VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDO #0577/01 1521005
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011005Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY DOHA
TO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0020
INFO RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0019
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1313
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6693

S E C R E T DOHA 000577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR AMBASSADOR SCHULTE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/30/2017 
TAGS: PREL KNNP UN IR QA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR GREGORY SCHULTE'S VISIT 
TO DOHA JUNE 3-5 
 
Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D. 
 
¶1. (C) Embassy Doha is pleased to welcome you to Qatar. This 
visit - your second - will mean a lot to the Qatari 
leadership. It will strengthen our cooperation on UN Security 
Council issues and help in our efforts to move Doha to take 
stronger positions on Iran and its nuclear activities, about 
which they have serious concerns. Qatar's relations with Iran 
are outwardly cordial but like other Arab Gulf states, Qatar 
is seriously concerned about the activities and intentions of 
its large neighbor across the waters. As you know, the 
Government of Qatar remains a key ally of the U.S. in the war 
on terror and has supported a significant U.S. military 
presence in the country since the beginning of Operations 
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. With Qatar's economy 
growing at a record pace thanks to both oil and gas 
production, the Amir is spearheading a program of political 
reform and economic development. Sheikha Mozah bint Nasser 
Al-Misnad, his consort, is making equally important strides 
in leading social cha 
nge. End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Qatar has adopted an increasingly assertive foreign 
policy not always in line with our own regional efforts and 
those of our other allies. Qatar's mediation between Fatah 
and Hamas on a Palestinian unity government, its continued 
relationship with Syrian president Bashar al-Asad, Hamas 
leader (and PA Prime Minister) Ismail Haniyah, and others, as 
well as Qatar's efforts to involve itself in the August 2006 
cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon, has annoyed many 
regional governments and often the U.S. Its relationship with 
Saudi Arabia is strained by anti-Saudi programming on Al 
Jazeera, a history of border issues, and Qatar's desire to 
emerge from the Kingdom's sphere of influence in the Gulf and 
be viewed as a progressive, outward-looking alternative to 
what they regard as Saudi Arabia's backwardness and 
provincialism. The result is a set of policies that 
antagonize Riyadh. 
 
---- 
Iran 
---- 
 
¶3. (C) At the bilateral Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) May 24, 
which was led on our side by Acting A/S Stephen Mull and on 
the Qatari side by Assistant Minister Mohamed al-Rumaihi, we 
raised the issue of Qatar's recent declaration that it would 
not serve as the base for any military operation against 
Iran. While acknowledging that the U.S. has no intention of 
launching military action against Iran at this time, we noted 
the tactical value of maintaining ambiguity around the 
question as a disincentive to Iran's aggressive posture in 
the region. Rumaihi accepted the point and said he would aim 
to steer his government away from similar declarations in the 
future. 
 
¶4. (C) Also at the GSD, we provided a detailed intelligence 
brief on Iran, including a threat assessment and an analysis 
of Iran's strategic vision. Rumaihi speculated upon three 
possible Iranian courses of action if cornered: First, Iran 
will try to stop oil and gas exports from the Gulf "in 
reaction to any measures," he said. "Iran has the upper hand 
in military, paramilitary, and terrorist actions against 
ships." Second, Iran will subject the region to political 
pressure for minority rights. "The region is sensitive to 
this," Rumaihi said, referring to local Shia populations. 
Third, Iran is trying to shape policy in the region, most 
visibly in Lebanon and Iraq. The Iranians seek regional 
power, recognition, and a role. Rumaihi said Iran's target 
was to affirm its influence by establishing a dialogue with 
the U.S. "Then they will have achieved their target." 
 
¶5. (C) Rumaihi said that Qatar aims to use consultation (such 
as the GSD) and diplomacy to prevent Iran from achieving a 
heightened regional role. "If they have relations with the 
superpower, they will have a free hand in the Gulf region," 
he asserted. On the Iran nuclear issue, Rumaihi said the U.S. 
"may have to use dissuasion" (i.e., military action). But he 
advised consulting with "regional powers" Turkey, Pakistan, 
and India to help "stabilize" Iran and its nuclear program. 
Acting A/S Mull replied, "We've sensed that Iran wants to use 
talks (on May 28) to become a regional player." 
¶6. (C) In private, Qatari officials express concern about the 
role of Iran in the region and its pursuit of nuclear weapons 
(which they believe is unstoppable). They agree with our 
analysis of Iran's revolutionary motivations and goals and 
note Iran's active support for subversive elements in 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, eastern Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Qatar 
had no objection to the stationing here of B1 bombers and 
Patriot missile batteries and they signed onto the 
Proliferation Security Initiative principles. 
 
¶7. (C) Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim 
Al Thani (HBJ) has stated that Qatar will not participate in 
any attack on Iran - a formulation that appears to be 
purposely ambiguous. At no time, however, have the Amir or 
Sheikh Tamim explicitly warned the U.S. against using Al 
Udeid in any direct conflict with Iran. But Qatar is likely 
to continue trying to balance its U.S. military cooperation 
its ultimate strategic defense with diplomatic efforts that 
seek to avoid antagonizing Iran. Thus, despite its wariness 
of Iran, Qatar has sought to keep lines of communication 
open. Qatar is uncomfortable with having to say or do 
anything publicly that might be seen as antagonizing Iran. 
The two countries share the largest non-associated gas field 
in the world and the source of much of Qatar's future 
prosperity. 
 
---- 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶8. (S) Qatar has been a pillar of support for our efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. We continue to fly unimpeded combat 
missions out of Al Udeid Air Base. The Amir shares our view 
that restoration of order and a successful democratic 
transition are of paramount importance not only to Iraq but 
to the region. However, there is some feeling that Qatar's 
efforts over the past three years are not fully appreciated 
in Washington, and this may drive Qatar's resistance to 
follow through on some of our priorities for Iraq, including 
comprehensive debt forgiveness. While HBJ has expressed 
concerns about civil war in Iraq, he has also stated publicly 
that the coalition needs to stay in the country to establish 
wider security. The GOQ also points to the importance of 
establishing a power structure in Baghdad that is fully 
inclusive of the Sunni bloc. The GOQ is not prepared to open 
an embassy in Baghdad until the security situation improves 
dramatically. 
 
------------------- 
UN SECURITY COUNCIL 
------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) The Qataris have not always behaved responsibly on the 
UN Security Council. Under HBJ, Qatar has staked out an 
independent path on Iran and Syria, which has had troublesome 
consequences on the Council. (They, like the U.S., look 
forward to the end of their term this December.) Qatar sees 
itself as holding the Arab "seat," and it sometimes gives 
interests of this region a priority over global security 
issues. On Iran's nuclear program, this approach resulted in 
a 14 to 1 consensus-breaking UN Security Council vote on 
Resolution 1696 in July. However, since then, Qatar has been 
part of two unanimous votes, UNSCR 1736 and UNSCR 1747, to 
impose sanctions on Iran's nuclear program. On several 
occasions, Qatar has voted against our wishes (and often 
against the broad international consensus) on issues such as 
Sudan and Burma. 
 
--------------- 
Hariri Tribunal 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C) The GOQ found itself in the spotlight on the Hariri 
Tribunal vote in the UN Security Council. It abstained May 
30, arguing that Lebanese groups needed to agree internally 
first. At the GSD, Rumaihi said his government was concerned 
that enacting such a resolution would be destabilizing within 
Lebanon. While this position appears to be based on 
principle, Qatar's public ties with the Syrian leadership and 
its desire to counter Saudi diplomacy (which supports the 
Tribunal) were also major factors in Qatari decision-making. 
 
---------- 
AL JAZEERA 
---------- 
 
¶11. (C) Though their coverage of Qatar itself is minimal, Al 
Jazeera is by far Qatar's - and the region's - most prominent 
media outlet and the bane of many governments in the region. 
With an Arabic-speaking audience of around 50 million 
viewers, Al Jazeera is now ten years old. In November it 
launched an English-language edition with a potential 
audience of 70 million and ambitions to compete with the 
major U.S. and British satellite networks worldwide. 
 
¶12. (U) Since early last year, the USG has seen a bumpy 
downward trend in inflammatory anti-Western bias and 
inaccuracy in Al Jazeera's content. Al Jazeera has increased 
its use of U.S. government sources, limited its use of 
inflammatory terminology, and devoted more time to stories of 
interest in the region other than the U.S. role in Iraq. 
However, Al Jazeera's track record remains far from 
acceptable. Unprofessional, biased, and inaccurate propaganda 
continues to appear on its newscasts, talk shows, and 
website. The USG objected to Al Jazeera's practice of airing 
terrorist-provided video tapes, though the terrorists 
increasingly prefer to use the internet to release these 
videos. 
 
¶13. (C) DIA began monitoring the channel's compliance with 
U.S.-promoted journalistic standards in March 2005. Never 
higher than 20% (October 2005), these ratings have dropped to 
the low single-digits during the last quarter, and in DIA's 
most recent report (January 2007), Al Jazeera's "hostile" 
coverage was pegged at 1 percent. 
 
------------------------------ 
U.S.-QATARI MILITARY RELATIONS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶14. (C) At the strategic level, bilateral military relations 
between the U.S. and Qatar are excellent and the GOQ 
continues to demonstrate strong support for U.S. military 
operations. However, our mil-mil relationship has been 
plagued in recent months by problems on customs and 
immigration issues. The GOQ has imposed customs procedures 
not used in the past that have caused severe degradation in 
CENTCOM's operational readiness. 
 
¶15. (S) Currently Qatar hosts approximately 9,000 U.S. forces 
based at Camp As-Sayliyah and Al-Udeid Air Base. Some 100 
U.S. and Coalition fighter and support aircraft operate from 
Al Udeid Air Base, making the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing 
the largest in the USCENTCOM AOR. In addition to the 
USCENTCOM Forward Headquarters at Camp As-Sayliyah, Qatar 
also hosts the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air 
Base for theater-wide command and control. Al Udeid Air Base 
itself continues to undergo a surge of both GOQ and U.S. 
funded construction to support U.S. operational and 
logistical requirements. 
 
---------------- 
POLITICAL REFORM 
---------------- 
 
¶16. (U) Qatar's own program of reform, launched by the Amir 
after he assumed power in 1995, could take a significant step 
forward when the government eventually holds first-time 
elections for its national legislature. Qatar has gone slow, 
seeking to establish an institution that reflects local 
social and political norms. The current sticking points are 
who will be able to vote (likely a fraction of Qatar's 
186,000 citizens) and who may stand for office. Qatari women 
have had the right to vote since the first election took 
place in the country in 1999, for the Central Municipal 
Council. Elections for the country's third municipal council 
took place April 1, and a woman was elected with the highest 
number of votes in any district. 
 
------- 
ECONOMY 
------- 
 
¶17. (U) At USD 61,540, Qatar's per capita income is ranked 
fifth in the world (and ahead of the U.S.). The country's 
vast wealth is a result of the successful development of its 
natural gas resources: Qatar is now the world's largest 
exporter of LNG. The country has plans for even greater 
expansion over the next five years, during which time exports 
will more than double. Qatar Petroleum is maximizing use of 
Qatar's natural resources to diversify the economy and 
provide business and employment opportunities to Qataris. 
Qatar is friendly to U.S. energy companies: Since 1999, there 
has been USD 60 billion in foreign investment in Qatar's 
energy sector with the majority about USD 40 billion coming 
from the U.S. firms, including Exxon Mobil, Conoco Phillips, 
Chevron, Anadarko, and Occidental. Qatar plans to invest USD 
70 billion in the natural gas sector over the next seven 
years, with LNG exports to the U.S. beginning in 2009 and 
amounting to one-third of our LNG needs. 
 
¶18. (U) The GOQ estimates Qatar's oil reserves at 27 billion 
barrels. Qatar's daily average production is currently 
estimated to be 806,000 barrels per day; at current 
production rates, oil reserves are expected to last 20 to 60 
years, depending on estimates. Qatar's goal is to increase 
overall production capacity to over one million bpd by 2006. 
Occidental and Anadarko are the two U.S. companies operating 
in this sector. 
 
-------------------- 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
-------------------- 
 
¶19. (U) Qatar signed a Trade and Investment Framework 
agreement with the U.S. in March 2004, but progress toward a 
Free Trade Agreement has stalled, and the TIFA Council has 
not met since its inception. Achieving a FTA will require 
Qatar to remove such obstacles as mandatory majority Qatari 
ownership of most businesses, the government telecom 
monopoly, restrictions on foreign investment in the financial 
services sector, labor issues, and transparency in government 
procurement. 
 
--------- 
EDUCATION 
--------- 
 
¶20. (U) Qatar's commitment to modernize its educational 
system is exemplified by Education City, a 2500-acre campus 
on the outskirts of Doha. Managed by Qatar Foundation, the 
umbrella organization chaired by Sheikha Mozah, Education 
City is home to five U.S. college branch campuses, with some 
800 students currently enrolled. The majority (roughly 60%) 
are Qatari; others come from around the region and some from 
further beyond, including Bosnia and the U.S. About 
two-thirds of the students are women, since the Education 
City campuses allow them to live at home with their families. 
 
¶21. (U) Five U.S. branch campuses are currently represented 
at Education City: Virginia Commonwealth University (fashion 
design, interior design, graphic design); Weill Cornell 
Medical College (medicine); Carnegie-Mellon University 
(business, computer science); Texas A&M University 
(engineering); and Georgetown University's School of Foreign 
Service. Northwestern's Medill School of Journalism is 
expected to open in the fall. The National Defense University 
is considering locating a branch of its Near East-South Asia 
(NESA) Center in Doha. While far short of Sheikha Mozah's 
wish for a branch of West Point, "NESA Forward" would 
represent a step in the direction she wants Arab militaries 
to go. 
UNTERMEYER