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FM AMEMBASSY HARARE
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1835

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/S FOR S. HILL 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR B. PITTMAN 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
ADDIS ABABA FOR ACSS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ASEC ZI
SUBJECT: MUJURU LIEUTENANT PITCHES FOR USG SUPPORT 
 
REF: A. REF A: HARARE 448 
 
     ¶B. REF B: HARARE 336 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Christopher W. Dell under Section 1.4 b/d 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (C) David Butau, ZANU-PF MP and member of the faction 
allied to ex-military commander Solomon Mujuru, told poloff 
on May 31 that Mujuru had determined that the time to unseat 
President Robert Mugabe was now.  Mujuru had flexed his 
muscle and wrested control of the party structures in 
Masvingo and Bulawayo, and his subordinates had begun to chip 
away at Mugabe's key backers.  Butau added that while 
pressure on Mugabe was needed, the USG needed to quietly 
weigh into this intra-party battle to help block Mugabe's bid 
for another term.  End Summary. 
 
----------------------------------- 
Mujuru Faction Assesses Time Is Now 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Ruling-party MP David Butau told poloff on May 31 
that Mujuru had determined that he needed to act decisively 
within the next four to five months to unseat Mugabe.  If the 
Mujuru camp was not able to force Mugabe out by the time of 
the Extra-ordinary Congress expected in December (ref A), it 
would be too late and Mugabe would by then solidify his 
candidature and with it the presidency.  Butau ) who is from 
the same Shona ethnic sub-group as Vice President Joyce 
Mujuru and reportedly employs one of the Mujuru daughters at 
his investment company, Dande - noted that the Mujuru faction 
had scored important victories in provincial party elections 
in Masvingo and Bulawayo, adding to Mujuru's current support 
in the three Mashonaland provinces. 
 
¶3.  (C) Adding to this sense of urgency, Butau outlined three 
possible scenarios for the near term: 1) continued Mugabe 
rule and economic decline that would be unsustainable; 2) a 
reformed (read Mujuru-led) ZANU-PF coming to office that 
would restore economic stability; or 3) a stalemate leading 
to confrontation that would quickly entangle the 
military/security forces and pit the Shona ethnic sub-groups 
against each other.  Butau contended that ZANU-PF was headed 
for a train wreck, with one faction led by Mugabe determined 
to stay in power at any cost and another faction led by 
Mujuru desperate to save its business interests.  Unless 
Mujuru was able to gain the upper hand soon, Butau said that 
the factional battles could spiral out of control.  Asked 
about the camp led by Rural Housing Minister and former heir 
apparent Emmerson Mnangagwa, Butau said they were still 
licking their wounds from a strong rebuke from Mugabe in late 
2004 and had contented themselves with allying ) at least 
temporarily ) with Mugabe in the hope that he would once 
again turn his favor in their direction. 
 
---------------------- 
Fierce Battles Ongoing 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Despite attempts by the Mugabe faction to undermine 
its intra-party opponents, Butau said the reformist element 
of ZANU-PF was alive and well.  Butau contended that the GOZ 
decision to sever ties with a USG-funded parliamentary 
support project (ref B) was ultimately an attempt to weaken 
critical ZANU-PF MPs, such as himself, Walter Mzembi, and Leo 
 
HARARE 00000485  002 OF 002 
 
 
Mugabe - whom Butau added was out of favor with the 
President. 
 
¶5.  (C) Instead of targeting Mugabe directly, Butau said the 
Mujuru faction had decided to undermine his supporters, 
chiefly Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, ZANU-PF Commissar 
Elliot Manyika, Security Minister Didymus Mutasa, and Deputy 
Youth Minister Saviour Kasukuwere.  Noting that the on-going 
economic crisis was crippling the pocketbooks of ruling party 
insiders, Butau contended that the only way to confront 
Mugabe's inner circle was on economic issues.  To that end, 
Butau ) who also chairs Parliament's Budget Committee ) 
noted that his Committee had recently taken Gono to task on 
his failure to stabilize the economy.  Specifically, the 
faction wants to link its intra-party opponents to high-level 
corruption, which they could then take to the military and 
the party to convince those structures to rebuke Mugabe. 
While Mujuru retained broad support within the military, 
Butau stated that the military's professionalism ) which he 
ascribed to Mujuru's leadership ) prevented them from 
intervening without compelling reason. 
 
------------------------------ 
Asks US Support For Reformists 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) Butau asked poloff that the USG quietly support the 
reformist element of ZANU-PF in this battle.  While it was 
important to maintain the heat on Mugabe and his circle, 
Butau said US policy also had to cultivate contacts with 
Mugabe's intra-party opponents, and not just those outside 
the party.  Poloff acknowledged that ZANU-PF was not 
monolithic and noted that we continually sought more contact 
with reform-minded ruling party members.  Asked for specific 
recommendations on how the USG should proceed, Butau was 
initially at a loss but finally suggested that firm promises 
of international financial support would help the Mujuru 
faction erode Mugabe's support and ultimately usher in a 
reformist government.  Poloff replied that international 
financial assistance was predicated on the GOZ undertaking 
reforms, not the other way around. 
 
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Comment 
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¶7.  (C) Poloff's meeting with Butau, which the MP scheduled 
only hours before, smacked of desperation.  The Mujuru camp 
has done everything it could to gain control of the ruling 
party structures in Masvingo and Bulawayo, while forestalling 
Mugabe's full endorsement at Central Committee, but the 
status quo still favors Mugabe.  The meeting, which resembled 
more of a brainstorming session than a formal request for 
help, demonstrates that the Mujuru camp is running out of 
ideas and possible options.  While Butau's comments regarding 
Mujuru's commitment to reform were certainly intended to 
influence, he's right that the next few months will be key. 
Unless this camp gets a shot in the arm soon, we're likely 
looking at several more years of Mugabe. 
DELL