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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0341
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2101
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2134
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 2106
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0038
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1998
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1447
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 0013
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2045

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 000786 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/1/2017 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON ENRG EAID TI AF IR
SUBJECT: PERSIAN POWER: TAJIKISTAN'S DEVELOPING TIES WITH IRAN 
 
REF: A) 06 DUSHANBE 1434, B) DUSHANBE 703, C) 06 DUSHANBE 1977 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Tracey A. Jacobson, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy 
Dushanbe, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Tajikistan has characterized its ties with 
Iran as purely economic, but growing political, military and 
diplomatic relations indicate that more than investment and 
trade is bringing the two countries closer together.  In the 
last eighteen months, Tajik President Rahmon and Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad have made trips to each other's capitals 
and signed a raft of agreements and declarations ranging from 
education, science and culture to inter-parliamentary and 
defense cooperation. 
 
¶2.  (C) Rahmon's public rhetoric has always emphasized the 
shared linguistic and cultural bonds, but his private rhetoric 
lately has begun to include an element of political apology for 
his neighbor and cultural kin.  Iranian assistance has also 
trickled into impoverished rural areas, building schools and 
mosques in places where the government has provided little 
development.  Secular Tajiks may not be comfortable with Iranian 
religious dictatorship, and parts of Rahmon's government still 
resent the quiet support Iran gave to the Islamic-oriented 
opposition in the Tajik civil war ten years ago.   But although 
friendship with a country that supports religion-based 
insurrections in neighboring states is a dangerous game for 
Tajikistan, neither Rahmon nor Tajikistan can afford to say no 
to infrastructure development and investment.  In the short run, 
both countries stand to gain from closer relations:  Tajikistan 
needs the money, and Iran needs the friend.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Persian Shuttle Diplomacy 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) President Rahmon's May 7-10 visit to Iran was the latest 
in a series of meetings for the Persian-speaking leaders.  In 
January 2006, Rahmon went to Tehran, and in July 2006, 
Ahmadinejad and Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited Dushanbe 
for a tripartite meeting.  Although the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs characterized the May trip as a "working level visit" on 
ongoing investments (ref b), the Iranian news agencies used the 
opportunity to report that Tajikistan would "support Iran's 
call" to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization.  Rahmon called on the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei and proposed a Tajik-Iranian business forum, as well as 
a regional railroad project linking Tajikistan, Afghanistan and 
Iran.  While the visit broke little new ground, it further 
cemented a relationship expanding into many spheres. 
 
Economics 
 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Tajikistan increasingly looks to Iran for economic 
assistance, both as a trading partner and as an investor in key 
infrastructure projects.  According to official statistics, in 
2006, Tajikistan imported more than $34 million from Iran, 
mainly eggs, cooking oils, chocolate, other consumer goods and 
aluminum oxide, while it exported $76 million, primarily cotton 
and aluminum. 
 
¶5.  (C) In May, Iran announced intentions to invest in a Tajik 
vehicle production facility for Samand cars and construct a 
cement plant with a million ton capacity.  In addition, the 
Tajik aluminum company Talco will invest in several of Iran's 
seaports, providing Talco new outlets to the world market. 
Talco Chairman Sherali Kabirov told PolEcon Chief with great 
pride that his company intended to invest $66 million to rebuild 
a coke refinery in Iran -- Tajikistan's first ever foreign 
investment.  An Iranian company has begun construction of 
Dushanbe's tallest building, a 27-story "Tower of Peace" (reftel 
C). 
 
¶6.  (C) Iran is financing and building the Anzob tunnel ($39 
million, and from all accounts an engineering disaster months 
behind schedule); the 220 megawatt hydropower station 
Sangtuda-II ($220 million, and two years behind construction), 
and a tunnel at Chormazak ($55 million).  The Tajik government 
 
DUSHANBE 00000786  002 OF 004 
 
 
touts its "open door policy" as a guiding principle and welcomes 
all investors, but Iran, along with China and Russia, has been 
one of the few countries to sink major resources into 
Tajikistan's risky business environment. 
 
Politics 
 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (C) In response to every U.S. demarche regarding Iran's 
violation of U.N. resolutions and Iran's nuclear program, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs interlocutors are quick to tell 
EmbOffs that Tajikistan opposes all forms of nuclear development 
in the region.  However, they are equally quick to point out 
that Tajikistan will not openly oppose Iran on the issue, for 
fear of losing the much-needed infrastructure investment.  A 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs official recently admitted to EmbOff 
that Tajikistan could not object to Iran joining the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, should Iran pursue membership. 
 
¶8.  (C) However, during the May 23 visit of NATO Special 
Representative for Central Asia Robert Simmons, Rahmon made what 
Simmons characterized as "almost an apology" for Iran's civilian 
nuclear program and offered an explanation for Ahmadinejad's 
approach to the United Nations. 
 
¶9.  (C) Tajik officials across various ministries have proposed 
Tajikistan as a natural go-between for Iran and the United 
States to solve problems.  Since his re-election in November, 
Rahmon has been busy traveling around the Muslim world, not just 
to Iran, to project an image of Tajikistan as a regional player 
and to seek financing for infrastructure projects.  Iran views 
Tajikistan as a little brother in the relationship and would 
likely dismiss an intermediary role for Tajikistan in dealing 
with the United States or the United Nations on its nuclear 
program.  In turn, many Tajiks in the government still remember 
Iran's assistance to the opposition during the Civil War and 
fear any sort of religious resurgence in Tajikistan, which may 
limit the degree of engagement with Iran on political issues. 
 
Education and Culture 
 
------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) Both Iran and Tajikistan have played up the linguistic 
and cultural ties between their countries despite the fact that 
Iran is primarily Shia and Tajikistan Sunni.  Iran has increased 
its engagement in Tajikistan's educational sphere, planning an 
educational complex, providing up to 100 university slots for 
Tajik students to study in Iran, and offering Persian-language 
textbooks in Arabic and Cyrillic scripts.  (Note: Persian-Farsi, 
written with Arabic script, and Persian-Tajiki, written with 
Cyrillic, are mutually intelligible.  End Note.)  Due to the 
different alphabets, Tajik students and workers still turn more 
to Russia than Iran, but this could shift if Iran increases the 
number of scholarships and offers more instruction in Farsi in 
Dushanbe.  Many Tajiki language publications are consciously 
incorporating more Farsi and Arabic words. 
 
¶11.  (C) Iran maintains a cultural center in Dushanbe as well as 
a private secondary school that a few Tajik elites attend.  Iran 
is an important source of linguistically understandable pop 
culture as well.  A hugely popular Swedish-based Iranian pop 
star triggered a highly unusual public demonstration by 
disappointed youths when he postponed his concert last year. 
Iranian music and television are available through satellite 
television, and Iranian hits are all over Tajikistan's airwaves. 
 
Defense 
 
----------- 
 
¶12.  (C) The Tajiks and Iranians have danced around military 
cooperation, but activities and assistance have yet to produce 
any significant partnership.  In general, the Iranians are 
disappointed in the level of military cooperation and tend to 
dismiss the Tajiks' characterization of their military relations 
as cooperation.  The Russian-influenced Tajik Ministry of 
Defense remains wary of the influence of political Islam and 
therefore reluctant to fully engage the Iranian military. 
 
¶13.  (C) An Iranian Ministry of Defense delegation visited 
 
DUSHANBE 00000786  003 OF 004 
 
 
Tajikistan April 29-May 2 and although the two sides signed a 
document, the visit was more political than substantive in 
nature.  In addition to a dose of anti-U.S. rhetoric, the 
Iranians offered minor technical assistance including uniforms, 
small arms ammunition and radio repair.  Press reports mentioned 
that Iran has provided "over 6 million dollars" in military 
assistance to Tajikistan over the last 10 years.  This is a drop 
in the bucket compared to what other interested parties, 
including Russia, China and the United States, provide. 
 
¶14.  (C) The delegation cancelled a meeting with Tajik Foreign 
Minister Zarifi, a former Ambassador to the United States at the 
last minute, raising some speculation as to the real level of 
cooperation and goal of the mission.  The Iranian defense 
minister may have considered Zarifi too associated with the 
United States and therefore unworthy of meeting with the Iranian 
defense delegation.  On the whole, the visit indicated an 
Iranian preoccupation with U.S intentions in Tajikistan and 
further abroad. 
 
Religion and grassroots development 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶15.  (C) Much to the discomfort of Tajikistan's secular 
post-Soviet cadre, Iran has quietly been making an impact in 
rural areas, by donating money for mosques and schools.  The 
mosques are able to offer some short-term assistance for 
families needing food or assistance when the men are in Russia 
working.  We have anecdotal evidence that Iran funnels the money 
through local Islamic Renaissance Party chapters, which then use 
the money to build mosques and some schools.  Despite growing 
government efforts to control the construction and activities of 
these mosques in rural areas, more and more they are serving as 
community centers and providing social services. 
 
¶16.  (C) Nevertheless, recent Presidential moves banning the 
wearing of Iranian-style headscarves in schools and government 
offices provide evidence that secularism is still an important 
government policy.  The combination of heightened fears of 
religious extremism, government and local attitudes towards 
Islamic missionaries and Iran's overtures in the mid-late 1990s 
would make Tajikistan a difficult environment for Iranian 
religious influence to take root. 
 
 What does this all mean? 
 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶17.  (C) The trajectory appears to be upwards for Tajikistan and 
Iran.  The relationship is likely growing beyond the economic, 
which could mean a stronger Iranian influence on President 
Rahmon, particularly if Iran tried to leverage its substantial 
investments for political support on the world stage.  Adding 
Iran's well known anti-American rhetoric to the already dominant 
Russian propaganda means that the U.S. message could have a more 
limited impact.  The Tajik government is unlikely to embrace, or 
welcome, Iran's religious policy, but may try to ignore that 
aspect of Iran (as it sometimes does with U.S. messages on 
democracy and civil society) by concentrating on other areas of 
cooperation. 
 
¶18.  (C) Economically, the United States cannot compete with 
Iran's infrastructure investment, but we can use feasibility 
studies to define projects that might attract U.S. or other 
foreign investors.  We will continue to encourage a better 
business climate through assistance programs that aim for 
long-term stability and transparency for small and medium 
enterprises. 
 
¶19.  (C) Culturally, the growing influence of Iran makes 
bringing the Peace Corps to Tajikistan all the more essential. 
A volunteer teaching English in the same town as an 
Iranian-supported mosque would at the very least give Tajik 
citizens with limited access to outside media some exposure to 
our culture and values, while providing a desperately needed 
(and frequently requested) service. 
 
¶20.  (C) Politically, we will repeat our message to the Tajiks 
that supporting a country in flagrant contravention of UN 
resolutions and international opinion is a bad move, despite the 
economic incentives.  President Rahmon is a pragmatist, who 
 
DUSHANBE 00000786  004 OF 004 
 
 
carefully weighs his options but seems susceptible to strong 
rhetoric and international diplomacy.  A high-level visit to 
Tajikistan in August for the opening of the U.S.-funded bridge 
at Nizhniy Pyanj, just weeks before the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization Summit where Iran could make a play for full 
membership, will provide the ideal opportunity to open a 
dialogue with Rahmon on Iran. 
JACOBSON