question. 
 
-------------- 
FREEDOM AGENDA 
-------------- 
6. (C) The interests of the USG and the GOF are in close 
harmony when it comes to support for democracy, civil 
society and human rights in Russia and Europe's new 
neighborhood.  The government inherits several ongoing 
projects that complement US Freedom Agenda goals, 
including programs to support NGOs and educational 
exchanges in Russia and Belarus.  Through bilateral 
visits and other diplomacy, the GOF has also begun 
reaching out more to opposition leaders in Belarus; 
moderates in Serbia; and pro-democracy forces in Ukraine 
and the Caucuses.  Recent events in Russia and Estonia 
have also emboldened the government to move away from the 
traditional Finnish propensity to acquiesce to Russia on 
tough issues; indeed, Kanerva and others have publicly 
challenged Moscow's policies and actions in ways the 
previous government eschewed.  Finns are not yet fully 
comfortable with challenging Russi or taking a high 
profile role in pro-democracy rograms that host 
governments might view as "vioations of their 
sovereignty;" however, there are argets of opportunity 
on the Freedom Agenda and romoting democracy in Europe's 
New Neighborhood hat might include: 
 
 -- COMMON EU POLICIES TOWAR RUSSIA:  Kanerva showed 
real leadership in calling for a "common EU policy" to 
support Estonia and in criticizing Moscow's heavy-handed 
reprisals during the Bronze Statue crisis.  This was a 
clear break from the practice of previous 
administrations, which preferred to sit back and let 
Brussels take the lead on contentious Russia-related 
issues.  Bilateral trade difficulties -- including 
Moscow's unilateral ban on Finnish poultry imports, a 
questionable tariff on wood exports, Russian impediments 
to cross-border truck transit -- may further encourage 
Finland to step out of its shell and begin pressing for a 
tougher EU line in some areas.  The GOF is also facing 
rapidly building domestic pressure from the Parliament, 
the press and civil society to become more outspoken in 
urging Russia to improve its human rights record.  In 
sum, the GOF is realizing that the time-honored "gentle" 
approach to Russia no longer produces results that are in 
Finland's interest, and that the time has likely come to 
join Germany, the Baltics and other EU members who are 
pressing for a more united front in the face of Russian 
misbehavior.  Words of encouragement from the Secretary 
and a clear emphasis on the importance she attaches to 
improved US-EU coordination in dealing with Russia will 
be helpful in pushing the GOF toward showing more 
leadership in this area. 
 
 -- SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOs: Finland continues 
to fund several NGOs in Russia that are engaged in 
environmental and educational activities near the Finnish 
border.  There is also significant cross-border 
educational exchange.  When the Duma passed its infamous 
NGO legislation last year, Finland protested through 
diplomatic channels and insisted on exemptions to ensure 
that the NGOs it funds could continue their work.  There 
is significant cross-border educational exchange, and 
Finland also supports the International Humanities 
University in Vilnius for Belarusian exiles through the 
EU and bilaterally.  The new GOF understands the need to 
do more, but is still seeking direction in identifying 
the particular nitches it can best fill.  Kanerva will be 
open to suggestions from the Secretary or others. 
 
 -- SUPPORT FOR OPPOSITION AND PRO-DEMOCRACY LEADERS: 
Senior GOF officials have begun to take a more direct 
role in reaching out to pro-democracy leaders, especially 
in the Balkans and in Belarus.  PM Vanhanen hosted 
Belarusian opposition leader Alexandre Milinkevic last 
fall; the Finns highlighted support for democratic forces 
during the EU-Ukraine Summit that occurred during their 
EU Presidency; and President Halonen will host Serb 
President Tadic June 2 in an attempt to help bolster pro- 
Western forces within Belgrade's new government.  Finland 
also targets significant development and civil society 
funding to Kosovo.  The Finns should be encouraged to 
play an even more active role in showing public support 
for pro-democracy leaders and in visiting countries where 
they can reach out to democratic forces, with Belarus, 
Ukraine and the Balkans being perhaps the best fits for 
Finland.  The Secretary may also wish to encourage 
similar Finnish thinking on Russia. 
 
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COMMENT 
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7. (C) Kanerva and the new GOF genuinely want to improve 
both the tone and the substance of the bilateral 
relationship.  Unlike the previous FM, Kanerva will also 
listen to our views, seek our advice, and seriously 
endeavor to identify where Finland can do more to bolster 
cooperation in areas of shared interests.  We have also 
emphasized that the US is looking for concrete results, 
not simply discussions of ongoing processes.  Kanerva 
understands this, and intends to come to Washington with 
something to offer.  However, true to the Finnish 
character, he also will never promise anything he cannot 
deliver.  A clear message from the Secretary that 
emphasizes her priorities and her ideas for how Finland 
can do more will help Kanerva -- both as he seeks to 
expand Finland's role in NATO, Afghaistan and Europe's 
New Neighborhood, and as he loks to build domestic 
support for the new GOF's efort to improve trans- 
Atlantic relations. 
WAR