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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000789 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2017 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PHUM MOPS CE
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA: CONSULTATIONS ON DEVOLUTION PROPOSAL 
START IN EARNEST 
 
REF: A) COLOMBO 747 B) COLOMBO 705 C) COLOMBO 661 D) 
 
     COLOMBO 643 E) COLOMBO 629 (AND PREVIOUS) 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR ROBERT O. BLAKE, JR.  REASONS: 1.4 (B, D) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY: All-Party Representative Committee (APRC) 
chair Vitharana told Ambassador that discussions on 
devolution were proceeding constructively, and should be 
finished within two months, or by the end of July.  He agreed 
with Ambassador's assessment that President Rajapaksa was 
prepared to be flexible and move in the direction of the 
consensus within the committee for a stronger power-sharing 
proposal based on the province as the unit of devolution. 
Vitharana said he had adopted a strategy designed to avoid 
getting bogged down in up-or-down votes on particular 
passages of text in order to maintain a collegial atmosphere. 
 He was confident that his own draft would remain the basis 
for the final product.  He reported that the Committee had 
agreed that the consensus required for the final document had 
to include the two largest parties, the President's Sri 
Lankan Freedom Party, the main opposition United National 
party, as well as a plurality of the other parties 
represented on the Committee.  Other groups' proposals could 
be considered, but they would not have regular representation 
on the Committee ) or a vote on the final outcome.  Embassy 
believes that progress on the devolution proposal will depend 
on the cooperation of the UNP, which has adopted a much more 
confrontational posture vis-a-vis the government on all 
issues, and the extent to which the President himself is 
willing to embrace and push for a proposal that meets Tamil 
needs.  Both of these are open to question.  The debate 
within the APRC on the unit of devolution early in the APRC 
process will be an important indicator.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador and Pol Chief met Science and Technology 
Minister Tissa Vitharana on May 30 to discuss progress toward 
a consensus in Parliament on a devolution proposal. 
Ambassador noted that various political parties and groups, 
including the UNP "crossover" ministers in the government 
(ref a) had submitted several new proposals to the All Party 
Representative Committee (APRC), which Vitharana chairs. 
Ambassador also told Vitharana that President Rajapaksa had 
signaled to A/S for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher on 
May 10 his willingness to be flexible in negotiating with Sri 
Lanka's other political parties on the devolution package. 
 
APRC CHAIR CONFIDENT ABOUT PROCESS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Vitharana reported that the APRC had held a meeting 
on May 29 to discuss the way forward on devolution now that 
all proposals had been received.  The atmosphere, he said, 
was cordial, cooperative and constructive, and devoid of 
political posturing.  13 political parties had participated 
in the meeting.  Only the Sinhalese chauvinist JVP continued 
to boycott the sessions, he added.  Papers by other groups 
that do not have the status of parties, including the UNP 
"crossovers" and the Karuna group, had been distributed for 
discussion, but these groups had not been invited to 
participate as voting members of the APRC, he noted. 
 
¶4.  (C) Vitharana told us that the APRC had agreed on 
procedures for continuing the discussions.  All had accepted 
his earlier "compromise" draft as the basis for moving 
forward, he assured us.  This included the President's Sri 
Lankan Freedom Party.  They had also agreed on a working 
definition of consensus, Vitharana added.  This went somewhat 
beyond his concept of a "minimal consensus" of just the UNP 
and SLFP.  "A majority of the minority" would also have to 
endorse the final product of his committee.  In practice, he 
explained, this meant that at least five of the smaller 
parties represented on the APRC should agree to the final 
draft. 
 
 
COLOMBO 00000789  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5.  (C) Vitharana said he hoped to continue to proceed in a 
non-confrontational way.  He said the APRC had agreed to a 
collegial debate on a few basic issues posed by his text, 
rather than focusing on the exact working of the text itself. 
 Vitharana would then make improvements to his text between 
sessions, trying to accommodate as many points of view as 
possible.  He would seek to avoid up-or-down votes on 
amendments or particular test passages, he said, as this 
could have a negative impact on the working atmosphere and 
set up politically motivated confrontations. 
 
¶6.  (C) Vitharana believed that the product of the APRC 
deliberations would likely be close to his draft and borrow 
heavily from the concepts put forward by then-President 
Chandrika Kumaratunga in 2000.  He conceded that the militant 
monk-based party JHU and perhaps one or two others would feel 
constrained to distance themselves from the outcome, but 
appeared to take that in stride.  If he felt any lack of 
confidence in the resilience of the process and likelihood of 
coming to a broadly-based consensus, he did not show it. 
 
INDIA CRITICAL OF PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Indian High Commission Charge d'Affaires Manickam 
told Ambassador on May 29 that India concurred  the Vitharana 
draft was a solid, positive contribution that could help get 
the peace process back on track.  He was dismissive of the 
SLFP proposal, however, saying it was "less than what the 
Tamils have now."  Manickam was particularly critical of the 
SLFP stipulation that any area could be the subject of a 
"national policy" which would pre-empt all regional 
initiatives.  The critical policy areas, he concluded, were 
land and agriculture, water use, law and order, and 
education, which should be reserved for the provinces. 
 
¶8.  (C) Manickam explained that the Indian government was 
upset that the Sri Lankan Supreme Court had effectively 
negated the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord by de-merging the North 
and East Provinces.  The SLFP proposal, with the district as 
the unit of devolution, would also practically nullify the 
13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, a corollary of 
the Indo-Lanka Accord, which foresaw the province as the 
basic unit of devolved power.  Manickam noted that the 2000 
proposals of President Kumaratunga's administration were the 
foundation on which later peace efforts had built.  He did 
not think that any proposal offering substantially less would 
be viable or attract significant Tamil support.  He praised 
Vitharana's efforts, saying his government hoped the 
President would allow a consensus to develop within the APRC 
to offer a reasonable power-sharing formula to the Tamil 
population. 
 
¶9.  (C) COMMENT: We are encouraged by Vitharana's show of 
quiet competence and persistence in shepherding the 
devolution proposal through a series of complex and shifting 
obstacles.  However, the APRC draft will simply be the first 
in a number of steps in endorsing a final proposal (reftels). 
 Our sense is that, for the moment at least, Vitharana has a 
mandate from President Rajapaksa to continue his work. 
Despite Vitharana's customary optimism, there remain 
significant challenges ahead.  The first is whether the UNP 
will participate constructively.  UNP leader Wickremesinghe 
has adopted a notably confrontational attitude with respect 
to all government initiatives and entertains hopes of 
bringing down the government.  His willingness to give the 
President ) and the country ) an APRC victory is in 
question.  The APRC will also require a more significant 
public embrace by the President than he has been willing to 
give so far, if the APRC is to produce a consensus along the 
lines advocated by Vitharana.  Vitharana's plan to have the 
APRC engage early on the crucial and divisive question of the 
unit of devolution will be an early indicator of UNP 
willingness to cooperate and the President's willingness to 
 
COLOMBO 00000789  003 OF 003 
 
 
engage personally.  Another key factor will be the extent to 
which the government will pursue its military efforts to 
weaken the LTTE.  A major offensive could prompt a 
significant LTTE counter-offensive that would put APRC 
deliberations in jeopardy.  The Mission will monitor these 
possibilities closely and seek Washington intervention as 
appropriate. 
 
BLAKE